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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines Australia’s policies towards the development of the International 
Bill of Rights (1946-1966). It considers Australia’s approach both to the substance of 
human rights guarantees and to the modes of international and domestic implementation 
for such rights. Prevailing impressionistic accounts have assumed either that Australia 
consistently supported a commonly understood set of human rights standards, or voiced 
reservations motivated by Cold War ideologically related concerns. The picture that 
emerges from this thesis is of a more complex relationship between decision makers’ 
pre-existing philosophies, domestic pressures and policy. The dominant pattem noted is 
Australia’s progressive movement away from many of the tenets of the modem ‘human 
rights lexicon’. Under the leadership of Dr HV Evatt, Australia gave strong support to 
the equal recognition of all forms of rights and envisaged extensive forms of State and 
international implementation. When Liberal Ministers for External Affairs, PC Spender 
and RG Casey gained power, and as policy making power was devolved to the 
bureaucratic level, Australia moved towards triumphing ‘civil liberties’ as archetypal 
human rights. Support was forthcoming for only limited State and international society 
involvement. A sub-text throughout the negotiations were Australia’s efforts to 
accommodate sensitive domestic policies concerning, migrants, Aboriginal persons and 
indigenous inhabitants of Australia’s external territories and women. Although 
Australia has since ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, by highlighting 
the deep-seated philosophical differences concerning the scope of human rights, this 
thesis points to the likelihood of such variations continuing to influence the perceived 
implications of Australia’s international human rights obligations.
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INTRODUCTION
On 10 December 1948, Dr HV Evatt, then Australian Minister of External Affairs and
President of the United Nations’ General Assembly, presided over the General
Assembly’s adoption of the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights (UDHR).1 As the
cameras of the international media rolled, Dr Evatt spoke dramatically of the
importance of the UDHR as a ‘step forward in a great evolutionary process’:
It was the first occasion on which the organised community of nations had made a 
declaration of human rights and fundamental freedoms. That document was backed by 
the authority of the body of opinion of the United Nations as a whole and millions of 
people, men, women and children all over the world, would turn to it for help, guidance 
and inspiration.2
With its tone of triumphalism and idealism, Dr Evatt’s statement has been adopted by 
Australian human rights lawyers as Australia’s ‘first step in the [human rights] 
journey’. Yet, the picture we have of this journey is far from complete. Despite having 
attracted the interest of contemporary Australian academics,4 the details of Australia’s 
legal policies during the negotiations of the International Bill of Rights (1946-1966)5 
have become obscured by the passage of time and academic neglect. This thesis seeks 
to reclaim this early period of Australia’s human rights policy. By highlighting the 
complexities and divergences within the rich tapestry of Australia’s formative human 
rights policy, it draws attention to the ongoing need to consider the role of subjective, 
contextualised features in critiquing Australia’s implementation of human rights 
standards.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by GA Resolution 217A(III), 10 December 1948, 
3(1) UN GAOR, UN Doc A/811, 71.
UN GAOR, 183rd Plenary Meeting, 10 December 1948, 934, as quoted in N Harper, D Sissons, 
Australia and the United Nations, Manhattan Publishing Company, New York, 1959, 255. The 
statement is also quoted (though with varied tenses) in a Department of External Affairs (‘DEA’) 
internal memorandum entitled ‘International Instruments on Human Rights’, circa 1952, in NAA A 
1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 11.
N O’Neill, ‘A Never Ending Journey? A History of Human Rights in Australia’ in Redfem Legal 
Centre (ed), Human Rights: the Australian Debate, Redfem Legal Centre Publishing, Sydney, 
1987,7.
See G Sawer, ‘The United Nations’ in G Greenwood and N Harper (eds), Australia in World Affairs, 
1950-1955, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1957 and his subsequent entries in the volumes covering 1955- 
1960, and 1960-1965. See too N Harper, D Sissons, op cit.
The International Bill of Rights is the term commonly used to describe the UDHR, ICCPR and 
ICESCR. A copy of each instrument can be found in Appendix 2. As discussed below, Australia 
participated in all stages of the international negotiation of the International Bill of Rights.
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With few exceptions, texts dealing with Australia and human rights focus upon 
Australia’s relationship with international human rights following its ratification of the 
twin human rights Covenants, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR)6 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR)7 in 1976 and 1980 respectively.8 Scholars quote provisions of the 
international instruments, advance their understandings of the objective meanings of the 
provisions of such instruments and evaluate Australia’s behaviour accordingly. In 
exploring the interpretation of clauses, the general drafting history of the clauses may be 
considered together with the jurisprudence emanating from international human rights 
bodies and other commentators. Whether Australia supported an individual clause as 
drafted or evinced a particular understanding of the clauses is not noted. This author is 
no exception.9
Even where historical references are inserted into the ‘background’ section of 
contemporary analyses, the references are brief and impressionistic. Most take the form 
of variants on two themes, both of which serve to reinforce a narrative of Australia’s 
‘natural’, inevitable acceptance of universal human rights standards.
The first historical theme, one that features prominently in official statements, is that of 
Australia’s continuous, bipartisan support for international human rights. On the 
occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the UDHR in 1998, for instance, the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade produced a fact sheet outlining Australia’s relationship with 
international human rights. It cited Australia’s foundational work with the United
6
7
8
9
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature on 16 
December 1966, entered into force generally 23 March 1976, ATS 1976 No 5.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature on 16 December 1966, 
entered into force generally 3 March 1976, ATS 1980 No 23.
Peter Bailey has dealt with the period before ratification in tracing the Commonwealth’s lack of  
legislative power to enforce human rights: P Bailey, Human Rights: Australia in an International 
Context, Butterworths, Sydney, 1990, Chapter 5. For examples of the more common ratification 
starting point: see the studies in D Kinley (ed), Human Rights in Australian Law, Federation Press, 
Sydney, 1998; R Piotrowicz, S Kaye, Human Rights in International and Australian Law, 
Butterworths, Sydney, 2000.
See A Devereux, ‘Australia and the Right to Adequate Housing’ (1991) 20 Federal Law Review 
223.
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Nations Commission on Human Rights as evidence for the Australian government’s 
longstanding commitment to human rights.10 Similarly, Dr Stuart Harris, as Secretary 
of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 1987 emphasised the bipartisan 
nature of the Australian government’s support for international human rights.* 11 Each 
year on International Human Rights Day, Australian politicians join in support for a 
Resolution lauding the anniversary of the UDHR and affirm their ongoing support for 
human rights.12 This ‘heritage’ view of Australia’s engagement with international 
human rights has been fostered by academics’ invocation of Evatt’s involvement in the 
UDHR as the major ‘pre-ratification’ historical event of significance in Australia’s 
international human rights past. Such references have served to entrench an image that 
current Australian governments are carrying on an unbroken tradition of support for 
human rights principles.
The second historical narrative is of more general application. It concerns the role of 
the Cold War in the negotiations of the International Bill of Rights. In many 
international human rights texts used in Australia, the Cold War is depicted as having 
prolonged negotiations and interrupted or limited Western States’ enthusiasm for 
economic and social rights.13 Australia is implicitly classed as a Western State whose 
fear of communism led it to resist the equal recognition of economic and social rights. 
Within Australian literature, the Cold War has been used to explain Australia’s selective 
enthusiasm for United Nations intervention in cases of alleged human rights 
violations.14 While the Cold War theory hints at some level of change within Australian 
international human rights policy, by casting responsibility for this change on an
‘Australia and Universal Human Rights’, Department o f Foreign Affairs and Trade Fact Sheet No 
26, July 1998, 2.
11 S Harris, ‘Australia’s Foreign Policy and Human Rights’ (1987) 58 Australian Foreign Affairs 
Record 569, 569.
12 See for instance the bipartisan support given to the Resolution moved by the Prime Minister, J 
Howard, on the occasion o f the 50th Anniversary of the UDHR: Commonwealth o f Australia,
House o f Representatives, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 10 December 1998, 225.
13 See for instance MCR Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995, 8-9; M Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
CCPR Commentary, NP Engel, Strasbourg, 1993, xx. Whilst these texts do not deal specifically 
with Australia’s engagement with international human rights, they are both texts used by Australian 
practitioners and students and thus inform their understandings.
14 G Sawer, ‘The United Nations’ (1950-1955), op cit, 94.
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external event, the Cold War theory also minimises the significance of the change. It 
implies that had not the Cold War occurred, Australia’s support for the totality of the 
human rights regime may well have been complete and encourages the tantalising 
prospect that with the subsiding of East-West tensions, Australia’s ‘natural’ support for 
the equal recognition and enforcement of all human rights might return.
Both the total neglect of Australia’s history and the two styles of generalised references 
to Australia’s history identified above reinforce the belief that Australia’s act of 
ratifying the ICCPR and the ICESCR constituted acts of accepting human rights 
obligations whose meaning was (and remains) commonly understood by the Australian 
State and commentators alike. No attention is given to what obligations Australia 
considered itself as accepting. Neither is there any perceived need to consider whether 
Australia shared the philosophical outlooks towards human rights of other participants 
in the process or that of current commentators. Through their lack of attention to such 
detail, the impression is given that either Australia’s stance was unremarkably identical 
to others or that any ‘aberrant’ or non-conformist position was surrendered as of the 
date of accepting such commonly understood standards. Ultimately, this historiography 
serves to dissuade scholars from further investigation of Australia’s historical human 
rights by perpetuating the impression that Australia’s previous policies have little to 
offer ‘post-ratification’ practitioners.
Australian international human rights literature is by no means alone in reflecting such a 
dearth of historical information. The difficulties inherent in accessing relevant archival 
material no doubt play some role in contributing to this lacuna. However, two factors 
suggest the existence of a more fundamental unease with focusing on an individual 
State’s negotiating stance. First, even where historians and political scientists have 
carried out the base research, academic lawyers have made little use of such resources. 15
15 Note for instance, the infrequent references to works such as C Palley, The United Kingdom and 
Human Rights, Stevens, London, 1991; M Glen Johnson, ‘The Contributions of Eleanor and 
Franklin Roosevelt to the Development of International Protection for Human Rights’ (1987) 9 
Human Rights Quarterly 19; M Glen Johnson, ‘Historical Perspectives on Human Rights and 
United States Foreign Policy’ (1980) 2 Universal Human Rights 6.
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Secondly, within volumes tracing regional approaches to human rights, the tendency is 
to aggregate data from several countries, rather than provide segregated data from 
individual States.16 The explanation for this process of excluding or marginalising a 
State’s ‘pre-ratification’ history seems referable to the dominant constraining 
disciplinary and professional paradigms.
Certainly, the traditional view of the boundaries of international law does little to 
encourage retrospective investigation of a State’s approach to developing norms of 
international law. Often in the context of demarking their discipline from international 
relations or politics,17 international lawyers have tended to define international law as 
the study of global rules governing States.18 The task of international lawyers is 
regarded as researching, analysing, and interpreting the objective meaning of such 
norms and assessing the extent to which States’ behaviour complies with such norms. 
Practice of individual States is relevant to this task in so far as States develop these 
norms. Yet, once the norms have crystallised into treaty obligations or customary 
international law, past State practice is considered of marginal importance. It is the 
objectively interpreted ‘final product’ that forms the essence of international law. In 
order for the international rule of law to be respected, States must surrender attachment 
to subjective interpretation of norms in favour of the objectively understood, common 
intention. The Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties 1969,19 for instance, provides
Leben’s study o f European historic approaches to human rights provides a good example of this 
tendency. Despite drawing practically all his examples from French practice, his conclusions are 
framed in terms o f a European approach: see C Leben, ‘Is there a European Approach to Human 
Rights’ in P Alston (ed), The European Union and Human Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1999.
17 As to how international lawyers construct the boundaries o f their discipline, see D Kennedy, ‘A 
New Stream o f International Law Scholarship’ (1988) 7(1) Wisconsin International Law Journal 1; 
see too M Horwitz, ‘The Conservative Tradition in the Writing o f American Legal History’ (1973) 
American Journal of Legal History 275, 281.
18 One standard text, for instance, states: ‘there is common acceptance that international law is that law 
which governs relations between states, the basic units in the world political system during more 
than 300 years’: L Henkin, RC Pugh, O Schächter, H Smit, International Law: Cases and 
Materials, West Publishing, Minnesota, 1980, lvii. It should be noted that many international 
lawyers have been active in promoting a broader conception o f international law, in particular one 
that moves away from its traditional State centrism: see, for example, P Allot, Eunomia: new order 
for a new world, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990.
19 Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties, 1969, opened for signature 23 May 1969, entered into 
force generally 27 January 1980, ATS 1974 No 2.
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that treaty provisions are to be given their (universal) textual meaning viewed against 
the background of the object and purpose of the treaty (Article 31(1)). Statements made 
by State parties during the negotiations of a treaty (the travaux preparatoires) may only 
be investigated where the meaning of a clause is obscure or ambiguous,20 and 
practitioners are warned to approach the travaux with discretion ‘since its use may 
detract from the textual approach’.21 Historical research that illuminates the ‘common 
intention’ of States might well be encouraged, but analysis of a State’s individualised 
stance (other than in the particular area of establishing an individualised rule of 
customary international law) is regarded as o f little utility.
In the field o f international human rights law, the repudiation o f subjective approaches 
to understanding international law has been particularly pronounced. Commentators 
routinely celebrate the development of specifically global norms. Paul Seighart, for 
instance, explained the underlying premise o f his study of the international law of 
human rights as being:
that a distinction can and should be made between what various commentators believe 
human rights ought to be, and what international law now says they are.... The latter is 
more suitable for lawyers, using their particular skills in the interpretation of legal texts 
and the application of the results to particular cases.22
Similarly Philip Alston has stated that human rights are:
capable of partly transcending the institutions that gave birth to them, and those very 
same institutions (or their successors) which seek to exercise responsibility for their 
elaboration and interpretation.23
In the light o f fierce attacks from cultural relativists24 and critical legal scholars25 on the 
utility and legitimacy of international norms of human rights, many international human
20 Article 32, Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties.
21 I Brownlie, Principles o f Public International Law (4 th ed), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990, 
630.
22 P Seighart, The International Law o f Human Rights, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983, xx.
23 P Alston, ‘Introduction’ in P Alston (ed), Human Rights Law, Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1996, xvi-xvii.
24 Cultural relativists have attacked the universality of human rights standards on the basis that some 
human rights might be antithetical to some cultures or at least modified application in order to 
respect existing cultural imperatives: see A Pollis, P Schwab, ‘Human Rights: A Western 
Construct with Limited Applicability’, in A Pollis, P Schwab (eds), Human Rights: Cultural and 
Ideological Perspectives, Praeger, New York, 1979, 8-14; J Donnelly, ‘Human Rights and Human 
Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights’ (1982) 76 American 
Political Science Review 303.
25 Critical legal scholars have argued that rights language is inherently indeterminate and diverts 
attention away from the need for political change: see for instance, M Tushnet, ‘An Essay on 
Rights’ (1984) Texas Law Review 1363, 1364-1371; M Koskenniemi, ‘The Pull of the Mainstream’ 
(1990) 88 Michigan Law Review 1946.
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rights lawyers have been keen to defend the universal application and understanding of 
human rights guarantees.26 The fervour with which such defences have been advanced 
suggests that the debate evokes personal interests and allegiances of a deep-seated 
nature.
To use an allusion drawn from the theoretical work of David Kennedy, there is a sense 
in which international human rights law seems to have become a ‘proselytising faith’.
A State’s ratification of international human rights standards is rarely questioned but is 
welcomed as the moment of conversion to a common creed. In the case of States 
whose acceptance of the creed takes place Tater in life’ (such as the United States of 
America’s ratification of the ICCPR), there is particular celebration of the fact of 
conversion. Commentaries assume consensus as to the doctrines of the faith whilst 
allowing for some debate as to the interpretation of the creed. Analyses thus proceed on 
the basis of a shared ‘human rights lexicon’ that includes such features as the equality 
and interdependence of all forms of human rights, the unqualified right of all persons to 
enjoy human rights, the State’s positive role in ensuring the enjoyment of rights and the 
international community’s legitimate interest in scrutinising human rights practices. 
Whilst State interest, or the interests of privileged members of a State are identified as 
residual threats to a State’s implementation of its obligations,30 commentators look upon 
a State’s ratification of the human rights treaties as the harbinger of a new era for that 
State.
26 Y Ghai, ‘Human Rights and Governance: the Asia Debate’, (1994) 15 Australian Year Book o f  
International Law 1; P Williams, The Alchemy o f Race and Rights, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 1991, 151-3.
27 D Kennedy, ‘When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box’ (2000) 32 New York Journal o f  
International Law and Politics 355, 359.
28 Note also David Kennedy’s critique that international lawyers often regard the development of 
international law as a ‘good thing, both inevitable and worth working quite hard for against 
formidable odds’: D Kennedy, ‘The Disciplines of International Law and Policy’ (1999) 12(1) 
Leiden Journal o f International Law 9, 23.
29 Note for instance the minimal level of dissonance between authors of international human rights 
texts and views expressed by the international bodies such as the Human Rights Committee or the 
ICESCR Committee.
30 M Dixon, R McCorquodale, Cases and Materials on International Law (3rd ed), Blackstone Press 
Limited, Cambridge, 2000, 184.
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Against such a background, it is not surprising that existing studies of individual States’ 
‘pre-ratification’ human rights history have been largely excluded or marginalised from 
the mainstream literature. For international lawyers in general, the major task of 
analysis commences with the creation of international law norms, that is the point of 
ratification, at which subjective understandings become conceptually irrelevant. For 
those defending the merits of international human rights law, studies on individual State 
approaches might be regarded as a potential subversive distraction from the justification 
of common standards. At an extreme, it might be feared that considering in detail 
State’s ‘pre-ratification’ history might justify a continuing relativism of approach to the 
definition or implementation of human rights standards.
In addition to focusing attention on Australia’s ‘post-ratification’ human rights history, 
these paradigms have encouraged commentators to assume the existence of a common 
global language about human rights. The standards of the International Bill of Rights 
are quoted by government officials and community activists alike in the belief that the 
standards are understood by all to have the same content. Battlelines are drawn up on 
the basis that successive Australian governments understand and are committed to the 
shared objective meaning of international human rights standards. The major task is 
thus conceived as evaluating the practice of Australia against these fixed criteria and 
bringing the gaps between theory and practice to the attention of the government and 
the international community.
This thesis challenges these paradigms by revisiting Australia’s engagement with 
human rights during the negotiations of the International Bill of Rights (1946-1966). It 
looks to Australian attitudes towards the substance of rights to be included in the 
international instruments, as well as the respective roles of the individual, the State and 
the international community in realizing those rights. The two impressionistic accounts 
identified above, the ‘continuous support’ and ‘Cold War’ narratives, are used as 
counterpoints in evaluating the patterns revealed.
8
What emerges from this study is that Australian ‘international human rights policy’ 
during the 1946-1966 period varied considerably. Amidst the variations, one dominant 
pattern is evident. In the course of the negotiations, Australia progressively disengaged 
with many of the elements accepted as part of the ‘human rights lexicon’ of 2001. 
Initially Australia promoted the equality of all forms of rights and supported active roles 
for the State in guaranteeing rights and for the international community in investigating 
violations. In the 1950s and 1960s Australia’s policies dramatically reversed. Although 
the Cold W ar undermined faith in an ‘impartial’ international community, the dominant 
causal factors in producing this shift were domestic in nature. In Australia, human 
rights policy was determined by a succession of Ministers and bureaucrats. Rather than 
agreeing on the basic principles of human rights, these individuals brought to the task of 
policy-making distinct and divergent understandings of ‘human rights’, influenced by 
both party-political and non-partisan political perspectives. Deep-seated philosophical 
differences existed between Labor and Liberal Party Ministers as to, for instance, the 
role of the government in protecting the welfare of individuals. Similarly, actors 
differed in their assessment as to whether the individual or the State was the relevant 
reference point for the international negotiations. In terms of shaping the overall pattern 
of Australia’s policy, the most dramatic watershed undoubtedly occurred with the 
replacement of Dr Evatt, a Labor Party ‘internationalist’ by the Liberal Party’s PC 
Spender as Minister for External Affairs in 1949. Yet this thesis reveals also the 
influence of the bureaucratisation of policy development from 1952 onwards and the 
non-partisan political philosophies of both Ministerial and bureaucratic actors.
Not all policies, however, were subject to these domestic forces of change. Significant 
consensus surrounded the need to limit the universal and equal application of 
international human rights guarantees. Thus Australia consistently objected to the 
recognition of rights that would interfere with Australia’s race-based immigration and 
indigenous policies, and to a lesser extent, Australia’s entrenchment of sex-based 
discrimination. Whilst international pressure at times caused a softening of Australia’s 
public objections, the underlying ‘selective approach’ to human rights remained
9
influential. Thus, in revealing both the patterns of continuity and divergence in 
Australian policy, this thesis debunks the myth of Australia’s ‘natural’ and 
comprehensive acceptance of universal (commonly understood) international human 
rights guarantees.
It is not the contention of this thesis that the future trajectory of Australian responses to 
international human rights can be charted by reference to the ‘pre-ratification’ history 
alone. It would be inconsistent with this thesis’ findings to assume such a continuity of 
policy given likely changes to the identity of policy makers and their personal and 
political conceptions of human rights. In addition, in this ‘post-ratification’ era, one has 
to consider the impact of the expression of views concerning the objective meaning of 
clauses by bodies such as the United Nations Human Rights Committee, the ICESCR 
Committee or regional bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights in shaping 
governmental understandings of human rights obligations. Notwithstanding these 
variables, the findings of this thesis remain of significance to contemporary analysis.
Australia’s current human rights practice is properly considered not in isolation but as 
part of a continuum of Australia’s historic encounters with the international human 
rights system. Many of the factors responsible for producing variant policies towards 
human rights during the negotiations are capable of replication, such as the possession 
of Labor versus Liberal allegiances or adherence to individual centred versus State­
centric philosophic approaches.31 Even though the terms of the International Bill of 
Rights are fixed, the elasticity of much of the language of the UDHR and the human 
rights Covenants permits such varying approaches to flourish in the form of divergent 
understandings of the proper ‘objective textual’ meaning of the international 
obligations. In the current international human rights regime which relies so heavily on 
self-regulation by States, clear dialogue between governments and members of civil 
society, including academic commentators, is vital. This thesis suggests that rather than
31 As to the complex relationship between international law and State centrism, see A Cassese, 
International Law in a Divided World, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986.
being able to assume a common understanding of international human rights standards 
between State and non-State actors, participants in the dialogue need to address the 
likelihood that others may possess quite distinct and contrary understandings of the 
same standards. There is thus a need to avoid false complacency regarding the ‘shared 
goals’ of actors committed to ‘international human rights’. Hopefully this thesis will 
be of assistance in encouraging commentators to address directly the underlying 
assumptions that are likely to continue to play a role in Australia’s ongoing formulation 
of policy.
Methodology and Sources
The commencement date of 1946 of this thesis relates to the earliest discussions of the 
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in which the Commission on 
Human Rights was proposed. The Commission on Human Rights commenced the 
drafting of the International Bill of Rights in 1947. Whilst some use is made of material 
relating to discussions in the United Nations Conference on International Organisation 
held in San Francisco in 1945 (commonly known as the ‘San Francisco Conference’), 
this thesis does not address in any detail Australia’s stance on the inclusion of human 
rights guarantees within the United Nations Charter, a subject which has been the 
subject of some detailed scrutiny by others.32 The end point of 1966 reflects the 
General Assembly’s adoption of the ICCPR and ICESCR and Australia’s signature of 
each Covenant.33
32 See eg WJ Hudson, Australia and the New World Order: Evatt at San Francisco -  1945, Australian 
Foreign Policy Papers, ANU, 1993; HV Evatt, The United Nations, Oxford University Press, 
Melbourne, 1948; P Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1980; 
LF Crisp, ‘The Australian Full Employment Pledge at San Francisco’, (1965) 19(1) Australian 
Outlook 18; JDE Plant, The Origins and Development of Australia’s Policy and Posture at the 
United Nations Conference on International Organisation, San Francisco, 1945, PhD Thesis, ANU, 
1967; P Hasluck, ‘Australia and the Formation of the United Nations’, (1954) XL (III) Royal 
Australian Historical Society Journal and Proceedings 133; N Greet, ‘Australian Policy Towards 
the Emergent United Nations Organisation 1944-45, The Role of Dr H V Evatt and his Department 
of External Affairs’, Honours Thesis, University of Adelaide, September 1990.
33 The act of signature has some importance in international law. From the time of signature, a State 
comes under an obligation to refrain from acts calculated to frustrate the objects of the treaty:
Article 18, Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties.
11
Confining the period of examination to 1966 rather than covering the entire period of 
Australia’s ‘pre-ratification’ history can be justified on several bases. By concentrating 
on the period of Australia’s participation in the formulation of standards, one is looking 
at the most formative years of policy development. Secondly, the period 1946-1966 
enjoys a certain histone coherence in domestic terms in terms of sharing what might be 
termed the ‘post World War II culture’, a period predating the significant upheaval of 
the Vietnam years.34 Even within this period, one has to take account of significant 
political changes -  with Labor and Liberal administrations, six Ministers for External 
Affairs and the impact of nascent social movements associated in particular with 
women’s liberation and indigenous rights. Thirdly, the Commonwealth Archives Act 
1988 gives researchers access only to materials more than 30 years old.35 Thus while 
most of the Commonwealth material relating to pre-1966 negotiations could be 
obtained, the publicly available documentation relating to the post-1966 discussions 
remains less substantial.
In looking at Australian policy, or the policy of the Australian State (terms that are used 
interchangeably in this thesis), this thesis focuses on policy authored by the federal 
government in the relevant periods. At times details of the contributions of the state 
governments36 are included as are details of submissions by members of ‘civil society’. 
However, this thesis does not purport to consider the response of the Australian State 
most broadly defined. Furthermore, when discussing Australia’s ‘human rights policy’, 
this thesis does not examine the domestic impact of Australia’s involvement in the 
international debate -  for example, whether domestic legislatures amended laws or 
pressure mounted for change to legal or administrative systems as a result of (any) 
increase in currency of the international human rights terminology.
34 On 29 April 1965, Prime Minister Menzies announced the Australian Government’s decision to 
commit troops to South Vietnam: see A Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1938- 
1965, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1968, 183. The years o f Australia’s involvement in 
the Vietnam witnessed considerable social upheaval and social mobilisation around issues o f  
indigenous rights, women’s rights and militarism.
35 Records created in the last thirty years are closed to the public, except in so far as they are released 
under an application of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth).
36 Note in this thesis, the term ‘State’ is used to refer to the nation-State, and ‘state’ to the constituent 
units within the nation-State.
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In unearthing the story of Australia’s international legal history, primary reliance has 
been placed on archival material held in the National Archives of Australia. In terms of 
the raw documentation available, the task was at times somewhat overwhelming. In 
addition to the reports and memoranda in files of the Department of External Affairs 
(the predecessor of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade who had primary 
policy carriage of Australia’s international human rights policy), there were numerous 
files created by the Attorney-General’s Department, the Prime Minister’s Department, 
and the Departments of Territories, Labour and National Service, Immigration, Health 
and the Office of Education. This material has been augmented by a study of the 
official pronouncements of Australian representatives at international forums including 
the Commission on Human Rights, the General Assembly and specialist General 
Assembly committees. The archival records of the United Nations Secretariat in New 
York and Geneva provided a valuable source of further information regarding the 
responses of the Australian government to complaints by individuals.
Useful background information was also obtained from an exploration of personal 
records and recollections of participants in the process of negotiations. A number of 
Australian bureaucrats involved in Australia’s developing policy were generous in 
providing their personal recollections by way of interview and correspondence. 
Interviewees included Dr John Burton, Ms Elizabeth Decolgnon (nee Warren), Mr 
Patrick Brazil, Professor Peter Bailey, and Sir Walter Crocker. Professor Ronald 
McDonald, who for a lengthy period was the Canadian representative on the 
Commission on Human Rights, and Professor Oscar Schächter, who had been a 
Director of Legal Affairs within the UN Secretariat, were also able to provide 
information on other delegations’ perceptions of Australian policy makers and 
Australian policy. Useful correspondence was conducted with Sir Arthur Tange and 
Gough Whitlam (concerning his father, HFE (Fred) Whitlam) . 37 Other publicly
37 Unfortunately, there is no public collection of HFE Whitlam’s papers.
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available information included the oral interviews and memoirs of participants. 
Fortunately, a number of participants in the policy development process left their papers 
to the National Library or the National Archives of Australia including Percy Spender, 
Richard Casey, Robert Menzies, Garfield Barwick, and Kenneth Bailey. The National 
Library has also a collection of interviews with some participants in the negotiations as 
does the United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library in New York. Use has also been 
made of the Plimsoll papers held by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and 
the Evatt Collection of the University of Adelaide.
Of lesser quantity, but nevertheless significant value, were the secondary reference 
materials relating to the negotiations of the International Bill of Rights. In the 
Australian context, there are the contemporary evaluations of policy provided by 
Geoffrey Sawer, Neville Harper and David Sissons.39 Excellent compilations of the 
travaux preparatoires from the ICCPR, the ICESCR and the UDHR40 have been used to 
place the Australian contribution in its wider context. There are of course also the 
general works on the human rights instruments that provided more limited assistance41 
and numerous works on Australian history.
Many of the direct Australian participants in the process were however circumspect on the subject 
of Australia’s stance during the international human rights negotiations. The negotiations of the 
International Bill of Rights are not mentioned in P Hasluck, Mucking About: An Autobiography, 
Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1977; RG Menzies, Afternoon Light: Some Memories o f  
Men and Events, Cassell, Melbourne, 1967; TB Millar, Australian Foreign Minister: The Diaries of  
RG Casey, 1951-60, Collins, London, 1972; P Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy: the ANZSUS 
Treaty and the Colombo Plan, Sydney University Press, Sydney 1969; G Barwick, A Radical Tory: 
Garfield Barwick’s Reflections and Recollections, Federation Press, Sydney, 1995. Of greater use 
were the diaries and memoirs of Professor John Humphrey, the Director, United Nations Division of 
Human Rights during much of the drafting period: JP Humphrey, Human Rights and the United 
Nations: A Great Adventure, Dobbs Ferry, New York 1984; AJ Hobbins (ed), On the Edge of  
Greatness: The Diaries of John Humphrey, vol 1, McGill University Library, Montreal, 1994.
39 G Sawer, op cit; N Harper, D Sissons, op cit.
40 MJ Bossuyt, Guide to the ‘Travaux Preparatoires’ o f the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1987; MCR Craven, op cit-, M Nowak, op cit; and J 
Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1999.
41 L Henkin, The International Bill o f Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1981; LB Sohn, T Buergenthal, International Protection of Human 
Rights, Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, 1973; P Alston, H Steiner, International Human 
Rights in Context: Law Politics, Morals, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996; P Seighart, op cit.
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As with any analysis based so heavily on archival material, there are inevitable 
limitations to the available documentation. Within the departmental files for instance, 
there is the somewhat prosaic difficulty of discerning the ‘final copy’ of a document or 
ascertaining whether a particular submission was ever lodged with its intended 
recipient. Some key documents are referred to, but elusive to discover. Officials varied 
in the extent to which they kept notes of proceedings and judgements have to be 
occasionally made as to whether later amendments to the record were motivated by 
external pressure, reconsideration or faulty transcriptions. It is clear that not all 
exchanges between officials, let alone Ministers and officials were recorded for 
perpetuity.42 Memoirs also have to be approached with caution given that recollections 
can vary according to personal persuasions as well as varying experiences.
Furthermore, both individuals and institutions such as public service departments may 
create and maintain steadfast mythologies that distort the record through, for instance 
embellishing perceived achievements or attempting to recreate history in later 
memorandums of accounts. As far as possible, this thesis limits reliance on subsequent 
accounts, preferring to draw conclusions from the remaining contemporary evidence.
Allowance also has to be made for the occasional discrepancies between United Nations 
official records and Australian departmental records. In most United Nations forums 
other than the General Assembly, the records kept of proceedings were summary rather 
than verbatim in form. Whilst delegations had the opportunity to comment on the 
accuracy of the summary record and in some cases to provide the Secretariat of the 
United Nations with preferred transcripts of their speeches, the form of the official 
record often varies considerably from the file copy of a statement. In the present study, 
priority has been given to the full statement appearing in the Australian file. The basis
42 The propensity o f Dr Evatt, Australia’s Minister for External Affairs during the first three years o f  
Australia’s involvement with the Commission on Human Rights, to avoid giving written directions 
has received particular mention by Paul Hasluck who served as a bureaucrat under Evatt and in later 
years was himself to become Minister for External Affairs: see P Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, op 
cit, 31. Whilst Hasluck attributes this propensity to Evatt’s desire not to be ‘hedged in’, Dr John 
Burton, Evatt’s personal secretary and one-time Secretary o f the Department o f External Affairs has 
suggested more charitably that Evatt’s tendency was to talk around a subject, giving bureaucrats the 
base reasoning from which they were expected to draw the proper conclusions: Interview with Dr 
John Burton, conducted by author, 1 September 1999, Canberra.
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for this preferment has been that the risk that the statement was not read out in full is 
outweighed by the fuller understanding of a delegate’s intention revealed in the full 
version of a speech. It will also be noted this thesis uses a modified form of referencing 
speeches in United Nations forum. The date cited in references is the date on which the 
meeting was held rather than the date the United Nations record was published.43 This 
permits greater clarity in analysing the development of Australian policy.
In recognition of the variety of subject matters encompassed within the International 
Bill of Rights, this thesis adopts a thematic approach. Within each Chapter, a 
chronological approach is used to explore the level of consistency or inconsistency in 
Australian policy. Reference is made to eras of policy development that broadly reflect 
stages of policy development. Yet, there is not necessarily an equal treatment of all 
periods. Indeed the earliest six years of the negotiations attract a disproportionate 
amount of attention in this study. This weighting reflects the significantly greater 
amount of policy consideration that occurred during these early years. Although 
international discussions continued in the 1953-1966 period, Australia’s policy on many 
topics had become fixed by 1952. General restatements of existing policy became a 
frequent feature of Australian Briefs and Australian contributions to debate. The 
advantage of presenting Australian policies over the entire negotiations, however, is that 
the longer time frame permits an evaluation of the extent to which external and internal 
factors influenced Australian policy.
In a study of such a limited size, it has not been possible to present Australia’s policy 
towards each clause of the International Bill of Rights. Instead, topics have been 
chosen so as to elucidate the major philosophical trends in Australian policy. The first 
four Chapters of this thesis deal with Australian policies with respect to the nature and 
content of human rights. Chapters 1 and 2 consider the detail of Australian policy 
towards economic and social rights and civil and political rights respectively. The fifth
43 In certain cases this has not been possible. To distinguish between the two cases, dates written in 
full (eg 8 November 1957) refer to the date of the meeting, whereas dates in abbreviated form (eg 
8/11/57) should be taken as referring to the date o f the publication of the record.
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orthodox category of rights, cultural rights, is dealt with in part as part of Chapter 3. 
Chapter 3 examines Australian policy on minority rights and the right to self- 
determination. Chapter 4 looks more broadly at the jurisprudential assumptions of 
Australian policy makers. Chapters 5,6 and 7 turn to Australian policies concerning the 
implementation of rights. Chapter 5 considers the topic of States’ obligations to 
implement human rights within their domestic systems while Chapter 6 deals with the 
topic of preferred models of international implementation of the twin Covenants. 
Chapter 7 presents an examination of Australia’s parallel policies on the international 
community’s involvement in scrutinising human rights outside the contexts of the 
covenants, bringing to the fore the debate over ‘domestic jurisdiction.’ The Conclusion 
highlights the ongoing significance of the thesis’ findings by drawing out some of the 
parallels between Australia’s ‘pre-ratification’ and ‘post-ratification’ attitudes towards 
international human rights. In order to appreciate the broader context in which these 
policies were being developed, this Introduction concludes with a brief overview of 
international and domestic context in which negotiations took place.
International and Domestic Developments 1946-1966
As scholars of the international human rights movement have documented, the idea of 
human rights germinated in religious and political treatises over several centuries.44 
However, it was not until after the establishment of the United Nations following World 
War Two that negotiations for the establishment of a code of international human rights 
commenced. In a reaction to the atrocities that occurred during the war and individual’s 
experiences of privation, oppression and terror, human rights were seen as a touchstone 
for guaranteeing a better future. The President of the United States, Franklin D 
Roosevelt, for instance, in his State of the Union Address on 6 January 1941, referred to
44 Scholars have traced early precedents of modern human rights ideals for instance in the writings of 
theologians like Thomas Aquinas and political theorists like Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Stuart 
Mill, and John Hobbes. Significance has also been attached to the constitutionalising of rights in the 
United States and France in the eighteenth century: see L Henkin, The Age of Rights, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1990, Introduction and Chapter 1; J Shestack, ‘The Jurisprudence of 
Human Rights’ in T Meron (ed), Human Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy Issues, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, 70.
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the ‘supremacy of human rights everywhere’. The four freedoms he identified, freedom 
of speech, freedom of belief, freedom from fear and freedom from want,45 were later 
incorporated in the Atlantic Charter between the United States and the United 
Kingdom.46
When international delegates met to negotiate the establishment of the United Nations, 
respect for human rights was regarded as an essential pre-requisite for long-lasting 
peace. At both the Dumbarton Oaks preparatory conference in Washington in 1944 and 
the United Nations Conference on International Organisation in San Francisco in 1945, 
attempts were made to have human rights obligations entrenched in the United Nations 
Charter.47 Majority support was forthcoming only for a more modest proposal to refer 
in general terms to States’ obligations to respect human rights 48 Thus Article 1(3) of 
the Charter stated that one of the purposes of the United Nations was to promote and 
encourage ‘respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion’. Article 55 imposed an obligation of 
the United Nations to promote ‘universal respect for, and observance of, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms’ whilst in Article 56, members of the United Nations 
pledged themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the United
45 As M Glen Johnson has pointed out, FD Roosevelt’s initial conception of ‘freedom from want’ was 
not related to economic rights for individuals but was described in free trade terms -  the ‘removal of 
certain barriers between nations, cultural in the first place arid commercial in the second place’: M 
Glen Johnson, ‘The Contributions of Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt to the Development of 
International Protection for Human Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 19, 21.
46 Evatt quoted with approval President Roosevelt’s ‘Four Freedoms’ speech and the Atlantic Charter 
is his first Ministerial speech: Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives, 
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Vol 169, 27 November 1941, 978.
47 Some of the earliest American drafts of the UN Charter incorporated a declaration of human rights 
whilst Panama, Chile, South Africa and Mexcio sponsored proposals during the San Francisco 
Conference to have a Bill of Rights included: see D McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee: Its 
Role in the Development on Civil and Political Rights, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991, 3-4; J P 
Humphrey, ‘The UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in E Luard (ed), The 
International Protection o f Human Rights, Thames and Hudson, London, 1967, 46; P Meyer, ‘The 
International Bill: A Brief History’ in P Williams (ed), The International Bill o f Human Rights, 
Entwhistle Books, California, 1981; J Huston, ‘Human Rights Enforcement Issues at the UN 
Conference on International Organization’ (1967) 53 Iowa Law Review 272.
48 Particular opposition to these proposals emanated from the British and Soviet delegations -  the 
former apparently concerned with the implications of such a document for British imperial power 
and the latter fearing that the United Nations would become a tool to protect fascism and interfere in 
the domestic jurisdiction of individual countries: See M Glen Johnson, ‘The Contributions of 
Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt to the Development of International Protection for Human Rights’ 
(1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 19, 24-5.
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Nations in pursuance of this purpose. An Economic and Social Council was 
established. One of its purposes was to make recommendations for the promotion of 
human rights49 and prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly 
on matters within its competence.50 The Economic and Social Council was also to 
establish a Commission for the promotion of human rights.51
In 1946, the Economic and Social Council duly established the Commission on Human 
Rights. The Commission’s specific terms of reference included submitting reports and 
proposals to the Council on the establishment of an international bill of rights. It was 
also mandated to make proposals concerning specialist conventions on civil liberties, 
the status of women, freedom of information and similar matters.52 The Commission 
on Human Rights commenced its first session in January 1947 with Australia as one of
STits foundational members.
Early sessions of the Commission on Human Rights were dominated by discussions on 
the best way of proceeding for the Commission on Human Rights. In particular there 
was disagreement as to whether efforts should be concentrated on drafting a non­
binding declaration or a binding covenant.54 After heated debate during 1947 and 1948, 
the Commission resolved to work concurrently on a declaration and a covenant with 
separate drafting groups for each. A third working group was also set up on the specific 
issue of implementation of rights. The draft UDHR was completed relatively quickly
49 Article 72, UN Charter.
50 Article 62(3), UN Charter.
51 Article 68, U N  Charter.
52 J Morsink, op cit, 13.
53 A nuclear preparatory committee which met in April and May 1946, determined that there should be 
an equitable geographical distribution amongst members o f the Commission. The first members of 
the Commission were: Australia, Belgium, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR), Chile, 
China, Egypt, France, India, Iran, Lebanon, Panama, Philippine Republic, United Kingdom, United 
States o f  America, Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), Uruguay and Yugoslavia: J 
Morsink, op cit, 4; JP Humphrey, Human Rights and the United Nations: A Great Adventure, 
Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1984, 17.
54 There was also significant disquiet about initial attempts to narrow those involved in the drafting 
process: J Morsink, op cit 5.
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and was transmitted to the Third Committee of the General Assembly55 in September 
1948. It was adopted by the General Assembly on 10 December 1948.
The negotiation of the binding instrument(s) on human rights took far longer. From 
1948 until 1952, debate raged about whether there should be one or two Covenants. In 
a process that is explained further in Chapter 1, the General Assembly ultimately 
resolved the question in favour of two Covenants: one to deal with civil and political 
rights, the other to deal with economic, social and cultural rights.56 The Commission on 
Human Rights completed its consideration of the Covenants at its 10th Session in 1954, 
at which stage it referred the draft ICCPR and ICESCR to the General Assembly. In 
forwarding on the completed drafts, the Commission on Human Rights was to describe 
the Covenants as representing ‘a broad compromise between differing political, 
economic and cultural opinions and, while not ideal, should be regarded as fairly 
satisfactory’ ,57 The Third Committee of the General Assembly took up the task of 
reviewing these draft covenants, a task that took some eleven years. On 16 December 
1966, the ICESCR, ICCPR, and Optional Protocol to the ICCPR were adopted by the 
General Assembly and opened for signature. Although it has been ranked as a ‘second- 
tier participant’ in drafting the UDHR by John Humphrey,58 Australia was a constant 
participant in negotiations for the International Bill of Rights. Australia was a member 
of the Commission on Human Rights during the key period 1947-1954 and was an 
active participant in debates in the Third Committee of the General Assembly.
The negotiations of the International Bill took place against a volatile international 
situation. From the infancy of the United Nations, there was tension between the 
United States and the Soviet Union (USSR) as to the international balance of power.
55 The Third Committee of the General Assembly is the Committee on Social and Humanitarian 
Affairs.
56 GA Resolution 453 (VI), 6 UN GAOR Resolutions Supp No 20, 36. Note though, each Covenant 
was to have a number of similar provisions -  including recognition of the equality of men and 
women and the right to self-determination and to provide for the application of human rights to 
colonial and dependent territories.
UN Doc A/2808, quoted in MCR Craven, op cit, 20.
58 J Morsink, op cit, 32.
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The Soviet Union at the San Francisco Conference, for instance, would not support 
expansive powers for the new international organisation, fearing that the powers of the 
United Nations would be marshalled against the Eastern bloc countries.59 In 1946, 
Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, announced that an Iron 
Curtain had descended across Europe.60 The intensity of the Cold War ebbed and 
flowed during the 1950s and 1960s. International relations commentators have 
suggested that after the Cuban missile crisis in 1963 the international community 
entered a period of ‘detente’. Tensions remained high such that participation in the 
Vietnam conflict was regarded in largely ideological terms. Negotiations of the 
Commission on Human Rights were not immune from these tensions. It was not 
uncommon for delegates, particularly those from the United States and the USSR, to 
question the commitment to human rights of their adversaries.61
A secondary force in international relations of the period was the effect of widespread 
decolonisation in the wake of World War Two. Former territories of the Netherlands 
and Belgium were given their independence in rapid succession. Pressure mounted on 
administering States like the United Kingdom and Australia to grant self-government 
and independence in relation to trust and non-self-governing territories. The most 
enthusiastic advocates of decolonisation and self-determination were States who had 
recently won their independence and whose entry into the United Nations dramatically 
shifted the balance of power.62 In the negotiations of the International Bill of Rights, 
the changed composition of the Third Committee of the General Assembly was 
reflected in the emphasis on matters of racial discrimination and the application of 
human rights to trust and non self-governing territories.
59 JP Humphrey, ‘The UN Charter and the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights’ in E Luard, op cit, 
46.
60 M Burgmann, ‘Hot and Cold: Dr Evatt and the Russians, 1945-1949’ in A Curthoys, J Merritt (eds), 
Australia’s First Cold War, 1945-1953: Society, Communism and Culture, Allen and Unwin, 
Sydney, 1984, 82.
61 See discussion, J Morsink, op cit, 95.
62 In 1955, for instance, 16 new members were admitted to the United Nations and a further 7 in the 
period 1956-1958. Most of these new members were newly independent colonies and formed an 
unaligned group commonly termed the ‘Afro-Asian’ bloc in Australian documentation: see D 
Lowe, ‘Australia at the United Nations in the 1950’s: The Paradox of Empire’ (1997) 51(2) 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 171, 173.
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Within Australia, there were also significant developments in the 1946-1966 period.
The earliest years of Australia’s post-war history were dominated by the Australian 
Labor Party’s efforts to re-establish Australia after the trauma of the war. The Labor 
Party, committed to democratic socialism, attempted to nationalise industries in order to 
better provide for the reconstruction. Although successful in creating a Commonwealth 
Bank and establishing central marketing boards for many primary industries, the Labor 
Party was thwarted in its more ambitious programmes, such as nationalising the 
banks.63 With the Liberal/Country Party electoral victory in 1949, Sir Robert Menzies 
commenced his 16-year term as Prime Minister. The popular image of this period was 
of stability and high employment, the years that would produce what are known today 
as the ‘baby boomers’. Anti-communist sentiment became more pronounced in the 
early 1950s,64 fostered in part by the commitment of the Liberal Party to root out both 
communism and socialism from Australia. Robert Menzies declared a war on 
communists, attempting to pass draconian legislation to ban the communist party.65 
Fear of invasion, racism and xenophobia combined to produce a fear of invasion from 
Australia’s Asian neighbours.66 A massive immigration campaign continued throughout 
the period in order to boost Australia’s defence capabilities and overcome labour 
shortages in key industries. The White Australia Policy67 instituted at the turn of the 
century was regarded as vital to maintain social cohesion in Australia. Assimilation of 
indigenous persons in Australia and in Australian external territories was also taken for 
granted as the most appropriate means of integrating potentially clashing cultures.
63 The Privy Council held that the Banking Act 1947 infringed the freedom o f interstate trade and 
commerce protected under s92 o f the Commonwealth Constitution.
64 See D Lowe, Menzies and the ‘Great World Struggle: Australia’s Cold War 1948-1954, University 
of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 1999; A Curthoys, J Merrit op cit, and A Curthoys, J Merrit 
(eds), Better Dead than Red, Allen and Unwin, Sydney 1986.
65 Menzies’ introduction of the Communist Party Bill 1950 is discussed further in Chapter 1. For an 
interesting study o f this saga, see F Cain, F Farrell, ‘Menzies war on the Communist Party, 1949- 
1951’, in A  Curthoys, J Merritt, Australia’s First Cold War, op cit, Chapter 5.
66 D Lowe, Menzies and the ‘Great World Struggle: Australia’s Cold War 1948-1954, op cit, 6, 7.
67 The White Australia Policy was a policy of restricting ‘non-White’ migration to Australia, 
particularly by excluding those from Asia and Africa. It is discussed in more detail in Chapters 2 
and 3.
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Change was also evident in the identity of those responsible for shaping Australian 
international human rights policies. At a political level, there were six Ministers for 
External Affairs68 bearing ultimate responsibility for Australia’s public stance: Dr 
( ‘D oc’) HV Evatt,69 Percy Spender,70 Richard Casey,71 Prime Minister Robert 
Menzies,72 Garfield Barwick73and Paul Hasluck.74 Fortunately, the lives of these 
Ministers have been well documented.75 Considered as a group, these political 
ministers have impressive legal credentials. Two members were either former or future 
members of the High Court (Evatt and Barwick). Another of the group became a 
member of the International Court of Justice (Spender). Evatt and Menzies, in 
particular were noted jurists and achieved recognition as talented public law barristers 
before entering politics.76 Evatt had the added distinction of being elected as President 
of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948.
Yet, not all these Ministers played an equal role in policy development. As later 
Chapters of this thesis will demonstrate, Evatt and Spender stand out as having been 
most active in shaping policy directions. Casey showed less initiative. His initial 
approach was to approve the continuation of Spender’s policy while urging delegations 
to avoid becoming internationally isolated. Within a year of Casey taking office in 
1951, the burden of policy development had shifted to the bureaucratic level. During
68 A Timeline showing the stages in the development of the International Bill of Rights and the periods 
in office of the Australian Ministers for External Affairs is included in Appendix 1.
69 Dr HV Evatt, Minister for External Affairs, October 1941 -  December 1949.
70 PC Spender, Minister for External Affairs, December 1949- April 1951. Spender continued to have 
some influence on policy development in his subsequent appointment as Ambassador to the United 
States. Note that a number of Australian State actors mentioned in this study including all the 
Liberal Ministers and senior public servants including KH Bailey, AS Watt, J Plimsoll, AH Tange 
received knighthoods either during the period of study or in later years. In order to focus on the 
individual’s contributions rather than their date of receipt of honours, this thesis has not used titles 
such as ‘Sir’ unless the individual received such honours before the commencement point of this 
thesis in 1946 or unless the relevant documents quoted refer to such titles.
71 RG Casey, Minister for External Affairs April 1951 -  February 1960.
72 RG Menzies, Minister for External Affairs, February 1960- December 1961.
73 G Barwick, Minister for External Affairs, December 1961 -  April 1964.
74 P Hasluck, Minister for External Affairs, April 1964 -  February 1969.
75 See fn 38 above.
76 As to Menzies’ career as a barrister (including his appearance in the Engineers case) see AW 
Martin, Robert Menzies: a life, vol 1: 1894-1943, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, Chapter 
2. As to Evatt’s early career, see, K Tennant, Evatt: Politics and Justice, Angus and Robertson, 
Sydney, 1972, Chapters 3,4.
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the subsequent Ministries of Menzies, Barwick and Hasluck, there was little attempt to 
reclaim the policy-making initiative. With the exception of high profile international 
issues such as racial discrimination and the administration of trust and non-self- 
governing territories, few Ministerial directives on policy development were issued. 
Instead, bureaucrats formulated policies and embodied them in Briefs that appear to 
have been given only cursory attention by Ministers. In part Ministerial disassociation 
from direct policy development may have resulted from the burgeoning size of the 
Department of External Affairs. Geoffrey Sawer noted that as the Department of 
External Affairs expanded Ministers were no longer able to take as personal an interest 
in policies administered by their Department.77 Yet given the speed with which 
Ministers intervened in relation to sensitive topics such as racial discrimination, the 
Ministerial neglect does seem to indicate a lack of political interest in the negotiations.
In order to reflect the dominant influences in Australian policy development, this thesis 
adopts the following categories: the ‘Evatt period’ (1946-1949), the ‘Spender period’ 
(1950-1951) and the ‘Casey and Bureaucratic period’ (1951-1966).
Two public servants emerge as having been particularly influential in the Bureaucratic 
phase of policy development: HFE (Fred) Whitlam and Kenneth Bailey. No biography 
of either has yet been published. Fred Whitlam (who may be best known to a modem 
Australian audience as the father of a former Australian Prime Minister, Gough 
Whitlam78) was initially Crown-Solicitor during the Evatt period. After his retirement, 
he was appointed as a consultant to represent Australia at the Commission on Human 
Rights for the years 1950-1954. Kenneth Bailey, often known as ‘Professor Bailey’ in 
recognition of his original career as a law academic at Melbourne University, was also 
brought into the Commonwealth public service at the behest of Evatt,79 but served under
77 G Sawer, ‘The United Nations’, in G Greenwood and N Harper, Australia in World Affairs, 1950- 
1955, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1957, 123. JDB Miller has provided statistics on the growth of the 
Department: in 1939, the Department of External Affairs had a staff of some 28 persons, including 
3 officers posted overseas. By 1957, the Department had 835 staff, including 509 persons overseas: 
JDB Miller, Australian Government and Politics: An Introductory Survey, Duckworth, London, 
1959,210.
78 See G Whitlam, Abiding Interests, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1997, 282.
79 Interview with Peter Bailey, conducted by author, 4 March 2001, Canberra.
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Labor and Liberal governments. He had a distinguished career as Secretary of the 
Attorney-General’s Department and Commonwealth Solicitor-General (1946-1964). A 
secondary tier of influential public servants included, in the earliest years, Colonel Roy 
Hodgson, Ralph Harry, Terence Glasheen, Alan Watt, Eric Heyward, and Alan Loomes, 
and in later years, Arthur Tange, Bill Doig, John Petherbridge, Trevor Pyman, James 
Plimsoll, Dr Anstey Wynes, Leslie Lyons and Patrick Brazil. Once again the calibre of 
intellect involved in developing process is remarkable. At least four of these persons 
either were at the time or went on to become Secretary of the Department of External 
Affairs.80 Numerous other prominent public servants are revealed as having played 
more minor roles.
Individual Chapters will bring to light the significant changes in outlook between many 
of these politicians and bureaucrats. Yet, this thesis does more than underline the roles 
of individuals in creating history. This thesis identifies the underlying variations in 
philosophic attitudes that shaped Australia’s dynamic human rights policy, variations 
that may well be replicated in the future. During the negotiations of the International 
Bill of Rights, the Israeli delegate warned that the generality of language adopted in the 
international instruments would open the way for conflicting interpretations.81 
Hopefully this thesis will add to the existing scholarship by highlighting the likelihood 
of unresolved philosophical approaches feeding into future Australian States’ 
interpretations of their international human rights obligations.
80
81
The four are : Colonel Roy Hodgson, Alan Watt, Arthur Tange and James Plimsoll. A fifth, Patrick 
Brazil, went on to become Secretary o f the Attorney-General’s Department.
UN Doc A/C.3/SR 728, quoted by MCR Craven, op cit, 25.
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Chapter 1
Economic and Social Rights
Introduction
This Chapter focuses on Australia’s response to the development o f economic and 
social rights in the International Bill of Rights.1 References to the ideological conflict 
that surrounded these rights abound in the international literature. Mathew Craven, for 
instance, in his work on the ICESCR, argues that the reason for the separation of 
economic, social and cultural rights and civil and political rights into two Covenants 
was the ‘ideological conflict between East and West pursued in the arena of human 
rights during the drafting of the Covenant.’ While the Eastern bloc is seen as having 
championed the cause of economic and social rights, Western States are viewed as 
having asserted the priority of civil and political rights ‘as being the foundation of 
liberty and democracy in the “free world’” .3 The criteria for membership of the Eastern 
and Western blocs are assumed rather than spelt out: Eastern bloc countries being those 
which supported revolutionary communism and Western countries being those 
committed to what Louis Henkin has termed ‘democratic-libertarian’ principles.4 Given 
Australia’s categorisation as a Western State on this analysis, the impression created by 
references such as Craven’s is that Australia was part of a group whose hostility to 
economic and social rights arose within the context o f the international tensions 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. An examination o f Australia’s stance
Although the ICESCR contains economic, social and cultural rights, much o f the debate during the 
negotiations centred around what were called economic and social rights. This terminology has thus 
been followed in this Chapter. Cultural rights are dealt with in part in Chapter 3.
MCR Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1995, 8-9.
Ibid, 9, citing H Gros Espiel, ‘The Evolving Concept o f Human Rights: Western, Socialist and 
Third World Approaches’ in B Ramcharan (ed), Human Rights Thirty Years After the Universal 
Declaration, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1979, 41; M Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, NP Engel, Strasbourg, 1993, xx.
L Henkin, The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1981, 10. Note Jack Donnelly’s purposive use of more refined 
categories within the Western group to highlight the differences between Western States -  in 
particular the differences between the United States and what are termed the ‘like-minded States: J 
Donnelly, International Human Rights, Westview Press, Boulder, 1993, 125-132.
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reveals a more complex, internally-focussed approach to economic and social rights by 
Australian policy makers.
Throughout the negotiations of the International Bill o f Rights, all Australian 
delegations proclaimed the importance of economic and social rights. This unanimity 
belied the extent o f differences of opinion as to the nature and status of such rights. 
During the immediate post-war years, under the leadership o f Dr HV Evatt, Australia 
evinced enthusiasm for international guarantees o f economic social rights that could be 
used in the domestic sphere to improve conditions for the ‘working man’. It was an 
enthusiasm fired by the Labor Party’s ease with government’s responsibility for the 
economic and social conditions of individuals’ lives. Once the Liberal-Country Party 
gained power in 1949 and PC (Percy) Spender took over as Minister for External 
Affairs, Australia’s policies altered. Self-actuating individuals became the model of 
desirable economic growth. Government involvement in matters of economic 
development was to be limited in general. Within the field of human rights, 
government assistance was appropriate where individuals had demonstrated their 
worthiness by fulfilling their duties to society. Following Spender’s departure from 
office in 1951, Richard Casey cemented Spender’s policies and permitted senior 
bureaucrats to develop a policy of stressing the aspirational nature o f economic and 
social rights. During the remainder o f the negotiations, Australian policy was to be a 
policy of containment -  whereby economic and social rights would have minimal 
impact on Australian domestic policies.
Not all aspects o f Australian policy were marked by divergence. Typically, however, 
consensus surrounded policies of resistance rather than policies o f support. Women’s 
economic rights, in particular, were marginalised and excluded from the serious 
consideration given to other rights. In both the areas of policy continuity and 
divergence, therefore, Australian attitudes towards economic and social rights reflect 
the influence o f deep-seated domestic political philosophies and prejudices. Whilst 
participants were aware of the Cold War and pressures to conform to the stance adopted
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by traditional allies such as the United Kingdom and the United States, Australian 
policy primarily reflected ideological and structural divisions within Australia.
In order to situate Australian policy within its international context, this Chapter 
commences with a brief overview of the international debate concerning economic and 
social rights. In the substantive discussion of Australian policy that follows, two sub- 
topics have been chosen for particular analysis: first, Australia’s attitude towards 
economic and social rights (in particular vis-ä-vis civil and political rights); and 
secondly, Australia’s contributions and responses to the content of economic and social 
rights.
Overview of the International Debate
Recent scholarship has unveiled the longstanding heritage of recognition o f economic 
and social rights.* 5 When the Commission on Human Rights drafted the UDHR, a 
significant number of its Articles embodied economic or social rights. The UDHR 
protected an individual’s rights to own property (Article 17), to work and reasonable 
conditions of work (Articles 23,24), to social security (Article 22), to an adequate 
standard of living (Article 25), to education (Article 27), as well as recognising an 
individual’s freedom of association (Article 20). Rather than having been urged upon a 
reluctant Commission on Human Rights by a particular State or States, the drafters of 
the UDHR seem to have considered it desirable that recognition be given to economic, 
social, cultural, civil and political rights.6 As Johannes Morsink has revealed, behind 
the fa<?ade of unanimity lay some concern that economic and social rights should be 
distinguished from civil and political rights. Nonetheless, in the context of a non­
binding Declaration, differing views on the status of economic and social rights could
See A Eide, C Krause, A Rosas, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, Martinus
Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1995, 27-28; C Leben, ‘Is there a European Approach to Human Rights’ in P
Alston (ed), The European Union and Human Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, 75.
6 For a detailed history o f the UDHR’s drafting, see: J Morsink, The Universal Declaration o f  Human
Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1999, 75.
J Morsink, ‘The Philosophy of the UDHR’ (1984) 6 Human Rights Quarterly 309, quoted in MCR 
Craven, op cit, 17, fti 87.
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be accommodated. Once the attention of the Commission moved to the preparation of a 
binding international Covenant, differences of opinion soon emerged as to the status 
and nature o f economic and social rights. Debate over this topic was to generate more 
passion than any other topic in the International Bill o f Rights, with the possible 
exception of the right to self-determination.
From 1949 until 1952, the issue of whether there should be one Covenant containing all 
forms of rights or a separation o f economic and social rights from civil and political
o
rights was unresolved. Those on the Working Group delegated the task of drafting the 
Covenant on Human Rights side-stepped the issue by focusing ‘for ease of drafting’, on 
the drafting o f civil and political rights.9 When the relative neglect of economic and 
social rights was raised in the plenary sessions of the Commission on Human Rights, no 
consensus could be reached. At the Fifth Session of the Commission on Human Rights 
in early 1950, the Commission resolved to limit the Covenant to civil and political 
rights with a view to adopting further Covenants on other rights at a later stage.10 
Opinions remained divided. The issue was agitated further in the subsequent session of 
the governing body of the Commission on Human Rights, the Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC). ECOSOC requested the General Assembly to make a policy 
decision on the issue of whether there should be one or two Covenants.* 11 After what 
Craven has termed ‘a long and acrimonious debate’,12 the General Assembly directed 
the Commission to draft a single Covenant.13 In so doing, the General Assembly 
affirmed the interconnectedness and interdependency o f all rights.14 The Commission 
on Human Rights duly drafted some fourteen substantive articles, but cordoned off
8
9
10 
11 
12
13
14
For an account of the general debate, see MCR Craven, op cit, 18-20; S Hoare ‘The United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights’ in E Luard, The International Protection o f  Human Rights, Thames 
and Hudson, London, 1967.
In 1950, for instance, the draft Covenant embodied only civil and political rights. Draft economic 
and social rights were sent to States as ‘proposed additional articles’: MCR Craven, op cit, 18
11 UN ESCOR Supp (No 5) 1950; UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 377-9.
ECOSOC Resolution 303 I (XI), 9 August 1950, 11 UN ESCOR Resolutions Supp No 1, 29 (1950). 
MCR Craven, op cit, 18.
GA Resolution 421(V), 4 December 1950; 5 UN GAOR Resolutions Supp No 20, 42 (1950).
Ibid.
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these rights in a separate section of the draft Covenant and foreshadowed the 
application of a particularised obligations clause.15
Given the intransigence of the Commission on Human Rights and continued pressure 
for two Covenants, the ECOSOC referred the issue back to the General Assembly with 
a request for reconsideration.16 After an extensive debate in the Third Committee o f the 
General Assembly, the Third Committee reached the conclusion that the Commission 
on Human Rights should draft two Covenants.17 On 5 February 1952, by a vote o f 29 to
i o
25 (with four abstentions), the General Assembly endorsed this decision.
The substance o f the economic and social rights to be included in what was to become 
the ICESCR was not debated in each session of the Commission on Human Rights or 
General Assembly. Initial discussions on the content o f the rights were carried out in 
1951-2. The rights formulated at this time were adopted with very little alteration in the 
final text submitted by the Commission on Human Rights to the General Assembly 
prior to the Ninth Session of the General Assembly in 1954. They were not subject to 
detailed debate again until Sessions held in 1956, 1957 and again in 1962. By the end 
of the 17th Session of the General Assembly in 1962, the Third Committee had an 
approved text for the rights of the ICESCR and subject to minimal alterations in 1965, 
the text of rights was adopted by the General Assembly in 1966.19
I. Evatt Period
During the late 1940s, Australia was in the forefront of efforts to recognise and protect 
economic and social rights. Despite facing external opposition from traditional allies 
such as the United Kingdom and the United States and some degree of internal 
dissension, Australian officials attending the Commission on Human Rights spoke
15 UN Document E/1992, 13 UN ESCOR Resolutions Supp No 9, 1952.
16 ECOSOC Resolution 384 (XIII), 29 August 1951, 13 UN ESCOR Resolutions Supp No 1, 35 
(1951).
17 UN Doc A/C.3/L. 184/Rev 1 (1951).
18 GA Resolution 543 (VI), 5 February 1952, 6 UN GAOR Resolutions Supp No 20, 36 (1952).
19 GA Resolution 2200 (XXI), 16 December 1966, 21 UN GAOR Resolutions Supp No 16, 49 (1966).
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frequently and firmly on the topic of the importance of drafting internationally 
enforceable economic and social rights. Preferred lists of economic and social rights, 
including work, education and social security related rights, were submitted to the 
Commission on Human Rights for its consideration. Property related rights and 
women’s economic rights were resisted. Notwithstanding these limitations, the period 
is marked by a belief that an essential part of government’s role was to protect the 
economic interests of individuals and be accountable to both the individual and the 
international society in the fulfilment of that role.
(i) Attitudes Towards Economic and Social Rights
As noted previously, the inclusion of economic and social rights was relatively 
uncontroversial in the UDHR. Australian delegates reported back to the Department of 
External Affairs that ‘ [e]veryone thought that economic and social principles should be 
written into the declaration’ .20 Partly as a result of the level of consensus on the topic, 
and partly as a result of Australia’s primary representation being on sub-committees 
dealing with the implementation of rights,21 Australian representatives had a low profile 
in the debates on the economic and social rights included in the UDHR. From the few 
statements made, it is apparent that Australia gave its unqualified support to the 
inclusion of economic and social rights alongside civil and political rights and was 
desirous that the international community would develop strong means of international 
enforcement for such rights.
On the occasion of the General Assembly’s adoption of the UDHR, the Australian 
delegate, Alan Watt, spoke at length of his State’s interest in economic and social
20 Cablegram from Australian Delegation to the UN to the DEA, 12/5/48, in NAA A 1838/278, Item 
856/13 Pt 3. The reasoning given by the delegation for this uniformity was the UDHR’s status as a 
non-binding Declaration.
21 Australia elected to have primary representation on the Commission on Human Rights’ Working 
Group on Implementation rather than the Working Group on the UDHR or the Working Group on 
the Covenant. It attended sessions of the other Working Groups as an Observer and was a direct 
participant in debates only on the plenary sessions o f the commission and General Assembly in 
relation to the UDHR.
31
rights. Indeed, Watt devoted half of his speech to underlining the need for sturdy 
international protections for economic and social rights. Economic and social rights 
were justified on the basis both of their inherent utility to individuals and their 
interdependence with civil and political rights. The strength of the speech makes it 
worthy of lengthy quotation:
I should like to express satisfaction with the inclusion of economic and social rights and 
also the unanimous agreement that such rights should be included. Modem economic 
and industrial arrangements have brought with them terrible social risks. I mention only 
mass unemployment and other loss of livelihood, whether through old age or other 
causes. My government has continually urged, in international conferences, that full 
employment, or in the language of the Declaration, ‘the right to work’ and social 
security must be guaranteed for world prosperity and world peace. We know what 
economic insecurity can breed. The civil and legal rights of the Weimar Republic were 
destroyed in the collapse of the German economy and the rise of Nazism.
In speaking of the economic and social rights I do not underestimate the longer 
established rights. If we needed any conviction, the events of Nazism and the war have 
illuminated that traditional human liberties must be cherished. We know that economic 
rights are realised through the exercise of political liberties and that the surrender of 
these liberties can bring helplessness and insecurity.
It is the task of social democracy to maintain and develop to the full the simultaneous 
enjoyment of political and civil liberties and economic rights. The comprehensive
nature of the Declaration makes it an historic document in the progress of social 
22democracy.
The emphasis on governments’ responsibility to take concrete steps to realise economic
and social rights was equally evident in the Australian proposal that the UDHR
explicitly recognise governments’ responsibilities to implement economic and social
rights in the text o f the UDHR. An impasse had been reached as between the Soviet
Union (which supported the inclusion of obligations clauses for each economic and
social right) and the United States and United Kingdom (which strenuously opposed
such inclusions). Australia, together with Belgium and France, argued in favour o f the
insertion of a general prefatory clause to ‘give recognition to present day feeling that
individuals, as members of organised society, are entitled to economic and social
security’ and to affirm that rights should be affected through positive measures. The
result was the adoption of Article 22 of the UDHR:
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is 
entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation
22 Speaker’s Notes on the Report of the Commission on Human Rights, undated but circa November 
1948, ‘UN Charter’ Folder, Evatt Collection, Flinders University.
23 Report of the Australian Representative to the Third Session of the Commission of Human Rights, 
in NAA A 1838/278, Item 856/13 Pt 3.
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and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, o f the 
economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free 
development o f his personality.
Fuller expositions of the Australian position took place in the heated debates concerning 
inclusion of economic and social rights in the Covenant on Human Rights. Throughout 
the discussions in the Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly in the 
1947-1949 period, Australia’s position remained constant. One Covenant giving equal 
recognition to all forms of rights was needed. In May 1948, in the Drafting Committee 
of the Commission on Human Rights, for instance, the Australian delegate dismissed as 
‘misconceived’ fears that the drafting of a single Covenant would limit State signatures 
to the Covenant. The Covenant, it was said, should represent a guarantee of rights o f 
most concern to the common man. It should not be drawn up merely on the basis o f the 
denial of rights under Nazi persecution,24 but should extend to the rights expected by 
individuals. Freedom from want, to take one example, had been widely accepted in the 
world.25 If economic and social rights were omitted, the Australian delegate warned, 
the common man would regard the Covenant as a purely academic document. While 
conceding that specialised agencies had an important role to play in monitoring and 
assisting the implementation of economic and social rights, there remained a need to 
finalise a Covenant on such rights.26
In 1949, when presenting a list of ‘basic rights’ for the Commission on Human Rights’
consideration, the Australian representative delivered an impassioned speech, again
emphasising the interconnectedness of all forms of rights:.
The question that we have to answer now is whether this development towards the idea 
of the social service state, and the rights o f individuals therein, has reached the stage 
where the protection of the State in many circumstances is the duty o f the State and the 
right o f the individual. It is the view o f the Australian Government that we have
24 EJR Heyward, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/SR 29, 2; 4 December 1947. In 
this thesis the terms ‘representative’ and ‘delegate’ are used interchangeably. During the 
negotiations, personnel were appointed as either Representatives, Alternates and Delegations. The 
choice to use more generic references (other than in verbatim citations) was made in order to focus 
attention on the substance of comments rather than the individual’s official position.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid. The delegate specifically rejected the example of work done by the International Labour 
Organisation. He pointed out that the International Labour Organisations’s Convention on Forced 
Labour had not prevented the drafting o f an article prohibiting forced labour in the Covenant on 
Human Rights.
27 These basic rights are considered below, 40-41.
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reached that stage, and that the significant moment in the recognition of this fact was 
when the battle over Article 55 of the Charter was finally decided at San Francisco...
Civil rights are themselves the means to an end —a full and decent life. Without 
economic and social rights hand in hand with them they are largely meaningless. 
Without education man will not properly comprehend or enjoy his rights. Without work 
he will degenerate. Without protection in times of sickness and other hardship his life, 
and that o f his family may easily be ruined. We believe that the world has developed 
sufficiently for the realisation of these truths to be spelled out as rights of men in the 
Covenant o f Human Rights. Man has, in other words, reached the stage where he has 
the right to expect from the community all measures necessary to establish the minimum 
for decent life, or the right to the opportunity for decent life.’28
In this speech, the Australian delegate also sought to legitimise economic and social 
rights through a reference to State’s existing international obligations under the United 
Nations Charter (‘the Charter’). Article 55 o f the Charter, to which specific reference 
was made, was the ‘Full Employment’ clause. It obliged States to take steps towards 
the attainment o f  full employment policies. In mentioning Article 55, the delegate was 
repeating the refrain o f Evatt -  States had committed themselves to fulfiling economic 
responsibilities.29
On the international stage, Australia spoke with one voice. Behind the scenes, there 
was less consensus with particular criticism o f economic and social rights emanating 
from the Department o f Labour and National Service and some ranks o f the Department 
o f External Affairs.
The Secretary o f  the Department o f Labour and National Service, William Funnell was 
pessimistic about the feasibility and utility o f economic rights. In commenting upon the 
inclusion o f labour rights in the draft Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights, Funnell 
stated:
My general feeling is that the inclusion of articles on labour rights adds 
nothing either to the document or to the protection of fundamental labour 
rights. In a Declaration of this sort, which attempts to cover the whole field of 
human rights, any particular aspects must be so vaguely worded as to be
28 Speech on Economic and Social Rights, included as Annex to Report of the Australian Delegate of 
the Fifth Session of the Human Rights Commission, 1949, undated, inNAA A 1838/1, Item 
856/13/7 Pt 4, Speech given on 16 June 1949 by KCO Shann, Australian representative, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/SR 131,3.
29 As to Evatt’s championing of the significance of Article 55 of the Charter, see WJ Hudson, 
Australia and the New World Order: Evatt at San Francisco, 1945, Australian Foreign Policy 
Papers, ANU, 1993, Chapter 10; See also references in fii 77.
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completely useless either as protection or as gaining the approval by nations of 
policies in line with those rights, especially in the case o f labour matters where 
there is a specialist body in the field able to produce international regulations
after more precise study. The attempt to incorporate odds and ends o f labour
30rights in a document on human rights in general, seems particularly futile.
In a later letter reiterating his concerns, Funnell warned that the establishment of an 
international regime for economic and social rights might create a situation in which 
legal sanctions outstripped the moral acceptance o f the rights.31 As a practical matter, 
he questioned whether there would be an appropriate international body to oversee 
implementation of the rights. While agreeing that the International Labour Organisation 
was the obvious choice to fulfil such a role, Funnell considered that it would be 
unwilling ‘given the world context’. As a result, Funnell concluded that economic 
and social rights should be left out of the scope of the Covenant ‘despite my full 
agreement, in principle, with the Soviet contention that a document which purports to 
safeguard basic rights but fails to safeguard individual’s economic position, is 
unrealistic’.
At first glance, the hostility of the Department of Labour and National Service to the 
drafting of economic rights is perplexing. The Department of Labour and National 
Service had been closely involved with the development of economic rights in the 
context of International Labour Organisation Conventions and Recommendations. It is 
this involvement, however, which offers a possible explanation for the hostility. Given 
that dealing with the International Labour Organisation was an exclusive function o f the 
Department o f Labour and National Service, Funnell’s stated preference for leaving the 
development o f economic rights to the International Labour Organisation carries with it 
a strong message of territoriality.
Within the Australian Mission to the United Nations, there was additional disquiet as to 
whether Australia should maintain support for the inclusion o f economic and social 
rights. In a memorandum prepared in June 1948, the Mission noted the existence of
30 Memorandum of W Funnell, Secretary o f Department of Labour and National Service to the 
Secretary, DEA, 8/4/48, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 1.
31 Letter o f W Funnell, Secretary, Department of Labour and National Service, to the Secretary, DEA, 
26/7/48, in NAA A 1838/1, 856/13/7 Pt 3.
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disagreement internally and within the United Nations community on the question.34 
The arguments advanced militating against protection of economic and social rights 
related to their distinct nature in being resource intensive (for the State), incremental in 
form, and difficult to apply in countries with under-developed economies. After 
presenting the major arguments for and against and proposing basic rights, the Mission 
concluded that Australia might reconsider its policy of support for economic and social 
rights ‘in the light of the arguments being used’ .35
Australia’s stance certainly provoked strong reactions from traditional allies such as the 
United States and the United Kingdom. The United States representatives had 
discussed with the Australians their objections to the recognition of economic and social 
rights. Pragmatically, they argued that the United States’ executive would have 
difficulties in convincing Congress to pass the Covenant if it included economic rights. 
Furthermore, as a matter of principle, the United States considered that economic rights 
would require too great State control and necessitate the development of different 
international machinery from that envisaged for civil and political rights.36 Australian 
delegates evinced little sympathy for either argument. In discussions with their United 
States counterparts, the Australians suggested that perceived difficulties associated with 
implementation were overstated. Any constitutional difficulties could be overcome by 
the inclusion of an appropriately worded federal-state clause in the Covenant. Privately, 
the Australian Mission to the United Nations were hopeful that the United States might 
eventually resile from its hostile stance given that the need for strong implementation 
mechanisms applied equally to the realisation of civil rights in the southern states of the 
United States.37 Of greater concern to Mission staff was the implacable opposition of 
the United Kingdom. In the Commission on Human Rights, the United Kingdom 
characterised economic and social rights as non-legal. The United Kingdom undertook
Letter from Australian Mission to the UN to the Secretary, DEA, 11/6/48, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 
856/13/7 Pt 3.
Ibid.
Memorandum from the Secretary, DEA to HFE Whitlam, 26/5/48, in NAA A 1838/278, Item 
856/13 Pt 3.
Ibid. The Mission did not elaborate on this point, but the reference seems to have been to the need 
to overcome racial segregation in the southern states o f the United States.
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further lobbying of Australia through the agency of Commonwealth relations. In an 
attempt to persuade Australia to abandon its support for one Covenant, the Secretary of 
State for Dominion Affairs in London reported its view to Australia that cultural and 
economic rights cannot ‘in their nature’ be defined in the form of legal obligations for 
the State.38 Although Australia did not respond any more favourably to the pleas of the 
United Kingdom than to the United States, the Australian Mission to the United Nations 
may well have been influenced by such representations to encourage a ‘reconsideration’ 
of policy. Notwithstanding this pressure, however, Australia remained publicly in 
favour of the inclusion of economic and social rights in the human rights Covenant. 
Unwavering support, though, did not translate into unswerving support for all economic 
and social rights advanced in the negotiations.
(ii) Attitudes towards the Substance of Economic and Social Rights
Evidence of Australia’s responses to the economic and social rights included in the 
UDHR is limited to Australia’s contributions during the plenary sessions of the 
Commission on Human Rights and the 1948 Sessions of the Third Committee of the 
General Assembly preceding the UDHR’s adoption. The overwhelming impression 
gained from Australia’s public comments is that Australia welcomed the economic and 
social rights included in the UDHR.39 Only four draft clauses concerned the Australian 
delegation. The first two clauses related to trade unions, the third to remuneration of 
work, and the fourth dealt with the right to property. In at least two of these four cases, 
it could be argued that the basis of Australia’s resistance was the Labor Party’s desire 
not to affect existing industrial practices.
38 Cablegram from the Secretary o f State for Dominion Affairs, London, to DEA, 12/6/47, in NAA A 
1838/278, Item, 856/13/2.
39 Johannes Morsink has noted that Australia was at first opposed to the inclusion of detailed rights: J 
Morsink, The Universal Declaration o f Human Rights, op cit, 223. On a closer reading o f the 
documentation, however, Australia was not opposing the inclusion o f rights, but suggesting that a 
shorter version o f rights might be used in the UDHR and a more detailed elaboration in the binding 
Covenant: see UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/SR 9, 10; 18 June 1947 per Ralph Harry.
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Australia, together with New Zealand, objected to two clauses that were seen as 
potentially interfering with current trade union and labor practices: Article 20(2) and 
Article 23(4). Article 20(2) included the statement that ‘No one may be compelled to 
belong to an association’ whilst Article 23(4) declared that everyone was ‘free to form 
and to join trade unions’. Australia and New Zealand were concerned to protect States’ 
abilities to institute ‘closed shop’ practices, by virtue of which employers could limit 
the pool of employees to union members. Such practices were legislatively endorsed in 
most Australian states in the late 1940s. Whilst not wanting to have the international 
community endorse compulsory unionism per se, Australia and New Zealand wished to 
leave the choice o f such a system open to individual States. Two strategies were 
employed. First, Australia and New Zealand recorded their views that trade unionism 
was dealt with in only (the equivalent of) Article 23 and abstained on the vote on 
Article 20(2).40 Secondly, Australia supported a New Zealand amendment that 
proposed substitution of the formulation that everyone has the ‘right’ to form and join 
trade unions for the previous formulation (‘everyone is free to form and to join trade 
unions’) .41 It was hoped that by the deletion of the word ‘free’, any implication that an 
individual should be able to assert a right in employment not to join a trade union would 
also disappear. Australian delegates were also concerned to avoid any implication that 
an individual could choose to form his/her own trade union42 and undermine the system 
of centralised unions, which in turn would lead to the possible overwhelming of the 
arbitration system as such smaller unions sought a right of hearing before the 
Arbitration Commission.43
The second aspect of the UDHR that received particular attention from Australia was 
that relating to the means of determining a worker’s remuneration in Article 23.
40 Cablegram from the Delegation to the United Nations Organisation, Paris to DEA, 27/11/48, NAA  
A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 5.
41 Report on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the Australian Representative to the Third 
Committee, undated, in NAA A 518/1, Item 104/5/2 Pt 1.
42 Sir Frederick Eggleston also warned the Department that unions might be formed by persons having 
different views to the general trade unions -  eg company unions: Synopsis o f paper by Eggleston, 
prepared in the DEA for inclusion in the draft Brief by A Loomes, 28/7/48, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 
856/13 Pt 5.
43 A Watt, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 140, 530; 16 November 1948.
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According to the Australian delegation, a ‘man’s remuneration’ might need to cover not 
only personal needs, but also those of the family.44 In putting forward this argument, 
the Australian delegation was defending the structure of the ‘basic wage’ mechanism in 
use in Australia. When the text of Article 23(3) was adopted, the Australian delegation 
reiterated its opinion that the question remained open whether ‘a man’s salary or wages 
should cover the needs of himself and his family’ or whether such family needs should 
be covered ‘by other means of social protection’.45 The use of gender specific language 
by the Australian delegation was not merely a reflection of the language of the UDHR. 
The Australian delegation was also wary about an immediately enforceable obligation 
to provide equal pay for women.46 In taking into account the potential family 
responsibilities for men, the Australian award system entrenched a system whereby the 
standard wage for a woman was less than that for the single man, with adjustments for 
family responsibilities only made for married men. In recognition o f the perceived 
inability of the current system to provide equal pay for women, Australia had been 
resisting the freestanding recognition of a right to equal pay in relevant international 
fora such as the International Labour Organisation 47
Recognition o f the right to property (Article 17(1) UDHR) also prompted adverse 
comment by the Australian delegation. Ralph Harry, the Australian representative 
present when the right was discussed in the Sub-Committee of the Commission on 
Human Rights, echoed comments of the United Kingdom and Chilean representatives
44 A Watt, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 156, 676; 25 November 1948.
45 Report on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the Australian Representative to the Third 
Committee, in NAA A 518/1; Item 104/5/2 Pt 1. A copy can also be located in NAA A 1838/1,
Item 852/17/3/6 Pt 2.
46 Australia objected to a specific reference to non-discrimination within the context of the right to 
work on the basis that it narrowed the potential operation of Article 2 (the general non­
discrimination clause) o f the UDHR. When a Cablegram was sent from the Mission to the 
Department o f External Affairs explaining this conduct, the equal pay clause was underlined and a 
question-mark noted against it: Cablegram from the Australian Delegation to the United Nations, 
Paris to the DEA, 18/11/48, NAA A 1838/1, 856/13 Pt 5. Australia’s reluctance to endorse a 
guarantee o f  equal pay for women was more apparent in the debates on the Covenant, as discussed 
later on in this Chapter.
47 Australia had supported reference to the principle of equality in the preamble to the ILO 
Constitution, but had urged that the issue of the implementation o f an equal pay guarantee be subject 
to further study by the ILO: reported in letter o f W Funnell, to the Secretary, DEA, 8/8/48. The 
concern with respect to the Commonwealth’s ability to implement the provision was shared by the 
Attorney-General’s Department: see in NAA A 432, Item 54/3779 Pt 6.
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that property was subject to extensive governmental control and could not be considered 
a fundamental human right.48 An internal memorandum from July 1948, reflecting on 
Australia’s previous abstention on the inclusion of a right to property in the UDHR, 
considered that the abstention may also have been motivated by an awareness of the 
difficulties that would arise for States who practised an advanced form of 
socialisation.49 The author of that memorandum, Allan Loomes, provided this historical 
account in the context of arguing that Australia might conceivably support a right of 
protection against property acquired without adequate compensation.50 His proposal 
did not receive the endorsement of his departmental or political superiors.
Australia had a more detailed involvement with the drafting of the economic and social 
rights to be included in the Covenant on Human Rights. The initial Australian stance 
was to argue that all the rights included in the UDHR should be recognised in the draft 
Covenant. After failing in this proposal (and internally conceding that this proposal had 
been ‘unrealistic’) , 51 one of the staff of the Australian Mission to the United Nations, 
Eric Heyward drafted six ‘basic rights’. After some pruning by officials within the 
Department of External Affairs,52 these six rights were submitted to the Fifth Session of
the Commission on Human Rights. They read:
1. Every person shall have the right to work, and each State shall take such measures
as may be within its power to ensure that all persons ordinarily resident in its territory
53have an opportunity for useful work.
2. In order to ensure fair and reasonable wages and working conditions, in 
occupations where wages and conditions are not determined by collective bargaining, or
48 RL Harry, UN Doc E/CN.4/AC. 1/SR 13, 18; 9 June 1947.
49 Internal Memorandum, signed by A Loomes, to the Secretary, DEA, 9/7/48, NAA A 1838/278, Item 
856/13 Pt 3. Note though that Loomes saw some benefit in the provision dealing with ‘arbitrary 
deprivation of property’. This was later to be the focus of Australia’s hostility towards the clause.
50 Ibid.
51 Minute from TG Glasheen to AH Tange, 27/5/49, in NAA A1838/1, Item 856/13/2/1.
52 Australian Representative to the Third Session of the Commission on Human Rights, quoted in 
Memorandum from the A/g Secretary, DEA to the Australian Mission to the UN, 28/4/49, asking 
the Minister for policy rulings, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 3. Terence Glasheen of the 
Mission noted that it was not possible to obtain a ruling from Evatt (who had left New York), but 
that the Mission proceeded with submitting the rights: Minute from TG Glasheen to AH Tange, 
27/5/49, NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/2/1. There is no evidence though, when subsequently briefed 
that Evatt disagreed with the substance of the rights.
53 With respect to the right to work, the Australian delegation were instructed to bear in mind the 
‘consistent desire of Government to include full employment obligations in international 
organizations’ with specific reference made to the ITOfsic] Charter and the UN Charter: Cablegram 
from DEA to Delegation, 30/5/49, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 3.
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other arrangements are not available against exceptionally low wages, the State shall 
establish and maintain machinery for fixing minimum wages and conditions.
3. Everyone shall have the right to social security through medical care and to 
safeguards against absence of livelihood through unemployment, illness or disability, 
old age, or other reasons beyond his control.
4. Each State shall ensure by law that there shall be reasonable limitations on 
working hours.
5. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free at least in the 
elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. 
Technical and professional education shall be equally accessible to ail on the basis o f 
merit.
6. No one shall be deprived of his nationality by way of punishment [arbitrarily] or 
denied the right to change his nationality.
In submitting these rights to the Commission on Human Rights, the Australian delegate 
made a lengthy speech explaining each right. States were reminded of their pre-existing 
international commitments, particularly with respect to economic and social rights. The 
rights were justified not in terms of economic sense or organisation but in terms o f the 
expectation of the individual. In relation to the right to social security, for instance, it 
was stated that the right of the human was to ‘expect the organization of which he is a 
part, ie the State, to save him from degradation’. Similarly in relation to the right to 
work, work was said to be only the means to the end o f a good life for the individual 
and that the State had a duty to see that the ‘means does not harmfully distort the end ’ .54
The rights chosen as ‘basic’ and the reasoning provided in Heyward’s initial 
memorandum attaching the six rights are significant for a variety o f reasons. First, the 
clauses were drafted so as to create explicitly legal content. Heyward explained that 
statements regarded as ‘aspirational’ or ‘unobtainable’ had been avoided. Thus he 
rejected the clause that ‘every person has the right to receive pay commensurate with 
his ability and skill and to work under just and favourable conditions’ on the basis of its 
vagueness. A State guarantee against loss of livelihood was also rejected on the basis 
that the State could not necessarily compensate for the full extent o f loss. In its focus 
on what a State could be held to provide, the Australian proposal reflected an 
understanding that economic and social rights were legal rights or entitlements. At the
Statement on Economic and Social Rights Made by the representative o f Australia, undated, in 
NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 4. A summarised version is recorded at UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 131, 
3; 16 June 1949.
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same time, Heyward implicitly saw his role as creating rights, rather than recognising 
pre-existing rights. It was thus a conceptualisation that could accommodate the shaping 
of rights so as to avoid political embarrassment on issues of sensitivity such as equal 
pay for women.
Secondly, the progressive versions of the draft rights display an interest in the notion 
that economic and social rights should bind not only the State but also more generally 
the community. Heyward originally drafted an article on ‘education’ that read in part: 
‘there shall be equal access to higher education as can be provided by the State or 
community on the basis of merit. ’55 The intended meaning o f this clause is unclear.
One possible interpretation is that by referring to equal access to community education, 
Heyward was advancing the view that not only States, but persons within the 
community would be bound under the Covenants to respect human rights. If it was 
intended to operate in this broader fashion, it was to be a brief dalliance with such a 
notion. The reference to equal access to community education was removed in the re­
drafting process undertaken at the Departmental level.
Thirdly, Heyward in his correspondence with the Department of External Affairs 
anticipated that the content o f economic and social rights might be variable depending 
on the economic and cultural context in which rights were implemented. Heyward 
referred to resistance by countries such as Lebanon and the United Kingdom (in relation 
to its non-self-governing territories). Such resistance was interpreted as relating to the 
concern that economies that were in the agriculture and handicraft stage could not 
support the higher standard of living required by economic and social rights. In 
rebutting this concern, the delegation argued Tacking a highly specialised economy, 
these countries have not the same need for a guarantee of economic and social rights,
55 Letter o f EJR Heyward for the Minister of the Australian Mission to the United Nations, to the 
Secretary, DEA, 11/6/48, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 3. A similar comment was made by 
Ralph Harry, as Australian representative in debates on the UDHR: UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 14, 11; 3 
July 1947.
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and the rights they do need would be rather different.’56 Implicit in this analysis, was 
the belief that the content of economic and social rights could vary according to the 
stage of development of the economy and country. Heyward went on to further 
elucidate his point: ‘For example, a guarantee against distribution from crop failure or 
against extortion by landlords and money-lenders would mean more than a guarantee of 
the right to work’.57 That the Australian delegation adhered to a relativist position was 
further evidenced by the delegation’s 1949 quotation of the words of Lauterpacht, that 
obligations are ‘elastic and circumscribed by the internal conditions and the general
r  o
economic development of the State.’
Fourthly, the choice of which rights to include in a list of ‘basic rights’ is revealing. Not 
all the economic and social rights included in the UDHR were duplicated in the list of 
basic rights. No reference was made to a general right to an adequate standard of living. 
Despite the inclusion of such a right in the UDHR and its subsequent adoption in the 
ICESCR, the Australian proposal related only to social security. The omission did not 
receive detailed consideration in departmental papers. Equally, no explanation is given 
of the lack of any reference to a right to rest and leisure in the context of the right to 
work. More explicable is the continued opposition to the right to property and the right 
to equal pay. Perhaps ingenuously, the Australian delegate attempted to justify the 
absence of a reference to equal pay on the basis that the topic was being discussed by 
the International Labour Organisation.59 The omission, however, seems to reflect 
ongoing concern that implementation was not possible in the current Australian context.
The absence of an equal pay provision underlines the fifth significance of the ‘basic 
rights’. The choice of rights demonstrated a preference for the concerns of the ‘working 
man’. Equivalent substantive concerns for women were ignored. In addition to the
56 Letter o f EJR Heyward for the Minister of the Australian Mission to the United Nations, to the 
Secretary, DEA, 11/6/48, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 3.
57 Ibid.
58 Excerpt from H Lauterpacht, An International Bill o f Rights, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 3.
59 Statement on Economic and Social Rights Made by the representative o f Australia, undated, in 
NAA A 1838/1, 856/13/7 Pt 4, a summarised version o f which appears at UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 131, 
3; 16 June 1949.
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equal pay example, this proposition is confirmed by Heyward’s explanation of the 
scope of the right to social security. After mentioning the breadth of situations in which 
the State obligation arose, specifically mentioning the contingencies o f widowhood, 
death or incapacity of the breadwinner, and crop failures, Heyward stated that maternity 
benefits and child endowments were not encompassed by the provision.60 The vision 
was thus limited in its universality.
The ‘six rights’ proposal was not discussed in any detail at the Fifth Session of the 
Commission on Human Rights.61 Further consultations were held with Commonwealth 
departments in July 1949. After this pivotal round of inter-departmental talks, 
Australia decided to withdraw two of its economic and social rights, namely the 
obligation on the State to restrict working hours (paragraph 4 quoted above) and the 
prohibition on withdrawing nationality as a punishment (paragraph 6 quoted above). 
According to the minutes of the inter-departmental committee, the feeling was that the 
obligation with respect to working hours might ‘deprive persons of their freedom of 
action (particularly self-employed persons), and that in any case the protection of 
working conditions was sufficiently covered by paragraph 2 o f the Australian 
proposals.63 The nationality provision was withdrawn given that Australian legislation 
included the power to revoke citizenship and the distinction between nationality and 
citizenship remained hazy. It was thus thought more appropriate to leave the question 
o f nationality to the ongoing examination of the International Labour Organisation.64 
Commitment remained firm, however to the inclusion of economic and social rights 
dealing with the right to work, the right to fair working conditions, the right to social 
security, and the right to education.65
60 Letter o f  EJR Heyward for the Minister of the Australian Mission to the United Nations, to the 
Secretary, DEA, 11/6/48, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 3.
61 Submission to the Minister for External Affairs, 19/3/51, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 929/4/4 Pt 1.
62 Minutes o f  Inter-Departmental Meeting to Consider Text of Draft Covenant on Human Rights, 
Department o f External Affairs, 12/13th September 1949, in NAA A 1838/278 , Item 856/13/7 Pt 5.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 The inter-related question o f Australia’s attitude towards the implementation o f economic and social 
rights is dealt with in Chapter 6.
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Internal documents o f the Department of External Affairs show an awareness of 
mounting international tensions. Yet this awareness seems to have had little impact on 
the development o f policy with respect to economic and social rights. The Australian 
delegate to the Third Session of the Commission on Human Rights in May-June 1948, 
for instance, commented on the ‘extremely uncompromising’ language used by the 
Soviet representative, Professor Pavlov, in deriding the fact that economic and social 
rights had been left ‘hanging in the air’.66 The objections of the United States and the 
United Kingdom to the legal status of economic and social rights were also subject to 
scrutiny. Yet, neither Evatt nor Australian officials expressed any desire to mollify any 
of the superpowers. They viewed their role as pursuing a principled road, advocating 
Australia’s vision o f economic and social rights. At times they did perceive their stance 
as that of a ‘middle road’ -  as noted previously in the discussion o f Article 22 o f the 
UDHR. However, in the majority of cases, Australian policy paid scant regard to the 
growing Cold W ar tensions.
Instead, the fact that despite internal and external hostility to economic and social 
rights, the Australian delegation persisted with its efforts seems due to the priority 
placed on economic and social rights by Evatt. Unfortunately, there are few written 
records o f Evatt’s instructions to delegates concerning economic and social rights, a 
matter consistent with Evatt’s tendency to put very few instructions in writing. Yet all 
o f the important policy documents were marked for Evatt’s attention and there is 
evidence that departmental staff noted where it had not been possible to clear the 
submission through Evatt. None of the submissions on inclusion o f economic and 
social rights are so marked,68 giving the impression that Evatt gave his approval to 
Australia’s public stance. Furthermore, it seems unlikely, in the face o f significant 
pressure from allies and internal dissidents, that Department of External Affairs officials 
would choose to act without Ministerial authority. That Evatt assumed primary
66 Report o f  the Australian Representative to the Third Session o f the Commission on Human Rights, 
in N A A A  1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 5.
67 See Introduction, fn 42.
68 The only exception is the initial submission concerning the submission o f the six basic rights: 
Minute from TG Glasheen to AH Tange, 27/5/49, NAA A 1838/1, 856/13/2/1.
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responsibility for matters within his portfolio is also consistent with anecdotal evidence 
of Evatt’s tendency to act independently of staff or other Ministers.69
Whilst Evatt seems to have been the primary author of Australia’s stance, the policies 
adopted bear the hallmark of the social democratic policies of the Australian Labor 
Party. For Evatt and his Labor colleagues, the immediate post-war years offered the 
challenge and opportunity to reconstruct society on a more just basis. Employment was 
a particular focus. Large scale government intervention to achieve full employment 
was desirable. Thus in 1945, the objective of full employment was added to the Federal 
Labor Platform, to sit alongside its traditional commitment to socialism. Labor 
proclaimed its commitment to the ‘planning and regulation of all factors of economic 
life’ in order to achieve full employment and guarantee economic security.70 The 
Minister for Post-War Reconstruction, JJ Dedman, announced the government’s Charter 
for ExServicemen, defining the national policy as full employment, high and rising 
standards of living, the completion of a comprehensive social security programme, the 
rapid development of national resources and the adequate provision for political and 
military defence.71 A White Paper was produced on full employment in Australia 
premised on governmental responsibility to ‘provide the general framework of a full 
employment economy, within which the operations of individuals and businesses can be 
carried on’.72
69 Alan Watt, for instance, has commented that Evatt ‘did not want a Department organised to 
formulate, under his direction and control, a broad policy for submission to him to approve, modify 
or reject, but rather a Department organised to carry out his own pre-determined policy’: A Watt, 
‘Australian Diplomatic Service: 1935-1965’ in G Greenwood, N Harper (eds), Australia in World 
Affairs: 1961-65, FW Cheshire, Melbourne, 1968, 143.
70 Quoted in K Tennant, Evatt: Politics and Justice, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1972, 156. See 
too B McKinlay, The ALP: A Short History of the Australian Labor Party, Drummond, Melbourne, 
1981.
71 Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 23 
March 1945, Vol 181,873-4.
72 Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers, 1945-6, Vol IV, 1195. The Labor Party’s pre-occupation 
with full employment also needs to be understood against the background that in the immediate 
post-war period, Australia needed to find employment for 150 000 ex-service personnel in a normal 
working population of 3 000 000: K Tennant, op cit, 162. Ensuring employment was a 
preoccupation crossing party lines: see As for the more general pre-occupation with employment 
prospects in the post world context, see The Argus, Melbourne, 15 September 1945 (Weekend 
Magazine), quoted in FK Crowley, Modern Australia in Documents, Vol 2: 1939-70, Wren 
Publishing, Melbourne, 1973, 131.
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Viewing the task of reconstruction through Labor’s ideological lenses, Evatt’s approach 
was to empower governments to institute remedial policies.73 Within the context o f this 
post-war planning, Evatt saw his role as facilitating the international and domestic legal 
environment that would support such government obligations and interventions. As 
Attorney-General, Evatt proposed constitutional changes to give greater power to the 
Commonwealth to legislate with respect to economic matters in 1944 and 1947.74 As 
Minister for External Affairs, Evatt focused, in part, on gaining broad international 
recognition o f States’ economic responsibilities to bolster international cooperation and 
to bolster programmes instituted in individual States.
Evatt’s vision for international economic rights was apparent in the public speeches he 
made even before the Commission on Human Rights commenced its task. In 
applauding the Atlantic Charter entered into between United States President Roosevelt 
and United Kingdom Prime Minister Churchill, for instance, Evatt emphasised the 
‘declared international objective clause ... o f securing “improved labour standards, 
economic advancement, and social security’” .75 Peace itself would be meaningful only 
if it was based on ‘social justice and economic betterment’.76 According to Evatt, the 
means of guaranteeing social justice was to recognise the responsibility on States to 
engineer such change. It was a stance carried through in Evatt’s insistence that
Commentators have criticised Evatt’s policies as being aimed merely to increase Commonwealth 
power: see G Sawer, ‘The United Nations’, in G Greenwood and N Harper, Australia in World 
Affairs, Vol 1 (1950-5), Cheshire, Melbourne, 1957, 97. Whilst not denying that this may have 
been part o f  Evatt’s motivation, it fails to give credit to Evatt’s desire to obtain power to achieve 
certain ends.
74 The referendum in 1944 concerned the government’s proposal that the Commonwealth should be 
empowered for five years after the war to make laws for inter alia employment and unemployment, 
production and distribution o f goods with the approval of the States and national health with the 
consent o f the State. A further referendum was held in 1947 concerning, inter alia, the 
government’s proposal to give the Commonwealth power over rents. Both referenda failed. An 
excellent summary o f the results o f referenda held in Australia is contained in T Blackshield, G 
Williams, B Fitzgerald, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory: Commentary and Materials, 
Federation Press, Sydney, 1996, 964-970.
75 Ministerial Statement by Dr Evatt in the House o f Representatives, 19 July 1944, reproduced in HV 
Evatt, Foreign Policy o f Australia: Speeches, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1945, 194
76 Statement before the Plenary Session o f Conference o f Paris by the Australian Minister for External 
Affairs, Evatt, 31 July 1946, in 'War - Paris Peace Conference 1945-6’ Folder, Evatt Collection, 
Flinders University.
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Australian representatives advocate for a ‘full employment pledge’ at the Bretton 
Woods conference (leading to the establishment of the International Monetary Fund), 
the 1944 Philadelphia Conference of the International Labour Organisation and in his 
personal advocacy for a full employment pledge at the San Francisco Conference 
leading to the establishment of the United Nations.77 Whether or not Evatt played a 
central role in the United Nations’ adoption of Article 55 of the UN Charter, a matter 
disputed by commentators, Evatt saw Article 55 as one of the two ‘most significant 
achievements at the United Nations Conference’.78 It was regarded as significant since 
it entrenched the responsibility of the international community and of individual States 
to actively pursue economically interventionist policies.
Supporting the inclusion of economic and social rights in the draft Covenant on Human 
Rights was thus a continuation of Evatt’s belief that States needed to accept obligations 
to intervene in the market force to guarantee the wellbeing of its population, in 
particular to protect the ‘working man’. He presupposed the legitimacy of a welfare 
State and focused upon the fundamental needs o f individuals rather than the burden on 
States. For Evatt, international human rights obligations were accepted as a means of 
defining the ‘servile’ role of the State -  that is, the State’s obligation to serve 
individuals.
II. Spender Period
The real watershed in Australia’s attitude to economic and social rights came after the 
Liberal-Country Party Coalition ’s electoral victory in 1949. Under the direction of
77 As to this stance, see W J Husdon, Australia and the New World Order: Evatt, San Francisco, 
1945, Australian Foreign Policy Papers, ANU, 1993, Ch 10; JDE Plant, The Origins and 
Development of Australia ’s Policy and Posture, the UN Conference on International Organization, 
San Francisco, 1945, PhD Thesis, ANU, 1967, 192-203; Report on United Nations Conference on 
International Organization, ‘United Nations -  Conference on International Organization, San 
Francisco, 1945’ Folder, Evatt Collection, Flinders University.
78 The other significant achievement he noted was the breadth o f the powers o f the General Assembly. 
Report on United Nations Conference on International Organization, ‘United Nations -  Conference 
on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945’ Folder, Evatt Collection, Flinders University.
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79Percy Spender, the inaugural Minister for External Affairs of the Liberal Party,
Australia moved slowly away from an insistence on the equality of economic and social 
rights with civil and political rights. Spender inserted into Australian policy an 
emphasis on correlative rights and duties. The perceived role for the State in 
guaranteeing economic rights was reduced. Individual action was to be the primary 
agent for change, an emphasis that owed more to Liberal Party philosophy than Cold 
War hostilities.
(i) Attitudes Towards Economic and Social Rights
At an international level, the issue that dominated discussions o f the Commission on 
Human Rights during the short period of Spender’s Ministry, wastefully so according to 
Australia’s representative, was the issue of one or two Covenants.
In the midst o f the 1950-51 debates, Australia’s stance was marked by apparent 
indifference. In early 1950, Arthur Tange wrote to the Australian representative in the 
United Kingdom on behalf of the Secretary of the Department o f External Affairs. He 
informed the representative that Australia would continue to support the inclusion of 
economic and social rights, but that Australia would not press for the drafting of one 
Covenant if  the proposal lacked majority support. Australia’s contingency plan was to 
support the United States proposal that rights be included in separate, detailed Covenant 
or have additional articles incorporated in a later separate protocol. In public, 
Australia’s position moved to abstaining on crucial votes. In 1950 in the General 
Assembly, for instance, the Australian delegate emphasised that while the Australian 
delegation ‘stood, and always had stood’ for one Covenant, it considered it to be in the 
interests of fairness to permit those proposing separate Covenants to ‘have the fullest
79 The Liberal Party was only founded during 1944-45, see I Hancock, National and Permanent? The 
Federal Organisation of the Liberal Party of Australia: 1944-1965, Melbourne University Press, 
Melbourne, 2000, 37-38.
80 Report o f the Australian Representative to the Eighth Session o f the Commission on Human Rights, 
inN A A A  1838/1, Item 856/13/10/7 Pt2A.
81 Letter from AH Tange, for the Secretary DE A to External Affairs Officer, Australia House, London, 
22/3/50, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 5.
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opportunity to test the feeling of the Commission’. It would therefore abstain. Such 
action was in keeping with the Department of External Affair’s view that Australia 
should adopt a neutral position and accept the Commission’s superior position to 
determine its working priorities.
Following the General Assembly Resolution in favour of one covenant in late 1950, the 
Department of External Affairs advised the Minister that Australia should continue 
cooperating in efforts to draft the economic and social rights, notwithstanding the 
continued protests by the United States and the United Kingdom and despite their view 
that ‘the chances of ever preparing a Covenant which will prove acceptable to any 
number of states have been made even slimmer by the decision of the General 
Assembly and by heightening international tension.’84 Spender authorised the 
delegation to leave the Commission free to take up its task of continued drafting in 1951 
‘without being hedged in by Assembly directions’ .85 Spender was thus prepared to 
allow the Commission to continue its concentration on civil and political rights.
Shifts in relation to the one/two Covenant issue appear to have been the result of 
recommendations made by the Department of External Affairs which were endorsed by 
Spender. The Australian Mission to the United Nations had recommended to the 
Department of External Affairs in early 1950 that the new Minister reconsider 
Australia’s support for economic and social rights given the lack of support generally
oz:
for economic and social rights amongst other delegations. Although the Department 
of External Affairs initially did not agree with this recommendation,87 by late 1950, the
82 ‘Inclusion o f Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Covenant’, undated report, in NAA A 
1838/1, Item 856/13/10/6 Pt3.
83 Submission to the Minister for External Affairs, 22/9/50, excerpted in Letter from the Australian 
Mission to the United Nations to the Secretary, DEA, 29/9/50, in NAA A 432/20, Item 54/3779 Pt 
5.
84 Submission to Minister for External Affairs, annotated by Percy Spender, 12/3/50, in NAA A 
1838/1, Item 895/3/12.
85 Submission to Minister for External Affairs, annotated by Percy Spender, 24/10/50, in NAA A 
1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 10.
86 Memorandum from Australian Mission to the UN, to the Secretary, DEA, 2/3/50, in NAA A 1838/1, 
Item 856/13 Pt 8.
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Department was proposing that Australia soften its stance. The result was a ‘policy of 
neutrality’ by virtue of which Australia would neither press for the inclusion of 
economic and social rights in the Covenant, nor advocate for their exclusion.
Viewed against the background of policies adopted during the Evatt period, the shift to 
‘neutrality’ was a significant move. The Australian State was indicating publicly that 
it did not place as high a priority on economic and social rights and was open to their 
being relegated to another Covenant. Australia was no longer pushing for the equal 
recognition and enforcement of rights. As such, it did not have a strong view as to 
whether the rights were placed in a separate part of the Covenant on Human Rights or a 
subsequent Covenant. Economic and social rights were no longer a high priority for the 
Australian government.
In recommending the neutrality policy, it would appear that the Department of External 
Affairs were responding to the new Minister’s evident lack o f enthusiasm for economic 
and social rights. As KCO (Mick) Shann reported in September 1950 : ‘[t]he Minister 
regards the drafting and incorporation o f economic and social rights at this time as 
“highly dangerous”. He cannot see why we should go ahead with such ideas when there 
are so many things relating to the main purposes and objectives o f the Charter which
o o
deserve our prior attention.’ A similar ‘low-priority’ attitude to economic rights was 
demonstrated again in October 1950 when the Minister was reported as issuing a ‘go-
O Q
slow’ on economic rights.
Besides dampening Australia’s enthusiasm for economic and social rights, Spender was 
to have a profound effect on shaping the Australian philosophical approach to economic 
and social rights. In March 1950, Spender annotated a submission dealing with 
economic and social rights with the following comment:
88 Letter from Minister of Australian Mission to the UN to the Secretary, DEA, 29/9/50, in NAA A 
432/20, Item 54/3779 Pt 5.
89 Submission to Minister for External Affairs, annotated by Percy Spender, 24/10/50, in NAA 
A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 10.
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when dealing with social and economic rights it should always be stressed that such 
rights impose correlative duties, indeed, should be conditioned by such duties. It is 
proper therefore, that the Australian Delegation should bear these ‘duties’ in mind when 
directing its attention to ‘rights’. The idea that the so-called ‘welfare state’ exists to 
afford benefits to the people has to be corrected.90
With the brief comment, Spender implicitly rejected the previous orthodoxy. Social and 
economic rights were not to be considered free-standing rights o f individuals, but were 
one part of an equation and could not be separated from individuals’ duties. Indeed 
duties fashioned the shape of the economic and social rights.
Implicit in this statement was a belief that government did not exist to provide benefits 
to the people. Instead, the government had the power to confer benefits when and only 
when individuals fulfilled their duties to society. Economic and social rights 
themselves thus were not concerned with ensuring the individual received his/her 
entitlements, but were the means of codifying the mutual obligations between 
government and the individual. Within this system of mutuality, the government had a 
minimal role to play in providing for economic wellbeing. The primary obligation lay 
with the individual. It was a vision that was reflected in the amended proposals 
Australia advanced in relation to draft economic and social provisions.
(ii) Attitudes towards the Substance of Economic and Social Rights
In keeping with Spender’s pronouncement that economic and social rights were 
‘conditioned’ by duties, Australia proposed specific clauses embodying this relationship 
between rights and duties. In the March 1950 submission mentioned above, Spender 
suggested amendments to the ‘basic rights’ previously supported by Australia. As a 
result the Australian representative presented a revised set of rights to the Sixth Session
of the Commission on Human Rights in May 1950. They read:
1. Everyone shall have the right to work, and correlatively shall be under the duty to 
fulfil his obligations with respect to work for which he is voluntarily engaged. Each 
State shall take such measures as may be practical to ensure that all persons ordinarily 
resident in its territory have an opportunity for useful work.
2. In order to ensure fair and reasonable wages and working conditions in 
occupations where wages and conditions are not determined by collective bargaining, or
90 Submission to Minister for External Affairs, annotated by Percy Spender, 12/3/50, in NAA A 
1838/1, Item 895/3/12.
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other arrangements are not available against exceptionally low wages, the states shall 
establish and maintain machinery for fixing minimum wages and conditions.
3. Everyone shall have the right to social security which shall be guaranteed by the 
provision of social benefits, either in cash or in kind, assuring to every person at least 
the means of subsistence and, when necessary, adequate treatment in any common 
contingency occasioning the involuntary loss of income or its insufficiency to meet 
family necessities. The State may prescribe that all or any o f  such benefits may be 
provided under a general contributory system.
4. Everyone has the right to education. Free education shall be available for all, at 
least in elementary and fundamental stages, (emphasis added)91
In introducing these rights, HFE (Fred) Whitlam, Australia’s representative explained
the introduction of the ‘duty concept’ as follows:
Attention is invited to the statement of correlative duty in the first article. In the view of 
the Australian Delegation, it is appropriate and necessary that duty should be associated 
with right in the proposed article, and the Australian Delegation places emphasis on this 
mutuality o f obligation. Attention is also invited to the provision in the third article 
concerning a contributory system. In this respect, the Australian Delegation wishes to 
guard against any interpretation, or inference, that provision of social benefits should 
necessarily be independent of any individual contribution.92
Other delegations at the Commission on Human Rights were not convinced and
Whitlam did not press the point after his initial speech. This defeat, however, did not
affect Spender’s vision.
In advancing this ‘duties’ view, Spender was expressing a personal vision, rather than 
agreeing with departmental advice. Indeed in the aftermath of the Sixth Session (1950), 
Spender received stringent criticism of his stance. The Secretary of the Department of 
Labour and National Service, Dr Ian Sharp was openly critical of Spender’s suggested 
amendments for the right to work. First, he pointed out, the phraseology was out of 
keeping with the remainder of the Covenant. The Covenant dealt with rights that the 
State must ensure the individual had, whereas the insertion of a duty to fulfil work 
obligations widened the scope of the Covenant to cover the duties of an individual to an 
employer. Secondly, its inclusion together with enforcement clauses might legitimate 
international scrutiny of an individual’s actions. Dr Sharp argued that such a 
consequence would by contrary to Spender’s avowed intention to avoid undue 
international interference in matters of domestic jurisdiction. Thirdly, if the intention of 
introducing a duty to fulfil work obligations was to prevent strikes, Dr Sharp suggested
91 Cablegram APR Renouf to IG Sharp, of Labour and National Service, undated, in NAA A 1838/1, 
Item 929/4/4 Pt 1.
92 Copy in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 8; Summarised in UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 184, 3-4; 9 May 
1950.
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that the phrasing was inadequate. A strike could be considered the cessation of 
employment and thus outside a duty to fulfil work obligations. Fourthly, Dr Sharp 
indicated concern that the suggestion might give rise to an implication that a person is 
not under a duty with respect to work obligations which have not been voluntarily 
undertaken -  such as national service.93
In relaying these criticisms to a fellow officer for ultimate transmission to Spender,
Alan Renouf (then a junior officer of the Department of External Affairs) indicated that
he considered Sharp ‘to be right’.94 At the same time Renouf predicted that Spender
would not be receptive to Sharp’s point of view. Renouf was vindicated. When
informed of Sharp’s criticisms, Spender responded even more insistently:
The phrase may require some re-drafting but any right accorded by a State may be 
absolute or qualified. In my view it ought to be qualified by some duty whether in form 
above or another. I think we always tend these days to place emphasis on rights of 
individuals without any consideration of duties. To every right or for nearly every one 
there should be some correlative duty.95
Despite this affirmation of commitment, Whitlam as Australia’s representative appears 
to have exercised considerable latitude in adopting a low-key approach to the promotion 
of correlative rights-duties approach. In late April 1951, for instance, Whitlam reported 
that he had been unable to pursue the ‘duties’ point given that the delegations he was 
working with most closely (the United Kingdom, the United States and Denmark) 
considered that references to duties were illicit on policy grounds. Whitlam had thus 
been averse to raising the issue. He undertook that, should the Commission move to 
adopting a detailed form of rights, he would then push for inclusion o f references to 
duty.96 In the meantime, Whitlam expended his energy on minimising references to 
economic and social rights.
93 Letter from IG Sharp, Department of Labour and National Service to the Secretary, DEA, 29/3/51, 
inNAA A 1838/1, Item 929/4/4 Pt 1, see too summary in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 2.
94 Handwritten note from APR Renouf to T Pyman, date obscured, in NAA A 1838/1, 929/4/4 Pt 1.
95 Memorandum from AH Tange, DEA to Australian Representative to the Commission on Human 
Rights, 13/4/51, inNAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/10/6 Pt 1.
96 Cablegram from Australian Delegation to Human Rights Commission to DEA, 23/4/51, in NAA A 
1838/1, Item 856/10/10/6 Pt2.
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While adhering to an outward stance of support for the inseparability of economic and
social rights from their civil and political counterparts, Australia moved towards
advocacy for briefer, less specific economic and social rights. In May 1950, Whitlam
reiterated Australia’s support for economic and social rights in principle:
If freedom, justice and peace are not possible in the world without remedying such 
inequalities, as in effect the nations have declared, then economic and social rights must 
be regarded as inseparable from the rights which we have been considering -  mainly 
civil rights, and as having no less a claim to protection by law.97
Later in this speech, Whitlam concluded that it was not feasible nor ‘even desirable’ to
go beyond the basic rights suggested by Australia given the varieties of industrial and
social contexts in which the rights were to operate.98 Elaboration on a universal level
beyond basic terms was conceived as impossible ‘for a considerable period o f time.’99
His criticism was directed in particular at the more extensive formulation of rights being
advanced by the Yugoslavian and Soviet delegations, and indeed the original proposals
of Australia.
By April 1951 Australia was submitting that all the economic and social rights could be 
included within the one clause. Whitlam’s suggestion was for the Covenant to include 
the general clause:
Each State party to this covenant recognises that everyone has the right to education and 
cultural advancement, the right to physical and mental health, the right to work, the right 
to just and favourable conditions o f work, the right to rest and leisure, the right to an 
adequate standard of living and the right to social security.100
According to this proposal, the clause would be followed by two other clauses dealing
with implementation matters. In approach, this proposal was most similar to the
recommendations that had been made previously by the United States to keep
references to economic and social rights brief. A note by Arthur Tange in early 1950
reveals that Spender approved a fail-back position of supporting the United States’
position.101 Fred Whitlam, though appears to have been the person responsible for
97 Statement by Australia, ‘Economic and Social Rights’, Annexed to Report o f the Australian 
Representative to the Sixth Session, Commission on Human Rights, 30/5/50, Copy in NAA A 
1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 8.
98 Ibid. Whitlam did however, foreshadow, that more detailed provisions could be drafted by the 
International Labour Organisation.
99 HFE Whitlam, Australian Representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 184, 4; 9 May 1950.
100 L/CN.4/543, 18 April 1951.
101 Letter from AH Tange, for the Secretary DEA to External Affairs Officer, Australia House, London, 
22/3/50, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 5.
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activating this strategy. Whitlam worked with ‘friendly delegations’, in particular, the 
United States, the United Kingdom and Denmark102 to draft the list o f rights. This style 
o f clause was in keeping with Whitlam’s oft-expressed aversion to the imprecise 
language introduced by other delegations to give the Covenant ‘popular appeal’ and
1 A -l
‘philosophic content’. In the midst of the Department’s coming to terms with the 
unexpected departure of Percy Spender and the appointment o f Richard Casey as 
Minister for External Affairs, Whitlam’s initiative was not subject to critical comment. 
Australia by this time was firmly identified with those countries seeking limited 
economic and social rights.
Several o f the clauses regarded as problematic during the Evatt period continued to 
engender resistance. The equal pay clause and freedom of association clauses in 
particular evoked critical responses, though for slightly different reasons than in the 
Evatt period.
During the Spender period, the major issue for Australia in relation to the equal pay 
clause was not whether equal pay should or should not be given to women. It was 
whether the Commonwealth possessed the constitutional power to pass legislation 
dealing with equal pay. In the aftermath of the Commonwealth Arbitration Court’s 
rejection o f the equal pay claim in the Basic Wage case, 104 the Attorney-General’s 
Department had reached the conclusion that the High Court would probably invalidate 
any Commonwealth national legislation on the topic o f equal pay . 105 The Department 
of Labor and National Service remained hostile to the ‘glib and emotive’ nature of the 
‘equal pay’ phrase that would be taken by women’s organisations to mean ‘only one 
thing’. Their suggestion was to replace the term ‘equal pay’ with the phrase used by the
102 Cablegram from Australian Delegation to Human Rights Commission to DEA, 23/4/51, in NAA A 
1838/1, Item 856/10/10/6 Pt2.
103 Draft Report o f the Australian Representative to the Seventh Session to the Commission on Human 
Rights, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/10/6 Pt 3.
104 Basic Wage Inquiry 1949-1950, (1950) 68 CAR 698. The original judgment was handed down in 
March 1949 and a further ruling was handed down in April 1950.
105 Memorandum on Article 21 -  Equal Pay for Equal Work, undated, in NAA A 432/20, Item 54/3779 
Pt 6.
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International Labour Organisation, ‘equal remuneration for men and women workers 
for work of equal value’.106 It was a recommendation accepted by the Department of 
External Affairs and Spender and thus incorporated into the comments forwarded to the 
ECOSOC in 1951.107 It was clear, however, that the change of language was not 
intended to commit the Australian government to implementing equal pay for men and 
women, but was to be a method of obfuscating the debate.
Rights related to industrial organisation also received particular scrutiny. Spender and 
the Department of External Affairs feared the implications of the freedom of association 
guarantee for the recently introduced Anti-Communist Bill.10* Upon being notified that 
the Commission on Human Rights was proceeding with work on the freedom of 
association clause, the Department of External Affairs sent a cablegram to the 
Australian Mission to the United Nations informing them that the Department was 
reviewing the draft human rights articles in light of ‘recently introduced legislation’ in 
May 1950.109
Within the Australian bureaucracy, the Spender period is also noteworthy for the 
wariness displayed by Departments concerning the resource implications o f economic 
and social rights. The Department of Health described the right to social security 
through medical care as a ‘naturally desirable end’, but regarded the means of 
achievement o f this right as unclear and impossible under existing legislation.110 
Similarly, the Department of Social Security reported that whilst it agreed with the right 
to social security, an exception should be permitted for non-nationals.111 The fact that
106 Quoted in letter from AH Tange, Assistant Secretary, DEA to the Secretary, Attorney-General’s 
Department, 9/5/51, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 929/4/4/ Pt 1.
107 E/2059/Add 4. Note also that Australia continued to resist recognition o f the right to property when 
it was raised as an additional article.
108 Communist Party Dissolution Bill 1950 (Cth). This Bill is discussed more fully in Chapter 2. The 
Bill outlawed communist associations and allowed the State to seize the assets o f organisations 
declared to be communist.
109 Cablegram from DEA to Australian Mission to the UN, New York, 4/5/50, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 
856/13 Pt 8.
110 Memorandum from AJ Metcalfe, Director-General o f Health to the Secretary, DEA, 8/3/50, in NAA  
A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 8.
111 Quoted in Memorandum from the Secretary, DEA to the Secretary, Department o f Labour and 
National Service, 23/1/50, in NAA A 1838/278, Item 856/13/7 Pt 5.
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such feedback was received during the Spender period and not earlier could be regarded 
as reflective merely of the further drafting that had taken place on economic and social 
rights which made the resource implications more obvious than had been the case in the 
Evatt period. In the context o f a political mood-swing against expansive government 
intervention in the economic matters of individuals (discussed later), the comments of 
the Departments appear to have a broader significance.
To what extent can these changes be attributed to either the Cold War or Australia’s 
engagement with the Cold War? There is evidence that the Department of External 
Affairs took the Cold War into account in making recommendations concerning 
economic and social rights in 1950 and 1951. In its October 1950 submission to 
Spender, for instance, the Department of External Affairs noted that having two rival 
schemes o f rights (economic versus civil) would serve to divide rather than unite the 
East and West. The better (unifying) road they identified was to support one 
Covenant.112 In 1951, the delegation perceived itself taking a middle road between the 
United States and the USSR by proposing the inclusion of basic rights expressed in 
short, concise language with a separate scheme o f implementation. It is also evident 
that as a temporal matter, the issue of anti-communism within both the international 
arena and the domestic arena had great currency. 1950 saw the commencement of the 
Korean War. The 1949 election had been won by the Coalition in Australia at least 
partly on the basis of the Coalition’s anti-communist scare campaign that linked Labor’s 
socialist platform to the advancement of communism.114 The intensification of the Cold 
War appears to have contributed to an increased identification of Australia with its 
Western colleagues.115 Yet, the substance of the policies adopted by Australia reveals 
more anti-socialism than anti-communism. As such, they reflected less a response to
112 Submission to Minister of External Affairs, annotated by Percy Spender, 12/3/50, in NAA A 
1838/1, Item 895/3/12.
113 Report o f the Australian Representative to the Seventh Session o f the Commission on Human 
Rights, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/10/6 Pt 3.
114 C Hazlehurst, Menzies Observed, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1979, 315.
115 An example o f this identification is that in the October 1950 Submission prepared for Spender, the 
DEA drafted their recommendations in terms of Australia supporting the United Kingdom and the 
United States: Submission to Minister for External Affairs, annotated by Percy Spender, 24/10/50, 
in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 10.
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the Cold War than the ascendance of the political ideology of the Liberal Party which 
emphasised the role of the individual, rather than the government, in economic 
development. As Geoffrey Sawer noted, the values of the Menzies government were 
the ‘values.. .of modem conservatives in a welfare state whose main economic base is 
private enterprise’.1 lu
When the Liberal Party won government as part of a coalition with the Country Party, it
was still in its first bloom. Formed during the 1944-45 period from a coalition o f non-
Labor forces, it was committed to an individualist perspective on economic growth.
The private sector, rather than the government, had the major role to play in Australia’s
economic development. The objectives of the Party agreed upon at the October 1944
Conference (in which the Liberal Party gained its name) capture the prevailing
ideology. The third objective of the party was stated as striving to have a country:
3. In which an intelligent, free and liberal Australian democracy shall be maintained by:
(c) freedom o f citizens to choose their own way o f living and of life, subject to the rights 
of others;
(d) protecting the people against exploitation;
(e) looking primarily to the encouragement of individual initiative and enterprise as the 
dynamic force of reconstruction and progress.117
From this objective, the State was given some role in protecting people against
exploitation. However, clearly it was up to individuals to take up the challenge of
pursuing their initiatives. The use of the term ‘freedom’ too seems deliberate and
I 1 o
evocative o f John Stuart Mill type notions of freedom. The State’s role was to 
minimise its intervention in individuals’ lives. Prosperity was linked to the growth of 
good relations between employers and employees, with the Party striving to have a 
country ‘in which employer and employee have a sense o f common interest and duty,
116 G Sawer, ‘The United Nations’ in G Greenwood, N Harper (eds), Australia in World Affairs, Vol 2: 
1956-1960, FW Cheshire, Melbourne, 1963, 145.
117 Forming the Liberal Party ofAustralia: Record of the Conference of Representatives o f Non- 
Labour Organisations, Canberra, mimeo, October 1944; University o f Queensland collection. The 
Liberal Party’s platform is also extracted in DM White, The Philosophy o f the Australian Liberal 
Party, Hutchinson, Melbourne, 1978, 25-21.
118 John Stuart Mill posited that there was a sphere of action in which the individual had a paramount 
interest and the society little, if  any interest. This sphere of action included an individual’s domain 
of consciousness, liberty of tastes and movement, and the freedom to unite. The only basis on 
which interference with this sphere could be justified was self-protection (either individual or 
collective): see JS Mill, On Liberty, ed by S Collini, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1989, 13,15.
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and share as co-operators in all advances to prosperity, and in which living standards 
rise steadily as physical resources expand and ingenuity grows’ . 119 The platform spoke 
o f the need for social provision to be made but stipulated that it would be made ‘on a 
contributory basis’ . 120 Employment at good wages was to be available to ‘all willing 
and able to work ’ . 121 The Liberal Party’s initial leader, Robert Menzies explained that 
development was the result o f initiative, risk-taking and ambition. He discounted the 
role o f government by stating:
These things are not produced by Government Departments or by learned clerks. They 
will be produced in the future as in the past by letting the citizen understand that there 
are still rewards for the courageous and the intelligent and the vigorous and that the 
enterprise of the individual citizen is still the essential foundation o f the development o f  
the State.122
As a party that grew out of a coalition of non-Labor forces, the Liberal Party was 
vigorously opposed to policies that were associated with the Labor Party including the 
nationalisation o f industry and extensive state engineering of the economy. It was a 
particularly strong commitment in the context of the previous battles that had been 
fought concerning bank nationalisation. 123 Thus in engineering a shift to Australia’s 
economic and social rights policies, Spender was pursuing a distinct Liberal Party 
vision of small government supporting individual initiative. The Cold War undoubtedly 
helped to intensify the commitment to defeating socialism in Australia. However, the 
transformation in Australian policies owed more to domestic political ideologies than 
super-power rivalries.
III. Casey and Bureaucratic Period
In the fifteen years following the departure of Spender as Minister for External Affairs, 
many of the trends commenced under Spender continued. Notwithstanding that defeat
119 Clause 7, ibid.
120 Clause 8, ibid.
121 Clause 6, ibid.
122 RG Menzies’ 1946 electoral speech quoted in I McAllister, R Moore (eds), Party Strategy and 
Change: Australian Electoral Speeches Since 1946, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1991, 163.
123 As to the mobilising effect o f the Labor government’s attempts to nationalise banks (attempts which 
were ultimately held unconstitutional by the High Court and the Privy Council), see G Henderson, 
Menzies ’ Child: The Liberal Party of Australia, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1994, 96-97.
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was all but conceded in gaining recognition of ‘correlative duties’, Australia moved 
further away from the equality of all forms of rights, being more explicit about the 
aspirational, non-legal nature o f rights. Emphasis was placed on the ‘progressive’ 
nature of economic and social rights and an aversion displayed to economic and social 
rights having resource implications. With the increase in bureaucratisation of policy 
development came an increase in policies designed to cocoon domestic policies from 
the reach of economic and social rights. All vestiges o f Evatt’s enthusiasm to use 
international economic and social rights to transform society disappeared as policy­
makers sought to keep economic and social rights ‘at a safe distance’.
(i) Attitudes Towards Economic and Social Rights
It is difficult to draw a clear line in policy development between the end o f Spender’s 
period and the beginning of Richard Casey’s period as Minister for External Affairs. 
Casey’s appointment came in the midst of the Seventh Session o f the Commission on 
Human Rights in 1951. The Department of External Affairs recommended to Casey 
that Australia approve a separate part in the Covenant dealing with economic and social 
rights. Casey was told of the Department’s fear that omission o f such a part in the 
Covenant would lead to pressure to work out new instruments entirely devoted to 
economic and social rights and thus tending to cover ground already effectively covered 
by specialised agencies including the International Labour Organisation. As a further 
argument, the Department reported that Australia had been resisting pressure from 
South American countries in the International Labour Organisation to embark on a 
broad convention or recommendation embracing labour and social rights. Inclusion of 
economic and social rights in the Covenant would be o f assistance in preventing such a 
development. Casey agreed that Australia should continue to support a separate part to 
the one Covenant unless in doing so Australia would become isolated.124
124 Submission to the Minister on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 11/5/51, in NAA A 1838/1, 
856/10/10/6 Pt 2.
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Australia’s position on this issue was to change in late 1951, in the lead up to the
General Assembly’s reconsideration of the matter. As of November 1951 the
Department o f External Affairs wrote to Fred Whitlam reaffirming its neutrality:
Departmentally we appreciate that, technically, the present draft could quite readily be 
divided into two draft conventions, particularly if our views were adopted regarding the 
application of the two implementation methods. However, we do not have any strong 
views on the matter and consider that circumstances on the spot, together with the brief 
should enable the Delegation to make a recommendation to the Minister as between the 
alternatives.125
By December 1951 Whitlam was reporting that he regarded the paramount
consideration for Australia to be ‘not to do anything which might jeopardize the chance
of providing for twin covenants’. By the 1951 General Assembly debates, the
Australian representative, Ralph Harry, stated categorically a new attitude to the issue: 
The Australian Government has always been of the view that the obligations of states 
with regard to economic and social rights should be set out in a separate instrument, not 
of less importance, not less urgent, but separately formulated because of the essential 
difference in its obligations.127
Ralph Harry’s speech is interesting not only for its rather ahistoric view of Australia’s
attitude, but for its summation of Australia’s acceptance that economic and social and
social rights were ‘essentially different’. In the 1953 Commission on Human Rights
Brief for the Ninth Session, an outline of this ‘essential difference’ was provided:
Most of the members of the Commission also appear to recognise that ‘rights’ as applied 
in the economic and social field are somewhat different from rights in the civil and 
political field, being more in the nature of aspirations to be achieved over a period of 
time. In brief, the word ‘right’ is being used here in the limited sense of not bestowing 
specific rights sanctioned by law but of laying down desirable standards which States 
should aspire to attain.128
The difference was thus not merely in the means of implementation, but in the very 
nature of the categories of rights. Economic and social rights were not ‘true rights’, but 
merely standards or aspirations. It was an understanding that was nascent in Australia’s 
policy in relation to implementation of economic and social rights during the Spender
125 Memorandum from TA Pyman to Australian Delegation to the Sixth Session of the UN General 
Assembly, Paris, 6/11/51, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/22.
126 Minute of Meeting between HFE Whitlam and TA Pyman, 17/12/51, in NAA A 432/20, Item 
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127 Copy of Statement in NAA A 1838/1, 856/13/10/7 Pt 2. A summarised version is reported at UN 
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period, 129 but was not stated more explicitly in later years. It was to underlie Australian 
policy development until the finalisation of the Covenants.
The issue o f correlative duties was permitted to die a quiet death. Soon after Casey was 
appointed Minister, the Department of External Affairs sought to gain policy approval 
for a move away from insistence on the inclusion of correlative duties in substantive 
rights o f the ICESCR. The Department argued that efforts had not succeeded to date 
and that Fred Whitlam had reached the conclusion that the only realistic opportunity to 
introduce the concept of duties would be in the context of drafting an introductory 
article or an obligations clause. 130 Casey was not entirely persuaded. On the 
Ministerial Submission presented to him, he wrote: T agree entirely with the need to 
integrate rights and duties. Stress -  but not to the extent of isolating us from our 
principal friends’ . 131 Casey was concerned in particular about the attitude of the United 
Kingdom and the United States. 132
Faced with this direction, Fred Whitlam did not press the duties-related wording 
favoured by Spender. He supported more modest drafting changes. In relation to the 
right to work, for instance, Whitlam voted in favour of the French qualification that a 
person have the right to work ‘if  he so desires’. As he later explained to the 
Department, he saw such an amendment as having the virtue o f limiting government 
responsibility to the obligation of creating favourable economic conditions to support 
employment rather than provide individuals with work ‘as a hand out’. Consistently 
with his earlier prediction that it might be possible to address the duties point in the 
preamble, Whitlam drafted an amendment, in consultation with Sweden for submission 
to the Eighth Session of the Commission on Human Rights. A joint text was produced
129 See Chapter 6.
130 Submission to the Minister for External Affairs, ‘Inclusion o f Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
in the Draft Covenant’, 11/5/51, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/10/6 Pt 2.
131 Ibid.
132 Cablegram from DEA to Australian Delegation, Geneva, 21/5/51, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 
856/13/10/6 Pt 2. See too Report o f the Australian Delegate to the Seventh Session o f the 
Commission on Human Rights, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/10/7 Pt 1.
133 Report o f  the Australian Delegate to the Seventh Session o f the Commission on Human Rights, in 
NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/10/7 Pt 1.
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which was tabled and accepted by Chile and Yugoslavia.134 The duties issue was not to 
be raised again by the Australian delegation.
(ii) Attitudes towards the Substance of Economic and Social Rights
Australia made little original contribution to the substance of economic and social rights 
to be included in the ICESCR from mid-1951 to 1966. In the debates on the content of 
economic and social rights, held primarily in 1956-7 and 1962, Australia tended to 
volunteer minor drafting amendments rather than propose substantive substitute texts. 
Casey and his successors did not introduce policy directives o f their own concerning the 
substance of rights. Policies thus seem to reflect the largely uncritical adoption o f 
policies adopted by Spender, Whitlam and the Department of External Affairs in the 
early 1950s.135
The first feature of Australian contributions to debates on the substance of economic 
and social rights during this period is the emphasis on a limited role for government in 
interfering in the private sector. In relation to the draft discrimination clause, the right 
to work clause, the right to an adequate standard of living clause and the right of trade 
unions to function freely, objections were stated on the basis o f fixed State roles. In 
relation to the right to work, for instance, it was suggested that government could carry 
out only limited activities in a field dominated by private employers. It was not 
appropriate for the government to take on a role interfering between management and 
employees and interfering in the procedures of the arbitration tribunal.136 Similarly, in 
relation to trade union rights, it was said that trade unions were properly outside the 
realm of the State and that any government action, even to protect the functioning of the 
trade union, would constitute undue interference in the private sphere.137 This
134 UN Doc E/CN.4/L 171.
135 Indeed from 1955 until 1965, the section on economic and social rights in the Briefs prepared for 
Australian representatives to the Third Committee o f the General Assembly remained virtually 
identical.
136 White, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 1205, 351; 7 December 1962.
137 RN Hamilton, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 723, 213, 7 January 1957. Additional 
particular issues with the ICESCR are raised in other Chapters of this thesis -  see Chapter 3 
concerning migrant work contracts, and Chapter 5 concerning the need for federal-state and colonial 
application clauses.
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consolidation of visions of the proper realms of the private and public dovetailed with 
the ‘small government’ approach of the Spender period.
The second feature is the overriding concern of Australian policy to have economic and 
social rights drafted in such a way as to minimise their impact on domestic policies (of a 
budgetary, legislative or policy variety). Although Whitlam gained a reputation as 
being a pedant in relation to drafting,138 his frequent interventions on the form of 
clauses seem primarily motivated by his desire to safeguard Australian laws. The 
Department of External Affairs coordinated consultation with Commonwealth 
departments and state justice departments to provide a compilation of comments and 
concerns. The compilation reproduced in the 1955 Brief for the General Assembly 
served as the basis for the submissions of Australian representations during the later 
debates. Thus for instance, equal pay continued to be resisted on the basis that though it 
might command wide support as an objective, ‘many States’ would find it difficult to 
apply.139 Resurrected proposals for a right to property were rejected on the basis that 
they would restrict the exercise of legitimate powers in a democratic State.140 The 
inclusion o f detailed obligations concerning the right to education was also resisted, 
given the problems that would be encountered in meeting such obligations in 
Australia.141 The Brief also noted other concerns which arose from state legislation 
such as the employment of children aged 14-16 years, a practice that was to be taken 
into account in debates on any prohibition on child labour.142
The fact that Briefs were dominated by ‘shopping lists’ of concerns without major 
comment or analysis is indicative of the preference afforded to protection of domestic
138 G Sawer, ‘Problems of Australian Foreign Policy: June 1956 -  June 1957’ (1957) 3 Australian 
Journal o f Politics and History 1, 9.
139 RN Hamilton, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 716, 176; 20 December 1956.
140 HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 413, 8-9; 25 February 1954
141 Australia opposed in particular the imposition of an obligation on governments to provide a two 
year plan in relation to the implementation of its education responsibilities: T Pyman, Australian 
representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 789, 138; 23 October 1957. This topic is also dealt with in 
Chapter 4.
142 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the Seventh Session o f the Commission on Human Rights, in 
NAA A 1838/1,856/13/7 Pt2.
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practices from the scope of international scrutiny. Rather than the negotiation of these 
international instruments providing an opportunity for the reconsideration of domestic 
policies or a looking to the international instruments as a tool for transforming current 
practices (as in Evatt’s period), priority was given to ensuring non-interference with 
existing practices and policies. Even when there was dispute as between the Federal 
and state authorities as to appropriate policy, as in the case o f the ‘preference to 
unionism’ question, a choice was not made between the two policies. Instead, the 
preferred solution was to have wording adopted that permitted states to choose their 
own policies in the area.143 Not all concerns raised in the Briefs appear to have been 
raised in open debate. This in turn reflects the third feature o f the period -  an emphasis 
on the fact that economic and social rights needed only to be ‘progressively 
implemented’.
In both public international arenas and within the context of Australian governmental 
consultations, Australia unflinchingly stressed the non-immediate nature of any future 
economic and social rights. In addition to categorising economic and social rights as 
‘aspirational’ (discussed above), a vigilant watch was maintained to ensure the 
progressive implementation obligation embodied in the draft Covenant was not eroded. 
Thus, in relation to debates on the right to an adequate standard o f living, the Australian 
representative, Robert Hamilton, expressed concern that the proposed draft lost sight of 
the progressive nature of the obligation.144 In an inter-departmental committee meeting 
held in July 1951, for instance, Whitlam explained the ‘progressive implementation’ 
clause. The minutes record that all agreed progressive implementation was 
‘essential’.145 Similarly, in 1952, in the official publication o f the Department of
143 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the 10th Session of the General Assembly, NAA A 462/21, 
Item 575/1.
144 RN Hamilton, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 743, 310; 28 January 1957. The initial 
language used by Australian representatives to support progressive implementation was often in the 
form that this was needed in recognition of the limited resources o f many countries of the world -  a 
generalised, rather than specific or personal plea: see eg Copy of Statement by Australian 
representative on Article 2 of the Draft Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, circa 
1/12/55, in NAA A 432/68, 68/2797 Pt 3.
145 Notes o f  Interdepartmental Meeting on Draft Covenant on Human Rights, 20/7/51, in NAA A 
1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt2.
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External Affairs, Current Notes, Western countries’ emphasis on the progressive 
implementation of economic and social rights was described as ‘realistic’.146 Despite 
the opposition of the Soviets and Latin Americans, it was concluded that a majority of 
the Commission appeared to accept the rights were directly related to resources and 
gradual technological advance.147 Other Departments were quick to adopt this outlook. 
As early as 1952, for instance, the Department of Social Security noted the view of the 
Department o f External Affairs that this clause would excuse discrimination on the 
basis of nationality in pension distributions.148 Indeed by 1967, when explaining the 
effect of the ICESCR obligation clause to Commonwealth and State Departments, the 
progressive implementation clause was identified as the most important feature of the
149Covenant.
The Cold War was undoubtedly a lens through which Australian policy-makers viewed 
divisions on the international level. By 1954, the Briefs referred to ‘the Western point 
of view’ in relation to the order in which the Covenants should be finalised.150 It was 
assumed that Australia was in the Western group. Rising tensions in international arena 
may also have contributed to the decline in interest of Liberal Ministers in the 
negotiations o f the International Bill of Rights. However, the Cold War is not a 
sufficient explanation for the growing caution evident in Australian policy. The 
crystallisation of tendencies evident in the Spender period and the adoption of a greater 
caution with respect to domestic policies seem referable to the position faced by 
bureaucrats in developing human rights policy. It is likely that bureaucrats such as Fred 
Whitlam and his successors would have sought to anticipate the policies appealing to
146 (1952) 23 Current Notes 340.
147 Report o f  the Australian Representative to the Eighth Session o f the Commission on Human Rights, 
in NAA A 1838/1, 856/13/10/7 Pt 2A. The opposition to the ‘progressive’ element was attributed by 
the author o f the report to the pursuit o f (anti-West) propaganda purposes.
148 Letter from FH Rowe, Director-General, Department of Social Services to the Acting Secretary, 
DEA, 31/7/51, in NAA A1838/1, Item 929/4/4 pt 2. Emphasis on the progressive nature of 
economic and social rights was also noticeable in the responses received by the DEA in 1966 from 
other Commonwealth Departments: see for example, Minute from JD Petherbridge to MR Booker, 
15/12/66, International Covenants on Human Rights, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 929/4 Pt 22.
149 Memorandum on the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 19/6/67, 
authored by P Brazil, AA A 446/165, Item 1970/76776.
150 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the Ninth Session o f the Commission on Human Rights, in 
NAA A 1838/1,856/13/10/8/1.
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their political superiors. Hence the emphasis on limited government. In addition, in the 
absence o f specific direction, bureaucrats would have been reluctant to commit the 
government to any policies with resource implications. Thus the bureaucratisation of 
policy-development was a powerful influence in shaping a conservative approach to 
economic and social rights.
Conclusion
This Chapter has shown the insufficiency of existing generali sed accounts of Western 
States’ responses to economic and social rights to explain the shifts in Australian 
policies towards economic and social rights. Behind the continuous areas of resistance 
revealed in this Chapter were not ideological forces, but bipartisan concerns to 
safeguard sensitive policies, particularly those concerning wage structures and 
governmental power to acquire property. Similarly, whilst the divergences of approach 
of Australian State actors at times were clothed in the language o f East-West conflict, 
an examination of the shifts in policy reveal the importance of fundamentally different 
conceptualisations of the basis of economic and social rights. Evatt, with his Labor- 
Party inspired belief in a socialist transformation of society for the benefit of 
individuals, was receptive to and encouraging of the drafting of broad economic and 
social rights. His Liberal successors were hostile to the exercise o f centralised power 
and envisaged government’s role as protecting an individual’s right to pursue his/her 
economic goals. Once policy development became dominated by bureaucrats, priority 
was given to narrowing the scope of economic and social rights in order to protect pre­
existing federal and state government interests. The result was an increasing emphasis 
on the ‘progressive’ nature of economic and social rights and a total disengagement 
with any notion o f the recognition of economic and social rights being the catalyst for 
the creation o f enforceable legal rights. The interpretation likely to be given to the 
finalised text of the ICESCR by bureaucrats in 1966 was thus profoundly different from 
that likely to have been given by Evatt and his Labor colleagues in 1949.
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Chapter 2
Civil and Political Rights
Introduction
This Chapter focuses on Australian policy towards the development of civil and 
political rights in the UDHR and the ICCPR. It is one area in which Australia might 
have been expected to proffer continuous support. Often described as ‘first-generation’ 
rights to draw attention to their long heritage,1 civil and political rights are assumed to 
be easily accommodated into legal systems which emphasise the rule o f law and the 
importance of individual liberties. Even within what I have previously termed the ‘Cold 
War account’ of human rights development, Western States are viewed as having 
championed civil and political rights ‘as being the foundation o f liberty and democracy 
in the “free world’” .2 It appears as quite a contrast, therefore, to note that when the 
clauses of the ICCPR were finalised, Australian delegates abstained from six 
substantive rights and opposed two clauses outright.3 This level of opposition raises the 
question: how supportive of civil and political rights was the Australian State during 
the negotiations o f the International Bill of Rights?
The analysis carried out in this Chapter reveals that Australian policy was indeed 
marked by a level of comfort with the recognition o f civil and political rights. From 
1950 onwards, Australia was even proclaiming such rights to be the ‘gift’ o f the 
Western nations to less-developed nations. Somewhat paradoxically, as the intensity of 
Australian support for civil and political rights increased, so too did Australia’s 
reservations about the scope of rights being proposed. Throughout the period of
See for example, DJ Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law  (4th ed), Sweet and Maxwell, 
London, 1991, 601. The term ‘second generation rights’ is used commonly to distinguish economic, 
social and cultural rights, from ‘first generation’ civil and political rights. Rights such as the right to 
a clean environment and the right to peace have frequently been termed called ‘third generation 
rights’.
MCR Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1995, 8-9. See also the discussion in the Introduction to Chapter 1.
Australia abstained on Articles 2,6,7,12,14 and 24 o f the ICCPR. It voted against Articles 1 and 20. 
The bases o f Australia’s objections are outlined in a memorandum o f Patrick Brazil on the ICCPR, 
19/6/67, in NAA A 446/165, Item 1970/76776.
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negotiations Australia fought against a number o f rights, in particular those likely to 
conflict with Australian immigration and indigenous policies and those that restricted 
freedom of expression and information. During the Spender, Casey and Bureaucratic 
periods, however, the number of clauses considered unacceptable grew as Australia 
stressed a traditional ‘civil liberties’ view of civil and political rights. While 
international pressures served to rein in some of Australia’s reservations, Australia’s 
relationship with civil and political rights remained one of ambivalent enthusiasm.
Overview of the International Debate
There was little debate during the negotiations o f the International Bill o f Rights as to 
either the legitimacy of the category of civil and political rights or the suitability of such 
rights to be contained within international instruments.4 When the UDHR was drafted it
contained over 20 civil and political rights. These included:
(a) equality rights: the right not to be discriminated against on specified 
grounds, equality before the law and equal protection of the law;
(b) bodily integrity and liberty rights: the right to life, liberty and security, the 
prohibition on torture and cruel and unusual punishment/treatment, 
prohibition on arbitrary interferences with privacy,
(c) criminal justice rights: the prohibition on arbitrary arrest, detention and 
exile, the right to a fair and public hearing (in criminal maters), the 
presumption of innocence and the prohibition of retrospective criminal 
laws;
(d) status rights', the right to recognition before the law, the right to nationality, 
the right to seek and enjoy asylum;
(e) social and activity rights', freedom o f movement, the right to leave any 
country and return to one’s own country, freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion, freedom of opinion and expression (though subject to 
limitations concerning incitement to discrimination), freedom of assembly, 
marriage rights, cultural rights, rights o f minorities and self-determination;5 
and
For a full account of the drafting of civil and political rights in the International Bill o f Rights, see 
MJ Bossuyt, Guide to the ‘Travaux Preparatoires ’ o f the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1987; M Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: CCPR Commentary, NP Engel, Kehl, 1993; J Morsink, The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1999; 
V Pechota, ‘The Development o f the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ in L Henkin, The 
International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Columbia University 
Press, New York, 1981.
Because o f their significance as collective rights and areas of particular interest to the Australian 
delegation, the two topics o f rights of minorities and the right o f peoples to self-determination are 
dealt with separately in Chapter 3.
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(f) political rights', participation in public life, government and the right to 
vote.6
For the most part, the ICCPR refined and elaborated these rights. Additional rights 
were also drafted, including a specific reference to the equal right of men and women to 
enjoy rights, a right to be treated with humanity when in detention, a prohibition on 
imprisonment on the grounds o f contractual debt, procedural protection for aliens facing 
expulsion, a right of compensation for wrongful conviction, a more specific prohibition 
on war propaganda, and the advocacy of hate speech, and clauses mandating special 
protection to be given to the family and children.
Initial debates over the framing of civil and political rights for the UDHR took place in 
1948. In 1949-1952, discussion focused more on economic and social rights and self- 
determination. Detailed consideration of civil and political rights did not resume until 
the Ninth Session of the Commission on Human Rights in 1953. In 1954, a draft 
ICCPR text was conveyed to the General Assembly. The Third Committee of the 
General Assembly scrutinised the clauses from 1958 to 1961. Sporadically, work 
carried out by specialist bodies of the ECOSOC spilled into deliberations of the 
Covenant- work on the Draft Freedom of Information Convention being one example. 
There was also overlap between discussions on the ICCPR and ICESCR given the 
inclusion o f some common provisions.7 By 1962, however, the text of the substantive 
provisions o f the ICCPR was largely settled. In 1966, the General Assembly adopted 
the ICCPR.
The process o f categorisation is problematic -  many rights can be characterised in several ways -  
for example, the right to seek and enjoy asylum might be considered a political right, a social right 
or a status right. Similarly the prohibition on torture might be considered to be primarily a criminal 
justice right. This categorisation is designed simply to highlight the variety o f interests protected 
by civil and political rights. Paul Sieghart has commented on the difficulty in classifying rights, in 
opting for ‘purely functional’ divisions: P Sieghart, The International Law o f  Human Rights, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983, 127.
Of such overlapping rights, this Chapter deals only with the right o f non-discrimination. Freedom 
of association has been dealt with in Chapter 1. The right o f self-determination is dealt with in 
Chapter 3.
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I. Evatt period
Civil and political rights do not appear to have excited the passion of Evatt or early 
Australian delegates. Evatt gave no specific directions as to civil and political rights 
clauses. Few public statements were made by Australian delegates on point. On the 
occasions where delegates did offer drafting suggestions, however, their contributions 
indicated an ease with the recognition of broad rights in the civil and political fields and 
an enthusiasm for governmental action to guarantee the enjoyment o f civil and political 
rights. Three exceptions to this equanimity are noteworthy. First, there was discomfort 
with proposed limitations on freedom of expression and information. Secondly, 
Australian delegates baulked at the inclusion of any right that would interfere with 
Australia’s immigration policies. Thirdly, while endorsing principles of equality, 
Australian delegates sought to limit the application o f civil and political rights that 
would interfere with the application of discriminatory policies, particularly those 
instituted with respect to indigenous people in Australia and Australia’s external 
territories.
Neither the Australian departmental files, delegates’ reports nor the official United 
Nations records display evidence of detailed Australian contributions to the drafting of 
the civil and political rights in the UDHR or early drafts of the Covenant. As noted 
elsewhere, Australia’s decision to focus attention on implementation issues provides a 
partial explanation o f this reticence.8 The limited number of statements is also 
consistent with a certain complacency about the recognition o f civil and political rights. 
Internal memoranda of the Australian Mission to the United Nations confirm a high 
level of acceptance o f such rights. In EJR Heyward’s memorandum dealing with 
economic and social rights, for instance, civil and political rights were given cursory
As noted in Chapter 1, when in 1947 the Commission opted to establish three working groups to 
focus on the drafting of the Declaration, the drafting o f the Covenant and implementation issues 
respectively, Australia elected to have primary representation on the working group concerned with 
implementation issues.
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attention. Civil rights were described as having been secured ‘during the 17th and 18th 
centuries by the bourgeois sectors who obtained political power through their economic 
strength -  thus having enough economic security to enjoy those rights’.9 Apart from the 
negative overtones of the reference to being the product o f ‘bourgeois agitation’, the 
statement does not purport to challenge the legitimacy o f the rights. Instead, the 
impression created was that civil and political rights were well-established, such that 
attention should be focused on other outstanding issues such as the protection of 
economic and social rights.
Looking at the limited drafting contributions that were made by Australian delegates in 
this field, it is evident that Australian policy endorsed broad government responsibility 
to further the realisation of civil and political rights. Governments were to take steps, 
legislative steps if necessary, to protect individuals from both governmental and private 
interference with civil and political rights. In relation to discussions on a prohibition on 
interference with an individual’s reputation in the Commission on Human Rights, for 
instance, the Australian delegate suggested amending the clause so that it referred to an 
individual’s right to ‘protection under law from interference with reputation’ (emphasis 
added).10 Similarly, in relation to prohibitions on (arbitrary) detention, the Australian 
delegate referred to the need to protect the individual against detention ‘by anyone’, not 
simply State officials.* 11 Furthermore, Australia displayed a commitment to eliminating 
at least some current state practices such as the death penalty. Members o f the Third 
Committee o f the General Assembly were informed that whilst the death penalty 
remained on the statute books of several Australian states, the Australian Labor Party 
was committed to its abolition and would have no problem in committing to the
1 9progressive abolition of the death penalty as part of the right to life.
Letter from Australian Mission to the United Nations (EJR Heyward) to the Secretary, DEA, 
11/6/48, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 3.
10 EJR Heyward, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/SR 36, 7; 19 May 1948.
11 EJR Heyward, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/SR 40, 7; 19 May 1948.
12 Alan Watt, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 103, 151; 15 October 1948.
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The Australian preference was to have civil and political rights drafted with precision so 
that individuals would know the extent of their rights. It was a preference, however, 
that gave way at times to a pragmatic desire to have clauses adopted by a majority. A 
classic example o f this was the Australian approach to the prohibition on detention 
ultimately contained in Article 9(1) of the ICCPR. Australia, along with other 
delegations including Belgium, Denmark, France, Lebanon and the United Kingdom, 
engaged in debate concerning the circumstances in which detention was permissible and 
thus not a contravention of an individual’s rights. The 1948 Session of the Commission 
on Human Rights had suggested a clause with seven detailed exceptions including 
detention o f aliens awaiting deportation, the detention o f convicted criminals and the 
custody of minors by their parents.13 The United Kingdom in 1949 submitted a further 
text including additional exceptions. When it was apparent that the Commission on 
Human Rights was unlikely to reach agreement on a detailed listing, the Australian 
representative, John Hood, offered compromise wording: ‘No one shall be subject to 
arbitrary arrest or detention’.14 The proposal was accepted unanimously.15
At a philosophical level, there was some questioning of the legitimacy o f rights that 
limited freedom of expression and freedom of information. Disquiet was voiced, for 
instance, over a prohibition on incitement of discrimination in the UDHR. The 
Australian delegation agreed with New Zealand that ‘incitement to discrimination’ was 
unduly vague and might be interpreted so as to infringe the right to expression.16 
Similarly Australia abstained on a proposal that stated: ‘ [fjreedom of speech and the 
press shall not be used for purposes of propagating Fascism aggression and for 
provoking hatred as between Nations’.17 While affirming Australia’s abhorrence of 
war-mongering, the delegation argued that strict censorship and legal penalties were not
13 See UN Doc E/800, Article 9; ECOSOC OR, 7th Session, Supp 2 (1948).
14 JDL Hood, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR95, 10; 20 May 1949. The Australian 
proposal went on to allow for a list o f exceptions, but was not voted on by the Commission on 
Human Rights: see MJ Bossuyt, op cit, 194.
15 MJ Bossuyt, op cit, 194.
16 Cablegram from Australian Delegation to the UN to DEA, 26/10/48, in NAA A 1838/1, 856/13 Pt 5.
17 Cablegram Australian Delegation to the UN, Paris, to DEA 11/11/48, in NAA A 1838/1, 856/13 Pt 
5.
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the preferred means of deterrence. Instead States should encourage the freest 
dissemination o f information so as to combat such undesirable expression. Despite 
Sir Frederick Eggleston warning the Department of External Affairs that unrestrained 
access to freedom of information might lead to Australia being swamped by ‘news and 
information having a foreign slant’, Australian delegates remained committed to 
unrestricted freedom of expression and freedom of information. 19 By way of contrast, 
Australia was willing to limit the scope o f rights to protect existing immigration 
policies.
After World War Two, the Australian federal government embarked upon an ambitious 
programme o f encouraging immigration to Australia. Reception o f migrants to 
Australia was promoted domestically as being necessary to overcome shortages of 
personnel for the reconstruction process and to limit Australia’s vulnerability to 
occupation. The dominant slogan used by the Minister for Immigration, Arthur 
Calwell, was that Australia must ‘populate or perish’. Yet, it was a limited form of 
immigration that was encouraged. Racial bars instituted under the White Australia 
Policy20 were continued in a modified form. Only when it became clear that an 
insufficient number o f British residents would be able to travel to Australia to fulfil 
Australia’s needs was an invitation extended to European displaced persons. Asian 
and African migrants remained unwelcome. Those who received assistance for their 
passage to Australia were required to comply with government directions as to where to 
live and where to work in their first two years in Australia.
18 Ibid.
19 Synopsis o f  paper by Sir Frederick Eggleston, prepared by A Loomes o f the DEA for inclusion in 
Draft Brief, 28/7/48, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 5.
20 The White Australia Policy is the term commonly given to the restrictive policies instituted under 
the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 (Cth) to prevent persons of non-Anglo Celtic backgrounds 
being admitted to Australia. As to the origins of the policy, see KM Dallas, ‘The Origins o f “White 
Australia’” (1955) 27(1) Australian Quarterly 43.
21 Even then, the initial preference was for Europeans from the Baltic States, with Europeans from 
other countries being accepted in subsequent years: G Bolton, The Oxford History of Australia, vol 
5, 1942-1988, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1990, 55.
22 G Bolton, ‘ 1939-1951’ in FK Crowley (ed), A New History o f Australia, Heinemann, Melbourne, 
1974,482.
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In seeking to insulate these policies from international criticism, Australia consistently 
opposed clauses that restricted a State’s ability to determine freely its immigration 
policy. Australia thus opposed the UDHR’s recognition of a ‘right of asylum’. The 
Department of Immigration had conveyed their concerns about such a right in no 
uncertain terms :
If it is intended to mean that any person or body of persons who may suffer 
persecution in a particular country shall have the right to enter another country 
irrespective of their suitability as settlers in the second country this would not be 
acceptable to Australia as it would be tantamount to the abandonment o f the right 
which every Sovereign State possesses to determine the composition o f it’s own 
population, and who shall be admitted to its territories.23
In the debate on the UDHR in the Third Committee of the General Assembly, the
Australian delegation supported the deletion of any reference to an individual’s right to
be ‘granted asylum ’ .24 Support was given to an alternate formulation that recognised
an individual’s right to ‘seek and enjoy’ asylum without imposing any obligation on a
'y/r
particular State to grant asylum. Similar questioning took place with respect to the 
implications of recognising an individual’s right to nationality. Only when it became 
clear to the Australian delegation in Committee discussion that a State would remain 
free to determine the preconditions for nationality was Australian support 
forthcoming.26 Even the right of men and women to marry was questioned on the basis 
that it might imply married couples had the right to live together in a country in which 
one of them was resident or eligible for admission. The Australian Mission to the 
United Nations was directed that only if it was made clear that the obligation extended 
only to not preventing such persons leaving a country in order to be together could the 
clause be supported. Similarly, Australia objected to an unqualified prohibition on
23 Memorandum from THE Heyes, Secretary, Department o f Immigration to the Secretary, DEA, 
17/3/48, in NAA A 1838/1, 856/13/7 Pt 1.
24 A Watt, Australian Representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 121, 330; 3 November 1948.
25 Report o f  Representative to the Third Committee on the UDHR, in NAA A 518/1; Item 104/5/2 Pt 
1 .
26 Ibid.
27 Cablegram from DEA to Australian Delegation, UN Assembly, New York, 14/5/48, in NAA A 
1838/278, Item 856/13 Pt 3. Australia’s failure to permit non-national spouses o f Australians to 
remain in Australia had become a particularly sensitive issue in the wake of the O’Keefe case. In 
that case, Immigration officials had attempted to deport a family of eight Indonesian children whose 
(Indonesian) father had died and whose (Indonesian) mother had subsequently married an 
Australian. The High Court subsequently ruled that the O’Keefes could not be deported because of 
a deficiency in the administering Act: see F Crowley, Modern Australian in Documents, Vol 2, 
Wren, Melbourne, 1973, 196.
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exile, fearing that it would interfere with the deportation of immigrants who had 
committed offences. Support was thus given to the prohibition o f ‘arbitrary’ exiles on 
the basis that deportations under Australian law would not be regarded as ‘arbitrary’.28
Australia also sought to accommodate existing restrictions placed on immigrants upon 
their arrival in Australia. In relation to the prohibition on slave labour, for instance, the 
Australian delegation supported retention of the phrase ‘involuntary servitude’ so as to 
prevent aspersions being cast on indentured labour policies, including migrants on work 
contracts. Likewise, attempts were made to eradicate or dilute any statement 
regarding freedom of movement. Australia argued firstly that freedom of movement 
‘hardly seems to be a fundamental human right’ given the number of ‘natural and 
legitimate’ restrictions upon its exercise.30 When unsuccessful in this argument, 
Australian delegates sought an amendment to Article 11 of the draft Covenant to 
exclude the operation of immigration laws. KCO (Mick) Shann, on behalf of Australia, 
argued that restrictions on migrants’ travel was necessary in order that Australia might 
assist migrants’ adjustment to life in Australia and in order that migrants were directed 
to the areas of Australia’s greatest economic need.31 Australia withdrew its amendment 
(apparently when it garnered little support) and transferred its support to the Lebanese 
proposal to have a more generally worded limitation clause referring to ‘national 
security, public safety or health’.32
Immigration policies were not the only policies to evoke such defensive drafting tactics. 
Indigenous policies were also jealously guarded. Under the dominant assimilationist 
policies of the time, indigenous persons within Australia and within Australia’s external
28 Cablegram from the Australian Delegation, UN Assembly, Paris to the DEA, 28/10/48, in NAA A 
1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 5.
29 Cablegram from the Australian Delegation to UN Assembly, Paris to the DEA, 23/10/48, in NAA A 
1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 5.
30 Statement on Article 11 made by Australian Representative, undated, text included in NAA A 
1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 4; Corresponding to speech of KCO Shann, Australian representative, UN 
Doc E/CN.4/SR 106, 3; 31 May 1949.
31 UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 106, 3; 31 May 1949.
32 UN Doc E/CN.4/56 (1949): quoted in MJ Bossuyt, op cit, 244.
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territories were subject to severe restrictions in their daily lives.33 Both the Department 
of the Interior and the Department of External Territories, for instance, were quick to 
grasp the possible inconsistency between equal application o f human rights standards 
and existing policies.
The Department of Interior identified at least five of the provisions of the UDHR as 
problematic.34 Concern was expressed that the policy o f removing half-caste infants 
might be seen to be contrary to the spirit of Article 12 o f the UDHR (the prohibition on
o r
arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home or correspondence). Article 13 was
seen as possibly impinging upon widespread restrictions on the freedom of movement
of Aboriginal people in the Territory. Men and women’s right to marry, recognised in
Article 16, was seen as inconsistent with the need of female Aborigines to obtain the
permission of an official before being permitted to marry a non-Aboriginal male.
Article 21’s protection of equal suffrage was recognised as being infringed by the fact
that Aboriginal persons were expressly debarred from enfranchisement whilst Article
23’s protection of the right to work and the right to equal pay for equal work without
discrimination was potentially inconsistent with exclusions of Aboriginal persons from
employment in licensed premises and the mining industry. The Department o f Interior
was concerned that there was no provision in the UDHR ‘for action to be taken in the
interests of aboriginal natives where such action would be contrary to the articles of the
declaration’. However, they expressed the hope that:
It may be that it is not intended that the articles o f the declaration shall apply to persons 
such as aboriginal natives who have not yet reached a state o f  civilization where they 
can fend for themselves and protect their own interests.36
33 As for accounts of these assimilationist policies, see P Hasluck, Shades o f Darkness: Aboriginal 
Affairs: 1925-1965, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1988; W Sanders, ‘Aboriginal Policy’ in 
S Prasser, JR Nethercote, J Warhurst (eds), The Menzies Era: A Reappraisal o f Government, 
Politics and Policy, Hale and Iremonger, Sydney 1995, 258-9.
34 Letter from JA Carrodus, Secretary, Department of the Interior, to the Secretary DEA, 3/2/49, in 
NAA A 1838/1, 856/13/7 Pt 2.
35 For the legislative framework concerning removal policies, see Bringing Them Home: Report of 
the National Inquiry into the Separation o f Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from 
their Families, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Sydney, 1997. Removal was 
prevalent with respect to children of Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal partnerships due to the belief that 
removal would assist the assimilation of the children. Children of two Aboriginal parents were 
considered to be beyond the help of this policy and were, like Aboriginal culture, believed to be on 
the road to extinction.
36 Letter from JA Carrodus, Secretary, Department of the Interior, to the Secretary DEA, 3/2/49, in 
NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 2.
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The Department of External Territories expressed similar concerns with respect to 
policies it administered. Many of the restrictions operating on the inhabitants of Papua, 
New Guinea and Nauru were similar in nature to those applying to Aboriginal persons 
in Australia. A number of additional clauses of the UDHR were singled out for 
comment. The right to seek asylum (Article 14) was questioned on the basis that 
territory inhabitants were subject to restricted movement. The prohibition on arbitrary 
arrest was also noted as being of concern (Article 9). Reference was made to legislation 
that applied only to ‘natives’ such as clothing, gambling and adultery regulations. The 
Department of External Territories feared that recognition of marriage rights would 
imply the need to disturb customary marriages and that freedom of religion might 
interfere with the need to regulate practices such as cannibalism. Regulation of freedom 
of expression was needed in order to prevent the spread of anti-government or 
mischievous propaganda. Rather than apologising for these restrictions, they were 
lauded as being designed ‘assist all types of people, sympathetically, through 
progressive stages of development’.
The Department of External Affairs considered that several of these ‘inconsistencies’ 
could be easily accommodated within the human rights regime. Restrictions on 
cannibalism on Papua and New Guinea, for instance, were said to not infringe freedom 
of religion.40 The Department of External Affairs emphasised that all rights would be 
read as subject to limitations necessary for public order.41 Yet, in relation to two areas 
in particular, Australian policy makers toiled to limit the express human rights so as to 
safeguard Australia’s assimilationist policies.
37 Letter from JR Halligan, Secretary, Department of External Territories, to the Secretary DEA, 
17/3/49, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 2. The letter considered the effect o f restrictions in the 
Native Labour Ordinance and Regulations 1946, Native Administration Regulations (New Guinea) 
1924, Native Regulation Ordinance and Regulations (Papua) 1908-30, and Native Administration 
Ordinance 1922 and Regulations (Nauru) Movements o f Natives Ordinance {Nauru) 1921.
38 Letter from JR Halligan, Secretary, Department o f External Territories, to the Secretary DEA, 
17/3/49, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 2.
39 Ibid.
40 The DEA rejected, for example, that outlawing cannibalism in Papua New Guinea constituted an 
interference with freedom of religion: Comments on Articles, undated, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 
856/13/7 Pt 2.
41 UN Doc E.CN.4/SR 106; 31 May 1949.
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The first area was freedom of movement. In 1949, for instance, Australia put forward an 
amendment to Article 11 (freedom of movement). Its amendment not only excluded 
immigration laws from the scope of the Article (as discussed above), but sought also to 
exclude laws relating to indigenous people.42 The Australian delegate explained that 
restrictions on the freedom of movement of Aboriginal people were imposed ‘in their 
interest’. Aboriginal people were described as very backward peoples whose contact 
with the white population ‘had not always had the happiest results’. It was necessary to 
prevent their movement into urban areas in order to prevent Aborigines coming into 
contact with disease.43 As outlined above, the Commission on Human Rights accepted 
only a limitation related to ‘national security, public safety or health’. However, the 
Australian delegation considered this sufficient to remove potential inconsistency of 
approach, showing a preparedness to adopt a wide definition of limitation clauses.44
The second area concerned the application of the Covenants to the external territories
per se. Australian policy-makers advocated the insertion of a clause that would provide
for a graduated approach to the implementation o f human rights in the territories.
Section 35(1) o f the International Labour Organisation Constitution was presented as a
model approach. Section 35(1) read:
The members undertake that conventions which they have ratified in accordance 
with the provisions of this constitution shall be applied to the non-metropolitan 
territories for whose international relations they are responsible including any trust 
territories for which they are the administering authority, except where the subject 
matter o f the Convention is inapplicable owing to local conditions, or subject to 
such modifications as may be necessary to adapt the Convention to local 
conditions. 45
Under such a clause, States administering territories would be under an obligation to 
apply the provisions of the Covenant to all territories to the maximum extent possible. 
Non-application was permissible where the Covenant was inapplicable due to local 
conditions. Alternatively, application of the norms could be varied or modified to suit 
local conditions. It was a more moderate approach than that advanced by the United
42
43
44
45
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Cablegram from DEA to Australian Mission to the UN, 9/11/49, in NAA A 1838, Item 929/4/6 Pt 1
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Kingdom who supported the total exclusion of territories from the scope of the 
Covenant. Yet, it still sent a message that human rights were not universally applicable 
to all peoples.
Notwithstanding such attempts to limit the application of rights to particular classes of 
persons, Australia remained committed to the inclusion o f general equality and non­
discrimination clauses. At one of the earliest meetings of the Drafting Committee o f the 
Commission on Human Rights, an Australian representative, Ralph Harry, suggested a
composite text to be used in the Declaration. Its opening words were:
All men (without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion) are bom free and 
equal and have certain inalienable rights 46
Australia also proposed an additional text dealing with equal protection under the law
and protection against discrimination. The text, submitted in 1947, read:
Every person regardless o f office or status shall be entitled to equal protection 
under the law and shall be protected by the law against any arbitrary discrimination 
and against any incitement to such discrimination in violation o f this Declaration.47
Although Australia’s support for a prohibition on ‘incitement to discrimination’ was not
longstanding,48 the proposal reflected an awareness that the State (through enacting
legislation) needed to play a role in protecting individuals against arbitrary
discrimination. Through its use of the term ‘arbitrary discrimination’, the proposal also
made clear the Australian understanding that not all differences in treatment constituted
prohibited discrimination. Indeed, it was by virtue of this understanding of ‘arbitrary
discrimination’ that Australian policy makers felt justified in advocating equality
clauses alongside clauses limiting the rights of indigenous persons -  the latter
representing (in their eyes) permissible distinctions rather than arbitrary
discrimination.49
Australia’s representatives were also keen to ensure that the right of non-discrimination 
was seen not as an independent right, but a right limited in its application to other rights
46 RL Harry, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/SR 13, 4; 9 June 1947.
47 UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 35, 11: quoted in MJ Bossuyt, op cit, 480.
48 See discussion above relating to limitations on freedom o f speech.
49 In the debates on the UDHR, John Hood, the Australian delegate suggested that the term 
‘distinction’ be used rather than ‘discrimination’ in the non-discrimination clause: see J Morsink, 
op cit, 94-5.
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in the Covenant. EJR Heyward, as Australian representative in 1948, for instance, 
rejected proposals for a broad non-discrimination clause that did not refer back to the 
specific rights recognised in the Covenant.50 The example put forward by Heyward in 
conjunction with his argument was not necessarily apt. Heyward stated that restrictions 
on the employment of women for health reasons involved distinctions but not the 
infringement of a right.51 Other more fitting examples can be found in the Australian 
internal correspondence. The Department of External Affairs considered that once there 
was no freestanding right to asylum, Australia could not be criticised for its 
discriminatory entry requirements. The clear implication was that equality was not a 
concept to be welcomed as a freestanding right. Instead, it was to operate only with 
respect to recognised human rights and, even then, to apply only to unjustifiable 
distinctions.
Overall, Australia during the Evatt period accepted the legitimacy of the category of 
civil and political rights and advocated a strong role for government in ensuring such 
rights, even within the private sphere. Such support did not translate to acceptance of 
all the civil and political rights proposed -  with ongoing resistance to rights limiting 
freedom of expression and freedom of information and those potentially interfering with 
domestic immigration and indigenous policies. In large part, these areas of resistance 
reflect the interplay of dominant (bipartisan) political pressures and Labor Party 
ideology. Little dissent was voiced within the Australian community to the 
continuation of the White Australia Policy during the 1940s. The Australian Labor 
Party with its traditional concern for protecting the rights of workers had little incentive 
to challenge restrictions on imported labour. Furthermore, the conception that 
Aboriginal persons and the inhabitants of trust territories were at a lower stage of 
civilization and thus not capable of responsibly exercising rights was far from
50 EJR Heyward, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/SR 27, 4; 11 May 1948
51 It is conceivable that Heyward advanced this example with the understanding that the right to work 
was not a civil and political right and therefore the example did not involve infringing a right. It is 
an attenuated interpretation, however, given Australia’s parallel advocacy for inclusion o f a right to 
work in the draft Covenant. Heyward’s example seems to go more to the Australian insistence that 
not all distinctions constituted discrimination.
52 As to the Labor Party’s attitude towards the White Australia Policy, see B McKinlay, The ALP: A 
Short History o f  the Australian Labor Party, Drummond/Heinemann, Melbourne, 1981, 22-23.
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uncommon. The Evatt period’s emphasis on strong governmental intervention to ensure 
rights seems attributable to the Australian Labor Party’s ideology. By accepting a 
socialist agenda, and thus governmental power to transform the economic foundations 
of society, Labor Party adherents such as Dr Evatt appear to have been comfortable 
with government intervention in a range of ‘private’ areas. It was not a comfort so 
readily apparent in later Australian policy.
II. Spender Period
During the short period in which Percy Spender was Minister for External Affairs 
(December 1949-April 1951), civil and political rights continued to be given only a 
limited amount of analysis. The terms in which such analysis was conducted reflect a 
somewhat ambivalent relationship with civil and political rights. At one level, 
Australian policy began emphasising the traditional nature of civil and political rights, 
promoting these rights as the West’s gift to newer nations who were less conversant 
with the rule o f law. At the same time, the number of reservations Australian delegates 
voiced to the wording of civil and political rights increased. In addition to the 
objections raised in the Evatt period relating to domestic policies and freedom of 
information and expression, there was heightened concern about the perceived 
imprecision o f some of the clauses. With the Menzies government’s attempts to repress 
communism in Australia came a greater attachment to ‘national security’ limitations on 
all rights. At a more general level, there arose resistance to obliging States to take 
positive action to actualise civil and political rights. Civil and political rights became 
equated with ‘traditional civil liberties’.
The impression gained from examination of the documentation o f Australian 
delegations in the 1950-51 period is that civil and political rights were considered 
largely unproblematic. The challenge facing the Commission on Human Rights was 
characterised as one related more to drafting than conceptualisation. For the purposes 
of the Fifth Assembly of the General Assembly in 1950, for instance, a supplementary
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Brief was prepared on the issue o f the Draft Covenant on Human Rights. With respect
to the first 18 Articles (civil and political rights), it was stated:
These articles form a coherent whole, comprising the body o f  traditional rights. The 
delegation may vote in favour of the ‘general adequacy’ o f the articles, explaining that 
this vote simply expresses Australia’s view that these articles satisfactorily conform to 
the classic pattern of civil rights.53
Civil rights were thus seen to be endowed with a legitimacy by their long heritage -  
being part of a ‘classic pattern o f civil rights’, constituting ‘traditional rights’. Even 
when Commonwealth lawyers were aware of the lack of legal protections for some 
rights, such as the right to an interpreter in criminal trials, the reaction was not to 
question the right itself, but to suggest that Australia’s practice was sufficient in any 
case.54
A note of noblisse oblige crept into some of the discussions o f civil rights.
Notwithstanding the fact that not all civil rights were entrenched in the common law
system, civil rights were viewed as reinforcing the pillar o f the rule of law, and thus
familiar to Western legal systems. Fred Whitlam, as Australian representative to the
Commission on Human Rights in 1950, wrote for example in the following terms about
the prohibition on ex post facto laws in the draft Covenant:
This prohibition against ex post facto criminal laws is one to which those not o f the 
‘Western’ pattern of institutions attach great importance. It is apparently considered 
necessary in shaping, or re-shaping, their institutions o f law to give specific and positive 
legislative force to concepts that are more or less traditional with the ‘West’. 5S
In that same note, Whitlam related the nature of his discussions with the United
Kingdom on this point. Regarding the United Kingdom as ‘in the best position to
appraise [the clause’s] possible effects’, he noted that while he and the United Kingdom
representative perceived that the limitation on non-retrospective criminal laws would
mean a theoretical curtailment o f legislative power, such a curtailment would be ‘no
more than some possible technical inconvenience in regard to legislation and minor
53 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the Fifth Session of the General Assembly, Supplementary 
Item, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 7.
54 Letter from LD Lyons, for the Secretary, Attorney-General’s Department to the Secretary, DE A, 
23/3/50, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 8.
55 Memorandum from HFE Whitlam, Australian Mission to the UN, NY to the Secretary, DEA, 
29/5/50, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 7.
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legislation at that’. 56 This inconvenience, Whitlam argued, was a small price to pay for
•  57the ‘very real gain that it will represent to other countries’.
Associated with the trumpeting of civil and political rights was an acceptance that civil
and political rights would be legally enforceable and thus needed to be drafted with
precision. Hostility was focused in particular on the use o f the term ‘arbitrary’ in the
texts prohibiting deprivation of life and arrest and detention. Without acknowledging
the role Australia had played in having this term adopted, Whitlam decried the failure of
the Commission to be more precise in its drafting. In relation to the prohibition on
arrest and detention, for instance, Whitlam, stated:
Individual liberty was an old and clearly defined concept, and it would be 
dangerous to leave out definitions which were the fruit o f long experience from a 
legal instrument which had binding force.58
Whitlam thus sought the substitution of a list of situations in which State action was 
permissible. Even if  the Commission was not minded to include such a list of 
situations, Australia in its written comments suggested that the term ‘arbitrary’ be 
deleted and that the clause read:
No one shall be subjected to arrest or detention except on such grounds and in 
accordance with such procedures as are established by law.59
With respect to the attitude adopted to particular clauses, delegates under Spender 
continued to place high priority on removing or limiting rights that potentially clashed 
with migration and indigenous policies. The comments sent by Australia to the United 
Nations in 1950, for example, included a lengthy explanation o f the Australian 
government’s view that restrictions on freedom of movement were in the interests of
56 Ibid. Whitlam was aware that the High Court had confirmed the Commonwealth’s power to pass ex 
post facto legislation in the case o f R v Kidman (1915) 20 CLR 425: Letter from LD Lyons, for the 
Secretary, Attorney-General’s Department to the Secretary, DEA, 23/3/50, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 
856/13 Pt 8.
57 Memorandum from HFE Whitlam, Australian Mission to the UN, NY to the Secretary, DEA, 
29/5/50, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 7.
58 HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 144, 16; 3 April 1950 and see 
E/CN.4/SR 146, 14-15; 5 April 1950.
59 Australia’s comments on the draft Covenant submitted to the UN in 1950: UN Doc 
E/CN.4/353/Add 10 (1950). A copy is also found in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 8. Note that 
this formulation permitted virtually unrestricted powers o f arrest and detention to be exercised by 
the government -  with the only requirement being that the powers were granted by law and 
exercised in accordance with the law.
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Aborigines and the inhabitants of trust and colonial territories.60 Australia pushed for a 
prefatory clause to the Article on freedom of movement which provided for States to 
enact general laws ‘for specific reasons of national security, public safety or order, 
welfare or health or for the protection or wellbeing of women or indigenous peoples, or 
for immigration purposes’.0' When Australia’s proposal was not taken up by the 
Commission on Human Rights, Australia transferred its support to maintaining the 
proposed broad limitation referring to national security and public order.62
Similarly, Australia resisted the formation of a freestanding equality right. As in the
Evatt period, Australia insisted that the right applied only in relation to the enjoyment of
rights in the Covenant. Australia thus put forward a proposal to merge the draft Articles
2 and 20 (the equivalent of what is now Article 26). Its proposal read:
Everyone shall be accorded all the rights and freedoms (defined) recognized in this 
Covenant without discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.63
The paragraph mentioned neither equality under the law nor equal protection of the law. 
Thus laws themselves did not have to embody parity o f treatment, provided the laws did 
not regulate the exercise of human rights.
The campaign to limit the application of human rights guarantees to the inhabitants of 
trust territories was also maintained. In 1951, for instance, the Australian delegation 
proposed that the metropolitan government be able to declare at the time of ratification 
to which of its non-self-governing and trust territories the Covenant was to extend. 
Reasons would have to submitted as to why the Covenant was not to be extended to the 
remaining territory. With respect to such remaining territory, the metropolitan power 
was to be obliged to take the necessary steps for extension of the Covenant as soon as 
possible, subject to the consent of the territorial governments concerned where 
necessary for constitutional reasons.64 The Australian vision continued to be tied to the
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 The limitation had been discussed in 1949: see fh 32 above.
63 Ibid.
64 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the Seventh Session o f the Commission on Human Rights, in 
NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/10/6 Pt 3A.
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belief that human rights guarantees could only be applied to persons o f a particular 
stage of development, when they could be expected to ‘responsibly’ exercise such 
power.
The freedoms of information and expression received particular attention from 
Australian policy-makers. The clause containing reference to both freedoms (draft 
Article 19) was the one clause that attracted the attention of Spender when a draft o f the 
Covenant was given to him in 1950.65 By 1950, freedom of information had a high 
profile internationally largely as a result of the efforts of the United States. Debate 
centred upon the nature of restrictions that could be placed on the freedom. The United 
States desired a clause in broad, unqualified terms that drew upon the terms of the draft 
Convention on Freedom of Information. The United Kingdom supported a narrower 
Article that permitted regulation of these freedoms on grounds such as national security, 
the prevention o f disorder or crime, and the desire to prevent obscenity or libel.66 In 
weighing into this debate, Spender indicated a preference for a clause with tightly 
defined limitations such as included in the text proposed by the Australian Newspaper 
Proprietors’ Association:
This right shall be subject only to such limitations as are pursuant to law and are 
necessary for the protection o f national security in time o f war or declared 
emergency for the prevention o f crime, or for the protection o f the health, 
reputation or rights of other persons.67
At the same time, Spender remained concerned that a ‘national security’ limitation 
would leave the right vulnerable to abuse and would facilitate improper suppression of 
news items and commentary.68 Thus, he indicated that he would like loopholes closed 
up as far as possible by expanding phrases such as ‘such limitations as are pursuant to 
law’ and the reference to ‘war or declared emergency’ to be strengthened. The
65 Submission to the Minister for External Affairs from TG Glasheen, 30/4/50, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 
856/13 Pt 8.
66 Memorandum from J Hill, External Affairs Office, Australia House, London to the Secretary, DEA, 
13/3/50, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 8. Bossuyt has noted the difficulty o f the drafting 
Committee of the Commission on Human Rights in resolving this issue, leading to the drafting 
Committee’s putting before the Commission a variety o f texts with a list o f some 25 possible 
limitations: M Bossuyt, op cit, 374-5.
67 Reproduced in Brief for the Australian Delegation to the Fifth Session o f the General Assembly, 
Supplementary Item, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 7.
68 Ibid.
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Department of External Affairs then drafted a suggested amended text which, with
Spender’s additions underlined, read:
Everyone shall have the right to be free from governmental interference to hold 
opinions, to seek, receive and impart information, opinions and ideas, regardless of  
frontiers, through speech, press, art or any other media.
This right shall be subject only to such limitations as are pursuant to law and are 
strictly necessary
(i) for the protection of national security in time o f war or actual emergency, 
provided such emergency is declared, or
(ii) for the prevention o f crime or for the protection o f the health, reputation or 
rights o f other persons and enforceable through established courts o f law acting in 
accordance with settled and public procedures.
No limitations shall be imposed except with the concurrence o f or in accordance 
with rules and principles determined by the competent national legislature.69
Later amendments to the text were made to ensure that the limitations covered the 
protection of official secrets, codes and cyphers outside time of war. Spender originally 
contemplated that the text should be submitted to the Third Committee in late 1950, but 
came to agree with the Department of External Affairs that detailed discussion of texts 
should be avoided in the Third Committee. The issue was thus discussed only in 
general terms by Australian delegates. Its remains of significance, however, for 
demonstrating the continuance of an Australian emphasis on freedom of expression and 
freedom of information. It also provides a sharp contrast to policy-makers’ willingness 
to embrace broadly defined ‘national security’ limitations on rights in a desire to protect 
the Menzies government’s anti-communist policies.
In 1950 the Menzies government passed the Communist Party Dissolution Act 1950.
The Act declared the Communist Party to be an unlawful organisation and dissolved it. 
Under the Act, if the Governor-General declared an association or individual to be 
communist, such associations and individuals could be declared to be prejudicial to the 
defence of the Commonwealth. Associations could be dissolved, and their assets 
forfeited to the Commonwealth. Individuals found to be communist sympathisers 
would be barred from government employment and from holding office in federal 
unions. The Governor-General’s initial determination that an association or individual
69 Annex A to Memorandum from Australian Mission to the UN to the the Secretary, DEA, 3/11/50, in 
NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 9.
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was communist was reviewable. The subsequent Commonwealth determination that the 
association or individual constituted a threat to the Commonwealth was not. It was the 
most ambitious attack on a political movement ever attempted in Australia’s history.70 
So strong was the Menzies government’s determination to destroy the communist 
movement in Australia that when the High Court declared the Act to be unconstitutional 
in Australian Communist Party v the Commonwealth?1 the Menzies government 
resolved to seek additional powers for the Commonwealth through a Constitutional 
referendum. Only when a majority of Australians rejected the constitutional proposal 
on 22 September 1951, did the Menzies government desist in their legislative efforts.
Australian policy-makers were called upon to adapt their stance on human rights to 
accommodate the proposed anti-communist legislation. In May 1950 the Australian 
Mission was warned by the Department of External Affairs that a review of the 
Covenant was being conducted ‘in light of recently introduced Australian legislation’.72 
Copies of the Communist Party Dissolution Bill 1950 together with Menzies’ 
introductory statement in the House of Representatives were distributed to delegates 
with the instruction to ‘bear these in mind’ throughout consideration of the Covenant.73 
Officers of the Department of External Affairs met with officers from the Attorney- 
General’s Department to undertake a clause-by-clause analysis of the draft Covenant in 
light of the legislation. The outcome of the meeting was a recommendation that 
‘national security’ limitations be inserted into Article 8(3) (prohibition on 
forced/compulsory labour), Article 9 (prohibition on arbitrary arrest), Article 11 
(freedom of movement), and Article 17 (freedom of expression and freedom of 
thought).74 The meeting also considered the possibility of inconsistencies between the 
legislation and the onus of proof protection (Article 13) and the prohibition on non-
70 See E Atkin, B Evans (eds), Seeing Red: The Communist Party Dissolution Act and Regulation 
1951: Lessons for Constitutional Reform, Evatt Foundation, Sydney, 1992.
71 Australian Communist Party v the Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1.
72 Cablegram from DEA to Australian Mission to the UN, 4/5/50, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 8
73 Ibid.
74 Internal Memorandum on Discussions in Attorney-General’s Department, 19/5/50, in NAA A 
1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 7.
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retrospective criminal charges (Article 14), but concluded that the proposed legislation 
did not infringe these latter rights.75
Fred Whitlam, as Australia’s representative, did not publicly raise the issue of the anti­
communist legislation in the Commission on Human Rights. Given that the 
Commission was discussing mostly economic and social rights in the 1950-1 period, his 
silence may not have been significant. Equally, it may have reflected a deliberate, 
pragmatic choice not to raise a topic of some sensitivity unless absolutely necessary. 
Clearly his political masters did not share any such reticence. The Prime Minister, 
Robert Menzies, for instance, was frank in his assessment of the overriding need to take 
such measures. In his correspondence with Felix Frankfurter, a Justice of the United
States Supreme Court, Menzies for instance stated:
I have felt compelled to believe that the direct and conspiratorial activities of our 
Communists must be met by legal forms which one would rather shun under ordinary 
circumstances.76
Despite not being raised in the public sphere, Australia’s preparedness to use the veil of 
‘national security’ to justify anti-communist legislation remains an important interlude 
for displaying the preparedness of Australian policy-makers to limit the definition of 
civil and political rights to accommodate competing political interests.
During the Spender period, one also notices a movement away from committing 
governments to take positive steps to protect individuals’ civil and political rights.
In the equality clause advanced by the Australian delegation (quoted earlier), there was 
no reference to any government obligation to legislate so as to prohibit discrimination. 
In debates in the Commission on Human Rights, Whitlam argued that discrimination 
would have to be eliminated through education not legislation.77 Antipathy was 
expressed to clauses that involved enforceable government expenditure. Thus in 
relation to a right of compensation for wrongful conviction, Fred Whitlam argued in
75 Ibid. The basis o f this conclusion was that the legislation did not affect the onus o f proof, nor was 
the legislation related to a ‘penal offence’.
76 Letter from RG Menzies to Justice Felix Frankfurter, 20/7/51, Personal Correspondence Series 1, 
Menzies Collection, NLA MS 4936.
77 HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 173, 13; 27 April 1950.
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defence of existing Australian practice that left the question of compensation up to the 
Executive. Wrongful conviction was said to be a situation ‘so unlikely to be other than 
rare’ and as such a matter for the Executive to ensure a fuller and more flexible form of 
justice.78 In theoretical terms, Whitlam was arguing against any enforceable positive 
obligations on the State in the area of civil and political rights. Australian policy was 
focused on supporting ‘traditional’ liberties -  or areas of non-interference by the State.
It was for the State to desist from conduct, rather than the State to take action, for civil 
and political rights to be respected.
To the extent that policies changed during the Spender period, the major architect of 
such change appears to have been Fred Whitlam, Australia’s representative on the 
Commission on Human Rights. There is little evidence of Spender’s direct 
intervention, nor that of other Ministers or bureaucrats. In the absence o f any 
documentation relating to Whitlam’s reasoning for adopting the stances he took, it is 
difficult to state a definitive cause for the change. Two factors, however, would appear 
to be the most likely catalysts. First, as outlined in Chapter 1, the Liberal Party under 
the leadership of Robert Menzies laid a great stress on ‘individual freedoms’. In clause 
3 of the Party’s objectives, for instance, it was stated that the Liberal Party would seek 
to maintain the ‘freedom of citizens to choose their own way o f living and life, subject 
to the rights o f others’.79 Such a vision involved a government commitment to limiting 
its involvement in individual’s lives. Notwithstanding the lack o f direction by Spender, 
Whitlam may have been taking the initiative of moulding policy around his perception 
of the desires o f his Liberal Party Minister. The fact that Spender did not see the 
necessity o f outlining this vision points to there being a second factor at work: a shared 
conception by Whitlam and Spender that the archetypal human right was an individual’s 
protection against arbitrary interference by the State.
78 Memorandum from HFE Whitlam, Australian Mission to the UN, NY to the Secretary, DEA, 
29/5/50, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 7.
79 Forming the Liberal Party ofAustralia: Record of the Conference o f Representatives of Non- 
Labour Organisations, Canberra, October 1944, University o f Queensland collection.
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The source o f Spender and Whitlam’s shared philosophical outlook may well have been 
their shared legal training. Spender received his legal education at the University of 
Sydney, graduating in 1918.80 Whitlam went to the University o f Melbourne.81 Each 
would be likely to have left law school, well versed in English constitutional history and
O ')
Diceyan jurisprudence. " Both would have fostered a conservative approach to the 
identification and protection of human rights. Dicey emphasised the ultimate 
sovereignty of parliament. He also stressed the rule of law and the separation o f powers 
between the monarch and the parliament as the means of ensuring that Executive power 
was not arbitrarily exercised. The courts developed the rules o f the common law and 
equity in part to further protect individuals’ liberties.83 English constitutional history 
focused on the development of parliamentary power and the ‘freedoms’ respected in 
Magna Carta. As such, the orthodox approach to human rights would have been to 
ensure that ‘traditional liberties’ were protected by the courts, but that any codification 
of rights would need to be precise and respect parliament’s ultimate sovereignty. Evatt, 
too, a graduate of the University of Sydney, would have received a similar legal 
training. However, for Evatt, this training was tempered by the alternate set of values to 
be found in Labor Party ideology. Spender’s Liberal Party ideology served to reinforce 
his conservative training while Whitlam’s sense of needing to act impartially as a public 
servant would also have facilitated the undiluted expression o f conservative legal 
jurisprudence. As such, one sees in the Spender period, a coalescing of conservative 
paradigms supported by the prevailing Liberal Party philosophies and British legal 
traditions.
The Spender period is interesting for displaying the continuities and discontinuities in 
Australian policy towards civil and political rights. As with the Evatt periods, there 
was a clear comfort with recognition of civil and political rights. There was also a
80 Resume o f  PC Spender, in Department of External Affairs, Statement o f Service, 1950, held at the 
Department o f Foreign Affairs and Trade.
81 Entry for HFE Whitlam in Who ’s Who in Australia, Herald, Melbourne, 1950, 752.
82 The major textbooks used in Australian law schools prior to World War Two were by British 
authors.
83 AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study o f the Law o f the Constitution, (10th ed) Macmillan, London, 
1959,75-77; 202-3.
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desire to insulate key policies from the scope of human rights guarantees, in particular 
the recognition o f a right to equality. With the intensification of Australia’s Cold War, 
however, policy-makers showed an increased willingness to use ‘national security’ 
limitations to narrow the scope of civil rights. At the same time, the Liberal Party’s 
emphasis on the individual led to a restricted vision of government involvement in 
ensuring rights and a conceptualisation of civil and political rights as ‘civil liberties’. 
Many of these shifts were to be further developed during the Casey and Bureaucratic 
period.
III. Casey and Bureaucratic Period
During the Casey and Bureaucratic period, continued support for traditional civil 
liberties co-existed with intensified resistance to the scope of many of the civil and 
political rights proposed for the ICCPR. In a period where bureaucrats were the chief 
policy-makers, all o f the clauses that raised the ire of Australian delegates in previous 
periods continued to be the subject of adverse criticism. The ‘civil liberties’ view of 
civil and political rights was further cemented leading to hostility towards clauses 
requiring a State to take action to facilitate individuals’ enjoyment o f rights. New 
clauses provoked concern including the introduction of clauses on the equality of men 
and women, children’s rights and universal political rights. Opposition to an 
independent clause concerning the equality of men and women arose. Although in the 
face of international pressure Australia reversed its stance of opposition on some 
clauses, rarely did such reversal represent a fundamental change o f heart. Thus, by the 
time of the finalisation of the ICCPR, Australia retained significant reservations with 
respect to a number of the substantive rights included in the Covenant.
As in the Spender period, the noblisse oblige approach to civil and political rights 
remained evident. Australia’s policy with respect to the prohibition on retrospective 
laws is one example. South Australia had indicated in 1960 that it was uneasy with the 
prohibition given that a state might conceivably ‘in extraordinary circumstances’ wish
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to pass retrospective legislation to deal with a loop-hole in the law.84 Leslie Lyons of
the Attorney-General’s Department sought the opinion of Whitlam who dismissed
South Australia’s argument in terms reminiscent of his original statement on the matter: 
This is the position with every Government. The disadvantage o f adopting the provision 
referred to is a theoretical or, at best, a technical one. It has been felt that this is a 
contribution which free Governments, such as the Australian Government might well 
make to assist in remedying a situation which obtains in countries having Governments 
which are less free, ie the possibility and indeed not infrequent habit, o f passing ex post 
facto laws to dispose o f or harass political rivals85
Likewise, Australian delegations continued to insist that powers of government had to 
be defined with precision. Opposition continued to be displayed towards use of the
o / r
term ‘arbitrary’ in respect of the right to life and the prohibition on detention. Only in
1958 when JE Ryan reported that a majority of countries in the Third Committee
accepted use of the term ‘arbitrary’ did Australia accept the term.87 There was certainly
confusion as to the meaning of the term within Australian circles. When a proposal was
before the Commission on Human Rights to carry out a study on arbitrary detention, the
Australian delegation proposed the following definition be used:
arrest or detention (a) on grounds or in accordance with procedures other than those 
established by law, or (b) under the provisions o f a law the basic purpose o f which is 
incompatible with respect for the right and liberty o f person88
According to this definition, detention could be arbitrary even if lawful. By 1960 when
the Attorney-General’s Department was providing advice on the interpretation of the
draft clause prohibiting arbitrary interference with privacy, a different view was taken.
Clarrie Harders of Attorney-General’s expressed the view to the Department of External
Affairs that ‘arbitrary’ would be likely to be interpreted in Australia as meaning
‘unlawful’ rather than ‘harsh’ or ‘unconscionable’. Telephone tapping would thus be
permissible. Although Harders’ comments could be read as confined to the likely
interpretation to be given by an Australian court rather than purporting to offer an
84 Quoted in letter of LD Lyons for the Secretary, Attorney-General’s Department, to the Secretary, 
DEA, 11/10/60, in NAA A432/68, Item 68/2797 Pt 1.
85 Ibid.
86 A lengthy exposition of Australia’s dissatisfaction with the term was included in the Australian 
Comments on Draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, July 1955; a copy o f which is in NAA 
A 432/68, Item 68/2797 Pt 3; UN Doc A/2910/Add 2.
87 JE Ryan, Australian representative, A/C.3/SR 868, 156, 29 October 1958.
88 Letter from T Pyman to the Secretary, DEA, 20/4/56, in NAA A 432/68, Item 68/2797 Pt 3.
89 Memorandum from CW Harders, for the Secretary, Attorney-General’s, Department to the 
Secretary DEA, 28/9/60, in NAA A 432/68, Item 68/2797 Pt 1.
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interpretation at international law, there is evidence that the term ‘arbitrary’ was subject 
to varying interpretations within Australia. The insistence that civil and political rights 
be drafted in a precise fashion was accompanied by an unwavering policy that rights be 
‘realistic’ and capable of immediate enforcement. As such, there was no compunction 
about continuing the policy of seeking to accommodate,domestic policies.
As with previous periods, indigenous and immigration policies retained a sacrosanct 
status within policy-development Once it became apparent that the international 
community would not accept qualifications specifically mentioning indigenous people, 
Australia moved to the insertion of words o f general application such as ‘reasonable 
restrictions’.90 Australian representatives were instructed to continue to push for 
deletion of the freedom of movement guarantee in 1952, though Whitlam 
countermanded this direction due to the potential embarrassment to Australia in the 
Trusteeship Council should Australia have to justify its proposal.91 Delegates were 
instructed to defend Australia’s policies as ‘protective’ rather than ‘discriminatory’.92 
In relation to trust territory inhabitants, the Australian delegation continued to push for 
the inclusion of the inaptly named ‘colonial application clause’ to prevent application of 
the Covenant to dependent territories until admitting defeat in 1965. Before the Holt 
government’s decision to end the White Australia policy in 1966,94 there remained 
concern to insulate immigration policies from external criticism.
90 Australia made this suggestion at the 530th Meeting o f the Commission on Human Rights in the 
context o f  Turkey’s suggestion that the Commission carry out a specialist study on ‘arbitrary arrest, 
detention and exile’. Australia’s suggested definition detailed in letter from T Pyman to the 
Secretary, DEA, 20/4/56, in NAA A 432/68, Item 68/2797 Pt 3.
91 Report o f  the Australian Representative to the Eighth Session o f the Commission on Human Rights, 
in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/10/7 Pt 2A.
92 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the 10th Session o f the General Assembly, Item 28, in NAA A 
462/21, Item 575/1.
93 History as reproduced in Brief for the Australian Delegation to the 21st Session o f the General 
Assembly, Item 63, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 929/4 Pt 20; Annotated copy o f submission dated 
27/10/65 to the Minister for External Affairs seeking approval for Australian delegates to 
discontinue push for a colonial application clause in NAA A 1838/1, Item 929/4 Pt 20.
94 As to the Holt government’s decision to end the White Australia Policy, see A Watt, The Evolution 
o f Australian Foreign Policy: 1938-1965, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1968, 201-4. 
The Australian Labor Party removed the White Australia Policy from its platform in 1965: Watt, 
201.
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Australian delegates were directed that should attempts be made to resurrect a right of 
asylum, Australia should remain firm in its opposition. Thus in the 1955 Brief for the 
General Assembly, it was stated that if any right with respect to asylum existed, it was 
the right of States to determine who was to be given admission to a country. Limits had 
to be maintained on those granted asylum. The driving force was of course, the 
Department of Immigration which was described in the Brief as finding ‘any limitation 
of the right to exclude undesirable immigrants or visitors unacceptable’.95 A right of 
asylum was proposed by the Soviet Union in 1960.96 After seeking advice from 
Attorney-General’s Department, the Department of External Affairs advised the
Q7delegation to adhere to the policy of resistance.
Concern about discriminatory legislation in force in relation to indigenous persons, 
migrants and women motivated particular attention being given to Article 26 of the 
ICCPR, in particular its inclusion of a guarantee o f ‘equal protection before the law’.
The development of policy in this area is worthy o f more detailed consideration. It 
demonstrates the influence of international pressures on Australian policy as well as the 
deep-seated nature o f Australia’s resistance to surrendering powers to enact 
discriminatory laws.
Awareness o f the formal discriminations embedded in Australian gender and race 
policies dictated Australian opposition to all but the most generally phrased non­
discrimination clause up until the early 1960s. The 1955 Brief for the delegation to the 
General Assembly, for instance, stated without apology that many of the provisions of 
the two Covenants could not be applied to Aborigines or half-castes. The Department 
of Immigration persisted with concerns that the discrimination clause would interfere 
with the Commonwealth’s imposition of conditions on immigration and the treatment of
95 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the 10th Session o f the General Assembly, Item 28, in NAA A 
462/21, Item 575/1.
96 Note from HD Anderson, Head, United Nations Branch to RL Harry, 7/11/61, in NAA A 1838, Item 
929/4 Pt 18.
97 Internal Note, Draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Soviet Proposal for Article on Right of 
Asylum: Relation to Extradition Law of Australia, in NAA A432/68, Item 68/2797 Pt 3. Cablegram 
from DEA to Australian Mission to UN, NY, 8/11/61, in NAA A 432/68, Item 68/2797 Pt 1.
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migrants.98 Particularly after 1952, when efforts to have specific amendments to 
substantive sections such as freedom of movement were abandoned,99 attention was re­
focused upon ensuring a narrowly drafted equality provision in the ICCPR.
Australia’s preference in the 1950s was to have Article 2 as the sole source of non­
discrimination obligations. Such action was regarded as ensuring that non­
discrimination was seen as limited to a State’s fulfilment of obligations under the 
Covenant. Australia maintained support for this clause even whilst at the same time 
planning to enter a general reservation with respect to Aboriginal people and arguing 
for a colonial application clause to limit application o f the human rights clauses to 
inhabitants of dependent territories. Reference to equal protection of the law was said 
to be potentially confusing given the lack of boundaries as to which rights were 
encompassed by the non-discriminatory obligation and the lack o f clarity concerning 
how the provision would affect the content of the laws of contracting States.100 
Opposition remained consistent in the Briefs for Australian delegates to the Third 
Committee from 1955 until 1961. In 1961, Australia accepted Article 26 in full, 
though the significance of this act can easily be overestimated.
By 1961, racial discrimination had become the most prominent human rights topic 
discussed in the United Nations. Although the policies of South Africa attracted the 
greatest amount o f attention, Australia’s policies did not go unnoticed. The Bulgarian 
Chairman o f the Third Committee had, at the 32nd Session of ECOSOC in November
98 Letter o f THE Heyes, Secretary, Department of Immigration to the Secretary, DEA, 19/8/55, in 
NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 15. The concern of the Department o f Immigration related not only 
to Article 26 o f the draft ICCPR, but also to Article 2 of the draft Covenant.
99 The 1952 Delegation to the Commission on Human Rights had been directed to seek a deletion of  
freedom o f movement. Fred Whitlam reported back to the Department that he did not table any 
amendment to the clause given the lack o f receptiveness to any amendments and the risk that any 
amendment would give rise to the embarrassment of Australia in the Trusteeship Council: Report of 
the Australian Representative to the 8th Session of the Commission on Human Rights, in NAA A 
1838/1, Item 856/13/10/7 Pt 2A.
100 Brief o f the Australian Representative to the 10th Session o f the Commission on Human Rights, in 
NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/10/9 Pt 3; See also Brief o f the Australian Representative to the 10th 
Session o f the General Assembly, Item 28, in NAA A 432/72, Item 64/3385.
97
1961, referred to the ‘extermination of the Tasmanian aborigine by Australia’. 101 
Papers authored by academics and Aboriginal activists concerning the treatment of 
Aborigines were being circulated to foreign delegations.102 The Department of External 
Affairs was predicting that international attention to Australian Aboriginal policies 
could be expected to increase given the perceived communist infiltration of Aboriginal 
organisations and the fervour of communist and anti-colonialist delegations.103 Initially, 
the Department’s response was to arm delegates with ‘positive information’ concerning 
government policies on Aboriginal Australians. The Brief for the Sixteenth Session of 
the General Assembly (1961), for instance, included an Annex on Australian 
Aborigines, outlining the necessity of restrictive measures for the protection of 
Aboriginal peoples.104
Debate over Article 26, in particular, was imbued with strong racial overtones. In light 
of the politicisation of race, James Plimsoll of the Australian Mission in New York, was 
suggesting in mid-1961 that Australia should reconsider its stance on Article 26. 
According to Plimsoll, Australia would gain more than it would lose by voting in favour 
of the whole Article. It could still reserve Australia’s position with respect to matters 
such as control o f aliens and national resources, but would be seen to be supporting the 
guarantee o f freedom from discrimination on the grounds o f race.105 Viewing the 
debate on the Covenant as largely political rather than juridical and doubting whether
101 Cablegram from J Plimsoll, Australian Mission to the UN to DEA, 11/11/61, in NAA A432/68,
Item 68/2797 Pt 3.
102 The Department o f External Affairs showed particular awareness o f the circulation of a paper by 
Professor Zelman Cowan undertaken for the International Commission o f Jurists and a speech given 
by Shirley Andrews and Doreen Trainer: Memorandum from H Gilchrist to A/g Secretary, DEA 
entitled ‘Australian Aborigines: External Affairs Interest’, 29/8/61, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 929/5/3 
Pt 2.
103 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the 16th Session of the General Assembly, in NAA A 1838, 
Item 929/4 Pt 18. The Annex on Aboriginal Australians regarded the Communist Party as 
infiltrating existing Aboriginal welfare organisations such as the Federal Council for Aboriginal 
Advancement. See too Letter from ASIO to DEA, 13/5/63: in NAA A 1838/371, Item 897/31. The 
speech o f  Ms Shirley Andrews at a UN Seminar on the Role of Police was similarly dismissed as 
being from a ‘trouble-maker’ and a ‘communist sympathiser’: Note from WT Doig, A/g Assistant 
Secretary to P Shaw, NIN NAA A 1838/371, Item 897/31 Pt 1.
104 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the 16th Session o f the General Assembly, Item 35 in NAA A 
1838, Item 929/4 Pt 18.
105 Cablegram from J Plimsoll, Australian Mission to the UN to DEA, 11/11/61, in NAA A432/68, 
Item 68/2797 Pt 3.
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Australia would in fact ratify the ICCPR, Plimsoll recommend that Australia support 
Article 26 as drafted.106 The Department of External Affairs were not convinced that 
such a move was prudent given that Article 26 could be interpreted as ‘requiring 
Australia to amend legislation involving discrimination in respect not only o f aliens but 
also of Australian citizens, eg aboriginal voting rights, conditions o f employment or 
women in public service’.107 Plimsoll was thus ordered to abstain from voting on the 
Article.
In public, the Australian delegation sought to convey its limited understanding of 
Article 26. ‘Equality before the law’ was said to be synonymous with ‘equal 
application of the law’.108 Discrimination could be understood only in the context of 
particular situations and rights -  an approach adopted in Article 2 rather than in an 
oblique reference to equal protection of the law.109 After advice was sought from 
Kenneth Bailey (the then Solicitor-General) as to the appropriate procedure,110 the 
Department o f External Affairs sent a Cablegram to the delegation advising it to vote in 
favour of the Article, but with a statement explaining the Australian view that the 
second sentence of Article 26 was related to ‘equality before the law’. Australia’s vote 
for Article 26 was thus contingent on an understanding that it required simply that laws 
were applied equally rather than mandating laws provide for substantially equal 
treatment.111
The proper balance between State regulation and individual freedom in the areas of 
freedom of expression, information and opinion continued to vex Australian policy-
107 Cablegram from DEA to Australian Mission to the UN, NY, 13/11/61, in NAA A 432/68, Item 
68/2797 Pt 1.
108 The Australian representative, Elizabeth Warren wrote to the DEA indicating that there had been 
widespread agreement as to such a limited understanding o f ‘equality before the law’: 
Memorandum from EA Warren for Delegation, Australian Mission to the UN, 16/11/61, in NAA A 
1838, Item 929/4 Pt 18.
109 EA Warren, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 1101, 201-2; 13/11/61.
110 Internal Note to HD Anderson, A/g Sec, (author undecipherable), 14/11/61, in NAA A 1838, Item 
929/4 Pt 18.
111 Summary of Work o f Third Committee by Australian Representative to the 16th Session o f the 
General Assembly, in NAA A 1838, Item 929/4 Pt 18.
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makers. The Eighth Session Brief for the Commission on Human Rights in 1952, for 
instance, described the draft article on freedom of opinion and expression as raising the 
‘almost insoluble’ problem that had dominated the discussions o f the Sub-Commission 
on Freedom of Information.112 The problem was to find a formula that, while 
permitting the utmost liberality with regard to freedom of expression, also provided for 
restrictions that are exercised in relation to that freedom in a democratic society. 
Delegates were warned to avoid having a text adopted which read like a code of 
restrictions and was thus out o f keeping with the rest of the Covenant. If possible, 
delegates were to seek an identical set of limitations for the right of association and the 
freedom of information.113 By 1955, the Australian Brief for the General Assembly 
noted the difficulties in drafting the limitations, and were sympathetic to the United 
Kingdom’s additional list of objections, but found it difficult to conceive of justifiable 
limitations beyond those in Article 18(3). These consisted of limitations provided by 
law that were necessary for the respect of the rights or reputations of others, or for the 
protection o f national security, public order, public health or morals.
As in the Evatt period, Australian delegations resisted the imposition o f broad 
restrictions on freedom of expression in what was to become Article 20 of the ICCPR. 
In relation to proposals that advocacy of national, racial or religious hostility 
constituting incitement to hatred or violence be prohibited, Fred Whitlam, for instance, 
focused on the evils o f censorship and repressive police action which he claimed were 
‘abhorrent to the Australian way of life’.114 Freedoms enjoyed by Australian people 
were said to be derived directly from resistance to the imposition of directives from 
above, however well-intentioned they appeared.115 The comments submitted by 
Australia to the United Nations in July 1955 noted that the term ‘hatred’ was subjective
112 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the Eighth Session o f Commission on Human Rights, in NAA 
A 1838/1, Item 856/13/10/7 Pt 1.
113 Ibid.
114 HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 377, 7; 6 May 1953; See too 
Australian Comments on Draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, July 1955, in NAA A 
432/68, Item 68/2797 Pt 3.
115 Ibid.
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and so not amenable to legal regulation.116 In the directions replicated in the Briefs for 
delegates to the Third Committee from 1955-1961, the objection focused on the term 
‘hatred’. A specific review of this aspect was carried out in 1961. All the states and 
Territories, except South Australia, indicated support for continued efforts to delete a 
prohibition on hate speech.11' When in 1961 Brazil proposed the extension of Article 
20 to include a prohibition on war propaganda, Australia’s stance mirrored that o f the 
Evatt period. The Solicitor-General described the term ‘war propaganda’ as ‘too wide, 
too loose and too vague in expression... [it would] leave open the possibility of endless 
controversy on free-world defence arrangements’.118 The delegation was empowered to 
abstain rather than oppose the amendment (if opposition would be construed as support 
for war propaganda), but to seek to act in concert with the United Kingdom.119 Both the 
United Kingdom and Australia voted against the adoption of the amendment and 
clause.120
In opposing any obligation to legislate with respect to prohibiting hate speech, Australia 
was also adhering to the civil liberties view that arose during the Spender period. 
Government continued to be seen as having only a limited role to play in the area o f 
civil liberties. In the area of the non-discrimination clause, Australia argued against an 
obligation to enact anti-discrimination legislation in Articles 2 and 26 on pragmatic and 
principled grounds. Since discrimination often had its origin in social prejudice, its
191eradication required education campaigns rather than legislation. Indeed, Australia 
ended up abstaining on Article 2 o f the ICCPR (the non-discrimination clause) on the
116 Australian Comments on Draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, July 1955, in NAA A 
432/68, Item 68/2797 Pt3.
117 South Australia favoured the more extreme view of the United Kingdom that the clause should be 
deleted in its entirety: Letter of JS White, Secretary to the Premier o f SA, quoting the Crown 
Solicitor, to EJ Bunting, Secretary, PM’s Dept, in NAA A432/68, 68/2797 Pt 1. All the state 
responses are to be found in NAA A 432/68, Item 68/2797 Pt 1.
118 Filenote by LD Lyons, expressing the views of the Solicitor General, 31/10/61, in NAA A 1838, 
Item 929/4 Pt 18.
119 Cablegram from DEA to Australian Mission to UN, New York, 25/10/61, in NAA A 1838, Item 
929/4 Pt 18.
120 Summary o f Work o f Third Committee by the Australian Representative to the 16th Session o f the 
General Assembly, in NAA A 1838, Item 929/4 Pt 18.
121 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the 10th Session o f the Commission on Human Rights, in 
NAA A 1838/1, 856/13/10/9 Pt 3; The comment was duplicated in the Brief for the Australian 
Delegation to the 10th Session of the General Assembly, Item 28, in NAA A 432/72, Item 64/3385.
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1 99basis that Article 2 mandated legislative action. In a limited number of situations, 
Australia accepted that government intervention might be necessary. Around these 
cases, however, the boundaries were to be narrowly drawn. Thus in relation to the right 
to life in Article 1 of the Covenant, Australia argued for the right to be ‘protected by 
law’ rather than protected ‘by the State’.123 At times, even minimal government 
involvement was the subject of domestic discontent. The Department of Immigration 
unsuccessfully sought to convince the Department o f External Affairs to object to 
Article 13 of the ICCPR which provided for procedural rights for aliens facing 
expulsion.124 Yet, while accepting the need for use of State resources where the State 
had previously intervened, Australia would not volunteer the use of resources in private 
affairs.
A range o f new clauses also provoked trenchant criticism. The first o f these was draft 
Article 3 which provided for the equality of men and women. It was introduced in 1952 
in accordance with a directive of the General Assembly.125 Considering Australia’s 
opposition to an equal pay guarantee in the ICESCR,126 it is not surprising that 
Australia’s initial public stance was to abstain on the clause. In 1952, Whitlam 
reported to the Department of External Affairs that all members of the Commission 
eagerly endorsed the principle of equal rights, but that there was a division as to the 
value of a separate clause on the equal rights of men and women. Whitlam considered 
that the position o f opponents to the clause who derided the clause as a ‘charitable 
handout’ was more logical, but out of respect for the Assembly directive, he would 
abstain on the draft Article.127 By 1953, Whitlam was more forthright in his hostility to 
the clause. Where discrimination existed by virtue of culture, a treaty provision, he 
argued, would not serve to eradicate them nor was it desirable for traditions to be
122 Memorandum to federal departments on the ICCPR, authored by P Brazil, 19/6/67, in NAA A 
446/165, Item 1970/76776.
123 Cablegram from DEA to Australian Mission to the UN, 19/11/57, in NAA A 432/68, Item 68/2797 
Pt 3.
124 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the 10th Session o f the General Assembly, in NAA A 432/72, 
Item 64/3385.
125 General Assembly Resolution 421 (V), 1 December 1950, 5 UN GAOR Supp No 20, 42 (1950).
126 See discussion o f equal pay in Chapter 1: 56-57, 65.
127 Memorandum from the Mission to the UN, NY to the Secretary, DEA, 27/5/52, in NAA A 1838/1, 
Item 856/13/10/7 Pt 2.
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overriden or attempts made to change conditions that were inherent in the nature and
growth of organized societies.128 For Whitlam, the clause was an attempt to transform
attitudes rather than establish a legal right. Privately, the clause led him to state:
It even seemed to be suggested that a covenant such as that under discussion could 
change articles of faith and religion, but treaties like the covenants on human rights 
could never have an overriding effect of that sort.129
In the 1955 Brief for delegates to the General Assembly (the basis for instructions to 
delegates from 1955 until 1961), opposition to this clause continued. Such opposition 
was specifically linked to the issue of equal pay for equal work. The Attorney- 
General’s Department was asked for its comments on whether opposition should 
continue to be expressed to this clause in 1962. Leslie Lyons, for Attorney-General’s, 
advised that he could see no reason for departing from the 1955 Brief.130 However, the 
Brief for the 1962 Session of the Third Committee of the General Assembly, whilst 
admitting that Australia would prefer deletion of the Article ‘on technical grounds’, 
related that it would not seem advisable to do other than support the clause. Australia 
did not press for deletion of the clause and thus Article 3 was adopted unanimously in 
1962.131 International pressures seem to have dictated this choice, since there is little 
evidence o f the birth of a commitment to providing for the equality of men and women.
The scope o f political rights to be included in the ICCPR was also questioned. In 1953, 
Whitlam wrote to the Department of External Affairs concerning the right to participate 
in public affairs (draft Article 25), stating:
We have a far graver doubt as to whether such an article as has been formulated is 
capable o f wide application, in view of the great diversity of character and function 
amongst organs of authority throughout the world and also the vast differences in 
the stages o f community development amongst the peoples o f the world, o f which 
colonial territories are only one illustration.132
Similarly, Whitlam as Australian representative to the Commission on Human Rights 
voted against recognition of ‘universal and equal suffrage’. He explained that he
128 FHR Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 372, 9; 4 May 1953.
129 Ibid.
130 Referred to in 1964 Summary on Equal Pay Clause, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/10/7 Pt 2
131 UN Doc A/C.3/SR 1206, quoted in MJ Bossuyt, op cit, 78.
132 Memorandum from Australian Representative to the Commission on Human Rights to the 
Secretary, DEA, 8/5/53, in NAA 1838/2, Item 856/13/10/8 Pt 3.
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considered a new form of expression was needed, and that a right needed properly to be 
an attribute o f a human person rather than being dependent on the State. Since suffrage 
was linked to the State rather than the individual, it was not suitable inclusion in the 
Covenant.133 The 1961 General Assembly Brief added that the term ‘universal and 
equal suffrage’ was inappropriate for a legal text like the Covenant. Deletion of the 
phrase was admitted to be unlikely given its emotive appeal.134
For a country like Australia which championed democratic freedoms, such a stance may 
appear surprising. However, it too appears to have been influenced by an awareness of 
racial inequalities in Australia. In Whitlam’s 1953 statement concerning the right of 
participation, he alluded to the difficulties associated with colonial territories. The 1955 
Brief for the General Assembly stated that the electoral rights were unacceptable in part 
because of because o f restrictions on Aborigines, and inhabitants of dependent 
territories. Delegates were directed, however to refer in general terms to the need for 
most countries to make reasonable distinctions with respect to voting rights (given 
existing limitations on the basis of literacy, criminal conviction, and mental deficiency), 
so as to avoid ‘unwise public reference to special situations obtaining in Australia’. 135 
Only when the clause was amended to allow for reasonable restrictions on political 
rights, did Australian hostility lessen. Ultimately, Australia voted for Article 25 as a 
whole.
Concern about existing inequities with respect to Aboriginal children was also partially 
behind Australia’s resistance to inclusion of a clause specifically recognising children’s 
rights. Poland submitted a draft Article on the topic in 1962.136 It provided that every 
child had the right to special protection by society and the State, to non-discriminatory 
enjoyment o f rights, and the right to a name and nationality. Illegitimacy of a child was 
said to be an impermissible basis on which to restrict the rights of the child. The
133 HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 367, 14, 29 April 1953.
134 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the 16th Session o f the General Assembly, in NAA A 1838, 
Item 929/4 Pt 18.
135 Ibid.
136 UN Doc A/C.3/L 1014, quoted in MJ Bossuyt, op cit, 457.
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Attorney-Generals’ Department gave the clause a negative review. It noted that the 
clause did not limit itself to the rights in the Covenant, that Australian law made 
distinctions in relation to legitimacy (at least in subject areas outside the Covenant) and 
was likely to cause difficulties with respect to the treatment of Aboriginal children.137 
These comments were passed on to the Australian delegation together with the view of 
the Department o f External Affairs that, as children were already covered by the 
Covenant, a specific Article would be at best, repetitive and at worst, would have the 
effect o f casting doubt upon the application of the Covenant to other groups. Within
the Third Committee of the General Assembly, the Australian representative, Hugh 
Gilchrist spoke against the inclusion of the Article on the basis that children were 
granted rights by the other provisions of the Covenant. If however, the majority 
desired an Article, Gilchrist argued that it should be limited to relating to the rights 
already recognised in the Covenant. Australia eventually abstained on Article 24 of 
the ICCPR.
In contrast to the tendency seen in Chapter 1 of Briefs of this period to seek to 
accommodate indiscriminately all state economic and social policies through 
amendments to the draft text, Briefs prepared in relation to civil and political rights 
reflected greater confidence in sifting through state concerns. The standard 1955 Brief 
and its successors listed a variety of state concerns with the clauses, particularly in the 
criminal justice area. However, rather than directing delegations to sponsor textual 
amendments, the Briefs generally directed delegates to make clear their understandings 
o f the clauses so as to accommodate state policies. Thus, the Queensland government’s 
worry, that prison conditions might be considered degrading, was included in the Brief 
with a direction that the delegation make it clear that Australia did not consider Article 
7 to prohibit the ordinary condition of imprisonment upon conviction by a court.
137 Memorandum from LD Lyons, Attorney-General’s Department to the Secretary, DEA, 30/8/62, in 
NAA A 432/68, Item 68/2797 Pt 2.
138 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the 18th Session o f the General Assembly, Item 49, in NAA A 
1838/1, Item 929/4 Pt 19.
139 See Statement of H Gilchrist, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 1258, 10, a copy of  
which appears in NAA A 1838/1, Item 929/4 Pt 19.
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Similarly, when New South Wales expressed concern that imprisonment for non­
payment of maintenance would be regarded as an infringement o f Article 11 (no 
imprisonment for a contractual debt), the delegation was directed to make a statement of 
Australia’s understanding that such cases were outside the realm of the Article should 
the need arise. T he contrast between the treatment o f economic and social rights and 
civil and procedural rights in this respect seems to reflect the fact that advice was more 
frequently sought from the Attorney-General’s Department as to the interpretation of 
civil and political rights. It is consistent with the view that civil and political rights 
were amenable to protection as legal rights and thus capable o f being given precise 
definition by lawyers.
Overall, the Casey and Bureaucratic period witnessed a peak in Australia’s concern 
about individual civil and political rights. In theoretical terms, the dominance of a civil 
liberties view of these rights continued. Efforts were concentrated on limiting the scope 
o f rights to what was ‘realistic’ given competing domestic policies. Awareness of 
Australia’s minority position on many rights motivated a shift on some key votes. Yet, 
often the shift o f outward position hid a more subtle retention o f reservations in the 
form of restrictive understandings of clauses eventually adopted.
Conclusion
This Chapter has highlighted that Australia did not give continuous support to all the 
civil and political rights embodied in the UDHR and ICCPR. Throughout the 
negotiations Australia displayed resistance to recognising civil and political rights that 
would undermine the discriminatory policies Australia applied to women, migrants and 
indigenous peoples of Australia and Australia’s external territories. Although the 
international politicisation of racial discrimination motivated a shift in Australia’s 
policies, rather than embracing the right of all persons to enjoy human rights equally, 
Australian disguised its reservations by formulating previous objections into 
particularised understandings.
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Furthermore, only during the early years of Labor administration did Australia support 
government responsibility for underwriting individual’s enjoyment of civil and political 
rights. As a result o f Spender and his Ministerial successors’ Liberal Party ideology 
and the conservative Diceyan-legal views of Whitlam and his bureaucratic successors, 
Australia jettisoned government responsibility for enacting protective legislation with 
respect to rights. The proper scope for civil and political rights was reduced to those 
‘traditional civil liberties’ recognised in British common law systems. Confidence was 
expressed that in the majority o f cases, recognition of civil and political rights would 
require little amendment of Australian practice given the Australian State’s 
longstanding commitment to the rule of law. Where anomalies existed as a result of 
private action, the solution was not to insist upon governmental remedial action, but to 
have governments engage in more general promotion of human rights. As a result, at 
the conclusion of the negotiations of the International Bill of Rights, Australia viewed 
civil and political rights as non-threatening to the status quo, and capable of 
accommodating the distinct treatment of groups requiring ‘special protection’ in the 
eyes o f State actors.
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Chapter 3
Minority Rights and the Right of Peoples to Self-
Determination
Introduction
This Chapter considers Australia’s attitudes towards the right o f minorities to practice 
their culture, religion and language embodied in Article 27 o f the ICCPR and the right 
of peoples to self-determination proclaimed in Article 1 of both the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR. The rights have several features in common. Neither right has an equivalent 
in the UDHR, though each right has a heritage that predates 1948. Each right also 
involves a ‘collective’ element: individuals are entitled to minority rights by virtue of 
their membership of a relevant minority group, while the right o f self-determination is 
expressed to be enjoyed by ‘peoples’. Beyond these similarities, each right evoked 
considerable hostility and suspicion from Australian policy-makers during the 
negotiations of the human rights Covenants. Minority rights were feared as potentially 
undermining the existing cultural and national unity. Self-determination rights were 
viewed as subverting the bona fide administration of trust and non-self-governing 
territories and leading to the possible breakdown o f orderly government in nation 
States. Whilst Australia eventually accepted a narrowly interpreted Article 27, it 
remained implacably hostile to any recognition of the right of peoples to self- 
determination.
The timing o f the international discussions on minority rights and the right of self- 
determination does not permit a rigid adherence to the time periods used in other 
Chapters. Minority rights, for instance, were not discussed at any length in the 
Commission on Human Rights during the Spender period (1949-1951). Debates 
concerning a right o f self-determination arose only during 1950 and thus by-passed the 
Evatt period (1946-1949). Yet, the unevenness o f the international discussion is
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counteracted to a certain extent by the degree to which internal debate on the rights 
overlapped. Self-determination, for instance, was seen initially as a form of minority 
right. One can thus use the discussion of each right as part o f a larger narrative on 
Australia’s attitude towards race-based collective rights. In adopting this broader 
perspective, it becomes apparent that unlike the findings in Chapters 1 and 2, political 
affiliations played little role in determining Australia’s continuous opposition to such 
rights. Instead, policies were informed by a bipartisan belief in the supremacy of the 
Anglo-Celtic culture and a hostility towards affording ‘special rights’ to groups within 
Australian society.
A. Minority Rights
Overview of the International Debate
The international community’s concern with the protection o f minorities has a long 
heritage.1 In peace processes involving the redrawing of territorial boundaries between 
neighbouring States, a subsidiary effect was the creation of ethnic, linguistic and 
cultural minorities. Groups of persons who had previously been living in one State 
became citizens o f another by virtue of being residents of the territory that was 
transferred. The international community recognised that such persons were likely to be 
vulnerable given their lack of historic association with the new State, and their likely 
distinct language, culture and ethnicity. Pressure was placed upon States acquiring 
territory to provide guarantees with respect to such minorities. Attention was focused 
particularly on protecting minorities from discrimination in such key fields as 
citizenship, the freedom to move and establish residence and the exercise of culture, 
language and religion. A clause to protect minorities was thus included in the peace 
treaty of Westphalia (1648) as well as the treaties following both World Wars.
For a fuller history, see: M Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR 
Commentary, NP Engel, Strasbourg, 1993, 480; Y Dinstein, ‘Collective Human Rights o f Peoples 
and Minorities’ (1976) 25 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 102, 113; P Thomberry, 
International Law and the Rights of Minorities, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991.
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During the drafting process of the UDHR, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Denmark
each put forward proposals for an Article dealing with the rights of minorities. After
negotiations, a combined text was produced which stated:
All persons irrespective of whether they belong to the racial, national or religious 
minority or majority of the population have the right to their own ethnic or national 
culture to establish their own schools and receive teaching in their native tongue and to 
use that tongue in the press, at public meetings, in the courts and in other official 
premises.2
The emphasis of this text was on the right of each individual to use his/her own 
language in all aspects of public life. When debated in the Commission on Human 
Rights, it was apparent that delegations varied in their opinions as to the extent of 
diversity that States should accept in public life. In the absence of agreement as to an 
acceptable form of clause, no minority rights clause was adopted. Instead, in 1948 a 
draft Resolution was submitted to the General Assembly for its consideration. The 
Resolution, subsequently adopted by the General Assembly, proclaimed that the 
international community could not ‘remain indifferent to the fate o f minorities’.3 It 
requested the Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on the 
Prevention o f Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to prepare a detailed study of 
the problems o f minorities as a basis for putting in place effective measures of 
protection.4
From the earliest debates of the ICCPR, a minorities clause was on the negotiating
table. The Human Rights Division of the United Nations Secretariat prepared a clause
for possible inclusion in the Covenant in 1947. It read:
In States inhabited by a substantial number of persons of a race, language or religion 
other than those of the majority of the population, persons belonging to such ethnic, 
linguistic or religious minorities shall have the right to establish and maintain, out of an 
equitable proportion of any public funds available for the purpose, their schools and 
cultural and religious institutions and to use their own language before the courts and 
other authorities and organs of the State and in the press and in public assembly.5
Note too that the Secretariat had proposed a section: ‘In States inhabited by a substantial number of 
persons of a race, language or religion other than those of the majority of the population, persons 
belonging to such ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities shall have the right to establish and 
maintain, out of an equitable proportion of any public funds available for the purpose, their schools 
and cultural and religious institutions and to use their own language before the courts and other 
authorities and organs of the State and in the press and in public assembly’: UN Doc E/CN.4/21, 
annex A, Art 46. Each text is quoted in MJ Bossuyt, Guide to the “Travaux Preparatoires ” o f  the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1987, 493.
3 GA Resolution 217/C (III), quoted in M Nowak, op cit, 483.
4 Ibid.
UN Doc E/CN.4/21, Annex A, Article 46, quoted by MJ Bossuyt, op cit, 493.
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Pursuant to the General Assembly’s 1948 Resolution, the Sub-Commission on the
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities resolved not to prepare an
additional study, but to submit a draft Article to the Commission on Human Rights for
inclusion in the Covenant. The text it submitted in 1950 read:
Persons belonging to ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities shall not be denied the 
right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to 
profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.* 6
As a draft, it was written as a prohibition against State interference with a group’s right
to enjoy culture, religion or language, rather than a directive mandating the State to
facilitate the continuation of culture, religion or language. This soft tone did not win
the approval o f all proponents o f a minority rights clause. When the major debate on
the provision commenced in 1953, the Soviet Union put forward an alternative text
obliging a State to ensure national minorities the right to use their native tongue and to
possess schools, libraries, museums and other cultural and educational institutions.7 8
Yugoslavia similarly required the State to guarantee ethnic and linguistic groups the
right to be educated in one’s own language. At the end of its Ninth Session (1953), the
Commission on Human Rights adopted an amended version o f the text submitted by the
Sub-Committee which stated:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging 
to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of 
their own group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or 
to use their own language.9
It was not until 1961 that the Third Committee of the General Assembly focused on this 
clause. The text proffered by the Sub-Commission was adopted without amendment at 
the end of the 16th Session of the General Assembly and adopted by the General 
Assembly as part o f the finalised Covenant in 1966.
I. Evatt Period
From the earliest discussions o f a minority rights clause, Australian delegates were 
vocal in their opposition. The fervour of their hostility was fuelled by fears that such a
This is the Sub-Commission’s proposal as contained in E/CN.4/641, Annex II, Recommendation II,
quoted in MJ Bossuyt, op cit, 493-4.
UN Doc E/CN.4/L222, quoted in MJ Bossuyt, op cit, 495.
8 UN Doc E/CN.4/L225, quoted in MJ Bossuyt, op cit, 495.
9 UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 371, 6; quoted in MJ Bossuyt, op cit, 494.
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clause would interfere with Australia’s policy of expecting migrants to assimilate to the 
‘Australian way of life’. Attachment to assimilationist policies was particularly strong 
amongst Australian policy makers given the expansionist immigration policies after 
World War Two. Assimilation was seen as the only policy that would guarantee social 
cohesion and prevent the fracturing of society in the face of the reception of so many 
migrants from diverse cultures. As has been averted to in Chapter 2, the post-war 
period in Australia was indeed remarkable for broadening the racial base of Australia’s 
migrant intake and, accordingly, Australia’s demographic make-up. As Geoffrey 
Bolton has noted Australia remained overwhelmingly British at the end of World War 
Two.10 Culturally, it perceived itself as homogenous. Identification was with Anglo- 
Celtic norms of culture with Aboriginal cultures being largely ignored. The ‘populate 
or perish’ immigration campaign aimed at increasing Australia’s population by 1% a 
year -  approximately 70 000 persons.* 11 Given that a majority o f these persons (66%) 
were assisted migrants of non-British origin, Australians (and Australian politicians) 
feared that permitting cultural diversity would lead to a breakdown of the Australian 
social fabric.13 In any case, it was assumed that the Australian (Anglo-Celtic) culture 
was superior to other cultures so that retention of other cultures was regarded as 
undesirable in itself. Despite the fact that restrictions on recently arrived assisted 
migrants created a segregated, congregated group, the official Australian policy was to 
encourage the dispersal of immigrants. Enculturation and assimilation were to be the 
means by which immigrants in Australia could progress. As a result, any international 
attempt to encourage persons to maintain diverse languages or cultures was firmly 
resisted.
10 G Boulton, The Oxford History o f Australia, Vol 5: 1942-1988: The Middle Way, Oxford 
University Press, Melbourne, 1990, 53.
11 See CA Price, ‘Overseas Migration to Australia: 1947-1970’ in C Price (ed), Australian 
Immigration: A Bibliography and Digest, Australian National University, Canberra, 1970, A3.
12 Ibid, A4.
13 Surveys overwhelmingly showed a preference for migrants o f British stock: a 1948 survey revealed 
63% of respondents favoured English migrants whereas the comparable figure for Greeks was 8%, 
Italians, 4% and Germans 14%: cited in S Alomes, M Dober, D Hellier, ‘The Social Contract of 
Post-war Conservatism’ in A Curthoys, J Merritt (eds), Australia ’s First Cold War: Vol 1: Society, 
Communism and Culture, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1984. These authors conclude that ‘Images o f  
disease, or at least dirt and smell, of race and of evil were common in popular perceptions of 
migrants. Their colour, their foreign tongues and their food tastes all seemed different and therefore 
threatening to many Australians of Anglo or Celtic origin’: ibid.
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Primarily as a result o f this attachment to assimilationist migration policies, Australia 
launched a broad ranging attack on the minorities clause proposed for the UDHR. When 
the joint Soviet Union, Yugoslavian and Danish text was submitted for the 
consideration of the Commission on Human Rights, Australia voted against the 
clause.14 John Hood, the Australian delegate, described the draft Article as raising a 
problem ‘which directly affected the fundamental structure of States, and the science of 
government, that of reconciling the rights and interests of all groups within the State’.15 
Specifically not questioning the wisdom of ‘free development o f diversified groups in 
other countries’, Hood defended Australia’s stance that assimilation o f all groups was in 
the ‘best interests o f all in the long run’.16 The Australian situation was distinguished 
from that of other European nations. European nations had pre-existing minority 
groups as a result o f the historical re-drawing of boundaries and the involuntary 
integration o f ethnically distinct groups. In such contexts, it might be appropriate to 
speak of minority rights, particularly with respect to protecting political rights.
Australia, however, was a country of recent immigration in which persons of different 
ethnic backgrounds volunteered to come to Australia. The unspoken assumption was 
that in choosing Australia as their new home, immigrants had renounced their former 
political and cultural allegiances and committed to ‘becoming Australian’.
Accordingly, Hood argued that a minority rights clause in the Australian context would 
only serve to create divisions and undermine the policy of assimilation.17
Clauses that provided for multiple official languages were the subject o f particular 
criticism. In the debates in late 1948 in the Third Committee, Alan Watt, as Australian 
representative, stated that Australia did not recognise any fundamental right to use a
14 Cablegram from Australian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 28/11/48, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 5.
15 JDL Hood, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 73, 10; 15 June 1948.
16 Ibid.
17 Report by Representative to the Third Committee o f the General Assembly concerning the UDHR, 
in NAA A 518/1, Item 104/5/2 Pt 1.
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language other than the national language before a tribunal. 18 English was, and would 
remain, the only official language.
Australian delegates also questioned the precision of the proposed clause. In particular, 
the delegation claimed the term ‘minority’ was unclear. In countries of immigration, 
the delegate asked would the descendants of immigrants who demanded the right to use 
their own language be considered as a minority? 19 Without himself proffering a 
definition o f the term ‘minority’, the Australia’s representative, Alan Watt, implied that 
the answer was no. Ambiguity in the term ‘minority’ was also used to bolster the 
argument that a minorities clause would have a limited operation in Australia.
Delegates claimed that Australia did not have minorities. Migrants were assimilated so 
that they did not become minorities. Indeed, the only Australian experience of 
minorities was said to be of an indirect nature: during World War Two, German 
propaganda had encouraged racial stereotyping and the Australian government had 
moved quickly to suppress such material. It is noticeable that the delegate did not 
refer to other policies of the Australian government -  such as the internment of 
Australian citizens who were of German or Japanese ethnic origin during the war or the 
racially distinct treatment of Aboriginal persons.21 Instead, Australia was presented as a 
country o f racial and cultural homogeneity.
Internally, there was greater recognition of the existence of minorities within Australia. 
The Department o f Interior advanced the view that Aboriginal people could be regarded 
as a minority.22 Yet, so radical a proposition did the Department o f External Affairs 
view this proposal, that it did not address the Department o f Interior’s position in the
18 The delegate did, however, suggest that perhaps a separate Convention would be the appropriate 
venue in which to discuss the language question: A Watt, Australian representative, E/C.3/SR 161, 
725-6; 27 November 1948.
19 A Watt, Australian representative, UN Doc E/C.3/SR 161, 725-6; 27 November 1948.
20 Ibid.
21 The ignoring o f  Aboriginal people was consistent with the departmental view that they did not 
constitute a minority. As for the internment policies instituted, see P Hasluck, The Government and 
the People, 1939-1941, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1952, 593.
22 Memorandum from WA McLaren, Secretary, Department of the Interior to the Secretary, DEA, 
19/5/47, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 3.
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Briefs. Instead, all that was included was a Statement that the Department did not 
consider Aboriginal peoples to constitute a ‘minority’ in the relevant sense. In the light 
of justifications given for special laws to assist Aboriginal people to reach ‘higher 
standards’ o f civilization,23 the assumption of the Department of External Affairs 
appeared to be that the Aboriginal people did not possess the type o f ‘culture’ necessary 
to gain minority status at international law.
Beyond Australia’s objections to the phrasing and utility o f a minority rights clause was 
a stated preference for human rights clauses of more general application. Australian 
representatives sought the substitution of a clause that guaranteed the universal 
application o f human rights to all, rather than the recognition o f special rights for 
migrants. Notwithstanding Australia’s parallel attempts in other fields to limit the 
application o f substantive rights to immigrants (discussed in Chapter 2), Australia 
suggested that a statement along the lines ‘individuals belonging to special groups 
should enjoy the rights granted to all human beings’ should be inserted elsewhere in the 
Covenant.24
Ultimately, the Australian delegation supported the omission of any minority rights 
clause.23 Deferral o f the matter was considered the best solution available. Australia 
thus voted for the 1948 Resolution of the General Assembly expressing ‘concern’ for 
minorities. Even this step was obviously regarded as requiring justification within 
Australia. In an attempt to placate domestic concern over the General Assembly even 
implicitly endorsing rights for minorities, the Australian delegation wrote to the 
Department o f External Affairs drawing particular attention to the General Assembly’s 
recognition o f the sensitivity and complexity of the issue. With some satisfaction, it 
cited the General Assembly Resolution’s preamble: ‘Considering that it is difficult to 
adopt a uniform solution of this complex and delicate question [ie minorities] which has
23 See Chapter 2, 78.
24 JDL Hood, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 73, 10; 15 June 1948.
25 Cablegram from Australian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 28/11/48, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 5.
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special aspects in each state in which it arises.’26 The issue was not to be raised again in 
any detail until the Liberal-Country Party Coalition had gained power in Australia.
II. Spender Period
There was little agitation on the minority right clause during the Spender period. The 
debate in the Commission on Human Rights on the form of clause finished in 1948.
The new stage for its discussion in 1949-1950 was the Sub-Commission on the 
Prevention o f Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. One o f the members o f the 
Sub-Commission, William MacNamara, was Australian. Yet this o f itself did not 
involve the Department of External Affairs or Australian Ministers in the Sub- 
Commission’s deliberations. Members of the Sub-Commission were understood to 
participate in their personal rather than (national) representative capacity, thus 
MacNamara was not subject to government direction. Indeed the Department of 
External Affairs was far from enamoured with MacNamara and the Sub-Commission’s 
stances. In 1950, when making a submission to Spender as to whether Australia should 
nominate another Australian for membership of the Sub-Commission (on the expiry of 
MacNamara’s term of appointment), the Department o f External Affairs advised against 
nominating another Australian. The Sub-Commission was described as having been 
created for political reasons to appease countries such as the Soviet Union and was seen 
as duplicating the work of the Commission on Human Rights. The Sub-Commission 
was described as operating on an ‘enclave philosophy’ (separating out ethnic groups) 
antithetical to the dominant ‘assimilation policy’ adopted by the international 
community.27 It was noted that MacNamara had caused the government embarrassment 
through his support of resolutions concerning Aboriginal and migrant issues in 
Australia. Spender followed the recommendation of the Department and did not 
nominate a replacement for MacNamara. Australia thus had no official participation in
26
27
Ibid.
Ministerial Submission, ‘Election o f an Australian to Minorities Sub-Commission’, 21/3/50, in 
NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 8.
discussions on a minority rights clause until Commission on Human Rights resumed its 
examination of the issue in 1953.
III. Casey and Bureaucratic Period
From 1953 until 1961, Australia’s stance remained one of unflinching opposition to a 
minority rights clause in the ICCPR. Australia’s first line of attack was to dispute the 
existence o f any relevant minorities in Australia. Secondly, it disputed any ‘minority 
problem’ existing in Australia and thirdly, argued that the inclusion of a minority rights 
clause would serve to produce divisions and limit national progress in States such as 
Australia. Essentially, Australia’s three pronged attack repeated arguments used during 
the Evatt period. However, there was some re-ordering of arguments to emphasise the 
absence of minority difficulties in Australia. This change reflected a growing 
defensiveness in Australia’s policy that was eventually to lead to the reversal of 
Australia’s vote on the clause.
The non-existence of ‘minorities’ in Australia received greater emphasis in the 
statements o f Australian representatives during 1953-1961 than had previously been the 
case. In 1953, for instance, Fred Whitlam, as Australia’s representative in the 
Commission on Human Rights, gave a speech concerning the Yugoslavian and Soviet 
Union proposal for a minority rights clause. Whitlam identified the two groups most 
likely to be classified as ‘minorities’ in Australia -  Aboriginal people and immigrants -  
and disputed the eligibility o f either to be properly regarded as minorities. Whitlam 
argued that Aboriginal people had no competing culture of their own ‘since they had 
only reached the level of food-gatherers’. As such, they could not be considered a 
minority.28 Likewise with immigrants, there was ‘no question o f cultural differences’.29 
Australia explained its point of view more fully in 1954 during the Economic and Social 
Council’s discussion of the work of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of
28 HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 369, 10; 2 October 1953.
117
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. In that forum, the Australian delegate 
advanced the view that ‘minorities’ did not include immigrants who had assimilated, a 
view endorsed by Argentina, Belgium, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. This stance had 
not changed as of 1961. In the 1961 Brief for the General Assembly, in addition to 
referring to Whitlam’s 1953 statement, the Brief concluded that migrants were not 
‘minorities’ but equal citizens.31
A majority of Australian states clearly agreed with the Department o f External Affairs 
that minorities were undesirable. Yet, they were more diffident in expressing their 
views as to whether minorities existed in Australia. In 1952, the Commonwealth 
requested all the states to provide information to be used in a response to the United 
Nations Sub-Commission about the protection o f minorities in Australia. The 
Department of External Affairs referred the states to the definition of ‘minority’ which
was being utilized by the United Nations, namely:
(a) The term minority includes only those non-dominant groups in a population which 
possess and wish to preserve stable ethnic, religious or linguistic traditions or 
characteristics markedly different from those o f the rest o f the population;
(b) Such minorities should properly include a number o f persons sufficient by 
themselves to develop such characteristics; and
(c) The members of such minorities must be loyal to the State o f which they are 
nationals.32
Only New South Wales unequivocally saw itself as having no minorities in the relevant 
sense. Tasmania and Victoria were more evasive in their responses. Victoria stated 
that there was no legislation or judicial decision dealing with the position of minorities 
without tackling the issue of whether minorities existed.34 Tasmania similarly avoided
30 File Note relating to the 17th Session of the Economic and Social Council, undated, in NAA A 
1838/1, Item 856/13/10/9 Pt 1.
31 Uruguay proposed the addition o f a second paragraph to make clear that immigrants were not 
included: ‘such rights may not be interpreted as entitling any group settled in the territory o f a State, 
under the specific terms of its immigration laws to request special privileges or to form within that 
state separate communities which might impair its national unity or security’: UN Doc 
E/CN.4/L260.
32 Quoted in letter from Minister Paul Hasluck, for Prime Minister Menzies, to the Premier o f NSW, 
14/2/52, in NAA A 462/21, Item 575/1.
33 Letter from JJ Cahill, Premier o f NSW to Prime Minister Menzies, 21/4/52, in NAA A 462/21, Item 
575/1.
34 Letter from JGB McDonald, Premier of Victoria to Prime Minister Menzies, 24/3/52, in NAA A 
462/21, Item 575/1.
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the issue by stating that it had no need under its democratic system for measures to
protect minorities. It did comment that:
Non-dominant groups in the population are not encouraged in preserving their original 
ethnic or linguistic traditions, but are expected to adopt the personal and religious 
freedom obtaining in this State and eventually acquire full rights as members of their 
chosen country.35
Queensland felt the need to explain its perception that it had no minorities. The Deputy 
Premier of Queensland, Jack Duggan, stated that those of non-British stock had not 
made any ‘real effort to preserve or develop their own culture or tradition’ whilst 
Aboriginal natives lacked the ‘capacity to develop their own culture and traditions in a 
way which would enable them to take their place as ordinary members o f the 
community’. Western Australia accepted that it had legislation dealing with 
minorities, specifically legislation concerning Aborigines and Jews.
Likewise Commonwealth departments, other than the Department o f External Affairs, 
displayed caution about the ‘minorities question’. The Attorney-General’s Department 
considered that minorities in the sense of distinctive population groups had not appeared 
in Australia. At the same time the Attorney-General’s Department thought that the 
Economic and Social Council might be interested in measures dealing with migrants, 
implying that the Economic and Social Council might take a different view of the scope 
of the term ‘minority’ .38 It also considered that questions about Aboriginal peoples 
might arise.39 The Department of Immigration did not see itself as playing any role 
with respect to minorities who owed allegiance to the Commonwealth. It accepted, 
though, that in so far as the Department of Immigration dealt with aliens in Australia, it 
was dealing with minority groups.40 Notwithstanding this level o f uncertainty amongst
35 Letter from R Cosgrove, Premier o f Tasmania to Prime Minister Menzies, 25/2/52, in NAA 
A462/21, Item 575/1.
36 Letter from JP Duggan, for the Premier of Queensland to Prime Minister Menzies, 16/7/52, in NAA  
A 462/21, Item 575/1.
37 Letter from R McLarty, Premier o f Western Australia to Prime Minister Menzies, 9/4/52, in NAA A 
462/21, Item 575/1.
38 Quoted in letter from KCO Shann, for the Acting Secretary, DEA to the Secretary, Department of 
Immigration, 8/8/52, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/1/2 Pt 2.
39 Memorandum from LD Lyons for the Secretary, Attorney-General’s Department to the Secretary, 
DEA, 3/3/52, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/1/2 Pt 2.
40 Memorandum from THE Heyes, Secretary, Department o f Immigration, to the Secretary, DEA, 
19/5/49, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 3.
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departments and states as to the meaning of the term ‘minority’, the Department of 
External Affairs publicly maintained a consistent line that the term had little application 
in Australia.
The second argument that Australian delegates advanced was that there was no 
‘minority problem’ in Australia. It would have been open to Australian delegates to 
present this conclusion as a natural corollary of their first argument. If there were no 
minorities in Australia, there could be no minorities problem (unless a lack of minorities 
was itself considered detrimental). Instead, delegates proceeded to analyse the situation 
faced by Aborigines and migrants, implicitly conceding that a majority of the 
international community might view these groups as minorities. In relation to 
Aboriginal people, Whitlam accepted that the introduction of a foreign culture in 
Australia had created some problems in terms of fitting Aboriginal people into the 
general way of life in Australia, but characterised the Australian policy of assimilation 
as the ‘sensible solution’. In relation to immigration, Whitlam asserted that differing 
religious beliefs caused no dissension and again spoke in favour o f the policy of 
assimilation.41 Despite having argued that Australia’s immigration gave rise to no 
distinct cultural groups, Whitlam applauded the way in which Australian authorities 
were working to ensure that the cultural contributions that immigrants could make 
would not be lost either to themselves or to the Australian population as a whole .42
Australia’s third argument was that recognition of minority rights would have a 
detrimental effect on States like Australia. The articulation of minority rights would 
have the effect of creating national minorities. Such artificially created minorities 
would in turn prevent assimilation and the development of Australia as a cohesive 
nation. The real difficulties arising out of immigration were seen as linguistic in 
nature, the inability of immigrants to immediately communicate with others in 
Australia. The proposals being put forward by the Soviet Union and Yugoslav
41 HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 369, 10; 2 October 1953.
42 Ibid.
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representatives (providing schooling and public documentation in the range of 
languages of minority groups) were characterised as counter-productive.43 Separate 
language facilities were looked upon as a disincentive for ‘new Australians’ to learn 
English and assimilate into the Australian way of life.
All three arguments were developed from a State-centric perspective. Australia 
considered what effect a minority rights clause would have on the State -  as in the 
members o f the community as a collective. There was little engagement with the issue 
of whether it was in the interests of individuals within the groups most commonly 
regarded as others by ‘minorities’ to enjoy specialised rights. The State interest in the 
perpetuation of assimilationist policies was regarded as so strong as to make individual 
interest in maintaining diverse cultures a negligible consideration. In this respect, 
Australia’s policy on minority rights was unlike its policy on any other individual 
human right (with the exception of self-determination discussed later in this Chapter).
As seen in Chapter 2, for instance, in debating the scope of the equality clause, 
Australian policy-makers accepted the overall value of freedom from discrimination 
while seeking limitations to accommodate competing domestic policies. In the case of 
the minority rights clause, the State interest in preserving cultural unity was seen as so 
vital as to justify opposition to any clause, howsoever worded.
Furthermore, underlying the opposition to the minority rights clause was a questioning 
of the value o f collective specialised rights. Special rights were seen as having the 
potential to destabilise society and create divisions. Australia’s preference remained for 
human rights to be drafted in such a way as to be potentially applicable to all persons.
It was a position that did not alter significantly even when Australia ultimately accepted 
the clause.
43 Ibid. A similar argument was outlined in the Brief for the Australian Delegation to the 16th Session 
of the General Assembly, in NAA A 1838, Item 929/4 Pt 18.
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In 1961 Australia reversed its position by voting in favour of the draft o f Article 27 of 
the ICCPR. This change reflected more a change of tactics than a fundamental change 
of heart. Support for a minority rights clause was specifically linked to a narrow 
understanding of the language employed in the draft clause. Australia minimised the 
significance of the distinction between a majority and a minority. In the 1961 Brief for 
Delegates, for example, support for the draft clause was said to be justified on the basis 
that the clause provided ‘positive freedoms for all’.44 Australia remained insistent that 
it did not have minorities and remained committed to preventing the creation of 
minorities. Elizabeth Warren, the then Australian representative on the Third 
Committee o f the General Assembly, for instance, affirmed that Australia remained 
committed to preventing immigrants from forming migrant groups. It aligned itself 
with Brazil and Chile in stating:
As one o f the world’s newer countries, Australia was concerned to promote national 
unity and a sense of national identity. It was therefore doing its best to encourage new 
immigrants not to set up separatist minority groups, but to merge completely with the 
Australian community and enrich it with their ideas, cultures and traditions. There were 
no barriers in Australia against newcomers worshipping according to their own creed, or 
using their native language 45
Warren was also explicit in continuing to deny that Aboriginal people could ever be 
considered a ‘minority’ group.46 Thus the clause was seen as having little specialist 
application in Australia.
Australia’s support for Article 27 was also conditioned upon an essentially privatised 
view of Article 27. According to the Brief given to the Australian delegation in 1961, 
Article 27 permitted immigrant groups to enjoy the language, religious traditions and 
culture that they brought with them, thereby enriching Australian life. In addition to 
conceding the right had special application to immigrant groups, the Brief demonstrated 
a belief that the rights to be protected fell within the private sphere -  a groups’ own use 
of language, practice o f religion. There was no conception that Article 27 would apply
44 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the 16th Session o f the General Assembly, in NAA A 1838, 
Item 929/4 Pt 18.
45 EA Warren, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 1103, 214; 14 November 1961.
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in the public sphere or indeed require government assistance.47 Thus minority rights 
were viewed more in the nature of a ‘freedom right’ than a right requiring active steps 
by government.48 The Australian delegation was directed to remain vigilant against any 
attempt by the Soviets to reintroduce obligations on the State to provide schools and 
other institutions for national minorities on a linguistic basis. Australia could 
countenance protecting individuals’ right to speak their language o f choice in the 
privacy of their home. Yet it was not prepared to underwrite the establishment of a 
multi-lingual State 49
It is likely that the Australian change of heart was motivated by a perception that in the 
racially-charged atmosphere of 1961 (discussed in Chapter 2), Australia would lose 
more than it would gain by persisting in its opposition. Should it vote against a clause 
that others viewed as having particular significance for Aboriginal and migrant groups, 
Australia would be vulnerable to the charge that it was acting in a racist manner. The 
preferable alternative was to vote in favour of the clause, but emphasise that its 
application was universal (ie all peoples enjoyed this right) and that it operated 
primarily in the private sector. By reading down the clause in this manner, Australian 
delegates felt confident that the clause would offer no threat to Australia’s 
assimilationist policies.
Looking as a whole at Australian policy towards Article 27 o f the ICCPR, it is apparent 
that successive Australian policy-makers remained hostile towards acceptance of a 
specialised collective right to enjoy cultural rights. Minorities themselves were seen as 
an unattractive, destabilising feature of other States, Australia having no real minorities. 
Policy makers were determined to uphold the supremacy of the Anglo-Celtic culture 
and defend it against dilution from foreign influences. Australia’s opposition to this
47 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the 16th Session o f the General Assembly, in NAA A 1838, 
Item 929/4 Pt 18.
48 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the 10th Session o f the Commission on Human Rights, in 
NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/10/9 Pt 3.
49 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the 16th Session o f the General Assembly, in NAA A 1838, 
Item 929/4 Pt 18.
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collective right was to have clear parallels to the stance adopted with respect to the right 
to self-determination discussed in the second half of this Chapter.
B. Self-Determination
Australian opposition to the right o f peoples to self-determination was another constant 
in Australian international human rights policy from the right’s first appearance in 1950 
until the finalisation of the Covenants in 1966. As early as 1953, some policy-makers 
opined that Australia’s continued opposition was ineffective, ‘like pulling faces in a 
dark room’. 50 Yet delegates were not authorised to withdraw Australia’s objections. 
Indeed so great was the Australian resistance to a right of self-determination that 
Australia’s representatives made specific adverse comment about the right in their 
speech welcoming the finalised Covenants in 1966.51 Viewed from a modem 
perspective, Australia’s resistance might have been expected to be linked to concern 
about the implications of Aboriginal self-determination.52 An examination of 
Australia’s stance reveals other dominant concerns related to Australia’s administration 
of trust and non-self-goveming territories and the potential for the right to be used by 
minorities to demand a right to secede.
Overview of the International Debate53
Self-determination was not itself a novel concept to the international community.
50 Note from A Marshall to TA Pyman, DEA 29/4/53, in NAA in NAA A 1838/2, Item 856/13/10/8 Pt 
1 .
51 RF Osborn, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 1455, 479-80; 12 December 1966.
52 Australian representatives have in recent years expressed concerns about the use o f the term ‘self- 
determination’ in the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In the negotiations of 
the Working Group on the Draft Declaration held in late 1998, for instance, the Department o f  
Foreign Affairs ‘made clear the Australian Government’s concerns about the use o f the term.. .given 
that it has no settled meaning and for many implies establishment o f separate nations or separate 
laws’: Department o f Foreign Affairs and Trade, Human Rights and Indigenous Issues Newsletter, 
No 8, February 1999.
53 For a more detailed account of the history of self-determination, see A Cassese, Self-Determination 
o f Peoples, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, H Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty and 
Self-Determination: the accommodation o f conflicting rights, University o f Pennsylvania Press, 
Philadelphia, 1990, C Tomuschat (ed), Modern Law o f  Self-Determination, Martinus Nijhoff, 
Dordrecht, 1993.
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Article 1(2) of the United Nations Charter, for instance, proclaimed that one of the 
purposes of the United Nations was:
To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle o f equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to 
strengthen universal peace.54
With the drafting of the International Bill of Rights emerged a debate as to whether the
self-determination of peoples constituted a human right. For reasons that are not clear,
this debate did not arise in the context of the UDHR, but only several years into the
drafting of the Covenant on Human Rights.55 In 1950 the Soviet Union proposed a
clause for the Covenant which stated:
Every people and every nation shall have the right to national self-determination. States 
which have responsibilities for the administration of non-self-governing territories shall 
promote the fulfilment o f this right, guided by the aims and principles o f the United 
Nations in relation to the peoples of such territories.56
In the Third Committee of the General Assembly, the Soviet proposal was rejected
without consideration of its merit.57 Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia re-introduced the
topic in the subsequent session of the General Assembly with the result that the General
Assembly ordered the Commission on Human Rights to ‘study ways and means which
would ensure the rights of peoples and nations to self-determination and to prepare
r o
recommendations accordingly’. The failure o f the Commission to prepare 
recommendations by the Sixth Session of the General Assembly incurred critical 
comment from the General Assembly. The General Assembly then adopted a more 
specific Resolution, directing the Commission to include an article on self- 
determination.59 The text suggested by the Commission was relatively simple: ‘All 
peoples shall have the right o f self-determination’. The General Assembly also directed 
that the right should make special reference to the responsibility of States having
As to the weakness o f the principle conceived at San Francisco, see A Cassese, op cit, 40. 
According to the Committee which drafted principles concerning self-determination, it did not, for 
instance, give rise to a right of minority groups to secede nor did not it give colonial people a right 
to achieve political independence: A Cassese, op cit, 40.
55 A right to self-determination was not included in the UDHR, an omission that has not been 
explained by commentators: see, for example, J Morsink, The Universal Declaration o f  Human 
Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1999. The 
omission was not commented upon in Australian reports.
56 UN Doc E/CN.4/237. The proposed clause went on to speak o f rights o f national minorities. See 
too UN Docs E/CN.4/350,47; A/C.3/L 96, E/CN.4/L21: all quoted in A Cassese, op cit, 48
57 A Cassese, op cit, 48.
58 GA Resolution 42ID (V); quoted in M Nowak, op cit, 10.
59 GA Resolution 545 (VI), quoted and discussed in M Nowak, op cit, 10.
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responsibility for non-self-governing territories to promote the realization of the right in 
relation to the peoples of such territories.60 By this stage the General Assembly had 
decided in favour of two Covenants. As in indication o f the perceived importance o f 
the clause, the Commission on Human Rights was directed to include the self- 
determination clause in both Covenants.01
Notwithstanding these quite explicit directions, the inclusion of a self-determination 
clause remained a hotly debated topic in the Commission on Human Rights. A majority 
of the drafting work took place during the Eighth Session of the Commission on Human 
Rights in 1952. At this point, in addition to recognising the right and its application to 
trust territories, the text was expanded to include a reference to the economic aspects of 
self-determination. In particular, the draft clause made reference to self-determination 
including permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources and asserted that no
people could be deprived of its own means of subsistence on the ground of any right
62that may be claimed by other States.
In 1955, a small working group of the Third Committee of the General Assembly 
redrafted the article. It is notable that none of the so called metropolitan powers (those 
responsible for administering trust or non-self-governing territories) participated in this 
working group. The group consisted of El Salvador, Greece, India, Pakistan, Brazil, 
Poland, Costa Rica, Venezuela and Greece. It drafted an Article that was submitted to 
the Third Committee in General Assembly.63 Whilst debates continued on the form of 
implementation appropriate for the right of self-determination, the text of Article 1 was 
finalised following the Third Committee’s consideration of the Working Party’s draft in 
1955. The language adopted then was identical to that adopted in 1966. The clause
60 Ibid; See also Report of the Australian Representative to the Eighth Session o f the Commission on 
Human Rights, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/10/7 Pt 2A.
61 M Nowak, op cit, 10.
62 The third paragraph of text was the result of a Chilean proposal to include the right to control 
natural resources: A Cassese, op cit, 49.
63 Report o f Australian representative to the 10th Session o f the General Assembly, in NAA A 432/72, 
Item 64/3091.
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stated:
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue o f that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose o f their natural wealth and 
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out o f international economic 
cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no 
case may a people be deprived of its own means o f subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility 
for the administration of Non-Self-Goveming and Trust Territories, shall promote the 
realization o f the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity 
with the provisions of the Charter o f the United Nations.
The process o f drafting the clause on self-determination was interlinked with the 
development of recommendations concerning implementation o f the right of self- 
determination. The Seventh Session of the General Assembly in 1952 was presented 
with two draft recommendations from the Commission on Human Rights. The first 
made reference to the existing ‘slavery of peoples and nations’ and directed that States 
with responsibility for non-self-goveming and trust territories grant the right of self- 
determination to inhabitants upon their demand for self-government. In order to 
determine the popular wish of inhabitants, administering powers were to hold 
plebiscites under the auspices of the United Nations. The second recommendation 
suggested that governments administering non-self-goveming and trust territories 
should include in the information transmitted to the United Nations (under Article 73(e) 
of the Charter) detailed information on the extent to which the right of self- 
determination was being exercised by the peoples of the territories and the progress 
being made to develop the capacity for self-administration. When the recommendations 
were debated in the Third Committee of the General Assembly, the reference to 
‘slavery’ was removed from the first recommendation, but the substance of the 
recommendations was approved.
In 1954, the Ninth Session of the General Assembly requested the Commission on 
Human Rights to complete its recommendations on international respect for the right of 
peoples and nations to self-determination. Its Resolution referred to recommendations 
‘concerning their [peoples’] permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and
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resources, having due regard to the rights and duties of States under international law 
and the importance of encouraging international cooperation in the economic 
development of under-developed countries’.64 The response o f the Commission on 
Human Rights was to finalise a text of the right to self-determination and transmit it to 
the General Assembly for its consideration. As noted above, the text was then finessed 
by a Working Group of the Third Committee of the General Assembly and 
subsequently adopted as part of the ICCPR and ICESCR.
In none of these recommendations was there any hint that self-determination was 
anything but a right. Indeed, even before the finalising of the ICCPR and ICESCR, the 
General Assembly had taken further steps to recognise and promote the right of self- 
determination within the general context of decolonisation. Both the General 
Assembly’s 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples (GA Resolution 1514 (XV)) and its 1962 Resolution relating to Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources (GA Resolution 1803 (XVII)) specifically 
mentioned the right to self-determination. Despite this history, Australia remained 
resolutely against recognition of a right to self-determination. The discussion below 
explores this opposition, from the starting point o f the Spender period when a right of 
self-determination was first raised in the Commission on Human Rights.
I. Spender Period
The Australian reaction to the proposed ‘right of self-determination’ in 1950 was swift 
and unequivocal. Australia identified strongly with other metropolitan powers65 in 
challenging the legitimacy of the right. In comparison to its stance in later years, 
Australia’s public statement in 1950 appears somewhat muted. The major Australian 
speech given in the context of the Commission of Human Rights was relatively short
64 A Cassese, op cit, 49.
65 Metropolitan powers were the States who had responsibility for administering trust or non-self- 
goveming territories. Australian reports usually listed the United Kingdom, the United States, 
France, Belgium, and New Zealand as fellow metropolitan powers: see for example, Social 
Committee Report, undated, ‘UN-Australia Delegation to the General Assembly’ Folder, Evatt 
Collection, Flinders University.
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and endorsed previous speakers rather than offering an independent analysis. Yet the 
brevity of the statement seems to have been a consequence of the timing of the 
Australian speech (following most of the other metropolitan powers on the 
Commission) rather than disinterest. The Australian delegate was happy to endorse the 
arguments o f the United Kingdom: self-determination was a principle and not a right 
and that metropolitan powers were exercising power responsibly in their respective 
territories.
The Australian delegation did not pause to consider whether self-determination could be 
conceptualised as a human right. Instead, it reacted defensively, expressing frustration 
and indignation that the self-determination proposal was designed to discredit 
metropolitan powers:
The proposal typifies the extreme and ungoverned attitude that many delegations, 
particularly Middle Eastern, have brought to bear on the question o f  the Covenant in the 
Third Committee. It was used by its supporters mainly as a stick for belabouring the 
metropolitan powers yet again. It is the success attending these and similar efforts that 
has made the amended text o f the draft resolution something o f a monstrosity.66
Only when it became apparent that support for the right to self-determination was not
dissipating did the Australian policy-makers develop more sophisticated lines o f attack.
II. Casey and Bureaucratic Period
In the period 1951-1955, Australia continued to argue against recognition of the right of 
self-determination in its formal comments in the ongoing debates and in the official 
comments it lodged with the United Nations. In 1952 and in 1955, the issue was 
viewed as sufficiently important to warrant the Australian objections being articulated 
by (Sir) Percy Spender who was by then the Australian Ambassador to the United 
States.67 Even when Australian delegations were noting the subsidence of anti-colonial
67
Memorandum from Australian Mission to the UN, NY to the Secretary, DE A, 1475, in NAA A 
1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 9.
Percy Spender was made Australian Ambassador to the United States in 1951.
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sentiment in the Commission on Human Rights,68 Australia remained implacably 
against recognition of the right. In 1966 when the final texts of the ICCPR and 
ICESCR were adopted, Australia voted against inclusion of Article 1 in each Covenant.
Australia challenged the recognition of the right of self-determination on at least four 
bases. First, self-determination was said to be properly characterised as a political 
principle rather than a right. Secondly, if  self-determination was a right, it was a 
collective right and was inappropriate for inclusion in international instruments 
concerned with individual rights. Thirdly, the imprecision of the clause made it a 
dangerous clause for an international listing of rights. Fourthly, by including an 
expanded reference to self-determination, the drafters of the Covenants were usurping 
the proper function of the community of nations in law-making. In putting forward 
these objections, Australian representatives reiterated their support for the political 
principle of self-determination in accordance with the United Nations Charter but 
expressed the view that due respect for the range o f individual human rights and respect 
for the responsibilities administering countries exercised under the UN Charter would 
prove a sufficient means of addressing concerns of anti-colonial States and avoid 
corrupting the nature of the human rights covenants.
The primary basis o f the Australian objection to Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR 
was that self-determination was simply ‘not a right’. Instead, it was and always would 
be a political principle applicable only in the circumstances prescribed under the United 
Nations Charter. One of the finest expositions of this argument was the speech given by 
Fred Whitlam in the Commission on Human Rights in April 1952.
68 Report o f the Australian Representative to the 11th Session o f the Commission on Human Rights in 
NAA A 432/72, Item 64/3090: In this report the Australian Representative notes the subsiding of  
criticisms against colonial powers or at least the comparative silence regarding colonial powers’ 
policy which contrasted with the virulent attacks against Soviet imperialism. The Report o f the 
Australian Delegation to the 10th Session o f the Commission on Human Rights, in NAA A 1838/1, 
Item 856/13/10/9 Pt 3 also noted the conciliatory attitude o f the sponsors o f self-determination, 
though attributed it to their confidence that their resolutions would be accepted by a majority of  
delegations.
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At the 255th meeting of the Commission on Human Rights, Whitlam objected than an 
attempt was being made to transform a political concept into a broad-ranging legal 
right.69 Advocacy for the clause was described as propaganda ‘not in its secondary and 
rather perverted sense, but in its best and primary sense’.70 Whitlam explained that 
proponents of the clause were seeking to use the Covenant to broaden existing 
international law concerning States’ commitment to self-determination. Submitting to 
this request, he argued, would do violence to the Covenant because it would introduce a 
non-legal commitment into the Covenant. The Commission needed to be zealous to 
distinguish between legal commitments and non-legal commitments in order to avoid 
lessening, or appearing to lessen respect for the institution of law. Self-determination 
was not such a legal commitment but a ‘political concept to which only political 
sanctions were applicable.’ Had self-determination been regarded as a human right, it 
would have been included in the UDHR and the fact that it was not demonstrated its 
nature as a political concept.71
Sir Percy Spender’s speech at the 647th meeting o f the Third Committee articulated
objections to the legitimacy of self-determination’s characteristation as a right in a
similarly robust fashion. Without any equivocation, Spender stated that self-
determination was a political or moral principle rather than a legal right in the sense of
other rights in the draft covenants. Having stated this, he hastened to add that Australia
was a firm supporter of the principle of self-determination, attributing Australia’s
independence to respect for the principle:
Australia owed its presence in the UN to evolution from a completely dependent 
colonial status to completely independent nationhood and approached the question for 
self-determination with sympathetic understanding.72
Significance was attached to the statement of Mr Askoul of Lebanon in disclosing the
‘real motivation’ of supporters of self-determination: namely, to force an advance on
69 Reported in Memorandum from Australian Mission to UN, NY to the Secretary, DE A, 22/4/52 in 
NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/16 Pt 1.
70 Recommendations on Self-Determination: Australian statement, 23/4/52, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 
856/13/10/7 Pt 2A; a Summary report can be found at UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 265, 8; 23 April 1952.
71 Australian Statement on Self-Determination, 16/4/52, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/10/7 Pt 2a; A 
summary record can be found at UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 255, 4ff; 16 May 1952.
72 Sir Percy Spender, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 647, 115, 28 October 1955.
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the obligations in the United Nations Charter. Whereas the Charter obligation has been 
assumed by members in a collective sense, inserting a provision in the Covenant would 
impose an obligation on the individual State. The alternative suggested by Spender was 
to include reference to the ‘general principle o f self-determination’ in the draft 
Covenants. This would represent a ‘seed that would grow’, but would not seek to 
usurp the law making functions of the community of nations.73
This primary objection to the right of self-determination was repeated in the last formal 
(written) comments Australia submitted to the United Nations. In its July 1955 Note 
Verbale, Australia stated simply:
Self-determination is referred to in the Charter as a principle. It is nowhere referred to 
as a right.74
In making a distinction between rights and principles, none of the Australian 
representatives provided further elucidation between the two. The point was thought to 
be self-evident. Rights were intended to be enforceable whereas principles were not. 
Rights empowered individuals whereas principles guided States. In drafting the Charter 
and including a reference to the principle of self-determination, the international 
community had decided that self-determination should not be a right but a principle. 
Having been settled by international consensus, its characterisation should not be re­
opened for discussion.
The second basis of Australia’s objection to self-determination was that it was 
distinguishable from other rights in the Covenant. Australia in its 1955 official 
comments, for instance, remarked that even if  self-determination was regarded as a 
right, it would have to be regarded as a collective right and thus inconsistent with the 
‘object and pattern of this Covenant’ on individual rights.75 Furthermore, self- 
determination was not capable of implementation in the same form as other rights. In 
1951, Whitlam warned that a right of self-determination was ‘inappropriate for
73 Memorandum from Australian Mission to UN, New York to the Secretary, DEA, Memo 503/52, 
17/4/52, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/10/7 Pt 1.
74 Australian comments on Draft Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, July 1955, in 
NAA A 432/68, Item 68/2797 Pt 3; UN Doc A/2910/Add 2.
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inclusion in a Covenant which deals with the rights of individuals in a manner designed 
to enable enforcement’.76 In making this argument, no account was taken of Australia’s 
parallel policy on economic and social rights. As outlined in Chapter 1, by the early 
1950s, Australian policy was moving towards the promotion of economic and social 
rights as aspirational goals. Such a policy could have been adopted in relation to self- 
determination. Instead, a more hardline opposition to the recognition o f a right of self- 
determination was adopted.
The third basis of Australia’s objections, and one which took on increased importance
once the General Assembly directed that a clause be included in both Covenants, was
that the language being used to delineate the scope of the right was inappropriate. In
1955 Percy Spender described the Article as drafted as being expressed in language that
‘was obscure and in some places even contradictory’.77 Self-determination was difficult
to define and impossible to set forth in legal terms.78 Definitions of terms could not be
taken for granted, Spender argued. Particular critical attention was reserved for the
nebulous, but distinct, terms ‘peoples’ and ‘nations’. Fred Whitlam also singled out the
text’s coverage of disposal of resources. Without challenging the central idea of
sovereignty over resources, Whitlam complained that the concept o f self-determination
was being expanded into a novel area:
The result was that the idea, as it had been hitherto conceived, had been burst wide open 
and there was no indicated limit to its extension...It had been well said that ideas are 
weapons. So they could be. But weapons, if  carelessly handled, could be dangerous to 
the users, and the Australian delegation would urge that, as a weapon, ‘self- 
determination’ be not handled carelessly.79
A final objection raised was what might be termed a jurisprudential attack on the scope 
of powers permitted to the drafters of the Covenants. Whitlam reminded delegates to
76 Cablegram from DEA to Australian Delegation to GA, Paris, 10/12/51, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 
856/13/7 Pt 2.
77 Sir Percy Spender, Australian representative, A/C.3/SR 647, 115; 28 October 1955.
78 Note by UN Branch on Netherlands opposition to Art 1 o f both draft Covenants, in NAA A 1838/1, 
929/4 Pt 19.
79 Recommendations on Self-Determination: Australian Statement, 23/4/52, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 
856/13/10/7 Pt 2A; a summary record is at UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 265, 8; 23 April 1952. Sir Percy 
Spender in 1955 was also to express concern that the reference to economic self-determination 
would discourage investment: Sir Percy Spender, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 647, 
115, 28 October 1955.
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the Commission on Human Rights that the United Nations Charter had already set the 
limits of the operation of self-determination in the Charter.80 According to Whitlam, in 
making special provision for non-self-governing and trust territories in the Charter, the 
international community had already established the ground rules for the administration 
of territories. The immediate application of self-determination was inconsistent with 
this scheme. Indeed self-determination was dealt with in a separate part to
O 1
administration o f territories. To provide for a wider application for self-
determination, Whitlam argued, would be to extend beyond the proper powers o f any
United Nations body. It would be to legislate for the States, a power in fact beyond the
United Nations. The United Nations was not an international State but an organisation
of sovereign States. The Commission could only act as a functional Commission and
should resist entering what the Egyptian representative had referred to as the ‘greener
pastures of politics’.82 Spender in late 1952 echoed this sentiment in depicting
recognition o f the right of self-determination as an attempt to change the base rules
upon which States had agreed in the Charter, stating:
The Charter is a covenant which we have all accepted in good faith, and in reliance on 
its terms as interpreted accurately and reasonably, and to distort it and confuse it will, I 
fear, be a step along the road to its destruction.83
It was also included as the third point in the objections stated by Australia in its 1955 
Note Verbale which read: ‘[t]he transformation of the principle o f self-determination 
into a justiciable right in the terms of Article 1 would violate Article 2(7) of the 
Charter.’84
In advancing this fourth argument, the Australian delegation was asserting that should 
the Commission or General Assembly persist in its efforts to recognise a right o f self- 
determination, it would be trespassing into the area of domestic jurisdiction covered by
80 Recommendations on Self-Determination: Australian Statement, 23/4/52, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 
856/13/10/7 Pt 2A; a summary record is at UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 265, 8; 23 April 1952.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Statement by Sir Percy Spender, Third Committee o f GA, Self Determination, 14/11/52, in NAA A 
1838/342, Item 929/4/4 Pt 2.
84 Australian comments on Draft Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, July 1955, in 
NAA A 432/68, Item 68/2797 Pt 3; UN Doc A/2910/Add 2.
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Article 2(7) of the Charter.85 Self-determination matters, on this view, were not a 
matter of proper international concern. Instead they involved delicate matters of State 
policy that came within the discretion of the State. It was a view of Article 2(7) and 
domestic jurisdiction that involved fixed boundaries -  or at least the permanent 
inclusion of some subject areas. Self-determination was a matter forever entrenched in 
the field o f ‘domestic jurisdiction’. No concession was made that the process of 
negotiating treaties permitted changes in the dominant rules between nations and thus a 
narrowing of concerns considered of purely ‘domestic concern.’
Linked with the Australian opposition to a collective right to self-determination was an 
insistence that the application of existing human rights would be sufficient to protect the 
political interests of those in trust and non-self-goveming territories. Notwithstanding 
its simultaneous promotion of a colonial application clause (discussed in Chapter 2) , 
the right of self-determination was presented as a duplicating, complicating factor. 
Individual political rights paved the way for political action whereby peoples could
o r
organise and determine their own government, including an independent government.
In 1953, an Australian delegate to the General Assembly argued that recognition of the 
right to self-determination was unnecessary. The Covenants would create obligations to 
respect individual rights. If people were sufficiently mature politically, they would be 
able to determine their form of government through exercise of such rights. Thus the 
delegate’s statement:
If these individual rights are respected, the way is then open for political action through 
which peoples can organise and determine their own form o f government...if these 
rights are respected, the principle of self-determination becomes a political possibility.
If these individual rights are not respected then talk of self-determination becomes but 
empty phrases.87
85 Article 2(7) of the Charter provides ‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction o f any 
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; 
but this principle shall not prejudice the application o f enforcement measures under Chapter VH’. 
Australia’s increased reliance on a narrow view o f Article 2(7) is dealt with in Chapter 7.
86 KCO Shann, Australian representative, UN Doc E/C.3/SR 400, 320-321; 23 January 1952.
87 Statement in Explanation of Australia’s Vote on Self-Determination, 17/11/53, in NAA A 1838/1, 
Item 856/13.
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The Australian delegation was prepared to consider compromise proposals where they 
directed attention back to the United Nations Charter’s understanding o f self- 
determination. In 1951, for instance, the United States sent a proposal to Australia that 
a separate Article be included in the Covenant dealing with self-determination as a 
principle rather than a right. The United States’ suggested addition to the preamble 
consisted of the following text:
the principle of self-determination is applicable to peoples who have already organised 
as independent States as well as with respect to peoples who have not yet attained a full 
measure of self-government. That is, there is an obligation on all States to respect 
peoples already organised as independent States and the right of these States to maintain 
their free political institutions free of external pressures, threats, subversive activities or 
the use of force contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter.88
Trevor Pyman of the Department of External Affairs and Fred Whitlam met in
December 1951 to discuss the United States proposal. They acknowledged that it
would be difficult for Australia to object to something which in form was a restatement
of the principle in the United Nations Charter ‘and in regard to which the Australian
performance was far higher than that of many o f the other adherents’. They proposed,
therefore, to vote in favour o f the proposal whilst retaining their doubts as to the
purpose to be served by a simple re-affirmation of the principle.89 In April 1952, the
text the United States put forward had been amended to refer to the ‘right of self-
determination’, albeit with the direction that the right was to be:
promoted and realized as provided in the Charter of the United Nations, in accordance 
with constitutional processes, and with proper regard for the rights of other states and 
peoples.90
The Australian delegation indicated to the Department of External Affairs that they 
proposed to vote in support because it was ‘the least unacceptable’, noting that the 
United Kingdom and Belgium were inclined to support it.91 In the ensuing debate,
88 Statement on US Proposal on Self-Determination, 17/4/52 attached to Memorandum from 
Australian Mission to UN, New York to the Secretary, DEA, Memo 503/52, 17/4/52, in NAA A 
1838/1, Item 856/13/10/7 Pt 1.
89 Minute o f Meeting between HFE Whitlam and T Pyman, 17/12/51, in NAA A432/20, Item 54/3779 
Pt 6. Note also that Australia supported the United Kingdom’s suggested recommendation which 
affirmed the principle of self-determination whilst making it clear that the principle was not 
intended to interfere with or affect the orderly and gradual process of the attainment of self- 
government under Chapter XI or Chapter XII of the Charter: Text of Statement by Australian 
representative in Third Committee Concerning Proposals on Self-Determination, 28/11/52, in NAA 
A 1838/342, Item 929/4/4/4 Pt 2.
90 Ibid.
91 Cablegram from Australian Mission to the UN to DEA, 17/4/52, in NAA A432/20, Item 54/3779, Pt 
7.
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Australia indicated its preference for the United States’ version whilst maintaining its 
opposition to the inclusion of any clause.92
Support was also given to all diversionary mechanisms to remove self-determination 
from the agenda of the Commission on Human Rights and the Third Committee of the 
General Assembly. Thus Australia was prepared to vote in favour o f a United States 
proposal for an analytic study of self-determination by a Sub-Committee of the 
Commission on Human Rights. The Secretary-General’s proposal to have a small 
Committee draft principles relating to self-determination that could be used by United 
Nations bodies was also endorsed, though doubts were expressed at to whether it would 
be accepted or prove useful. 94 Even when it became apparent that the right of self- 
determination was not going to be deleted from the Covenants, Australia presented the 
right as a stumbling block to its acceptance of the Covenants, a theme continued into the 
speech of the Australian delegate welcoming the finalisation of texts for the ICCPR and 
ICESCR:
It will be clear from the statements made by the Australian Delegation at the various 
meetings of the General Assembly which have been concerned with the Covenants, that 
there are several points of detail in the Covenants which will require further study by the 
Australian Government by way of example, I might mention the lack of definition in the 
reference to a right of self-determination in Article 1 of both Covenants.95
92 HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 258, 9; 19 April 1952.
93 Australia objected only to one feature of the United States proposal, namely the study of the 
applicability of self-determination to ‘peoples and nations who have been by force or subversion 
deprived of their right to exercise it’. For the full text of the proposal and Australia’s response, see 
Cablegram from DEA to Australian Mission to the UN, NY, 7/3/55, in NAA A 432/68, 68/2797 Pt 
3. Support was given to the proposal despite opposition from Paul Hasluck, the then Minister for 
Territories: see Letter from Paul Hasluck, Minister for Territories, to RG Casey, Minister for 
External Affairs, 1/4/55; in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/10/10 Pt 2; and opposition from the United 
Kingdom: Submission to the Minister concerning the Request of the High Commissioner for the 
United Kingdom to Discuss Attitude towards Self-Determination, 28/3/55, in NAA A 1838/1, 
856/13/10/10 Pt 1. In the Third Committee, as it was evident to the United States that there was not 
majority support for the study, the proposal was not submitted but only referred to in a general way 
in the United States speech: Cablegram from Australian Consulate-General (Geneva) to DEA, 
19/4/55, in NAA A 432/72, Item 64/3090.
94 Copy of speech of the Secretary-General Before the Third Committee, SG 443, 11/10/55, in NAA A 
432/68, Item 68/2797 Pt 3. The DEA had initially considered that the Secretary-General should be 
dissuaded from making a personal intervention, questioning both the utility and the legitimacy of 
such intervention: Cablegram of DEA to Australian Mission to the UN, NY, 5/10/55, in NAA A 
432/72, Item 64/3090; See too Note on Self-Determination, 30/9/55, in NAA A 432/68, Item 
68/2797 Pt 3.
95 Reported in Cablegram from Australian Mission to the UN, New York, 12/12/66, in NAA A432/68, 
Item 68/2797 Pt 3.
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The righteous tone of Australian delegates hints at the emotive nature o f the debate for 
Australian policy-makers. Recognition or non-recognition o f self-determination was 
not simply an academic exercise. The fate of the clause was seen as having significant 
implications for Australia. The clause needed to be resisted through all possible 
arguments. At the same time, care had to be taken to avoid drawing attention to 
Australia’s vulnerabilities in the area of administered territories. On the whole, 
therefore, Australian delegates preferred objections based on the jurisprudence of 
human rights, rather than speaking directly of the tension between Australian 
administration policy and the clause.
Australia’s sense of vulnerability arose as a result o f the increased international scrutiny 
of its policies in trust and non-self-governing territories in the 1950s and 1960s. After 
World War Two, Australia had sole administering authority over Papua and New 
Guinea, and shared responsibility with New Zealand and Britain for the administration 
of Nauru.96 Australia was facing attacks on its policies not only in the Third Committee 
and the Commission on Human Rights , but also in the Trusteeship Council. In 1952, 
for instance, the Philippines, China, the USSR and Syria made adverse comment in the 
Trusteeship Council concerning Australia’s fulfilment of its obligations under Chapter 
XII of the Charter. Their remarks included criticism of the alleged inadequacy of the 
representation on non-indigenous inhabitants in the New Guinea Legislation Council, 
the low level of wages in New Guinea and Nauru, the relegation of Nauruans to the 
background in the interests of phosphate production, and the failure of Australia to set 
time limits with respect to granting stages of independence in these territories. In 
1955, El Salvador attacked Australian policies in Nauru in the Third Committee, 
alleging that the phosphate deposits were being exploited to the point of exhaustion 
such that the inhabitants would lose their only natural resource and be obliged to 
abandon the island in less than 50 years time. John Hood, as Australia’s representative
96 As to Australia’s responsibilities, see: N Harper, D Sissons, Australia and the United Nations, 
Manhattan Publishing Company, New York, 1959, 69-77.
97 Report o f the Trusteeship Council, undated, but post October 1952, ‘UN-Australian Delegations to 
the General Assembly’ Folder, Evatt Collection, Flinders University.
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in the Third Committee was able to quote favourable findings of the Trusteeship 
Council to counter El Salvador’s charge.98 However, Australian sensitivities remained
acute.
Australia took particular offence at the equation of administration o f trust territories
with the oppression o f colonised nations. In his speech in 1952, Spender indicated how
personally Australia took the Resolutions on self-determination being proposed for the
General Assembly with the statement: ‘[n]o one can be expected to lie down and be
sniped at forever without some human impulse to retaliate in kind.’99 His first objection
was to the reference to slavery in the first 1952 resolution:
The implication of the definition is that persons are in fact ‘owned’ for the selfish 
interests of the owner. We in Australia have ever since our beginnings stood for fair 
play to individuals no matter who they are, and resent the implication of a resolution 
which, o f course, involves ourselves.100
More substantially, the Resolution was said to be based upon a misconception of the 
relationship between metropolitan power and administered powers. That relationship, 
he argued, consisted of the administering power giving assistance to the inhabitants of 
the territory, whether that be of a technical, moral or material type. The aim of the 
assistance was to facilitate the inhabitants eventually being able to stand alone in the 
modem world and decide realistically on their future. Australia was not exploiting the 
territories but helping to bring them nearer the goal of self-government. The terms 
‘colonisation’ or ‘colonial methods’ should not be considered to be automatically or 
exclusively linked with the exploitation of oppressed people. Spender quoted from 
legal commentaries concerning the United Nations Charter101 to provide support for his 
view that trusteeships were designed to assist peoples to reach the stage of development 
whereby they could make a choice as to their future. In the absence of territories 
reaching that stage of development, there was no immediate justification for changing
98
99
100 
101
JDL Hood, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 675, 256, 29 November 1955.
Statement by Sir Percy Spender, Third Committee o f GA, Self Determination, 14/11/52, in NAA A 
1838/342, Item 929/4/4 Pt 2.
Ibid.
Specifically Spender quoted from Bentwich and Martin’s text, A Commentary on the Charter o f the 
UN (1950) and Hans Kelsen’s The Law of the United Nations: ibid.
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those territories’ status.102 Finally, Spender reiterated his frustration at being called to
defend Australian trust territories. He described the unpleasant experience of being
brought before the bar of the United Nations:
with a jury not wholly free of prejudice, our legal argument ignored, our liberal and 
democratic performances disregarded, are, if  this resolution is carried, condemned by 
implication of engaging in slavery and other crimes.103
The call for recognition of self-determination was also viewed by Spender as being (at
least in part) ideologically motivated. Thus in describing the potential o f a right o f self-
determination to fragment States, Spender noted that this development would be
welcomed by the Soviet Union and would ‘be used in the interests of world
communism’.104 Similarly, calls for plebiscites were seen as related to the desire to
destabilise States rather than assist the inhabitants o f trust territories:
If for example -  and this is by no means a remote example -  a minority group of 
subversive agents are to be permitted to agitate, apart from wasting the time o f the 
United Nations with persistent demands for a plebescite, the result would be lamentable, 
and may even, in a primitive country such as Papua or New Guinea, be extremely 
dangerous and contrary to the interests of the people themselves. Moreover, as we 
know, agreement on the holding of a United Nations plebescite does not always mean 
that it will automatically take place, even when the right to the free exercise o f self- 
determination has been agreed on all sides.105
From an examination of the correspondence between the Department of External 
Affairs and the Australian Mission prior to discussion of the Resolutions, it would 
appear that the Department was prepared to adopt a less hardline approach to the 
Resolutions than were the delegation. The delegation in November 1952 foreshadowed 
its intention o f not voting for any Resolution containing a specific reference to trust or 
non-self-goveming territories that equated self-determination with self-government or 
referred to the holding of UN plebiscites in territories upon demands for self- 
government without including safeguards for administering powers’ authority.106 In 
response the Department of External Affairs replied that it would be content for the 
delegation to adopt a more conciliatory position. The Department did not share the
102
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105
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Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Cablegram from Australian Mission to the UN, NY to DEA, 25/11/52, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 
856/13/16 Pt 1.
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delegation’s misgivings about mentioning an obligation on those administering non­
self-go veming territories to promote self-determination. Nor did it object to references 
to plebiscites provided the plebiscite option was merely an alternative means o f 
ascertaining the wishes of the people of the territories or nations. For the Department of 
External Affairs, the most important factor was that it was made clear that the 
administering government had complete discretion to choose between widely defined
• 107alternative options in light of the particular circumstances of the territory or nation.
The delegation’s persistence with the harsher stance seems attributable to the strong 
views held by the delegation’s leader, Percy Spender. Although there is evidence that 
the Minister for External Affairs, Richard Casey, approved Australia’s general 
opposition to self-determination in 1951108 and 1955,109 there is no surviving evidence 
showing his view on the Resolutions. As an ex-Minister for External Affairs, Spender 
may have been particularly sensitive to attacks on Australia’s policy with respect to 
administration of territories. He certainly voiced with great confidence the stance that 
Australia’s record in trust territories was beyond the scope of the Commission’s power.
It is also likely that the delegation was influenced by Fred Whitlam’s strong opposition 
to the self-determination clause. The speeches bear the hallmarks of Whitlam and 
Spender’s legalism noted previously in this thesis.110 For Whitlam, however, a right of 
self-determination needed to be resisted for reasons other than protecting the reputation 
of administering powers.
Internal documents of the Department of External Affairs reveal Whitlam’s abiding 
preoccupation was the implications of a right of self-determination for the stability of 
existing nation States. His earliest conception o f the right of self-determination was that
107 Cablegram from DEA to Australian Mission to UN, NY, 28/11/52, in NAA 1838/1, Item 856/13/16 
Pt 1.
108 In 1951, Casey signalled his consent to Australia opposing self-determination: Memorandum from 
AH Tange, Assistant Secretary, DEA to Australian representative to the Commission on Human 
Rights, 13/4/51, in NAA A 1838/1; Item 856/13/10/6 Pt 1.
109 In 1955, Casey rejected the plea o f Paul Hasluck, the Minister for Territories, that Australia oppose 
the discussion o f self-determination in the Third Committee. In Casey’s view, the Third Committee 
had clear jurisdiction: Correspondence in NAA A 1838, 856/13/10/10 Pt 2.
110 See Chapter 2.
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the right could be equated with a right of minorities to secede from the nation States in 
which they resided. In the December 1951 meeting o f Trevor Pyman and Whitlam (at 
which the United States proposal was discussed, see above), Pyman and Whitlam 
agreed that self-determination could be regarded as synonymous with the protection of 
minorities.111 In this context, and parallel to the concerns about recognition of a right of 
minorities outlined in Part A of this Chapter, Whitlam queried the potential 
embarrassment that a right of self-determination might cause with respect to Australian 
migration and Aboriginal policy. It was thus concluded that it would be in the best 
interests of Australia to maintain its opposition to the clause. In the debates in 1952, 
Whitlam reminded other delegations of the potential application of the clause to 
minorities in an attempt to lessen enthusiasm for the clause. In the Eighth Session of 
the Commission on Human Rights, for instance, Whitlam drew attention to the potential 
application o f the right of self determination to existing autonomous states that might be 
threatened with submergence (for example Yugoslavia), or to separatist movements 
within existing states, or to the aspirations of minority groups. Spender reinforced this 
point by suggesting that members of the Commission on Human Rights would hardly 
countenance the right of German minorities resident in various countries of Europe 
before World War Two to exercise the right o f self-determination and thus to disrupt 
and dismember the countries in which they lived.112 Privately, Whitlam expressed some 
frustration that the debate over self-determination was focusing solely on anti­
colonialism and thus failing to appreciate the true breadth o f the clause. After the 
Eighth Session of the Commission on Human Rights, Whitlam reported back to the 
Department o f External Affairs that the majority were ‘largely indifferent ’and 
concerned with ‘hammering away at the administrations o f trust and non-self governing 
territories’.113
111 Minute o f Meeting between HFE Whitlam and T Pyman , 17/12/51, in NAA A432/20, Item 54/3779 
Pt 6.
112 Sir Percy Spender, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 647, 115; 28 October 1955.
113 Report o f the Australian Representative to the Eighth Session of the Commission on Human Rights, 
in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/10/7 Pt 2A.
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Other internal actors honed in on the international tensions relating to trust and non- 
self-governing territories. The Department of Territories, for instance, wrote to the 
Department of External Affairs in May 1955 confirming its opposition to the right of 
self-determination. In addition to agreeing with comments that the Department of 
External Affairs had previously made concerning the collective nature of the right, the 
Department of Territories complained of the difficulties in ascertaining the practical 
meaning of the clause. Citing the example of Papua and New Guinea, the Department 
of Territories stated there were people of one race, colour and ethnic qualities who were 
divided into many smaller communities. The people were unconscious o f belonging to 
any larger group than the local one. In such circumstances, it would be difficult to 
determine who came within the definition of ‘peoples’ in the right of self-determination. 
For the Department o f Territories, there needed to be a subjective understanding o f a 
group that they constituted a nation together with sufficient educational and political 
maturity to support independent political machinery before it was sensible to talk o f the 
application of a right of self-determination.114 The Department o f Territories was also 
concerned with the way in which any peoples might exercise a right of self- 
determination, querying if a decision were taken to enter a federation, would the right 
be exercised for all time?115
Regardless o f whether Australian actors focused on the implications of the right for 
trust territories or for all States with minorities, it is apparent that all were basing their 
appraisals on a limited understanding of the concept of self-determination. Self- 
determination was understood as ‘external self-determination’.116 The fears expressed 
were that trust territories would expect independence immediately or that minorities 
would secede. Self-determination was equated with independence and self-government. 
There was no conception of a lesser form of self-determination, such as a bundle o f 
participatory rights that would guarantee a group having a voice within a particular
114 Memorandum from CR Lambert, for the Secretary, Department of Territories to the Secretary,
DEA, undated but annotated ‘May 1955’, in NAA A 518/1, Item 104/5/2 Pt 2.
115 Ibid.
116 For an explanation o f understandings o f ‘external’ and ‘internal’ self-determination, see A Cassese, 
op cit, 101
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political context. Nor was there agreement that self-determination included full 
economic autonomy in relation to natural resources. In 1955, for instance, the 
Australian delegate stated that a right to dispose of natural resources might be 
interpreted so as to allow a minority within a State to claim the free use o f its natural 
resources, regardless of the economy of the State as a whole or the interests of the
117group.
It is also apparent that the majority of Australian policy-makers gave no real policy 
consideration to the implications of the right o f self-determination for Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples. Only one reference to the possibility of Aboriginal self- 
determination claims embarrassing the government has survived. It is to be found 
within the minutes of the meeting between Trevor Pyman (of the Department of 
External Affairs) and Fred Whitlam in 1951.118 It was given no further consideration. 
Obviously, the dominant view within Department of External Affairs, that Aboriginal 
people did not constitute a ‘minority’, influenced this neglect. If  not a minority, then 
Aboriginal people were less likely to be a distinct ‘peoples’ entitled to self- 
determination. Instead, the real threat of the clause remained perceived as its impact 
upon Australia’s external policies with respect to Papua, New Guinea and Nauru.
In contrast to their attitude towards Article 27, Australian policy-makers do not appear 
to have given any substantial consideration to changing their attitude towards self- 
determination. Although Clarrie Harders of the Attorney-General’s Department 
suggested in 1966 that, at least in relation to the ICESCR, Australia might consider 
withdrawing its objection in light of the ‘progressive’ nature o f the ICESCR 
obligations, the Department of External Affairs was unmoved. No narrow 
understandings were formulated. Instead Australia maintained its policy of resistance 
until the General Assembly’s adoption of the Covenants. The reason for the contrasting 
attitudes taken in relation to Article 27 and Article 1 is not clear. Perhaps Australian
117 Australian representative, HA Mc-Clure Smith, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 669, 227; 23 November 1955
118 Minute of Meeting between HFE Whitlam and T Pyman , 17/12/51, in NAA A432/20, Item 54/3779 
Pt 6.
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policy-makers considered they were on firmer jurisprudential grounds in resisting a 
right of self-determination. Alternatively, perhaps Australian policy-makers considered 
that it would be more difficult to prevent the application of Article 1 to Australian trust 
territory inhabitants.
Whatever the reason, what emerges most strongly from this Part is the deep-seated 
nature of Australia’s resistance to the right to self-determination o f all peoples. As a 
right equated with a right of political independence, it was viewed as potentially 
subversive o f the interests of any State with minorities and any State with responsibility 
for administering trust or non-self-governing territories. As with its opposition to a 
minority rights clause, Australia questioned the appropriateness o f recognition o f a 
‘collective right’ and indicated a satisfaction that a State’s protection of the individual 
rights o f all its citizens would be sufficient to protect their interests.
Conclusion
Australia was consistently opposed to the rights o f minorities and the right o f peoples to 
self-determination. Underlying this hostility was a perception that each set of rights 
threatened vital State interests in Australia and Australia’s external territories. In 
relation to both rights Australia adopted a State-centric approach which gave primacy to 
the perceived State interest in maintaining cultural homogeneity. While the adoption of 
a narrow understanding of Article 27 eventually permitted Australia to endorse the 
right, no such conciliatory approach was attempted with respect to the right to self- 
determination. In addition, Australia advanced a consistent preference for individual 
human rights that could be applied to all persons, rather than the recognition o f distinct 
rights for some groups. Collective rights or the recognition of rights which persons 
possessed by virtue o f their membership of a group were viewed as encouraging or 
creating diversity in circumstances where the desired aim was cultural unity. In 
resolving the tensions between diversity and unity, Australian decision-makers 
ultimately accepted only the right of individuals to private exercises of cultural
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diversity. So far entrenched was an Anglo-Celtic perspective on culture that Aboriginal 
people were regarded as possessing neither minority status nor the right of self- 
determination. Though decision-makers rejected claims that their policies were racist, it 
is clear that Australian policy-makers in the 1940s through to the 1960s gave meaning 
to the term ‘human rights’ through a culturally specific lens: the defence of an Anglo- 
Celtic homogeneity.
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Chapter 4
The Jurisprudence of Human Rights
Introduction
This Chapter considers the jurisprudential assumptions concerning human rights 
underlying Australia’s policies during the negotiations of the International Bill of 
Rights. Almost twenty years after the finalising of the International Bill of Rights, 
Jerome Shestack adverted to the lack of a common answer to the question ‘what is 
meant by human rights’ . 1 Myres McDougal, Harold Lasswell and Lung-Chu Chen have 
also pointed to the ‘simple intellectual confusion’ surrounding the topic of human 
rights.2 Australia did not escape this intellectual confusion. In light of the low priority 
given to jurisprudential debates internationally and domestically, it is not possible to 
identify any comprehensive Australian jurisprudential approach to human rights in any 
period of policy development. However, it is possible to extricate a number of 
divergent jurisprudential assumptions influencing Australian international human rights 
policy.
Successive Australian policy-makers possessed quite distinct approaches to defining the 
sources and nature of human rights, and the roles of the individual and the State within 
an ideal human rights framework. Even where Australian policy-makers tended to 
agree, as for instance in relation to the adoption of a narrow model of the classic ‘rights 
holder’, the area of consensus did not mirror the model of universal, inalienable rights 
advanced in the preamble of the UDHR.3 In view of the ongoing debates in academic 
circles, such diversity is not surprising. Confronting this diversity, however, does 
dispel any assumption that Australia maintained support for an identified and agreed
J Shestack, ‘The Jurisprudence o f Human Rights’, in T Meron (ed), Human Rights in International 
Law: Legal and Policy Issues, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, 70.
2 M McDougal, H Lasswell, LC Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order: The Basic Policies o f  
an International Law o f Human Dignity, quoted by J Shestack, op cit, 70.
3 Note in particular paragraphs 1 and 5 of the preamble to the UDHR.
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upon set o f ‘human rights principles’ during the negotiations of the International Bill of 
Rights.
Given the lack of any structured or ongoing international debate on jurisprudential 
issues during the negotiations, this Chapter moves directly to an examination of 
Australian policies. It focuses on Australian attitudes towards three issues in particular: 
(a) the nature and source of human rights, (b) the identity of rights holders and (c) the 
significance o f human rights. Some of the material used has been drawn from 
discussions in previous Chapters. This material, however, is being used to draw out the 
theoretical dimensions of Australian policy in a more thematic fashion than has been 
possible in the subject-specific Chapters.
A. Nature and Source of Human Rights 
I. Evatt Period
With the benefit of hindsight, it seems remarkable that the first recorded question of an 
Australian delegate to the Commission on Human Rights in its deliberations on the 
International Bill o f Rights concerned jurisprudential issues. Colonel Hodgson? as 
Australian representative, directed a question to John Humphrey, the Director of the 
Human Rights Division of the United Nations Secretariat and the author o f the draft 
UDHR text then before the Commission.* 5 Specifically he queried the underlying 
philosophy o f the draft UDHR .6 This was to be the only occasion on which an 
Australian representative initiated a question on the jurisprudential basis o f human 
rights. Whilst the Lebanese representative (Dr Charles Malik) and the Chinese 
representative (PC Chang) engaged in lengthy debates concerning the meaning and 
purpose o f rights, 7 Australian representatives remained silent. In private
Colonel Hodgson had previously been the Secretary o f the Department o f External Affairs, a post he
held from 1935 until 1945. He was then made Ambassador to France.
Col R Hodgson, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 1, 5; 27 January 1947.
6 Ibid.
Dr Charles Malik (Lebanon’s representative) looked to Christian precepts, especially the teachings 
of Thomas Aquinas. PC Chang (China’s representative), quoted Confucian teachings but
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correspondence, Colonel Hodgson was even to describe discussions as to the
o
relationship between rights and the State as ‘rambling and, at times, fruitless’. In 
giving Hodgson his initial instructions, Evatt did not offer any guidance as to the nature 
of the task confronting the international community other than stressing the importance 
of ensuring strong methods of international implementation. 9 The overwhelming sense 
emanating from the instructions to early Australian delegates is that jurisprudential 
debates were viewed as an unnecessary diversion from the pressing task o f drafting 
internationally binding instruments. As such, Australia sought to short-circuit 
discussions of the genesis or nature of human rights.
It was with such a reluctant mind-set that the Australian delegation approached the 
earliest jurisprudential debates in the Commission on Human Rights. The Commission 
was engaged in a general discussion on the contents of the proposed Bill o f Rights ‘with 
a view to ascertaining whether any agreed principles could be ascertained for the 
guidance of the drafting group’ . 10 The Soviet and Yugoslavian delegates placed 
emphasis on the primacy of the State and the inherently collective nature of society. As 
a result, the rights of the State and the rights of the community were central.
Individuals had only those rights that had been granted by the State. In jurisprudential 
terms, this outlook was positivist, communitarian and State-centred. Other States, 
including the United States, took a more natural law, individualist perspective. They 
saw the rights o f the individual as a human person as being paramount over all other 
considerations. According to this view, human rights were not themselves dependent 
on the State for their existence. Furthermore, the State lacked the power and moral 
legitimacy to narrow the boundaries of such pre-existing rights.
advocated a more universal approach to human rights that recognised the diversity of philosophical 
approaches: see AJ Hobbins, (ed) On the Edge o f Greatness: The Diaries o f John Humphrey, vol 1, 
1948-9, McGill University, Montreal, 1994, entry o f 27 September 1948, 58.
Cablegram from Col Hodgson to Evatt, 8/2/47, in NAA A 1838/278, Item 856/13 Pt 2.
9 Cablegram from DEA to External Affairs Officer, London, (Hodgson), 23/1/47, in NAA A 
1838/278, Item 856/13 Pt l .
10 Report o f First Session of Commission on Human Rights, in NAA A 1838/278, Item 856/13 Pt 1.
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The Australian delegation, seemingly without receiving detailed instruction, advanced 
what it described as a ‘middle course’. Without explicitly addressing the source o f 
human rights, the Australian delegation argued that human rights were not absolute in 
the sense suggested by the United States. In addition to possessing rights, each 
individual had a duty to respect the rights of others and the law o f the land in the 
interests o f the State.11 Despite self-consciously putting forward this proposal as a 
compromise rather than a considered declaration o f philosophy, there were a number of 
jurisprudential assumptions underpinning the compromise proposal that were mirrored 
in Australia’s stance on ‘substantive clauses’.
First, in the Australian ‘middle course’ proposal, human rights were not envisaged as 
enjoying priority over all other considerations. To use Ronald Dworkin’s terminology,
1 9rights were not seen as operating as automatic ‘trumps’ in a given situation.
Limitations on human rights were foreshadowed as being acceptable in two situations: 
(a) where limitations were necessary so as to protect the rights o f others, and (b) where 
the exercise o f human rights was regarded as incompatible with ‘ law o f the land in the 
interests o f the State’. The first limitation echoed that commonly found in liberal 
discourse about the limits of personal freedoms.13 The second limitation, that relating 
to the ‘laws o f the land’, was prima facie much broader. The Australian delegation did 
not qualify it by reference to the laws needing to have legitimate ends or needing to be 
consistent with recognition of human rights. It might have been read as permitting any 
limitation on rights, provided the limitation was expressed in law. However, the 
reference was to respecting ‘laws of the land in the interests o f the State ’ (emphasis 
added). When taken against the background o f Australia’s proposal that human rights 
be included in the fundamental law of the State parties (a subject discussed in Chapter 
6) and so serve to limit the State’s law making powers, it is at least arguable that the
11 Report o f First Session of Commission on Human Rights, in NAA A 1838/278, Item 856/13 Pt 1.
12 R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Duckworth, London, 1977, 269 ; R Dworkin, ‘Rights as 
Trumps’, in J Waldron (ed), Theories o f Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984
13 As noted in Chapter 2, liberal theorists such as John Stuart Mill permitted interference with an 
individual’s freedoms only in the limited circumstances where exercise o f one individual’s rights 
infringed another’s rights: see for instance, JS Mill, On Liberty, ed by S Collini, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1989, 13-15.
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Australian delegation meant that only general laws, that themselves were not repugnant 
with the very basis of human rights, would serve to limit the operation o f human rights. 
Australia’s support at the time for a limitations clause that referred to ‘laws which were 
designed either to secure respect for others’ rights or meeting the requirements of 
morality, public order, and the general welfare’l4 would confirm this narrow 
understanding of permissible limitations.
Secondly, the Australian proposal accepted the coexistence of rights and duties. The 
individual was said to be under a ‘duty’ to respect the rights of others and the laws of 
the land. However, these duties were conceived of as separate or additional to the 
possession o f human rights. The duties did not form part of the definition o f the rights. 
The individual’s possession of rights was not dependent upon performance of the 
duties. Instead, the exercise of rights or the extent to which rights might be enjoyed was 
legitimately qualified by the individual’s duties to respect the rights of others and 
respect the law of the land. A similar point of view was evidenced by the Australian 
delegate, Ralph Harry, during the drafting negotiations. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
Harry suggested a composite text to sum up a State’s responsibilities with respect to 
non-discrimination. It read:
All men (without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion) are bom free and 
equal and have certain inalienable rights fundamental to their life as reasonable beings, 
brothers within the family of mankind. These rights are limited only by the equal rights 
o f others as individuals, and by the duties man owes to society through which he is 
enabled to develop his spirit, mind and body in wider freedom.15
It is noticeable that the only reference made to duties was the duties ‘man owes to 
society’. The omission of a reference to duties to uphold the law does not appear to 
have been o f major significance however. At the same time as proposing the composite 
non-discrimination text, Australia was supporting the adoption o f a general limitations 
clause that would make all rights subject to restrictions embodied in State law s.16 In
14 Report o f Representative to Third Committee concerning the UDHR, in NAA A 518/1, Item 104/5/2 
Pt 1. This clause became Article 29, UDHR.
15 RL Harry, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/SR 13, 4; 9 June 1947.
16 Report o f Representative to Third Committee concerning the UDHR, in NAA A 518/1, Item 104/5/2 
Pt 1.
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referring to an individual’s duty to society, Harry seems to have been endorsing a 
‘social contract’ theory of social organisation: in exchange for the protection and 
benefits offered by membership of the community, individuals agreed to abide by 
certain rules for the benefit of the collective.17 The Australian delegation was similarly 
supportive of Article 29 of the UDHR’s reference to duties of the individual. In 
reporting on the final debates in the Third Committee, Alan Watt, the Australian 
representative, described the inclusion of Article 29 as ‘particularly important’. In 
contrast to Australia’s later public attitude, rights and duties existed independently -  the 
non-performance of duties did not negate an individual’s entitlement to his/her rights.
Thirdly, the Australian compromise ‘middle course’ proposal reflected a belief that in 
the field of human rights, the only rights holders were individuals. There was a clear 
dichotomy utilised in the proposal. Individuals had rights whereas the State had 
‘interests’. No reference was made to ‘rights’ of the collective group, only to the ‘rights 
of others’. ‘Rights of others’ seems to have been equated with the rights of other 
individual persons. The emphasis on rights of individual persons had expansive and 
restrictive implications. In theory, it committed the Australian government to 
recognising the human rights of all individuals. Yet, the emphasis on individuals’ rights 
also bolstered Australian claims that rights which could not be, at least potentially, 
enjoyed by all, were illegitimate. As the discussion in Chapter 3 has shown, for 
instance, the preference for individual human rights was to be used as ammunition 
against recognition of minority rights.
Fourthly, though the delegation made no mention of the source of human rights in 
advancing the ‘middle course’ proposal, there was an implicit acceptance that human 
rights existed independently of State action. By mentioning that rights might be limited
17 This is similar to the notion of a social contract or compact in which an individual agrees to 
surrender part o f his/her natural liberties in return for the safety provided for in the collective: see 
for instance, T Paine, Rights o f Man, ed by G Claeys, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 
1992, 39.
18 Report o f Representative to Third Committee concerning the UDHR, in NAA A 518/1, Item 104/5/2 
Pt 1.
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by the law o f the land, the implication was that rights existed a priori and were 
subsequently limited by State action. State action did not have the effect of shaping 
them or preventing their creation. It was a conception equally evident in the language 
chosen in the composite non-discrimination text put forward by Ralph Harry.19 This 
text stated that men were ‘bom with inalienable rights that were fundamental to their 
life as reasonable beings’ (full text quoted above). A similar stress on human rights 
existing independently of State recognition was apparent in the support given by the 
then Crown Solicitor, Fred Whitlam, for an additional paragraph in Article 3 of the 
UDHR stating ‘Everyone is entitled to these rights and freedoms as attributes o f his 
personality’.20 The value of such an addition was seen as making clear that the rights 
and freedoms belonged to an individual by virtue o f ‘his existence as a person and not
91by the grace and favour of the State.’
Fifthly, by talking in general terms about human rights, the sense created by the 
Australian ‘middle course’ proposal was that human rights were eternal. Rather than 
being limited to one epoch or arising out of specific historical events, human rights 
were envisaged as having a timeless operation. A similar concept was evident in 
Australia’s drafting contributions. Australia, for instance, sought to have the reference 
to World War Two deleted from the preamble to the UDHR, arguing that it unduly 
limited the understanding of human rights.22 The lack o f attention given to such matters 
and the surprise and frustration evinced by Australian delegates at the lengthy 
theoretical debates also demonstrate a belief that the existence and legitimacy o f human 
rights were beyond question. On this view, human rights existed and continued to exist. 
The task o f delegates was merely to find the agreed language to express such rights. 
Having reduced the significance of the drafting task to a technical, rather than
19 RL Harry, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/SR 13, 4; 20 June 1947
20 Memorandum o f HFE Whitlam, Crown Solicitor, to the Secretary, Attorney-Generals Department, 
18/3/48, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 1.
21 Ibid.
22 A Watt, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 164,752; 29 November 1948.
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substantive, matter, the delegates saw the important task to be developing norms of
' y ’y
international enforcement.
Yet the idea of eternal pre-existing rights was not universally applied by Australian 
delegates. In particular, a more cautious jurisprudential approach was used with respect 
to the recognition of economic and social rights. In the debates on the one or two 
Covenant issue (discussed in Chapter 1), there is a sense in which States were seen as 
not simply defining rights but as being intimately involved in an evolutionary process of 
creating human rights. KCO (Mick) Shann as the Australian representative in 1949, for 
instance, argued that the relevant question was whether the world had attained a level of 
evolution where it was possible to declare that the individual had true rights and the 
State formal responsibilities in that field.24 It is possible to view Shann’s statement in 
one o f two wrays. The first is that human rights themselves evolved as States accepted 
their role in protecting individual rights in novel areas (an ‘evolving human rights’ 
approach). The second interpretation is that States developed a greater understanding of 
pre-existing human rights over time (an ‘evolving understanding’ approach). Although 
it would be more consistent with the ‘eternal human rights’ approach discussed above if 
Shann were intending the ‘evolving understanding’ approach, the stronger implication 
is that he was expressing an ‘evolving human rights’ approach. Shann framed his 
question in terms of whether it was possible to declare that the individual had ‘true 
rights’ in the field of economic and social rights.
If this ‘evolving human rights’ approach is a correct interpretation of Shann’s statement, 
it serves as evidence for a certain ambivalence in the Australian approach. It arose only 
in relation to economic and social rights -  a field in which the Australian delegation 
seem to have felt the need to justify the recognition o f what might be regarded as 
‘novel’ rights. The ‘evolving human rights’ approach allowed the delegation to
23 Evatt’s initial cablegram directing Colonel Hodgson to attend the First Session o f the Commission 
on the Human Rights stressed the importance o f devising a scheme for the international 
implementation of rights: Cablegram of DEA to External Affairs Officer, London, (Hodgson), 
23/1/47, in NAA A 1838/278, Item 856/13 Pt 1.
24 KCO Shann, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 131, 3ff; 16 June 1949.
154
reconcile their tasks o f protecting well-established human rights and encouraging States 
to expand their activities into new fields. There was little concern that differing 
philosophical assumptions were being used in the economic and social field as with 
‘human rights’ generally. Perhaps the reason for this complacency was that Shann and 
other members of the Australian delegation assumed that if States took their 
responsibilities to their people seriously, they would see that their only option was to 
recognise the pre-existing needs of individuals which would lead to the recognition of 
social and economic rights. The approach did not condone States choosing to withhold 
recognition of such rights. Instead, it mandated the adoption o f rights that would 
continue to be given recognition and protection for further generations.
Outside the context o f the ‘middle-course’ proposal, a number o f other distinct 
jurisprudential assumptions can be identified. Breach o f human rights was not regarded 
as a sufficient justification for armed insurrection or revolution. Thus, the one aspect of 
the preamble o f the UDHR that the Australian delegation resisted was that of the right 
of oppressed persons to rebel. The third paragraph of the UDHR preamble states ‘it is 
essential if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion 
against tyranny and oppression that human rights should be protected by the rule of 
law’. Australian delegates presented Australian law as being designed to prevent 
persons taking justice into their own hands. Any international instrument on human 
rights should encourage individuals to obey the law and not to resort to unconstitutional 
means of changing the law .25 The ideal presented was that people should use their 
political structures to ensure respect for human rights. Respect for human rights was 
regarded as a feature of mature political systems and individuals were viewed as 
capable of developing their political structures into mature ones without the use of 
violence.
25 A Watt, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 164, 752; 29 November 1948; See too Report 
of Representative to Third Committee concerning the UDHR, in NAA A 518/1; Item 104/5/2 Pt 1.
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Human rights were regarded as being endowed with moral, political and legal
significance. As an indication of the belief in human rights’ moral significance,
26religious leaders were appointed to act as advisers to Australian delegations.
Although they were not particularly influential in contributing to particular policy, the 
fact that religious leaders were asked to participate is evidence o f the view that human 
rights touched upon issues relating to ethics and morality. For Evatt, it was self-evident 
that human rights’ operation went beyond the moral sphere. Human rights were an 
important element in defining the appropriate relationship between the State and the 
community. Thus in 1949 in sending a message to the President o f the French Republic
for the opening of UNESCO, Evatt described the UDHR in the following terms:
The Declaration was a solemn pronouncement by governments that the power exercised
27by governments is to be used by them in trust for the benefit o f those they govern.
Respect for the rights contained in the UDHR was seen as a means by which the State 
remained faithful to its grant of power. A State that did not accept and respect such 
rights was not legitimately exercising power from the people. Human rights thus 
formed part o f the definition of the political contract between individuals and their 
government.
There is no doubt that Australian delegations during the Evatt period were committed to
human rights having a further significance. Human rights were to become legally
enforceable rights. By virtue of this conviction, Australian delegations favoured strong
implementation methods o f human rights both internationally and domestically (a
subject taken up in Chapters 5 and 6). The Australian delegate in 1947 was to declare
in the Commission on Human Rights:
In English law the remedy is to us as important as the right, for without the remedy there 
is no right.28
26 Bishop O’Brien and the Reverend Alan Walker attended sessions o f the Commission on Human 
Rights: see Reverend Alan Walker’s Report, April 1949, in NAA A 1838/283; Item 852/10/18 Pt 3; 
Bishop O’Brien, Impressions of Commission, December 1948, ‘Overseas Trip’ Folder, Evatt 
Collection, Flinders University.
27 Cablegram from DEA to Australian Embassy, 28/9/49, ‘Cables-Paris-1946-49’ Folder, Evatt 
Collection, Flinders University.
28 Statement by Australian Representative on International Court o f Human Rights, undated, circa 
1947, in NAA A 432/82, Item 1947/725 Pt 3.
156
Whilst not necessarily convinced that the same method of implementation was 
appropriate for all categories of rights, no right was regarded as outside the scope of 
domestic and international implementation and enforcement. Not all to whom Evatt 
turned for advice shared this vision. Sir Frederick Eggleston, an academic and
occasional diplomat, considered that some of the rights being considered were
*
meaningless. In responding to the draft of Article 28 of the UDHR, for instance, 
Eggleston stated:
This seems to me to be a good illustration o f the intellectual attitude in which these 
rights are expressed. A right o f this kind, if  it be called a right, cannot be given legal 
expression; and pious aspirations of this nature seem to me to be absurd and to discredit 
the whole attempt. The only way to get a good social and international order is by the 
disinterested effort of millions of human beings willing to make sacrifices for their 
objectives. 29
Eggleston did not reject the existence of human rights. He simply doubted whether 
human rights could be made the subject o f legal protection. Notwithstanding his 
doubts, Australian delegations during the Evatt period consistently supported the 
international and domestic legal enforcement of human rights. As seen in Chapter 1, it 
seems likely that Evatt’s vision of an international order of human rights was most 
responsible for this commitment and conceptualisation. There was little in the Labor 
Party platform that made adoption of these stances inevitable. Instead, the key factor 
seems to have been the personal political philosophy held by Evatt and his supporters. 
Once Evatt departed and new personalities took control of Australia’s policy, 
Australia’s jurisprudential stance altered significantly.
II. Spender Period
With the appointment of Percy Spender as Minister for External Affairs in 1949 and the 
rise of Fred Whitlam as the major bureaucratic player in developing Australian policy, 
came a slow erosion of the jurisprudential outlook of the Evatt period. Although 
‘human rights’ continued to be used as a category of pre-existing moral rights, the task 
of drafting internationally enforceable human rights was viewed as a distinct process in
29 Comments o f Sir Frederick Eggleston on the Report of the Australian Representative on the 
Commission on Human Rights, Third Session, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 5.
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which States played the major constitutive and definitional roles. In the absence of 
State action to adopt human rights standards and transform them into legal rights or 
limitations, human rights had no inherent force. States were thus viewed as the 
authorities which were at liberty to decide whether or not to cede their power in certain 
areas. Positivism thus came to dominate the conceptualisation of human rights. The 
relationship between rights and duties was also reconceived. Duties were transformed 
from the independent corollary of rights to necessary pre-conditions for the enjoyment 
and exercise o f rights.
In the general statements made by Australian delegates during the Spender period, there 
was a continuation of the inalienable, inherent, eternal view of human rights espoused 
during the Evatt period. Whitlam, as Australian representative at the 138th meeting of 
the Commission on Human Rights, for example, argued that it was inappropriate to 
have rights ‘defined’ in the Covenant. They could only be ‘recognised’ in the 
Covenant.30 In expressing his rationale, Whitlam stated that rights were not granted 
from above ‘as from some sovereign overlord’ or ‘in a bargaining instrument’, but were 
inherent in mankind and were the attributes of mankind.31 This lead inexorably to the 
conclusion, he argued, that rights must be recognised rather than defined in the 
Covenant:
The peoples of the world would be asserting for themselves the rights that belonged to
them; such rights could not be defined, they could only be recognised.32
At the same time, however, a distinction began to be drawn between human rights in 
general and human rights as they were encapsulated in legally binding instruments. 
Human rights were seen as having a raw, moral existence that was not identical to their 
refined, legally enforceable existence. The UDHR, for instance, was characterised as a 
‘statement o f the noble strivings of humanity which had seen the light of day after years 
of struggle’.33 By describing the contents of the UDHR as ‘strivings’, the status of the
30
31
32
33
HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 138, 7; 29 March 1950. 
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid, 6.
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substantive human rights contained therein was implicitly diminished. In other 
Statements, the contents of the UDHR were described as ‘ideas’ that were not 
translatable to legal formulae.34 Thus Whitlam at the Commission on Human Rights 
stated that:
Attempts to change the ideas set forth in the Declaration into legal formulae would 
inevitably diminish both the value of the ideas and the efficacy o f the Covenant.35
Australia rejected the idea that the role of the Commission was to re-formulate
generally agreed upon human rights for inclusion in legally binding instruments.
Instead, it argued that a further selection process had to take place to choose which of
the UDHR standards were appropriate for inclusion in a legally binding instrument. A
division was thus drawn between legally justiciable human rights and non-justiciable
human rights. In his report back to the Department of External Affairs on the lessons to
be learnt from the Fifth Session of the Commission on Human Rights, Whitlam
emphasised the importance of this dichotomy:
In terms o f Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, the draft covenant has some unusual features.
Apart from the difficulty which attends on all large assemblages o f obtaining ready 
agreement about phrases, there has had to be recognized the differences that exist in 
institutional patterns and in the states o f public order o f the various societies represented 
on the Commission. These differences manifested themselves in a certain hesitancy in 
distinguishing between the moral and imaginative character o f the Universal Declaration 
and the juridical and precise demands o f the covenant, in a tendency to turn to rather 
vague and impressive language foi introductory expressions in articles, and a desire to 
utilize institutions o f law beyond the limits normally set to them in Anglo-Saxon 
jurisprudence.36
In Whitlam’s world view, elaborate provisions that mentioned the genesis of rights 
equated with ‘moral and imaginative’ statements. The task of the Commission was to 
identify and discard any excess packaging around statements of human rights, to leave 
brief, precise statements of obligations. Whitlam thus decried the French proposal to 
insert a clause stating ‘human life is sacred’. In Whitlam’s view, the clause was 
unsatisfactory because it failed to define for what purposes human life was sacred. A 
preferable form according to Whitlam was the Lebanese suggestion that ‘[ejveryone’s
35 HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 139, 11; 30 March 1950.
36 Memorandum from HFE Whitlam, Australian Mission to the UN, NY to the Secretary, DEA, 
29/7/50, in NAA A1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 7.
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right to life shall be protected by law’. He commended its simplicity in the following 
terms:
while avoiding a rather mystic intrusion into a juridical instrument and at the same time 
satisfying an urge for a ‘flag’, it stated no more than a legal platitude and was not likely 
to be treated by a Court as other than that.38
Underlying Whitlam’s emphasis on legal formalism was a subtle reconceptualisation of 
the task of representatives in drafting human rights protections. The rigours of Anglo- 
Saxon drafting style were to operate in order to contain the scope of rights so that their 
force was confined within narrowly defined boundaries. Those boundaries were to be 
determined by what was acceptable to States.
The State was seen as enjoying a wide discretion in accepting or rejecting human rights 
and determining the applicability of rights within a particular context. Spender gave the 
Department of External Affairs strict instructions that delegations were not to approve 
any contentious clause unless he was made aware of its full implications and signalled 
approval.39 Yet in addition to political deference in decision making about contentious 
clauses, Australian policy-makers promoted a view of the State having full moral 
authority to delineate the scope of internationally recognised human rights. Rather than 
seeing their role as being the agents of individuals in providing mechanisms for 
enforcement of human rights against States, stress was laid upon the role of delegations 
to represent the State in assenting or objecting to statements regarding human rights. 
Thus Whitlam invoked the United Nations Charter as not merely proclaiming 
principles, but setting out in clear-cut terms certain obligations to which the signatory 
States had voluntarily subscribed.40 State assent had thus become the source of 
legitimacy for human rights. The task of delegates was to draft an ‘effective 
instrument’ that governments would be able to accept. Delegates, he said, should not 
feel pressured or unduly concerned by non-government opinion that sought broader 
guarantees of rights since governments ‘must recognise that in the democratic system 
they could not move ahead of public opinion’ .41 It appears to have been assumed that
38 Ibid.
39 Annotated Submission to Minister for External Affairs, 4/5/50, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 8.
40 HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 137, 9; 29 March 1950.
41 HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 211, 14; 23 April 1951.
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governmental interest in human rights equated with public opinion. Such statements 
might be regarded as simply a reflection of political realism. Yet, the underlying 
premise was that States had the power to determine what rights should be recognised 
and that it was a power untrammelled by exterior notions of the ‘inherent rights of 
man’.
Accompanying this emphasis on State power was a particularly wide reading of the 
State’s power to impose limitations on human rights. This was evident, for instance, in 
the interpretation Whitlam gave to what was to become Article 4 of the ICCPR, the 
clause permitting a State to derogate from certain human rights in times o f emergency. 
Whitlam suggested that the term ‘emergency’ should be regarded as covering general 
strikes on the basis that general strikes often led to economic and social disorder, and 
the disruption o f the means of transport and food supplies.42 Police action to combat the 
difficulties o f such a strike, he argued, should be permissible under the Covenant.43 
When challenged by the Yugoslavian representative that the right to strike was itself a 
human right and as such could not be considered as giving rise to a public emergency, 
Whitlam remained resolute. Strikes causing nationwide disturbances might be 
engendered by subversive elements seeking to disrupt the economic and social system 
and to endanger public order and national security and as such constituted a public 
emergency.44 In light of Menzies’ ongoing concern that industrial action was a tool 
wielded by communist sympathisers,45 Whitlam’s resolve is not surprising. However, 
its importance in the current context is to demonstrate Whitlam’s broad view of the 
situations in which derogation o f human rights was legitimate. Where exercise of a 
right threatened the national interest, Whitlam’s response was to permit a State not only 
to restrict the exercise of that right, but to restrict all human rights until the situation 
was remedied.
42
43
44
45
HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 195, 15; 16 May 1950.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Menzies, for instance, depicted the 1949 coal strike as engineered by communist sympathisers. It 
was a view also proclaimed by some Labor Ministers such as Arthur Calwell: see D Lowe, Menzies 
and the Great World Struggle: Australia’s Cold War: 1948-1954, University o f New South Wales 
Press, Sydney, 1999, 23.
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It is possible to cite other examples of Australia’s State-centred approach to defining 
human rights. In relation to the ability of States to limit rights on the basis o f ‘national 
security’, for instance, the Department of External Affairs argued that the concept of 
‘national security’ was to be left to individual States for application and was not to be 
subject to international scrutiny.46 As seen in Chapter 2, the desire o f the Department of 
External Affairs was to legitimate the restriction of rights where necessary to combat 
the spread o f communism. Australian policy-makers did not want to open up the 
sufficiency o f this justification to international scrutiny. Similarly, Whitlam, as 
Australian representative, did not feel abashed in justifying particular stances on the 
basis of a wish to preserve the status quo in Australia. In the context o f discussing an 
individual’s right to compensation in circumstances where he/she had suffered an 
arbitrary deprivation of property, Whitlam stated explicitly that he did not consider 
himself bound by a text which would necessitate changes in Australian legislation .47 
No limits to the legitimacy of State shaping of norms in such a fashion were 
acknowledged.
Besides this State-centrism, the Spender period is remarkable for its re-conceptualising
of the relationship between rights and duties. Whilst representatives during the Evatt
period embraced the co-existence of rights and duties, Spender shifted the emphasis
towards interdependence of rights and duties, at least in relation to economic and social
rights. In April 1951, for instance, Arthur Tange, then Assistant Secretary o f the
Department o f External Affairs, reminded Whitlam of Spender’s view that:
any right accorded by a State may be absolute or qualified. In my view it ought to be 
qualified by some duty whether in form above or another. I think we always tend these 
days to place emphasis on rights of individuals without any consideration o f duties. To 
every right or for nearly every one there should be some correlative duty.48
46 Cablegram from DEA to Australian Mission to the UN, 12/5/50, in NAA A 1838, Item 856/13 Pt 8.
47 HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 159, 8; 18 April 1950.
48 Memorandum from AH Tange, Assistant Secretary, DEA to Australian Representative to the 
Commission on Human Rights, 13/4/51, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/10/6 Pt 1.
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The key point in this statement is that duties were not only correlative to rights, but 
qualified the rights. Duties were to be inserted into the very definition o f rights, at least 
in relation to economic and social rights.
The way in which this philosophy manifested itself in the draft rights advanced by
Australian delegations during 1950-1 has been dealt with in Chapter 1. For present
purposes one example suffices. Spender proposed the insertion o f a reference to a
contributory system into the guarantee of social security:
Everyone shall have the right to social security which shall be guaranteed by the 
provision o f social benefits, either in cash or in kind, assuring to every person at least 
the means of subsistence and, when necessary, adequate treatment in any common 
contingency occasioning the involuntary loss o f  income or its insufficiency to meet 
family necessities. The State may prescribe that all or any o f such benefits may be 
provided under a general contributory system.49
The draft clause retained the basic statement of right. Insertion o f the contributory 
system qualification was designed to illustrate that individuals bore the primary 
responsibility for fulfilling their rights. Their duty was thus not simply to obey laws or 
respect the rights o f others (as it had been regarded in the Evatt period), but to expend 
energy so as to ensure enjoyment o f rights. Under this model, failure to fulfil one’s 
duty could result in failure to enjoy rights. The State was not even conceived of as 
underwriting individual failure to perform one’s duty. As such, rights became partially, 
if  not wholly, dependent on individual action. Rights became opportunities that 
required the exercise of individual initiative to be realised. The State was not 
responsible for seeing that individuals enjoyed the right such as employment (an 
‘outcome’ view of rights), but responsible merely for providing the environment 
conducive to the exercise of individual initiative.
As a philosophy, this conceptualisation was not universally applied. There was no 
attempt in the field of civil and political rights to condition an individual’s right to enjoy 
rights upon fulfilment of duties o f individual initiative. In part the selectiveness of 
approach may have reflected the distinct conceptualisation of civil and political rights.
49 Quoted in Cablegram from APR Renouf, DEA to IG Sharp o f Department o f Labour and National 
Service, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 929/4/4 Pt 1.
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As Chapter 2 has revealed, during the Spender period civil and political rights came to 
be envisaged as ‘civil liberties’, protections of areas of individual freedom against State 
interference. Given this image of States desisting from conduct, it would have been 
difficult to place the burden for fulfilment of the right on the individual. Another factor 
contributing to the selectiveness of statements about duties may have been the 
dominance of international discussions as to the formulation of economic and social 
rights during the Spender period. However, at least in part, the selective use of the 
duties philosophy seems referable to a belief that civil and political rights were non- 
negotiable rights whereas economic and social rights had not reached this status. The 
jurisprudential divide between civil and political rights and economic and social rights 
thus widened from a debate about the genesis of the rights (in the Evatt period) to the 
appropriate protection to be afforded to such rights (in the Spender period).
To the extent that particular causal factors can be identified for these shifts in 
Australia’s jurisprudential stance, party political divisions appeared to play a lesser role 
than the personal political philosophies of Australian policy-makers, in particular 
Spender and Whitlam. A Liberal emphasis on individual initiative (discussed in 
Chapter 1) can be detected in the emphasis on individuals being empowered to seek the 
realisation of economic and social goals. However, nothing in the Liberal philosophy 
(as opposed to the Labor philosophy) would pre-determine a stance of State-centrism. 
Indeed internationally, an approach of favouring a positivist, State-defined set of human 
rights was associated with States adopting a socialist perspective.50 Instead, the 
development of the division between moral rights and legal rights and the central role 
given to the State in defining the latter category of rights seems to owe its creation to 
the State-centric perspective of Spender and Whitlam. For them, States were entitled in 
international negotiations to restrict their consent to those rights which they could 
accommodate in their national spheres. It was a view that accorded with the traditional 
international law doctrine of State sovereignty.51 Australia was viewed as a
50 See earlier discussion of the First Session of the Commission on Human Rights, 149.
51 State sovereignty has been a dominant concept in international law from the seventeenth century.
Indeed Cassese has highlighted the extent to which State sovereignty and the unfettered freedom of
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comparatively enlightened State in terms of recognising the interests of Australian 
individuals in enjoying certain rights. Individuals’ interests would be best served 
through permitting the continuation of orderly government and the promotion of 
democracy. After the departure of Spender from the domestic sphere, Whitlam 
continued carrying the torch of State-centrism into the Casey and Bureaucratic period,
III. Casey and Bureaucratic Period
During the early Casey Ministry and throughout the period described as the 
Bureaucratic period in policy development, one sees the continued development of 
several of the trends noted in the Spender period. A separation o f juridical and non- 
juridical human rights was maintained. Other dichotomies such as ‘political principles’ 
(supported by emotion) versus ‘rights’ (supported by rationality), and ‘aspirations’ 
versus ‘rights’ were employed to narrow the field of legitimate, internationally 
enforceable rights. UDHR rights continued to be seen as non-legal prescriptives to be 
achieved only progressively whilst the gap between economic and social rights and civil 
and political rights widened. Explicit reliance on the inter-dependence o f rights and 
duties subsided only to be replaced by a hostility to having the State provide material 
benefits to individuals in any of the civil, political, economic, social or cultural fields. 
Furthermore, a State’s recognition of rights remained a discretionary matter, secondary 
to a State’s institutional interests.
As in early periods, Australian delegations neither sought to proffer a definition of 
human rights, nor to dispute the existence of ‘inalienable’ human rights.52 Instead, 
delegations preferred to draw a distinction between those rights that were appropriate 
for inclusion in the Covenant and those that were not. The UDHR came to occupy an 
ambiguous position. It was championed as the embodiment of human rights standards
States has survived notwithstanding the reconceptualisations urged by modem theorists and newer 
States: see A Cassese, International Law in a Divided World, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, 4, 31- 
32.
52 See for example, HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 333, 5, 7; 12 June 
1952.
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on occasions when Australia was seeking to dispute the existence o f a right that had not 
been articulated in the UDHR. The debates over the right of self-determination were 
one instance in which recourse to the UDHR was undertaken in order to challenge the 
legitimacy of a right.53 At the same time, Australian delegations were not prepared to 
accept the potential of all rights articulated in the UDHR to be recognised in the 
Covenants. Thus in a submission to Casey in November 1951, the Department o f 
External Affairs suggested that the Australian delegation ‘emphasise that the draft 
Covenant on human rights should not be a mere echo of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights but should be in the form of a binding international treaty’.54 Similarly, 
Kenneth Bailey, as Solicitor-General in proposing a response that Prime Minister 
Menzies might use in replying to letter from a constituent, described the UDHR as 
aspirational in form. Bailey stated:
nor was it intended by the General Assembly that the Declaration should be regarded as 
legal prescriptions. Indeed its purpose is quite otherwise, for as the Declaration itself 
shows, its purpose is to serve as a ‘common standard o f achievement for all peoples and 
all nations...’. In other words, the Declaration is a summary statement of those human 
rights and freedoms which the General Assembly affirms are entitled to universal 
recognition but which can only be achieved progressively.55
The task of the Commission on Human Rights continued to be seen in terms of sifting 
through the UDHR, selecting justiciable rights and refining those rights into a form 
appropriate for legally binding obligations. In December 1951, Ralph Harry, as 
Australian delegate, described the task of States to the Third Committee of the General 
Assembly in the following terms:
we have undertaken to translate the imaginative inspiration o f the Declaration into such 
legal obligations as may appropriately be undertaken by States and which a substantial 
number o f them are prepared to accept.56
Whitlam continued to criticise other delegations’ failure to ‘distinguish between the 
moral and imaginative character of the Universal Declaration and the juridical and 
precise demands of the Covenants.’
53 This point is discussed at greater length in Chapter 3.
54 Submission to the Minister for External Affairs, 14/11/51, in NAA A 432/20, Item 54/3779 Pt 7.
55 Memorandum from KH Bailey, Secretary, Attorney-General’s Department to the Secretary, Prime 
Minister’s Department, 26/2/52, in NAA A 462/21, Item 575/1.
56 RL Harry, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 363, 100; 10 December 1951. A copy of the 
full text o f this speech is in NAA A 1838/1, 856/13/22.
57 Report o f  the Australian Representative to the Eighth Session o f the Commission on Human Rights, 
in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/10/7 Pt 2A.
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The language used to distinguish between provisions of the UDHR and the draft 
Covenants is revealing. In the comment of Whitlam quoted above, ‘moral and 
imaginative’ clauses were distinguished from ‘juridical and precise’ ones. In linguistic 
terms, the categories are not exact opposites. One would expect the opposite of moral 
and imaginative clauses to be immoral and dull clauses rather than juridical and precise 
ones. However, the use of this dichotomy suggests that juridical and precise rights were 
equated with rights that conformed to existing legal norms. They did not involve 
transformation of existing legal structures -  and thus did not have an ‘imaginative’ or a 
‘moral’ character. Instead, human rights suitable for inclusion in a draft Covenant were 
to fit within existing structures, in particular, within the legal framework defining 
powers of the State.
The application of the sifting process to select those rights appropriate for inclusion in a
legally binding instrument led the Australian delegation to reject rights that included too
extensive or too imprecise State obligations. Rights involving detailed State action
were described as ‘derivative’ rights. The comments of the Australian government to
the United Nations Secretary-General in 1951, for instance, noted with concern the
tendency to include such derivative rights as an obligation on States to devise a two
year plan on realising the right to education.58 At the same time, the Australian
delegation ruled out of contention for inclusion in the Covenants clauses that did not
give rise to a precisely defined State obligation. Ralph Harry, for instance, when before
the Third Committee in December 1951, gave the example of Article 28 of the UDHR
as a right that should not find a home within the Covenant:
In a Covenant or Treaty as distinct from a Declaration it is not sufficient to be able to 
define a Human Right. The question is what action is required from States or from what 
action States should be bound to refrain. It is for this reason that the rights to be dealt 
with by covenant may not be so extensive as the rights included in the Declaration. It 
was possible, for example, for States to agree in the Declaration that ‘everyone is 
entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in 
the Declaration can be fully realised’. It is obvious, however, that it would be
58 Cablegram from DEA to Australian Consulate General, Geneva, 3/8/51, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 
856/13/7 Pt 2.
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impossible to define in a treaty what action States should take to give effect to this 
right.59
In the same speech Harry rejected inclusion of a right o f self-determination on similar 
grounds.60
On the surface the application of these drafting standards to object to certain clauses 
could be interpreted as representing nothing more than a rigorous ‘quality control 
process’ that sought to maintain a high level of precision in legal drafting. Certainly 
contemporary commentators such as Geoffrey Sawer noted that Australia was gaining a 
reputation for being a pedant on matters of drafting.61 However, had a pure concern 
with drafting been the case, the Australian delegation could have chosen to re-draft 
clauses in such a way as to provide consistency and clarity. The Australian delegation, 
for example, could have cooperated in the task o f elucidating the State obligations that 
arose from the obligation to respect the right of self-determination or elaborated upon 
the nature o f the desired ‘social and international order’ required to realise the 
Declaration. Instead, the Australian delegation used the existence of such drafting flaws 
to object to the very basis of the rights.62 This reveals the extent to which Australia’s 
perceptions of drafting flaws disguised a fundamental unease with the human rights in 
question.
It is interesting to note that besides the separation of human rights into the categories o f 
juridical and non-juridical, the Australian delegation attributed other delegations’ 
support for opposed clauses, such as the right of self-determination and the application 
o f human rights to all dependent territories, to ‘emotion’. Thus, in explaining the nature 
o f Australia’s objections to various draft clauses of the ICCPR in the Brief for the 10th 
Session of the Commission on Human Rights (1954), the root problem was identified as
59 RL Harry, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 363, 100-101; 10 December 1951. Note 
that this is the same clause whose inclusion in the UDHR was questioned by Sir Frederick 
Eggleston during the Evatt period.
60 Ibid.
61 G Sawer, ‘Problems of Australian Foreign Policy: June 1956 -  June 1957’, (1957) 3 Australian 
Journal o f  Politics and History 1, 9.
62 Australia’s objections to the right to self-determination were multi-faceted and relied on more than 
the drafting flaws of the bland statement. It is discussed further in Chapter 3.
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arising from provisions written ‘as a result of the emotional attitudes of many
governments towards the handling of problems in the colonial and related fields’. 
Attachment to the right of self-determination, in particular, was seen as associated with 
this ‘emotional’ way of thinking. The Australian policy was, by implication, presented 
as the product of rational consideration of the utility of human rights.
Not all juridical rights recognised by the Australian delegation were to be legally 
enforceable or justiciable. Economic and social rights in particular were regarded as 
aspirational. They were to be placed into a separate Covenant and have separate, 
generalised implementation relying on reporting by States rather than the imposition of 
legal remedies.64 Thus within the field of juridical human rights, a further distinction 
was developed between aspirational and enforceable human rights. Economic and 
social rights had thus become two steps removed from Evatt’s policy o f enforceable 
human rights: they were not universally suitable for inclusion in Covenants binding as a 
matter of international law and their designation as ‘rights’ did not entail their 
entitlement to be incorporated within the domestic legal setting.
In the early period of the Casey Ministry, the Australian delegation persisted with its
emphasis on the interdependence of rights and duties. Whilst not pushing for the
integration o f rights and duties in the definition o f rights, Australian delegations
supported the use of general references to parallel duties for all forms of rights. In May
1952, for instance, it proposed with Sweden an amendment to the United States draft
preamble to the ICCPR inserting a paragraph dealing with duties:
Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to 
which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of 
the rights recognized in this Covenant. 65
Though not as explicit as statements during the Spender period, the clause was broad 
enough to encompass both an individual’s duty to respect the rights of others, but also
63 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the 10th Session of the Commission on Human Rights, in 
NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/10/9 Pt 3.
64 The issue o f the implementation of rights is considered further in Chapters 5 and 6.
65 UN Doc E/CN.4/L 171. This proposal was adopted unanimously: E/CN.4/SR 333,9: quoted in MJ 
Bossuyt, Guide to the ‘Travaux Preparatoires ’ o f  the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1987, 12.
63
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to be responsible for his/her own enjoyment of rights. The Australian delegation was 
ultimately successful in having this clause incorporated in the preambles of both the 
ICCPR and ICESCR. Later Briefs did not devote particular attention to the clause. 
However, by remaining supportive of this clause in each Covenant, the Australian 
delegation retained a commitment to envisaging the individual as the primary agent for 
the realization of human rights.
Alongside this reliance on individual initiative was a rejection o f State responsibility to 
take definite positive steps to assist the individual in this process. As has been noted in 
both Chapters 1 and 2, one sees in the Casey and Bureaucratic period the flourishing of 
a ‘small government’ philosophy that was nascent during the Spender period. On this 
view, the State was not responsible for providing work for all, nor was it responsible to 
legislate so as to prohibit discrimination in the private sector.66 Instead, the State’s role 
continued to be defined as creating the general atmosphere conducive to individuals’ 
attainment of their rights. The only exception related to conditions surrounding State 
intervention in an individual’s life. Thus in relation to prosecuting an individual, a State 
would come under an obligation to provide for fairness of process or, in expelling an 
alien, there would be a similar obligation of procedural fairness.
As in the Spender period, there was a continued emphasis on human rights only gaining 
efficacy once States had undertaken a binding legal commitment with respect to such 
rights. Such an undertaking could be evidenced in the enactment o f domestic 
legislation or the ratification o f an international instrument. However, human rights in 
the more general sense (that is, outside these two contexts) were regarded as rights only 
in a non-legal sense. There was no discussion, for instance, of the independent effect of 
human rights in limiting the power or legitimacy o f governmental power. Nor was their 
any fetter on a State’s power to select which human rights to recognise and commit to 
implementing. The endorsement of human rights was a matter for the discretion of 
States. Neither competing traditions nor conditions ‘which were inherent in the nature 
66 For further details, see Chapter 1, 64; Chapter 2, 90.
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and growth of organized societies’ could be overridden. States had legitimate 
domestic interests and constitutional barriers to accepting a full range of human rights 
commitments.68 Ultimately, States retained the power to make reservations in order to 
accommodate competing concerns. 69
Admittedly, Australian representatives occasionally averted to a broader responsibility
on States to respect a broader range of ‘human rights’. Thus Whitlam argued, in a
rather grand fashion in 1954, that States needed to do more than observe the letter o f the
law. States needed to make a great effort to improve the life o f society in such a way as
to satisfy the conscience of mankind :
The ultimate obligation was a moral and spiritual one. Consequently, the limited sxope 
[sic] o f the legal obligations undertaken by federal States was not the full measure of 
their real commitments.71
Before concluding, however, that Whitlam was actively promoting States to take on 
broader commitments, it is important to recognise the context in which the statement 
was made. In lauding State’s ‘moral and spiritual’ obligations, Whitlam was attempting 
to justify curtailment of State’s legal obligations at least in the case of federal-States.72 
His recourse to a higher level of obligation was thus a strategy employed to placate 
States insisting on universal textual obligations for all members of the international 
community. Certainly, domestically, there was no exhortation for departments and 
states to enforce moral and spiritual obligations. Indeed, as has been seen in previous 
Chapters, the Department of External Affairs reassured concerned domestic players that 
the obligations under the Covenants were tightly constrained and required minimal 
change to existing legislative policies.73
67
Little changed in the Australian policy up until the finalisation o f the Covenants. The 
Australian delegate, Rowen Osborn in the Third Committee of the General Assembly
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 372, 9; 4 May 1953.
HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 341, 4-5; 9 April 1953. 
As to Australian support for a reservations clause, see Chapter 5.
HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/C.4/SR 438, 7; 17 March 1954. 
Ibid.
Australia’s attitudes towards a federal-state clause is dealt with at length in Chapter 5. 
This was particularly the case with respect to economic and social rights: see Chapter 1.
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made the following comments in welcoming the adoption of the Covenants in 
November 1966:
My delegation has supported throughout the idea o f elaborating covenants designed to 
advance the purpose expressed in the UN Charter o f promoting and encouraging respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language or religion...
As the Committee will be aware, a vote cast at this stage is not in any sense an 
expression o f a State’s agreement to be bound by the provisions o f the text.
A further expression o f its consent -  involving signature, ratification, accession or 
acceptance -  is necessary before the text can become binding.74
States drafted Covenants to advance the promotion o f human rights, but were not
thereby obliged to ratify the Covenants. The statement did not purport to define the
content o f juridical or justiciable human rights, but reinforced a positivist outlook that
stressed the role o f States in creating and giving effect to legal human rights guarantees.
This third period o f policy development reflected assumptions virtually identical to 
those operative in the Spender period. Select policies show a continuance of a Liberal 
Party-induced emphasis on small government and limited intervention in the private 
sphere. But in large part, the similarities seem to arise out of the continued dominance 
in the years 1950-1954 of Whitlam’s positivist outlook. It proved to be a perspective 
that was sufficiently attractive to bureaucrats to be continued after Whitlam’s 
involvement ceased in 1955. The approach permitted State interests to be given priority 
in the drafting process. It also allowed bureaucrats to support the continued 
developments o f the Covenants without committing Australia to support for particular 
clauses. Through the adoption of such a stance, however, policy-makers during the 
Spender and Casey periods opened the way for a level of future intellectual confusion. 
The term ‘human rights’ was used both in reference to the broader category of ‘human 
rights’ in their moral sense, and ‘human rights’ in their narrower juridical legal sense; 
and to refer to rights regarded as legal and those regarded as aspirational. Together the 
Spender and Casey periods thus helped to create a cloak of invisibility surrounding 
disparate views o f the source and nature of human rights.
74 RF Osborn, Australian representative, A/C.3/SR 1455, 479-480; 12 December 1966.
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B. Identity of Rights’ Holders
Throughout Australia’s participation in the negotiations of the International Bill of 
Rights, its delegates affirmed the universality of human rights norms -  that is, their 
application to all individuals. However, this theoretical stance belied the extent to 
which Australian delegations supported the restriction or non-application of rights to 
certain groups. In particular Australian delegations consistently undermined the 
universal application of human rights through their insistence that the Covenants on 
Human Rights were unsuitable for application to indigenous people of both Australia 
and external territories, immigrants, and to a lesser extent, women. The standard rights 
bearer in Australian policy was thus an Anglo-Celtic male.
As has been outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, Australian policy-makers consistently put 
forward justifications for the non-application of human rights measures to indigenous 
people. Indigenous people of Australia were not regarded as at a sufficiently high level 
of civilisation to constitute a minority for the purpose of Article 27 of the ICCPR. Nor 
were they sufficiently advanced to be able to exercise rights such as freedom of 
movement or the right to equal pay. So deeply embedded was the belief that indigenous 
people could not be granted the full range of rights enjoyed by others, that in the 
parallel development of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD),75 the Australian delegate, Hugh Gilchrist, characterised 
Australia’s legislation as ‘protective legislation’ that constituted ‘special measures’ 
under the terms of the CERD:76
A great number o f nations...have minority peoples who, for various reasons of 
geography or history, have failed to advance at the same rate as other groups o f the 
nations, and for whom special provisions have to be made...in many countries special 
temporary measures are needed to protect such groups and their culture, while
Convention on the Elimination o f all Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature 21 
December 1965, entered into force generally 4 January 1969, ATS 1975 No 40.
76 Article 2(2) of CERD obliged States to undertake where necessary ‘special and concrete measures 
to ensure the adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or individuals belonging 
to them, for the purpose o f guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment o f human rights and 
fundamental freedoms’.
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developing their capacity to live happily and to make their own contribution as an 
integrated and equal part of a modem nation.77
Indigenous people of the external territories were regarded as similarly backward. As 
was noted in Chapters 1 and 2, Australian delegations advanced the view that, given the 
existing stages of (under) development of inhabitants of external inhabitants, such 
peoples needed to be excluded from the scope of the Covenant. This conclusion was 
regarded as regrettable, but unavoidable. Although the intensity with which this view 
was put forward varied over time, all Australian delegations considered that indigenous 
people could not be granted the same level of human rights protection as would apply to 
non-indigenous Australians. Attempts to argue differently were regarded as either 
irrational and ill-informed or motivated by more sinister (politically subversive) forces. 
The benchmark to be used in judging whether the inhabitants of trust territories (or 
indeed indigenous inhabitants of Australia) had reached a level of development 
sufficient for all protective legislation to be removed was not stated. However, the 
underlying premise was that only when such persons became more like their Anglo- 
Celtic counterparts could they be considered ready for the application of unqualified 
human rights.
In the case of immigrants to Australia, the process of exclusion was more subtle. 
Australia did not oppose Article 2 of the ICCPR or the ICESCR in which States 
undertook obligations with respect to ‘all individuals within its territory’, regardless of 
their legal status. However, immigrants were consistently placed in a different category 
to other persons within Australia. Thus, for instance, justifications were offered for 
their restricted movements or job prospects.78 Restrictions on their social security 
benefits were also seen as justifiable.79 Most commonly restrictions on immigrants
77 Statement by the Australian representative, Hugh Gilchrist, to the Third Committee, 1 October 
1963, reproduced in Brief for the Australian Delegation to the 20th Session o f the General Assembly 
(1965), in NAA A 1838/1, Item 929/5/5 Pt 1.
78 See Chapter 2, 77.
79 The Department o f Social Services were consistently worried about the application o f the non­
discrimination clause in relation to the right to social security, but were eventually placated on the 
basis that only progressive implementation was required for economic and social rights: Letter from 
DH Rowe, Director-General of Department of Social Services, to the A/g Secretary, DEA, 31/7/51, 
in NAA A 1838/342, Item 929/4/4 Pt 2.
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were regarded as being subsumed into the category of permissible limitations related to 
‘national security’ in relation to civil and political rights, or acceptable under a 
‘progressive implementation’ view of economic and social rights.
The rationale for the exclusion of immigrants was several-fold. The strong attachment 
to the White Australia Policy in the post-World War Two period seems to have been the 
initial catalyst for the drawing of the curtains around Australia’s immigration policies. 
With the expansion of the immigration policies to include a more diverse range of 
ethnic groups, the desire for racial homogeneity developed into a desire for cultural 
homeogeneity and a defence of assimilationist policies. Yet, this insulating of 
immigration policies appears to have had a longer term effect. Even when the White 
Australia Policy was being revisited (and formally dropped in 1966), Australian policy 
was marked by a policy of regarding the immigrant as ‘other’. A State could be 
expected to protect its long-term citizens, but immigrants had to earn the same benefits. 
Immigrants were thus conceived of as a secondary group within society whose rights 
could be varied at the whim of the State.
The exclusion of women from consideration as equal rights holders with men was a less 
conscious process by Australian policy-makers. In general, Australian delegations did 
not stop to ask whether men and women had different life experiences that might lead to 
the need to consider the drafting of human rights in such a way as to respond to the lives 
of both men and women. Even where specific issues arose as to men and women’s 
differential experiences, the Australian delegation was more likely to side with the 
status quo in the interests of the economy, State politics and community prejudice.
An example of the lack of significance attributed to differentiating between men and 
women was the failure of successive Australian delegations to respond positively to 
calls for the use of inclusive language in the international instruments. In 1948, for 
instance, the Soviet Union had suggested that the draft UDHR’s use of the term ‘men’ 
reflected the historical mastery of men over women and that it should be altered. The
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Australian alternate, Ralph Harry, responded that the terminology problem was 
insoluble. His solution was to adopt the language of the Charter and the UDHR, thus
on
‘man’ and ‘mankind’, since it was generally taken to include men and women. When 
the issue was raised again in 1955, Australia was no more enthusiastic about the use of 
broader language. In reporting back to the Department of External Affairs, the 
delegation noted that the move from ‘men’ to ‘human beings’ had been driven by the 
Dominican Republic Representative, Ms Bemadino who three years previously had 
been successful in obtaining the Assembly resolution changing the Spanish text of the
O 1
Covenants from ‘Derechos del Hombre’ to ‘Derechos Humanas’. The Australian 
delegation minimised the significance of the proposal by noting that all the sponsors of 
the move for the English text were female. It concluded that the substitution of ‘free 
human beings’ for ‘free men’ was ‘a change for the worse’ since ‘free men’ had strong 
traditional and historic meaning.82 Furthermore, it considered that no one would think 
of interpreting the word ‘men’ in any exclusive sense. It was only because the 
Australian delegation considered that the amendment was bound to be adopted that the 
delegation did not oppose it.83
When the inclusion of rights to specifically address the position of women were raised, 
Australia was generally hostile. Jessie Street, in her personal capacity as the Vice- 
Chairman of the Commission on the Status of Women in the late 1940s, circulated a 
draft document concerning the rights of women. It was presented to the Commission on 
Human Rights for its consideration. It contained such clauses as a right to be free from 
violence, and a right to financial security.84 This draft did not receive any analysis from 
the Australian delegation. It was simply filed in a departmental folder without further 
comment, indicating a level of marginalisation without parallel in relation to other 
human rights topics. In other cases, Australian hostility was more overt. When texts of
80 RL Harry, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/SR 13, 6-7; 20 June 1947.
81 Memorandum from Delegation to the UN to the Secretary, DEA, 9/11/55, in NAA A 432/68, Item 
68/2797 Pt 3.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Proposed Amendments to the International Bill o f Human Rights, Report o f the Drafting 
Committee, UN Doc E/CN.4/21, Annex A, in NAA A 461/7, Item G327/1/8.
176
particular application to women were introduced, such as the equal pay clause, 
Australian delegations were consistently opposed.85 When a complaint was sent to the 
United Nations from an Australian individual concerning the lack of equal pay in 
Australia, Australia without any seeming qualms cited community opinion as the reason 
for the unequal pay structure:
Change in the status of women and the development of the principle of equal pay for 
equal work depend to a large extent on the pressure of public opinion. At present a large 
section of the Australian pubic remains unconvinced that women should be granted 
equal rights with men in such matters and until women have changed the thinking of the 
Australian public, advance in the status of women can only be slow and the gains small. 
Similarly the Australian public, as a whole, seems uncertain as to whether married 
women with children should be encouraged to undertake work outside the home.86
This response by Australia is important for signalling the source of Australian
reluctance to undertake what would today be called a ‘gender analysis’ of human rights
principles. The Australian delegations saw themselves as mirroring generally accepted
community sentiment about the role and importance of women. The negotiation of
international standards of human rights was not to be the stage on which Australia
challenged such sentiment.
It is evident, therefore, that there were significant gaps in the Australian understanding
of a system of universally applicable human rights. In excluding indigenous peoples,
immigrants and women from equal policy consideration, Australian policy-makers were
reflecting the dominance of continuing prejudice. It was a form of exclusion that
equates with what Klaus Gunther has described as a ‘process of neutralization’:
at first perceiving a human being as somebody who does not in all respects belong to the 
community of human beings, and secondly with the right to treat them as something 
which does not deserve the protection of human rights.87
In so far as it was based upon unquestioned assumptions about the nature of the ideal 
rights bearer, it points to a long-lasting form of myopia.
C. Domestic Significance of Human Rights
Throughout the negotiations of the International Bill of Rights, Australian delegations
85 See Chapter 1.
86 Letter from KCO Shann for Assistant Secretary, DEA to Australian Mission to the UN, NY, 
16/6/54, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 13.
87 K Gunther, ‘The Legacies of Injustice and Fear: A European Approach to Human Rights and their 
Effects on Political Culture’ in P Alston (ed), The European Union and Human Rights, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1999, 118.
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accepted that international human rights standards were applicable in, and had real 
consequences for, Australia. Human rights were not regarded as simply a matter related 
to foreign affairs, to be used in judging the performance of other States, but were looked 
upon as standards against which the Australian record might be evaluated. Even as 
Australian policy-makers became focused on limiting the scope of internationally 
protected human rights, the sense of relevance of the standards to domestic policies was 
retained. At the same time, the promotion of the view that human rights texts bore a 
fixed, static meaning had a tendency to increase complacency about the likelihood that 
Australian standards would be considered to be in breach of the international standards.
The Evatt period was the high water mark for Australia’s preparedness to consider and 
accept the domestic implications for international human rights. In 1946, for instance, 
the Department of External Affairs approved Geoffrey Sawer’s entry in the United 
Nations Yearbook of Human Rights that acknowledged a range of outstanding human
o o
rights issues in Australia. Whilst stating at the outset that there was ‘probably no 
country in the world in which human rights...are more extensive or better protected’,89 
Sawer proceeded to identify a number of shortcomings in Australia’s human rights 
record. He conceded, for instance, that there was not complete respect for political 
rights, given the restrictions on the franchise for the upper house in several states, the 
restrictions on Aborigines and the inadequate representation of the people of Canberra 
and the Northern Territory.90 The entry also acknowledged the difficulties in ensuring 
the right to social security given existing constitutional constraints.91 Whilst there were 
definite limits to the preparedness of Australia to amend existing practices (particularly 
in the indigenous and immigration fields), the Evatt period was to be the most open in 
acknowledging human rights problems in Australia.
88 United Nations Yearbook of Human Rights 1946, UN Doc E/CN.4 1946, 31.
89 Ibid, 31.
90 Ibid, 33.
91 Ibid, 34.
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During the post-Evatt years, there was less frankness in acknowledging publicly areas 
of inconsistency between human rights standards and Australian practice. Instead, 
where inconsistencies were perceived, the stance of delegations was more defensive in 
nature. The object became to seek amendment of the ‘offending’ human rights 
guarantees. The fact that the Department of External Affairs undertook regular 
consultations with Commonwealth departments and the states during the negotiations 
suggests that decision-makers remained of the opinion that the international human 
rights standards had potential domestic impact. Yet as the frequency o f these 
consultations increased during the Spender and Casey periods, so too did Australia’s 
attempts to insulate key policies from the scope of human rights guarantees through the 
proposal of amendments or narrow ‘understandings’. Ultimately, it would appear that 
the bureaucratisation of the process was responsible for this watering-down of 
Australia’s commitment to changing its domestic policies. It was a pattern that was 
only reversed on occasions when political leaders took particular interest in an aspect of 
the human rights treaties.92 Yet, the fact that inconsistencies were still noted points to 
an underlying acceptance that human rights standards were relevant in the Australian 
context.
It is noteworthy that Australian human rights policy included few instances of Australia 
seeking the recognition of particular rights to embarrass other States or to be used in 
attacking other States. This was not to say that Australian political leaders did not make 
comments attacking other countries’ record on human rights issues. Prime Minister 
Menzies on the occasion of the 13 th anniversary of the UDHR in 1961, for instance, 
stated:
It is easy to point where the ideals of the declaration have failed to take root -  more than 
a quarter o f humanity today lives under Communist systems o f Government which 
reject the whole concept o f individual rights. Yet in the comparatively short period 
since the declaration was adopted, it is encouraging to see the extent o f  its influence
92 In 1961, for instance, as a result o f international pressure concerning Australia’s aboriginal policies, 
Cabinet directed the Department of External Affairs and the Attorney-General’s Department to 
review Commonwealth legislation to identify provisions which discriminated against the 
employment o f Aboriginal people and to provide a report on the desirability o f removing such 
discrimination: Cabinet Decision, 23/8/61, referred to in Memorandum from H Gilchrist to the A/g 
Secretary, DEA concerning Australian Aborigines: External Affairs Interest, 29/8/61, in NAA A 
1838/1, Item 929/5/3 Pt 1.
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among men and women in many other countries. We who are privileged to live under 
the rule o f law should do what we can to help the less fortunate members of the world 
community to overcome tyranny, discrimination and want and to enjoy the individual 
freedom an dignity to which they aspire.93
Similarly, Australian policy-makers blamed Soviet intransigence for delays in the 
drafting o f the Covenants. However, Australian policy-makers never considered 
changing their attitudes towards clauses on the basis of a strategic advantage to be 
afforded in amassing ammunition to be used against another State. Instead, Australian 
policy-makers consistently focused on the implications for the Australian State in 
accepting or rejecting clauses.
Having noted that all policy-makers viewed human rights as a matter o f domestic 
import, it should also be observed that policy-makers viewed the determination of 
human rights policy largely as a governmental affair. Admittedly, there was some 
movement as between the Evatt Ministry and the later Ministries in the dominant view 
of the role o f the government in participating in the negotiations. During the Evatt 
period, there was an emphasis on the State acting as the agent o f the community in 
seeking to protect the human rights of individuals. It is apparent, for instance, in 
relation to the Australian delegates’ arguments concerning economic and social rights: 
the government, in fact all governments, would have to be answerable to their 
population for the stances adopted. Far more common during the post 1949 period was 
the setting up o f an adversarial position between the State and individuals. Community 
interest was equated with that of the State and opposed to the potentially unruly 
individual. This was evident in the suspicion cast upon individual Aboriginal activists 
who sought to draw attention to Australia’s discriminatory practices. It is also a factor 
that is evident in Chapter 6’s exploration of implementation practices. In such policies, 
the State was seen as needing to protect its own interests in the negotiations rather than 
seek to represent individuals.
93 13th Anniversary o f UDHR: Statement by the Minister for External Affairs, 10/12/61, in NAA A
463/50, Item 65/4844.
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Despite these variations, however, in neither the Evatt nor the later periods did the 
Department o f External Affairs seek to involve non-government organisations in the 
ongoing development of policy. On occasion, copies of the draft documents were sent 
to organisations such as the United Nations Association. There is no evidence, 
however, that policy-makers took into account the comments made by such 
organisations in response. Admittedly the number o f non-government organisations 
was a great deal more limited than it is today. From the limited use made of existing 
organisations, however, it would appear that policy-makers proceeded on the 
assumption that the negotiation of treaties was primarily a matter for governmental 
officers.
Spanning the Evatt, Spender, Casey and Bureaucratic periods was also a conception that 
human rights standards, once finalised, would have a static and predictable meaning. 
Whether it be in the confident terms in which advice was provided by Attorney- 
General’s as to the level of consistency or inconsistency between international 
provisions and domestic law, or in the explanations of the Covenants provided to 
Australian states and Commonwealth departments in the latter stages of the 
negotiations, primary reliance was placed on the ‘objective’ meaning o f the provisions. 
Recourse was had to the drafting histories of provisions to elucidate this meaning. 
However, there was no indication that the scope of human rights guarantees might 
change in the future as a result o f subsequent State practice. Nor was there attention 
given to the fact that the ‘objective’ meaning ascribed to the clause by other States or 
the international community might be influenced by future comments by the 
supervisory bodies under the Covenants or the writings of jurists. Furthermore, there 
were some isolationist tendencies evident with respect to permitting other States or 
international bodies to question the Australian interpretation o f treaty provisions. In 
May 1950, the Department of External Affairs advised the Australian Mission to the 
United Nations that they were not prepared to have the ‘national security’ limitation be 
subject to review by any international organ.94 Similarly, in putting forward 
94 Cablegram from DEA to Australian Mission to the UN, NY, 12/5/50, AA A 1838, 856/13 Pt 8.
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‘understandings’ of clauses in the civil and political rights field, there was an implicit 
belief that such understandings could be used to ‘estop’ later challenges.
Admittedly, the Vienna Convention on the Law o f  Treaties with its establishment of a 
regime of looking for common intentions and permitting recourse to future practice of 
States and adjudicatory bodies was not finalised until 1969. However, given that the 
overlap between personnel involved in representing Australia in the negotiations on the 
Vienna Convention on the Law o f  Treaties and providing advice on the ICCPR and 
ICESCR,95 one might have expected a more cautious approach to be adopted in 
predicting the meaning of clauses. The confident prediction of the meaning of the 
clauses was obviously designed to reassure domestic players (where appropriate) or to 
justify Australia’s stances on particular clauses. The manner in which it was undertaken 
does suggest, however, a belief that the language o f the clauses was sufficiently precise 
as to be capable of bearing a fixed meaning. Whatever be the motivation, the 
promotion o f such a static, subjective approach is likely to have led to a certain 
complacency within federal and state authorities. When the Department of Immigration 
was reassured, for instance that work contracts were not ‘forced or compulsory labour’ 
under Article 8 of the ICCPR, or that restrictions on the freedom of movement of 
migrants did not infringe Article 12(3) of the ICCPR, the Department o f Immigration 
was likely to take the view that their policies had been given a permanent imprimatur. 
Similarly, when departments were reassured that the ‘progressive achievement’ nature 
o f ICESCR rights protected existing discrepancies in Australian law from attack, one 
would not expect departments to feel any compulsion to undertake targeted programmes 
for the eradication of discrepancies.
Notwithstanding these limitations, it is evident that there was a continuous appreciation 
of the potential significance of the International Bill o f Rights in the domestic scene. 
Even where enthusiasm for the transformative potential of international human rights
95 Patrick Brazil, an officer of the Attorney-General’s Department was a leading member of
Australia’s delegation involved in the negotiations o f the Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties 
and also provided key advice in the 1965-6 period on the meaning of the draft human rights treaties.
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was not evident, there remained a sense of vulnerability that made policy-makers seek 
to reduce the scope of the Covenant.
Conclusion
Despite the continuing rhetorical support given to ‘inalienable, universal’ human rights, 
Australian policy-makers did not share a common understanding of the nature of human 
rights. During the Evatt period moral, political and legal human rights were viewed as 
synonymous. The responsibility of States, already bound by human rights in the moral 
and political spheres, was to provide for the international and domestic legal protection 
of human rights. With the rise of Spender and Whitlam as dominant influences in the 
1950s, Australia’s policy became marked by an emphasis on the distinct nature o f moral 
human rights vis-ä-vis legal human rights. The latter were regarded through a positivist 
lens such that States could select, shape and amend any pre-existing human rights. 
Significant gaps also appear between Australia’s commitment to the universality of 
rights and the exclusion of particular groups from being full rights-bearers. Attitudes 
towards the domestic significance of international human rights standards were 
similarly mixed. While delegations consistently accepted that the human rights regime 
had implications for Australian domestic policy, delegations varied as to the balance to 
be struck between international human rights and domestic interests.
Rather than being able to attribute these changes and divergences to one factor, this 
Chapter reveals the multiplicity of factors at work. The primary factor appears to have 
been the personal political philosophies of the policy-makers, in particular Evatt and 
Whitlam, concerning the powers of the State, the roles of individuals and the divide 
between morality and law. Of secondary importance overall were the ideological 
constraints o f the Liberal and Labor Parties, particularly in the area of State 
involvement in the guaranteeing of rights. Equally, however, the bureaucratisation of 
the process o f human rights development in the latter years ensured continued 
adherence to a positivist, State-centric model of human rights. Given these distinctions
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in the period 1946-1966, it is impossible to conclude that as 1966 there was any 
inevitability about future Australian governments embracing one, universal, view of the 
role and importance of international human rights.
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Chapter 5
The Domestic Implementation of Human Rights
Introduction
The international law of human rights builds and depends on national law.. .When a 
State is deficient in respecting or ensuring human rights, the international law of human 
rights does not supersede national laws and institutions, but seeks to induce the state to 
improve them and make them more effective.1
The efficacy o f international human rights law ultimately depends upon national laws 
and institutions. To convince States to develop national laws and policies consistent 
with the standards established in the International Bill o f Rights remains one of the 
primary aims o f the international human rights system. Delegates involved in 
negotiating the International Bill of Rights were aware of the vital interconnection 
between the provisions o f international and domestic law. As representatives of 
individual States, they were also aware of political and constitutional complexities 
surrounding the national implementation of human rights. A balance between these 
two interests thus had to be struck in working out acceptable clauses concerning 
domestic implementation to be included in the International Bill o f Rights.
This Chapter examines Australian policy towards the domestic implementation issue, 
focusing on three topics of particular concern to contemporary delegates: (a) the 
general obligation clauses in each Covenant; (b) the inclusion o f federal-States clauses; 
and (c) the inclusion of a reservations clause. It reveals that over the course of the 
international negotiations, Australia moved away from its initial support for robust 
obligations on States to legislatively or constitutionally entrench all human rights. In a 
process that was fuelled by Spender and his successors’ adherence to Liberal Party 
values and the cautiousness engendered by Whitlam and his bureaucratic colleagues, 
Australia’s policies shifted towards advocacy for a scheme of diluted, decentralised 
domestic implementation.
L Henkin, ‘International Human Rights and Rights in the United States’, in T Meron (ed), Human 
Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy Issues, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, 25.
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A. Obligation Clauses
Overview of the International Debate
The UDHR was recognised as a non-binding declaration of the General Assembly. As 
such the issue of domestic implementation did not need to be examined in any detail.
By a vote of 47 to none with one abstention, the Third Committee adopted an Egyptian 
Resolution that ‘deferred the formulation of principles relating to the duties of States for 
incorporation to an appropriate instrument’.2 Debate on domestic implementation thus 
began in earnest with the drafting of the (then termed) Covenant on Human Rights.
With the separation of the draft Covenant into twin Covenants in 1952, the door was 
opened for separate obligation clauses to deal with each category o f rights. The clause
drafted for civil and political rights was Article 2 o f the ICCPR which read:
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.
2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each 
State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance 
with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to 
adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant.
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated 
shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed 
by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto 
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any 
other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop 
the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.
A different formulation was chosen for the ICESCR. While including a guarantee of 
non-discrimination, Article 2(1) of the ICESCR obliged States:
to take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a 
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of 
legislative measures.
UN Doc A/C.3/222: quoted in J Morsink, The Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights: Origins, 
Drafting and Intent, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1999, 239.
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No reference was made to the granting of remedies for infringements. Developing
States were empowered to choose the extent to which they guaranteed economic rights. 
Given the centrality of these clauses in the two Covenants, it is somewhat surprising to 
note how little controversy accompanied their drafting.
The domestic implementation clause to be applied to civil and political rights was first 
discussed in 1947 at the First and Second Sessions of the Commission on Human 
Rights.3 4 Even at this stage it was envisaged that the clause would not be extended to 
economic and social rights. The draft clause prepared in 1948 thus referred to rights 
and freedoms in ‘part II’ of the draft Covenant, limiting it to civil and political rights.5 
With the exception o f the non-discrimination element (which arose only in 1949), the 
1948 draft clause contained the major elements of the eventual Article 2: the obligation 
to adopt laws where necessary and to provide judicial or other remedies for breach of 
rights.6 7The major issue of contention was whether permitting States time to ‘take the 
necessary steps’ constituted a negation of immediate obligations. Despite vehement 
opposition towards this aspect of the clause from the United Kingdom in 1950-1952, the 
Commission on Human Rights adopted the clause in its present form in 1952. It was 
adopted, unamended, by the Third Committee of the General Assembly in 1963.8
Article 2 of the ICESCR was not conceived until several years into the drafting process. 
Indeed, it was only at the Seventh Session of the Commission on Human Rights in 
1951, that the Commission first attempted to draft an umbrella clause to cover State 
obligations.9 When the clause was discussed in the Commission on Human Rights in 
1952 and the General Assembly in 1962, debate centred around whether or not the 
obligation should be ‘progressive’ and to what extent States were required to take
3 Article 2(3) ICESCR.
MJ Bossuyt, Guide to the Travaux Preparatoires o f the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1987,49-50.
The draft clause is contained in UN Doc E/800, quoted by MJ Bossuyt, op cit, 50.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid, 72.
8 Ibid.
See MCR Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1995, 116.
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legislative steps to achieve economic and social rights.10 The final text of Article 2(1) 
was adopted by the Commission on Human Rights in 1952 and endorsed by the Third 
Committee o f the General Assembly in 1962.11
I. Evatt Period
During at least the early stages of the Evatt period, Australia was an advocate for 
stringent, ambitious methods of domestic implementation of human rights. Its preferred 
model of domestic implementation extended far beyond the realms of Article 2 o f either 
the ICCPR or ICESCR. Australia suggested that States be required to incorporate 
human rights into their ‘fundamental law’. ‘Fundamental law5 was a generic term used 
to refer to the foundational law of States. The proposal was first aired and given its 
fullest exposition at the Paris Peace Conference in 1946.12 The intention was that human 
rights would become a permanent aspect of the legal order of States. As part of this 
proposal, States would guarantee that individuals could challenge administrative or 
legislative action where their human rights were being threatened.13 In States where 
courts had the power to review the constitutionality of Acts of the legislature, human 
rights would become part of the standards used in the review through their inclusion in 
the constitution. In systems where parliamentary supremacy was untrammelled by 
judicial review, two possibilities were foreshadowed.14 The court could make use of its 
statutory interpretation functions to read down provisions that appeared to be 
inconsistent with human rights in an enacted ‘fundamental law5 unless the intention to 
abrogate such human rights was express.15 Even in cases where the intention to
10
11
12
13
14
15
For a fuller version of the history of Article 2(1) o f the ICESCR, see MCR Craven, op cit, 107-134. 
Ibid.
The Paris Peace Conference of 1946 negotiated the peace treaties between the Allies and Rumania, 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Finland, Austria and Germany. Early drafts of a treaty between the Allies and 
Italy were also discussed. In the context o f the Italian peace treaty, Australia proposed the inclusion 
of the following text: ‘Italy undertakes that, in order to fulfil its obligations under paragraph 1 of 
this article, those obligations shall be recognized as fundamental laws and that no law, regulations or 
official action shall conflict or interfere with those obligations, nor shall any law, regulation or 
official action prevail over them’: included in paper on ‘Fundamental Law’, Annex H, to Brief to 
Paris Conference, in NAA A 1067/1, Item E46/38/28.
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abrogate human rights was express, courts were not powerless. Their role in such 
circumstances was to draw the disconformity to the attention of the legislature and the 
United Nations.16
Australia’s enthusiasm for this proposal was not particularly long-lived. Having 
succeeded in having a ‘fundamental law’ option included in the report of the 
Commission on Human Right’s Working Group on Implementation in 1947,
Australian representatives adopted a lower profile on the issue in 1948 and 1949. The 
issue was not, for instance, raised by the Australian representative in the context o f the 
deliberations o f the Second Session of the Drafting Committee for the Covenant in 
1948. The change of heart came in the midst o f a growing recognition o f the difficulties 
Australia would face in changing its own fundamental law, the Commonwealth 
Constitution. A Department of External Affairs memorandum written in June 1948 
noted that the Australian Constitution could only be changed by referendum. 
Referendums were described as ‘notoriously difficult’ to win.18 Constitutional experts 
writing in 2001 would be unlikely to disagree with this sentiment. In 1948, there was 
particular sensitivity over the issue given the Labor government’s failure to convince a 
majority of the Australian population to endorse any o f its proposals for constitutional 
change in 1944, 1946 or 1948.19 An Australian delegate to the Commission also 
reported back to the Department the lack of support from other States, drawing attention 
to the particular hostility demonstrated by the United States.20 By 1949, the Australian 
Mission to the United Nations was directed ‘not to push the issue’. Whilst appropriate
17 Report o f Working Group on Implementation, Annex C to Commission on Human Rights, 2nd 
Session Report to the Economic and Social Council, 36, UN Doc E/600, 6 ESCOR Supp 1 (1948).
18 Memorandum from AH Loomes, to the Secretary, DEA, 29/6/48, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 
Ptl .
19 For the questions put to the Australian people and the results, see T Blackshield, G Williams, B 
Fitzgerald, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory: Commentary and Materials, Federation 
Press, Sydney, 1996, 969-70. As an indication of the abysmal record o f successful referenda, o f the 
23 proposals put to the Australian people on 11 occasions in the period 1906-1948, only four 
proposals were carried, based on the results presented in T Blackshield, G Williams, B Fitzgerald, 
op cit, 964-970.
20 Report o f the Australian Alternate on Human Rights Drafting Committee, 2nd Session, (1948), in 
NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 1.
21 Memorandum from the A/g Secretary, DEA to Australian Mission to the UN, NY, 28/4/49, in NAA  
A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt3.
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in the context o f the Peace treaties, the Department o f External Affairs regarded the 
proposal as ‘less appropriate now where the contracting parties are well-established 
States with long-operating written or unwritten constitutions’.
Having given up on the compulsory constitutional entrenchment o f human rights, 
Australia’s support switched to proposals requiring States to enact legislation to protect 
and promote human rights. Australia supported all references in the earliest drafts of 
Article 2 of the ICCPR to States being required to take legislative steps to ensure 
individuals’ enjoyment of human rights. Similarly, in the substantive clauses of the 
Covenant, Australia advanced specific amendments to impose more specific legislative 
responsibilities, such as those relating to the non-discrimination obligation.24 Australia 
did not share the United Kingdom’s concern that States should only be able to accede to 
a treaty when they were able to fully implement its terms.25 Instead, Australia, along 
with States like the United States and Denmark, argued that States might properly ratify 
the Human Rights Covenant and proceed, ‘within a reasonable period of time’, to fully 
implement the terms of the Covenant. In an attempt to make this feature clearer, the 
Australian delegation proposed at the Fifth Session o f the Commission on Human 
Rights in 194 that the words ‘within a reasonable tim e’ be added to Article 2.27 
Australia was thus prepared to recognise a transitional period for States to ensure that 
their legal systems complied with international human rights and to take the necessary 
steps to legislatively protect human rights.
Australian delegates also voted for recognition o f an individual’s right to an effective 
remedy for breach of human rights. In 1948, the draft clause o f the Commission on 
Human Rights stated:
23 This included support for a United States proposal that stated States would take ‘legislative and 
other measures’ to give effect ‘as a matter of domestic law’ to the rights in the Covenant: UN Doc 
E/CN.4/SR 125, 17 quoted in MJ Bossuyt, op cit, 59.
24 Discussed in Chapter 2,81.
25 As to the United Kingdom’s stance, see UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 138, discussed in UN Doc A/2929, 
quoted by MJ Bossuyt, op cit, 58.
26 See MJ Bossuyt, op cit, 59.
27 Australia made this suggestion orally: UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 125, 17; quoted by MJ Bossuyt, op cit, 
59.
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any persons whose rights or freedoms as herein defined are violated shall have an 
effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons 
acting in an official capacity.28
In referring only to an ‘effective remedy’ rather than a ‘judicial remedy’, the clause 
gave a wide discretion to States to fashion the appropriate remedy. However, the 
Australian Briefs for the period do not indicate any concern to have the general wording 
adopted in order to prevent an obligation to provide ‘judicial remedies’ arising.
Australia’s policy with respect to the implementation of economic and social rights is 
less clear. As was outlined in Chapter 1, in speeches defending the inclusion of 
economic and social rights in the draft Covenant, Australian delegates supported the 
view that States should be under obligations to take immediate action (legislative or 
otherwise) to ensure the rights. In relation to the UDHR, for instance, Australia was 
one of the initiators of Article 22 which recognised each individual’s right, inter alia, to 
‘national effort’ aimed at the realization of economic, social and cultural rights. In 
the six rights forwarded to the Commission on Human Rights for its consideration in 
1949, there were references to the State limiting work hours ‘by law’, establishing and 
maintaining machinery for minimum wages and conditions and taking action to ensure 
persons have an opportunity for useful work.30 In the absence of any draft clause on the 
implementation of economic and social rights, however, it is difficult to ascertain 
whether the Australian delegation would have supported identical implementation 
provisions for all types of rights.
Indeed, there is at least some evidence suggesting that Australian delegates would have 
shied away from granting judicial remedies for breaches of economic and social rights. 
In the context o f defending economic and social rights, Australian delegates 
acknowledged that international implementation of such rights might take a different 
form from that suitable for civil and political rights. Whereas civil and political rights 
could be made the subject of inquiry by a court or commission, economic and social
28 UN Doc E/800, Article 2, quoted in MJ Bossuyt, op cit, 64.
29 Report o f the Australian Representative to the Third Session o f the Commission o f Human Rights, 
in NAA A 1838/278, 856/13 Pt 3.
30 Discussed in Chapter 1, 40.
191
rights lent themselves to scrutiny by a specialised agency.31 Although these comments 
were made in the context of discussing international implementation, it is conceivable 
that had the delegation been pressed on the issue, it would have conceded that a similar 
distinction should be made in the domestic sphere.
Notwithstanding this residual question mark over Australian policy concerning the 
domestic implementation of economic and social rights, it is apparent that Australia 
during the Evatt period supported the imposition o f extensive obligations with respect to 
the implementation of human rights. As with its contemporary stance on economic and 
social rights and international implementation, Evatt seems to have been the 
mastermind in developing these policies. Such policies sat comfortably with Evatt and 
his Labor colleagues’ willingness for government to take legislative action to protect 
human rights, a topic discussed in Chapters 1 and 2.
II. Spender Period
During the Spender years, there was much less consideration given to the issue of the 
obligations clauses to be included in the Covenant. In part, this reflects the focus in the 
Sixth Session o f the Commission on Human Rights in 1950 with the overarching 
question whether there were to be one or two Covenants, an issue that was not to be 
resolved until after Spender’s departure from office. Even in the debates that arose, 
however, Australia adopted a relatively low profile.
Looking at the statements that were made, one notices a widening gap between 
Australia’s policies with respect to the domestic implementation o f civil and political 
rights and economic, social and cultural rights. In relation to Article 2 o f the ICCPR, 
Australia maintained support for reference to a State’s obligation to ‘take the necessary 
steps’ to implement civil and political rights. The United Kingdom was pushing to
31 See Statement o f Australian representative to Third Committee o f the General Assembly, quoted in 
Memorandum from the A/g Secretary, DE A to the Australian Mission to the UN, 28/4/49, in NAA 
A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 3; and Letter from EJR Heyward, Australian Mission to the UN to the 
Secretary, DEA, 11/6/48, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 3.
32 See for instance, HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 194,4; 16 May 1950.
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have this reference deleted altogether on the basis that States had to fully implement the 
clauses before entry into the treaty.33 Australia’s response was much as it had been in 
the Evatt period -  States needed a period of time in which to ensure compliance with 
the human rights standards.34 Given that Article 2(1) of the ICESCR was not drafted 
until 1951, there was no specific debate on the topic o f an overall obligations clause for 
economic and social rights. However, in the debates on the substantive economic and 
social clauses to be recognised there was a movement away ffom the undertaking of 
extensive State legislative responsibilities. As has been discussed in Chapter 1, 
Australian policy-makers shifted the fulcrum towards individual efforts to achieve 
rights and away from State action through the introduction of the concept of ‘mutuality 
of obligations’.35 State action would only be undertaken in exceptional instances. It 
was a dual conceptualisation of domestic implementation that was to flourish in the 
Casey and bureaucratic periods.
III. Casey and Bureaucratic Period
The most significant changes in Australian approach to the domestic obligations clauses 
of the human rights instruments occurred during the Casey and Bureaucratic period of 
policy development. These changes related to Australia’s conception of the role o f the 
State in realizing and guaranteeing rights, the nature of distinctions between categories 
of rights and the ideal relationship between different spheres of government, in 
particular, the legislative, judicial and administrative branches. Rather than embracing 
the State’s responsibility to transform national policies and laws to meet human rights 
standards, Australian policy favoured more limited, diluted forms of State obligations.
Australia’s policy with respect to the domestic obligation of civil and political rights 
became characterised by an emphasis on a State’s duty to ‘respect’, rather than ‘protect’ 
or ‘promote’ human rights. Passive rather than active elements o f obligation were 
stressed. The 1955 Brief for Australian delegates to the 10th Session of the General
33 The United Kingdom’s views are recorded in UN Doc E/CN.4/374, and UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 194, 
quoted in MJ Bossuyt, op cit, 58.
34 HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 194,4; 16 May 1950.
35 See Chapter 1, 52.
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Assembly, for instance, a Brief that was used as the basis for instructions to delegations 
in the 1955-1961 period, concluded that Australia should support the United Kingdom’s 
push for deletion of Article 2(2) of the Covenant.36 It did not refer to Australia’s 
previous stance on the issue. Instead, it stated that Australia should support deletion of 
the reference to a State taking ‘legislative and other measures’ and offer its 
understanding that civil and political rights required immediate, pre-ratification 
implementation.37 The United Kingdom proposal for deletion of the Article was not 
supported by a majority of the Commission on Human Rights. Nonetheless, Australia 
reiterated its concerns about Article 2(2) in 1963, eventually abstaining on its 
adoption.38
Australia’s stance on Article 2(2) had an element o f ‘double-speak’. The clause was 
described as weakening the Covenant, such that its deletion would lead to a
->Q
strengthening of the Covenant’s provisions. However, behind these words was a
narrow conception of the State’s responsibilities in the field. As indicated by the 1955 
Brief to the General Assembly, Australia was resolutely opposed to imposing an 
obligation on States to take ongoing legislative measures.40 From the parallel 
Australian hostility towards clauses referring to the need for States to enact protective 
legislation against discrimination (Article 26), the prohibition on racial hate speech 
(Article 20), or arbitrary interferences with privacy or life (Articles 17 and 6 
respectively),41 it can be surmised that Australia did not wish to undertake obligations to 
eradicate breaches of human rights, particularly those that occurred in the private 
sphere. By referring to immediate obligations, Australia seems to have been endorsing 
a ‘one-off review of legislation to ensure that no State laws directly offended human 
rights principles. In the Brief for the 18th Session o f the General Assembly in 1963, for
36 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the 10th Session o f the General Assembly, in NAA A 1838/1, 
Item 856/10/10/9 Pt3.
37 Ibid.
38 Final votes on Article 2(2) are recorded in UN Doc E/CN.4/L1259: MJ Bossuyt, op cit, 63.
39 Internal Memorandum from ‘JPP’ to T Doig, annotated by Doig, 13/11/63, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 
929/4 Pt 19.
40 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the 10th Session o f the General Assembly, in NAA A 1838/1, 
Item 856/10/10/9 Pt 3.
41 Discussed in Chapter 2.
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instance, it was stated that Australia did not intend to accede or ratify until local laws, at 
both the Commonwealth and state levels, were in accordance with the provisions of the 
Convention. Once this action was taken, it was anticipated there would be no need for 
further legislative action.42
Not all within the Department of External Affairs agreed with the policy of opposing 
Article 2(2). William Doig, a senior Department o f External Affairs official, annotated 
a memorandum from the Australian Mission to the United Nations concerning 
Australia’s policy of continued opposition to Article 2(2) with the words ‘but it doesn’t 
say why we should except on follow [sic] Big Brother principle’.43 Doig clearly 
thought Australia’s stance was dictated by allegiance to the United Kingdom. 
Particularly in the period following the departure o f Whitlam from the scene, allegiance 
to the United Kingdom may well have played a major role in policy development. 
Predating the British influence, however, was the increased hostility to active State 
action in implementing human rights in the Spender and early Casey periods.
Whitlam, as Australian representative to the Commission on Human Rights in the early 
1950s, was prominent in arguing that States should have discretion with respect to the 
methods o f enforcement best suited to their domestic contexts.44 In respect of the 
Australian State, Whitlam had on occasion preferred the view that the common law 
offered the most appropriate means o f protecting human rights.45 It was a confidence 
shared by the then Secretary of Attorney-General’s Department, Kenneth Bailey.
Bailey was called upon to draft a response for Prime Minister Menzies’ use to explain 
why the terms of the UDHR had not been incorporated into the Australian Constitution. 
Bailey commented on the generality of the text o f the UDHR and the danger that such a
42 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the 18th Session of the General Assembly, in NAA A 1838/1, 
Item 929/4 Pt 19.
43 Memorandum from ‘JPP’ to T Doig, annotated by Doig, 13/11/63, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 929/4 Pt 
19.
44 See for instance Whitlam’s arguments concerning non-discrimination and remedies following 
wrongful conviction, discussed in Chapter 2, 91.
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text would be given an unduly restrictive or misleading interpretation by Courts.46 His 
strongest arguments related to the sufficiency of the current common law to protect 
freedoms:
However, the real objection is that, were the rights and freedoms contained in the 
Declaration to be translated into terms o f legal obligations and included in the 
Commonwelath Constitution, they would make little, if  any addition o f substance to the 
rights and freedoms already enjoyed by the Australian people under the ordinary law of 
the land. As the Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Denning, speaking recently on ‘Freedom under 
(English) Law’ said, particularly in relation to freedom o f mind and conscience, ‘The 
system which has been built up by our forefathers over the last 1000 years suits our 
people because it is the best guarantee of our freedoms. The fundamental safeguards 
have been established...’ These remarks are as applicable to the Australian system of 
law as they are to the English system, for both peoples enjoy the same heritage of 
freedom.47
Given the context of Bailey’s comments, shadow-writing for Prime Minister Menzies, it 
is possible that Bailey did not personally adhere to this point o f view. It may be that 
Bailey was basing his comments on Menzies’ preference for a Diceyan-style reliance on 
the common law and parliamentary sovereignty to protect human rights.48 Regardless 
of Bailey’s personal views, it is clear that Whitlam saw the traditional British reliance 
on the common law something to be proudly protected. It is also likely that Whitlam, 
working under a Liberal administration, was aware o f the Liberal Party’s aversion to 
governments ‘interfering’ in the lives of individuals.49
Paragraph 2 was not the only element of Article 2 to come under attack from Australian 
policy-makers. During the 1950s, Australia also objected to draft Article 2(3)’s 
requirement that judicial remedies were available for breaches of rights. While happy 
to consider a softer form of wording such as the ‘legislation and practice of States 
Parties shall be directed towards the development o f judicial remedies’, Australian 
Briefs instructed Australian delegates that the reference to judicial remedies was 
unnecessary and o f value only to countries in which the rule o f law was not firmly 
established.50 Again, this opposition seems linked to a desire to maintain the status quo
46 Memorandum from KH Bailey, Secretary, Attorney-General’s Department to Secretary, Prime 
Minister’s Department, 26/2/52, in NAA A 462/21, Item 575/1.
47 Ibid.
48 Menzies clearly ascribed to the views expressed by Bailey: see for instance, Sir Robert Menzies, 
Central Power in the Australian Commonwealth, Cassell, London, 1967, 52.
49 Discussed more fully in Chapter 1, 59-60.
50 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the 10th Session o f the General Assembly, in NAA A 1838/1, 
Item 856/10/10/9 Pt 3.
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in Australia and avoid the need for the creation o f additional entitlements to seek 
judicial remedies.
More satisfaction was evinced with draft Article 2(1) o f the ICESCR, essentially 
because it was seen to represent a minimal obligation on the State. As Chapter 1 has 
revealed, as early as July 1951 Whitlam stressed the progressive nature o f economic 
and social rights domestically and internationally.51 This emphasis was to remain a 
consistent feature o f Australian general support for the ICESCR. It even served as the 
basis for Australia’s challenge to the inclusion o f an anti-discrimination clause in the 
ICESCR. Australia objected that the clause improperly implied an immediate 
obligation on States to afford economic and social rights to all, whereas States had 
recognised that rights could be achieved only progressively.52 Behind the stress on the 
progressive nature o f State obligations appears to have been a belief that it was not 
possible to provide exact benchmarks for standards o f achievement. No attempt was 
made in internal discussions or public debate to quantify what would be considered 
‘progressive achievement’ in any particular field. Instead, the prevalent complacency 
indicated a belief that the ‘necessary steps’ to progress could be judged by the 
individual State. Thus, in both the areas of civil and political rights and economic, 
social and cultural rights, Australia was supporting the possibility o f minimal levels of 
government action and high levels o f government discretion in implementing human 
rights.
The journey between the Evatt period and the Casey and Bureaucratic periods was thus 
one of dramatically contrasting contours. Inspired by varying personal political 
philosophies o f actors, party-political pressures and bureaucratic caution, Australia 
moved from an enthusiastic embracing of expansive State obligations towards an 
emphasis on State discretion and minimal State action. In the area o f economic and 
social rights, the movement was more predictable given some reservations in the
51 Discussed in Chapter 1, 67.
52 Copy of Statement by Australian Representative on Article 2 of the Draft Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, circa 1/12/55, in NAA A 432/68, Item 68/2797 Pt 3.
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earliest period concerning the nature of economic and social rights. As the next part 
will show, this movement was to be repeated in the debates over a federal-State clause.
B. Implementation in a Federal State
International law tends to operate on the assumption that States ratifying treaties possess 
the means o f immediately implementing treaty obligations in the domestic setting. The 
reality faced by States is that implementation of international obligation is a topic 
bedevilled by questions of considerable political and constitutional complexity. In 
States with separate and independent executive, legislative, and judicial branches, for 
instance, the branch that authorises entry into a treaty may or may not have the 
necessary legislative or administrative authority to implement it. Federal States face an 
additional diffusion of power, with power being divided between a central authority and 
constituent units, most commonly called provinces or states. During the negotiations of 
the International Bill of Rights, the issue of whether any special concession should be 
made for federal States attracted particular attention. As a result o f Evatt’s commitment 
to protecting maximum powers of the central government to legislate with respect to 
external affairs, the initial Australian approach was cautious. However, by the Spender 
and later periods, a more conservative view of likely Commonwealth power together 
with a party-political emphasis on federalism combined to produce strong support for 
limitations on the obligations of federal States. Even though Australia was ultimately 
unsuccessful in its campaign to have such a limitation included in either Covenant, its 
consistent stress in the domestic and international spheres of the importance of such a 
clause led to it being regarded as ‘received wisdom’ that the implementation of human 
rights was most properly considered a matter for state governments.
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Overview of the International Debate
The need to clarify the obligations to be undertaken by federal States was raised at an
early stage o f the debates on a draft Covenant on Human Rights. The earliest clause
adopted on this topic permitted federal States considerable latitude in the domestic
obligations they assumed. In 1948, for instance, the Drafting Committee of the
Commission adopted a text similar to that employed in the Constitution of the
International Labour Organisation.53 It read:
In the case of a Federal State, the following provisions shall apply:
(a) With respect to any articles of this Covenant which the Federal Government 
regards as wholly or in part appropriate for federal action, the obligations of the 
Federal Governments shall, to this extent, be the same as those o f parties which are 
not Federal States;
(b) In respect of articles which the Federal Government regards as appropriate under its 
constitutional system, in whole or in part, for action by the constituent states, provinces, 
or cantons, the Federal Government shall bring such provisions, with favourable 
recommendation, to the notice o f the appropriate authorities o f the states, provinces or 
cantons at the earliest possible moment.54
It was designed to permit central authorities to be responsible only for those parts o f the 
Covenant that were ‘appropriate for federal action’. However, within two years, the 
tide had changed. At the General Assembly in 1950, there was a determined push to 
remove the clause on the basis that it was inequitable to allow some States to implement 
only some of the human rights in the Covenant. The Fifth Session of the General 
Assembly, in a close decision, resolved that the Commission on Human Rights ‘study’ 
the problem ‘of securing the maximum extension o f the Covenant to the constitutional 
units of federal states and meeting the constitutional problems o f federal states’.55
Debate continued to rage in the Commission on Human Rights. Further texts were
proposed by the United Kingdom, Denmark, the United States, Australia and India. On
each occasion in the 1950-53 period, the proposals were either not voted on or
consideration o f their merits postponed.56 In 1954, the Soviet Union proposed an
alternative text ruling out any special rules for federal-States:
The provisions of the Covenant shall extend to all parts o f federal states without any 
limitations or exceptions.57
53 Instrument for the Amendment o f the Constitution o f the International Labour Organisation o f 28 
June 1919, as amended, entered into force 20 April 1948, ATS 1948 No 8.
54 E/800, Article 24; quoted in MJ Bossuyt, op cit, 762.
55 GA Resolution 421C (V),. 4 December 1950, 5 UN GAOR Resolutions Supp No 20, 42 (1950).
56 See MJ Bossuyt, op cit, 763-765.
57 UN Doc E/CN.4/L340/Corr 1, quoted by MJ Bossuyt, op cit, 766.
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It was adopted by eight votes to seven (with three abstentions) in 195458 and despite the 
expression o f concern by federal States in the 1960’s, its inclusion in both the ICESCR 
and ICCPR was approved unanimously in 1966.59
Before considering the attitudes adopted by Australian policy-makers towards the 
inclusion o f a ‘federal-State’ clause, it is necessary to understand the legal background 
against which policy choices were being made.
The Legal Framework o f  Federalism in Australia
Australian policy-makers approached the issue o f a federal-State clause with knowledge 
of two complexities in the Australian legal system. The first was that, as Australia’s 
legal system incorporated a dualist separation o f international and domestic law,60 the 
provisions o f the international treaties would have no substantive effect in Australian 
domestic law unless and until they were incorporated in domestic legislation.61 The 
second was that it was unclear as to whether the Commonwealth government possessed 
authority under the Commonwealth Constitution to legislate with respect to human 
rights. In 1901, when the Australian colonies joined to form the Commonwealth of 
Australia, power was divided between the Commonwealth and the states. The division 
of power was embodied in the Commonwealth Constitution. The states retained 
plenary power to legislate for the ‘peace, welfare and good government’ o f their state, 
subject only to the primacy o f Commonwealth laws62 and some very limited exclusive
58 UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 450,4, quoted by MJ Bossuyt, op cit, 766.
59 UN Doc A/C.3/SR 1437, quoted in MJ Bossuyt, op cit, 766.
60 Under the dualist theory, international law and domestic law systems are regarded as distinct legal 
systems. International law owes its existence to the collective will o f States and governs the 
behaviour of States. Domestic law owes its existence to the sovereign or the populace o f the 
individual State and governs individuals within that State. For a fuller investigation o f this dualist 
theory, see H Lauterpacht, Oppenheim ’s International Law, (8th ed), Longman, Essex, 1955, 37-39. 
As to the Australian legal system’s adoption of this conceptualisation, see R Balkin, ‘International 
Law and Domestic Law’, in S Blay, R Piotrowicz, M Tsamenyi, Public International Law: An 
Australian Perspective, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1997, 119-145.
61 The Parlement Beige (1878-79) 4 PD 129. Rules o f international law were permitted to have some 
indirect effect -  primarily in application of the assumption in statutory interpretation that parliament 
did not intend to infringe international law: Jimbunna Coal Mine NL v Victorian Coal Miners ’ 
Association (1908) 6 CLR 309, 363 per O’Connor J; There were also comments in the 1949 High 
Court decision o f Chow Hung Ching v The King (1949) 77 CLR 449 hinting at a broader influence 
of the rules o f international law: discussed in R Balkin, op cit, 121-122 .
62 Section 109, Commonwealth Constitution.
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areas of Commonwealth power.63 Prima facie , the states could legislate with respect to 
all human rights matters. However, the Commonwealth government, being a 
government of limited powers, would have to justify any enactment by reference to the 
specific heads of powers granted to it under section 51 of the Constitution.
From the list o f designated legislative powers given to the Commonwealth, it was 
apparent that the Commonwealth had few subject-specific powers that would enable 
Commonwealth legislative implementation of human rights guarantees. Potential 
sources of authority included its power in relation to industrial disputes extending 
beyond the boundaries of one state,64 power with respect to corporations65 power over 
the territories, and after 1947, power with respect to social services. Even 
collectively, however, such powers could not underwrite Commonwealth enforcement 
of human rights legislation. The only clause offering the potential of such broad 
coverage was the Commonwealth’s power with respect to ‘external affairs’ in section 
51(xxix) of the Constitution. In the years 1946-1966, the scope of this clause remained 
unclear.
Throughout the period of the negotiations of the International Bill of Rights, the leading
authority on the scope of the external affairs power was the 1936 High Court decision
of King v Burgess; ex parte Henry (the ‘Henry case’).68 In the Henry case, the Court
was asked to determine the validity of provisions o f the Air Navigation Act 1920 (Cth)
which empowered the Governor General to make regulations ‘for the purpose o f giving
effect to the Paris Convention for the Regulation o f Aerial Navigation’. Australia had
become a party to this Convention in 1919. Members of the High Court adopted
different tests for determining the scope of the Commonwealth’s power to pass
legislation implementing treaties. Evatt and McTieman JJ took the broadest view,
concluding that once Australia entered a treaty, the Commonwealth had legislative
67 Section 52 o f the Constitution gives the Commonwealth exclusive powers in relation to the seat of 
government, the Commonwealth public service and Commonwealth public lands.
64 Section 51 (xxxv) of the Constitution.
65 Section 51 (xx) of the Constitution.
66 Section 122 of the Constitution.
67 Section 51 (xxiiiA) o f the Constitution.
68 King v Burgess; ex parte Henry (1936) 55 CLR 608.
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power to implement its terms. The fact that an international convention had been made 
on a particular subject brought the subject matter in so far as it was dealt with in the 
convention into the field of section 51(xxix).69 Dixon and Starke JJ adopted a narrower 
test, requiring the subject matter of the treaty to be itse lf‘international’ in character 
before s 51 (xxix) powers were attracted. Latham CJ’s position was that the subject 
matters must concern the ‘amicable living together o f States in a worldly 
neighborhood’.71 All members o f the Court considered that the Convention in question 
in the case met their tests, so that the differences did not influence the result o f the case. 
Not until 1983 was the ambiguity surrounding the appropriate test to be applied in
77determining the limits of s 51 (xxix) laid to rest by the High Court.
The uncertainty as to the extent of the Commonwealth’s power to legislate so as to 
implement treaties was reflected in academic commentaries o f the time. Writing in the 
1960s, PH Lane, for instance, detailed the division o f opinion without drawing any 
conclusion.73 He did note, however, that on the narrow view of the power, the 
Commonwealth was unlikely to have power to implement international provisions 
concerning such ‘internal’ matters as International Labour Organisation conventions on 
working hours.74 Yet, the fact that one of the proponents of the ‘broad view’ was 
Justice Evatt, who was later to become the Minister for External Affairs, had obvious 
ramifications for the policy adopted in the early stages of the negotiations concerning 
the International Bill of Rights.
I. Evatt period
During the Evatt period, Australian policy-makers were cautious in their approach to a 
federal-State clause. Perhaps not surprisingly, in light of Evatt’s expressed views in the 
Henry case, policy was informed by the belief that the High Court might well uphold
69 Ibid, 681.
70 Ibid, 669.
71 Ibid, 658.
72 Commonwealth v Tasmania (the Franklin Dam case) (1983) 158 CLR 1. A majority of the Court 
adopted the broad test used by Evatt and McTieman JJ in the Henry case.
73 PH Lane, Some Principles and Sources o f  Australian Constitutional Law, Law Book Company, 
Sydney, 1964, 173.
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the Commonwealth’s power to legislate so as to implement the human rights treaties. In
1947, for instance, the Department replied to a query from Colonel Hodgson,
Australia’s first representative on the Commission on Human Rights, as to the extent of
Commonwealth power in the following terms:
There have been no developments since 1939 in position regarding External Affairs 
power. Position is that it is believed that the Court would uphold power of 
Commonwealth to legislate for implementation or treaty where it took view that 
subject matter of same was genuinely one of international interest.75
The test applied was that which had been forthcoming from the Attorney-General’s 
Department in relation to other Conventions including the Maritime Convention on 
Wages, Hours o f Board Ship and Manning,76 and appears to have been regarded as a 
test that would fulfil the requirements established by Evatt, McTieman, Starke and 
Dixon JJ in the Henry case.
Australian policy-makers had in other contexts received directions from Evatt to avoid 
doing anything that would prejudice the High Court’s approval o f Commonwealth 
action implementing treaties. In relation to the negotiations of the World Health 
Organisation conventions, for instance, Evatt had insisted that Australia not support a 
federal State clause,77 notwithstanding the advice o f Whitlam as Crown-Solicitor that 
Australia might support a compromise proposal that stressed the international nature of 
the conventions.78 The only international instrument in which Australia supported a 
federal-State clause was in the International Labour Organisation Constitution, though 
the reasons for this stance are not clear.79 There is no record of any expression o f views 
by Evatt in relation to the draft human rights Covenant. However, Australian policy­
makers opted for a low key approach to the issue.
75 Cablegram from DEA to Australian Delegation, Geneva (For Hodgson), 5/12/47, in NAA 
A1838/278, Item 856/13/2.
76 Quoted in memorandum on Federal State clauses, undated, post 5th Session o f the Commission on 
Human Rights (1949), in NAA A 1838/1, Item 929/4/6 Pt 1.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 KH Bailey, ‘Australia and the International Labor Conventions’ (1946) 54 International Labour 
Review 285.
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In early 1948, EJR Heyward of the Australian Mission to the United Nations supported 
a federal State clause that obliged the federal government to take action in areas ‘which 
the Federal Government regards as appropriate for Federal action’.80 Heyward regarded 
this formula as acceptable since it permitted, but did not require federal action, and did 
not purport to define the realm of areas ‘appropriate for Federal action’.81 In May 1949, 
the Department of External Affairs stressed to the delegation that if  a federal clause was 
to be included, the delegation should insist on retention of this formulation.82 While the 
United Kingdom resented the possibility of federal states being subject to less 
obligations than colonial powers, and the United States opposed the formulation on the 
basis that its demarcation of responsibilities was not sufficiently clear, Australian 
policy-makers welcomed the flexibility inherent in the proposed clause.83
Up until the end of the Evatt period in December 1949, Australian delegates displayed 
more interest in the form of any federal-State clause than whether or not a clause should 
be included or excluded. The imperative was to ensure that nothing in the instruments 
should serve to undermine the possibility of Commonwealth legislative action. In 
November 1949, the delegation was instructed that a federal State clause was ‘not 
necessary, but that opposition to the insertion of such a clause should not be carried to 
lengths which would exclude the adherence o f important federal states’.84 The 
delegation was further instructed that it was desirable to use a form of words that could 
be used in other conventions dealing with social and economic matters and thus 
suggested continued support for the International Labour Organisation Constitution 
formulation (adopted in 1948 and discussed above) on the basis that it left ‘maximum
80 Memorandum from EJR Heyward for the Minister o f the Australian Mission to the UN, to the 
Secretary, DEA, 11/6/48, in NAA A1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 2.
81 Ibid.
82 Cablegram from DEA to Australian Delegation, NY, 27/5/49, in NAA A 1838/1, 856/13/7 Pt 3.
83 Comments of Delegate included in memorandum from DEA to the Secretary, Attorney-General’s 
Department, 14/4/49, in NAA A1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 2. This approach brings to mind Gillian 
Triggs’ comment: ‘Resorting to deliberately ambiguous words and phrases, variously described as 
creative, contrived, emotive and purposeful has been a time-honoured technique in the treaty 
making process’: G Triggs, ‘Creative Obfuscation: The Role o f Joint Development Agreements in 
Side-Stepping Sovereignty Disputes’, in Proceedings o f the Australian and New Zealand Society of 
International Law Annual Conference 2000, Centre for International and Public Law, Australian 
National University, Canberra, 2000, 167.
84 Cablegram from DEA to Australian Mission to the UN, 9/11/49, in NAA A1838, Item 929/4/6 Pt 1.
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freedom to member governments while insisting on their real responsibilities as parties 
to the convention.’85 If majority support was not forthcoming for this style of clause, 
the delegation was directed to withhold support from any clause that implied a lack of 
competence in a federal state to implement external commitments or implied that such 
power was limited to subject areas covered b y  other express heads of power. As an 
indication o f the sensitivity of the issue, the delegation was told to exercise ‘utmost 
caution in public argument’ and to endeavour to arrive at a satisfactory formula by
o n
private discussion.
Examining the process that led to the adoption o f this stance reveals the absence o f any
push from Commonwealth departments or states as to the inclusion o f a federal-State
clause. At a Commonwealth inter-departmental meeting held in September 1949,
Terence Glasheen of the Department of External Affairs explained the imperative to
avoid any implication that the ‘power of the Commonwealth was not comprehensive
enough to cover the ratification of international conventions’.88 There is no record of
any Commonwealth department demurring.89 Instead, the meeting resolved that the
memorandum on the options (including have no federal-State clause) should be the
subject of further discussion and policy decision by the Attorney-General’s Department
and the Department of External Affairs.90 Similarly, when a copy of the UDHR and the
draft Covenant was forwarded to states in 1949, only one state commented on the
federal implications of the Covenant. Tasmania stated:
In the case o f a Federated Government based on sovereign States retaining certain 
controls such as Australia, every endeavour should be made to speed up the lines of 
communication and decisions as between the major contact body and the sovereign 
States by recognizing the existing machinery and making the responsible State 
Department officially a Federal and State liaison advisory body.91
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Minutes o f Inter-departmental committee, held 12-13 September 1949, in NAA A 1838/278, Item 
856/13/7 Pt 5.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Comments annexed to Letter from Premier of Tasmania to Prime Minister Menzies, 2/2/50, in NAA  
A 1838/278, Item 856/13/7 Pt 5.
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Even in drawing attention to this issue, though, Tasmania was not suggesting that 
human rights should become the exclusive purview of the states. Instead, human rights 
were seen to be most properly the subject of co-operative development.
Instead, the dominant factor in Australia’s cool response to a federal-State clause 
appears to have been an awareness of Evatt’s desire to maintain the possibility of the 
Commonwealth legislating in the area. Whilst the High Court might obstruct the 
Commonwealth’s efforts, Evatt’s concern was not to give the High Court ammunition 
for invalidating any such legislation. It was important to preserve the 
Commonwealth’s capacity to implement human rights through the enactment of 
legislation. This consideration disappeared during the later periods of policy - - 
development.
il. Spender Period
After Spender became Minister for External Affairs, Australia’s policy shifted 
dramatically. The diffidence of the Evatt period evaporated. It was replaced by an 
aggressive defence of the necessity of a federal-State clause. Thus in September 1950 
Colin Moodie, Australia’s representative in the Third Committee of the General 
Assembly, sought to defend the legitimacy of federal-State clauses by referring to their
92use some thirty years previously in International Labour Organisation instruments. 
Central governments, Moodie argued, could not assume responsibilities that were not 
within their competence without ‘endangering the basic compromise of federation and, 
ultimately, the federation itself.93 A static view of Australia’s constitutional division of 
powers was advanced. Capital punishment, judicial process, retroactive legislation and 
punishment, liberty of movement, freedom of speech and thought, freedom of 
association and assembly were all matters that were within state competence alone. The 
wish of the Australian people was that states should retain and exercise these powers.94 
Were the central government to accept and ratify the Covenant unilaterally, it would be
92 C Moodie, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 292, 134; 25 October 1950.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
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provocative to state feeling and ‘a breach of the whole spirit o f the federation. The 
constituent states must be consulted and must indicate their views’. 95 Including a 
federal-State clause would enable central governments to accede to the Covenant 
immediately, avoiding the delays involved in gaining the agreement of all constituent 
states.96
Moodie’s statement mirrored the pessimism concerning the Commonwealth’s power to
implement legislatively international human rights standards expressed in internal
documents in 1950. The conclusion of a joint memorandum prepared by the Attorney-
General’s Department and the Department of External Affairs in 1950 was that the
Court ‘as at present constituted’ might give a restrictive interpretation of the federal
government’s power to legislate to implement conventions concerning subjects that
were not expressly included in its field of legislative powers.97 This view was said to be
based on the post-war trend o f High Court constitutional decisions and by the human
rights Covenant itself. In terms that harked back to a notion of ‘reserved state
powers’,98 the memorandum argued that were the external affairs power broad enough
to authorise Commonwealth legislation implementing all the human rights guarantees,
states’ power would be reduced to insignificance:
A moment’s consideration of this covenant will reduce ‘ad absurdum’ the 
arguments of those who favour the extreme interpretation of the external affairs 
power, as giving the Commonwealth authority to legislate to implement any 
international treaty to which it is a party. On this view the federal government, by 
ratifying the Covenant could invade the state field in such fundamental matters as 
capital punishment, and judicial process, the hearing of criminal charges, 
retroactive legislation and punishment, liberty of movement, freedom of speech 
and thought, freedom of association and assembly. Moreover, if the Covenant 
includes economic and social (including health) rights, the government, by 
ratifying the Covenant, would secure powers which have been expressly denied to 
it by referenda. An extension of the area of international agreement would enable 
the federal government under s 109 of the Constitution to ratify the States into 
legislative impotence."
95 Ibid.
96 C Moodie, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 308, 233; 8 November 1950.
97 Memorandum entitled ‘Federal State Clause in International Agreements’, undated, but related to 
memorandum dated 15/5/50, in NAA A 1838/1, 929/4/6 Pt 1.
98 According to the ‘reserved state powers’, the Commonwealth Constitution impliedly ‘reserved’ 
states’ legislative powers. Grants of power to the commonwealth were to be read narrowly so as to 
avoid infringements of these reserved powers: see eg R v Barger (1908) 6 CLR 41. The High Court 
rejected the existence of any such implication in Amalgamated Society o f Engineers v Adelaide 
Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129.
99 Memorandum entitled ‘Federal State Clause in International Agreements’, undated, but related to 
memorandum dated 15/5/50, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 929/4/6 Pt 1.
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The High Court was anticipated as being likely to concur with the view of Professor 
Harrison Moore that ‘a matter in itself, purely domestic, and therefore within the 
exclusive powers of the States cannot be drawn within the range of Federal power 
merely because some arrangement has been made for uniform national action’.100 The 
approach it advocated was for Australia, Canada and the United States to put forward a 
joint proposal modelled on the clause in the International Labour Organisation 
Constitution that referred to the separation of powers under States’ constitutional 
systems.101 If necessary, the delegation could yield to pressure o f non-federal States by 
supporting an obligation to report on the application o f the federal-State clause, though 
such support was to be kept in reserve as a tactical concession rather than a starting 
point for negotiations.102
The High Court’s composition had not radically altered between 1947 and 1950. Nor 
had there been any High Court decisions on the external affairs power in this period. 
The most likely reason for the reversal in position appears to be the change in legal 
personnel providing the advice. By 1950, Kenneth Bailey (then Solicitor-General) was 
playing a greater role in providing advice as to the likely attitude o f the High Court. A 
submission to the Minister of External Affairs in November 1951 reported that the 
Attorney-General’s Department (presumably Bailey) had come to the view that the 
inclusion o f a federal state clause was essential if  Australia were ever to contemplate 
becoming a party to the Covenant.103 In his public statements, Bailey was certainly 
cautious about the extent of the Commonwealth’s external affairs power, describing the 
position as remaining ‘obscure’.104 In his 1951 article on the Australian Constitution, 
he displayed his personal preference for a wide reading of section 51 (xxix) in order for 
the federal division not to:
prove one of crippling weakness, leaving Australia to face a shrinking world in which 
concerted and decisive international action is necessary for her welfare, but without the 
authority to ensure the fulfilment of her undertakings.105
100
101
102
103
104
105
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Submission to Minister for External Affairs, 14/11/51, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/22.
KH Bailey, ‘Fifty Years of the Australian Constitution’ (1951) 25 Australian Law Journal 314, 322. 
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At the same time, however, in the context of the human rights Covenants, Bailey stated 
that ‘[f]or practical reasons, it may be much more convenient to leave the whole matter 
to be handled by the legislatures of the States’.106
It is evident that concern for the position of the Australian states and maintaining 
federalism was given emphasis by Commonwealth decision makers rather than being 
prompted by a groundswell of concern by states. In the responses of states received in 
1950 to the draft Covenant, no state made any comment about the issue of powers. 
Bearing in mind that the draft Covenant in 1950 had a federal-State clause, the states 
had the opportunity to comment on its terms. The absence of any comments is 
significant for ruling out state pressure as the dominant motivating force behind the 
Australian representative’s strong comments about the ‘spirit of the federation’.
The initiative for limiting Commonwealth power to implement human rights standards 
came from within the Commonwealth. This finding is consistent with the highly 
particularised form of federalism supported by the Menzies government. Political 
commentators like Campbell Shannan have questioned the Menzies government’s 
commitment to federalism, pointing out that Menzies showed no inclination to roll back 
the Commonwealth’s financial powers107 and spoke less about federalism than other 
topics such as freedom.108 Yet, rather than eschewing federalism, Menzies and the 
Liberal Party supported a narrowly conceived form of federalism, borne out of the 
desire to protect freedoms. Their concern was not so much to empower states or 
preserve state authority as to prevent the growth of centralised power. Centralised 
power was associated with Labor’s socialist goals.109 In uniting the anti-Labor parties 
into the Liberal Party, Robert Menzies had proclaimed the importance of avoiding
106 Quoted in a note by J Clarke, Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Human Rights Covenant: Federal 
Clause’, 29/1/54 in NAA A 432/20, 54/3779 Pt 9.
107 In 1942, the Commonwealth had instituted the uniform tax scheme that excluded the states from the 
collection o f  income taxation. The states became dependent on grants from the Commonwealth: see 
C Shannan, ‘Federalism and Commonwealth-State Relations’ in S Prasser, JR Nethercote, J 
Warhurst, The Menzies Era: A Reappraisal of Government, Politics and Policy, Hale and 
Iremonger, Sydney, 1995, 139.
108 Ibid.
109 I Hancock, National and Permanent: The Federal Organisation o f the Liberal Party of Australia 
1944-1965, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2000, 62.
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excessive government intervention and the ‘dull and deadening process’ of socialism.110 
The 1946 Draft Platform of the Liberal Party thus listed federalism under its 
constitutional policies.* 111 The notion of federalism was attractive precisely because it 
could act as a bulwark against an all powerful, interventionist, central government. In 
this defensive mindset, Liberal Ministers could emphasise the responsibility of the 
Commonwealth to avoid usurping state functions without necessarily seeking to 
encourage states to exercise their legislative powers. An absence o f governmental 
regulation o f a subject area would be preferable to an over-extension of central 
governmental power.
In the context of human rights matters, this particularised commitment to federalism 
may well have fostered the view amongst policy-makers that the federal government 
should not accept international responsibilities to take legislative action in novel areas.
It would also militate against attempts by Commonwealth policy-makers to direct the 
states to take legislative action, particularly to extend the scope of government 
regulation in individual’s lives. Instead, perceptions of the Liberal Party’s commitment 
to federalism could encourage support for clauses leaving the implementation of human 
rights primarily to the states, the policy underpinning Australian support for a broad 
federal-State clause.
III. Casey and Bureaucratic Period
From 1951 until 1965, Australia’s enthusiasm for a federal-State clause was unabated. 
In its official comments to the United Nations Secretary-General in 1951, for instance, 
Australia noted its regret that there had been insufficient time for discussion of a 
federal-State article at the Fifth session of the Commission on Human Rights, and 
concluded that ‘[s]o far as Australia is concerned, the inclusion o f a Federal clause
110 This phrase was used by Robert Menzies at the Canberra Conference o f 1944: quoted in PC 
Spender, Liberalism: Some Reflections on the Past, Some Thoughts on the Future, James Ferguson,
Brisbane, 1970, 8.
111 C Sharman, op cit, 139.
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seems essential’. Whitlam engaged in private discussions with the United States, the 
United Kingdom and India on the form of clause.113 In April 1952, the Australian 
delegation to the United Nations queried the Department o f External Affairs as to 
whether Australia needed to maintain its support for the clause.114 The Department of 
External Affairs replied in the affirmative.115 In addition to reminding the delegation of 
the uncertainties surrounding the ‘external affairs’ power, the Department of External 
Affairs noted that the bulk of the laws covering relevant subject matters were state 
rather than Commonwealth in nature. To create an entirely new body of federal law for 
the sole purpose o f implementing the Covenant was described as ‘politically and 
administratively impossible’.116 In this statement, the Department o f External Affairs 
revealed that the basis of the policy was not only legal principle, but Australia’s view of 
what was most practicable -  that is, state responsibility for human rights.
As a result o f discussions between Australia, India and the United States, a new joint 
text was proposed at the Eighth Session of the Commission on Human Rights in 1952.
It permitted a federal State to be exempted from itself carrying out provisions that were 
‘wholly or in part within the jurisdiction of the constituent units’.117 In relation to such 
provisions, the central authority was merely obliged to bring the provisions to the 
attention o f constituent units with a favourable recommendation, ask for information on 
the laws of constituent units concerning those provisions and transmit such information 
to the Secretary-General o f the United Nations.118 Unlike the previous draft that 
Australia had supported, under this clause the Commonwealth forewent any possibility 
of legislating with respect to human rights matters using the external affairs power. The
119
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draft provided that a federal authority would not gain any legislative competence by 
virtue of entering the treaty.
Despite the Department of External Affair’s stance that Australia would not be able to
contemplate adherence to the Covenants in the absence of a federal-State clause,119
Whitlam at one stage was moving towards the position of supporting a reservations
clause rather than a federal-State clause. After meeting with Dr Kaechenbeeck in
May 1953, for instance, Whitlam wrote a letter to Kenneth Bailey stating his agreement
with Kaechenbeeck’s opinion that a federal-State clause was likely to prove too rigid to
adapt to changes in constitutional law brought about by future judicial pronouncements.
A reservation was also seen as having the advantage of preserving the mutuality o f
obligations since a State could not invoke particular clauses against another State if  it
had entered a reservation to that article. Whitlam concluded:
Candidly my own view accords very closely, if  not wholly with K. Strength of 
opinion, paiticularly in the smaller states behind the traditional principle of equality 
o f obligations and reciprocity between parties to treaties, is extreme and the 
necessity for some consideration of a compromise is clearly indicated.121
Kenneth Bailey, remained unmoved. He stated in a Cablegram:
While it is true that...a Federal Clause deviates from the principle o f international 
law that no State can plead at international law that its Constitution precludes it 
from fulfilling its international obligations, it is equally true that a Federal State 
cannot, in British countries at any rate, plead in its municipal courts that an 
international obligation releases it from constitutional limitations. The only escape, 
therefore, for a Federal State which is subject to relevant constitutional limitations 
is to refrain from entering into international obligations which are not qualified by 
a Federal States clause. 122
1954 was the watershed year in terms of international attitudes towards the position of 
federal States. As mentioned in the ‘overview’ section above, the Commission on 
Human Rights in 1954 adopted what might be termed an ‘anti-federal-State clause’. It 
mandated that the Covenant was to extend to all parts of federal States without any 
limitations or exceptions. The Australian response was predictable. John Hood, as
119 Memorandum to A/g Secretary, DEA concerning ‘Human Rights Commission -  Ninth Session’, 
1/4/53, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/10/8/1.
120 Dr Kaechenbeeck, in addition to being an international legal expert, acted as a representative of 
Belguim.
121 Letter from HFE Whitlam to KH Bailey, 4/5/1953, in NAA A 1838/2, Item 856/13/10/8 Pt 1.
122 Cablegram from DEA to Australian Consulate General, 7/5/53, in NAA A 1838/2, Item 856/13/10/8 
Pt 1.
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Australian delegate, argued that the Soviet proposed clause was inconsistent with the 
General Assembly’s initial Resolution to seek ways o f maximising the application of 
the Covenant to federal States.123 The text was discriminatory in that it did not take into 
account the particular constitutional problems of federal states.124 In a refrain that was 
to be repeated from 1954 until 1965, Hood stated that Australia would be unable to
125adhere to the draft covenants in the absence of a satisfactory federal-State clause.
The debate over a federal state clause in 1954 not only centred around the issue o f 
equity and universality (as in previous sessions), but extended to the legitimacy of 
federal-State clauses under principles of classical international law. Whitlam conceded 
in the Third Committee that a federal clause might not be in line with a ‘strict 
interpretation’ of classical international law, but that to rule out the clause on that basis 
would be to ignore the emerging pattem of international organization that had been the 
greatest achievement of the twentieth century.126 Australia had only recently reached a 
fully independent status in international law, ‘[I]ts Constitution, which had been bom 
out of struggle, meant a great deal to its people and could not lightly be disregarded or 
interfered with.’127 Each constituent unit of the Federation was ‘jealous of their time- 
honoured rights’. The traditional doctrines of classical international law did not 
contemplate divisible sovereignty and were in themselves of doubtful application to any 
State so constituted.128 In asking the Commission on Human Rights to settle a modem 
problem on a point o f classical doctrine of international law, the Soviet Union’s request 
would be ‘to frustrate the organic growth of international law and to prevent it from 
rendering effective service to a rapidly changing society’. 129 Whitlam discounted 
arguments that the United Nations Charter already obliged States to apply the human 
rights agreed to by a majority of States in their States, regardless o f constitutional
123 JDL Hood, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 564, 104; 27 October 1954.
124 Ibid.
125 JDL Hood, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 582; 12 November 1954; See also RN 
Hamilton, Australian representative, A/C.3/SR 748, 335; 31 January 1957; T Pyman, Australian 
representative, A/C.3/SR 782,102; 16 October 1957.
126 HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 438,4; 17 March 1954.
127 Ibid, 5.
128 Ibid, 5.
129 Ibid, 7.
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structure. The United Nations remained an association of sovereign States and not a 
supra-State and as such could not impose obligations upon its Members without their 
consent.130
Publicly, Whitlam rejected the option of entering a reservation to particular clauses. It 
was said to be improper for Australia to commit to the conventions and then withdraw
i *>i
the commitment by making reservations of certain matters. Such action was wrong
in principle and might strain the relations between the federal and local governments
which would also undermine the proper observance o f the covenants. Furthermore,
Whitlam attempted to assuage those concerned with the extent of obligations that would
be taken on by Australia, noting that legal obligations were not always the most
important element of the commitments in international agreements:
The ultimate obligation was a moral and spiritual one. Consequently, the limited sxope 
[sic] o f the legal obligations undertaken by federal States was not the full measure o f  
their real commitments.133
Australia grew increasingly isolated in its stance in the years after 1954. The United 
States withdrew co-sponsorship of the clause in 1954, after it announced that it would 
not be ratifying either international instrument.134 Despite this, Australia pushed for the 
insertion of a federal-State clause, amending its proposals in an attempt to win broader 
support. Thus the section included in Australian’s 1955 Note Verbale added a 
paragraph to rebut the perceived inequity of permitting federal States to be exempted 
from obligations:
A contracting State shall not be entitled to avail himself o f the present Covenant 
against other contracting States except to the extent that it is bound by the 
Covenant.135
130 HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/C.4/SR 440, 8-9; 18 March 1954.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid, 9.
133 HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 438, 7; 17 March 1954.
134 In 1953, the United States announced that it would not be ratifying the Covenants. Its 
announcement was catalysed by domestic discontent about the Executive’s aggregation of power 
through entering treaties. An amendment to the Constitution was mooted (the Bricker amendment) 
that would have had the effect o f denying domestic effect to any treaty that would not have been 
constitutional as a simple act of Congress: see M Glen Johnson, ‘The Contributions of Eleanor and 
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This proposal was no more successful than its predecessors in winning the support of 
the Third Committee of the General Assembly.
It is interesting to note that in the Casey and Bureaucratic period, Commonwealth 
departments and states that had previously expressed little interest in the federal-State 
clause began agitating for the inclusion of such a clause. In 1951, for instance, the 
Department o f Labour and National Service was suggesting a graduated ratification 
approach be adopted. According to this approach, a federal State should ratify in 
relation to subject areas within its competence. Other subject matters should only be 
the subject o f ratification if agreed upon by a majority o f the population in each state.136 
The Department o f External Affairs responded that such a proposal was unlikely to be
1 77accepted by the international community.
By 1955, individual Australian states, too were being vocal in their support for the 
clause. Tasmania in 1955, for instance, wrote to the Prime Minister stating that that the 
Soviet style federal clause was ‘entirely unacceptable’ and should be replaced by that 
previously proposed by Australia. For Tasmania, it was not simply a matter of politics, 
but legality. It also opined that ‘[as] the Commonwealth cannot in any event bind the 
States as to matters within their legislative powers’ the anti-federal State clause would 
be ‘legally inoperative’.138 Victoria decried the anti-federal State clauses on the basis 
that they ‘might purport to alter the fundamental relationship between the federal and 
the constituent bodies.. .by purporting to bring within the legislative competence of the 
federal body, matters which under the Constitution are reserved to the constituent 
bodies’.139 The Solicitor General of Victoria, HA Winneke, issued a warning to the 
Victorian Premier that if the external affairs power permitted the Commonwealth to 
legislate with respect to the Covenants, ‘the Commonwealth Constitution could be
136 Minutes o f inter-departmental committee held 20/7/51, in NAA A 1838/342, Item 929/4/4 Pt 2.
137 Ibid,
138 Letter from Premier, Hobart, to Prime Minister Menzies, 22/4/55, in NAA 462/21, Item 575/1.
139 Letter from Premier Cain, Victoria, to Prime Minister Menzies, 13/5/55, in NAA A 462/21, Item 
575/1.
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indirectly amended in this matter.. .without resort to referendum’. 140 Western Australia 
appeared less concerned as the opinion of their Crown Solicitor was that the Covenants 
‘related to essential domestic matters’ such that accession would not have any effect of 
conferring powers on the Commonwealth.141
Only in 1966 did Australia give up its advocacy o f a federal-State clause. It was an act 
motivated by pragmatism rather than principle. In 1965, Paul Hasluck as Acting 
Minister for External Affairs approved a shift o f policy in relation to the Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination. No federal-State clause was 
included in the CERD, yet Australia signed the Covenant.142 In the face o f this 
precedent and the perceived certainty that a federal-State clause would not be accepted 
by a majority o f delegates, Australian representatives were advised not to press for 
inclusion of a federal-State clause.143 When a final roll call was taken on the anti- 
federal-State clause embodied in Article 27 of the ICESCR and Article 50 of the 
ICCPR, Australia abstained.144 RF Osbom, as Australian representative, reiterated the 
difficulties that would be created for federal States in applying all the provisions of the 
Covenant ‘without limitation or exception’ and indicated that the clause would 
inevitably delay Australia’s ratification.145 Australia was admitting defeat, but was not 
surrendering its objections.
Looking at Australian policies towards the issue o f a federal-State clause as a whole, it 
is apparent that behind the movement from initial indifference to intransigent insistence 
were distinct conceptions about the role of the Commonwealth in implementing human
140 Opinion o f HA Winneke, Solicitor General, attached to Letter from Premier Cain, Victoria to Prime 
Minister Menzies, 13/5/55, in NAA A 462/21, Item 575/1.
141 Report o f Crown Law Authorities o f Perth, annexed to letter from Under Secretary, Premier’s 
Department, to Sir John Bunting, Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department, 1/11/65, in NAA A 
463/50, Item 65/4844.
142 Memorandum from AH Body, Acting Legal Adviser to the DEA, to the Deputy Secretary, Attorney- 
General’s Department, 30/9/66, in NAA A 432/68, Item 68/2797 Pt 3.
143 This stance was outlined in memorandum of AH Body, Acting Legal Adviser to the DEA, to the 
Deputy Secretary, Attorney-General’s Department, 30/9/66, in NAA A 432/20, Item 68/2797 Pt 3
144 RG Osbom, Australian representative, A/C.3/SR 1411, 195; 2 November 1966.
145 Ibid\ See also UN Press Release, GA/SHC/1249, 2/11/66, copy in NAA A 1838/1, 929/4 Pt 22; Full 
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rights. Evatt desired the Commonwealth to take an active role in enacting human rights 
legislation of general application and was concerned to maximise the chances of the 
High Court accepting the validity of such legislation. During the Spender, Casey and 
Bureaucratic periods, a more pessimistic view of the High Court’s likely attitude 
combined with the view that state rather than Commonwealth implementation was more 
practical and desirable, to produce a strong attachment to the inclusion of a federal-State 
clause. Even in 2001, at a time when the High Court has made it clear that the 
Commonwealth would have legislative competence over international human rights 
obligations,146 this Part highlights the likelihood that Australian governmental actors 
will possess divergent attitudes as to the best means of implementing human rights 
guarantees.
C. Reservations
One of the broader questions that was grappled with by drafters of the ICCPR and 
ICESCR was whether to allow States to make reservations147 and, if so, whether any 
restrictions should be placed on this power. It was an issue of obvious relevance to the 
scope of domestic obligations that would be undertaken by a State. If a State made a 
reservation in relation to a particular topic, purporting to exempt the State or a State 
policy from the operation of a substantive human rights clause and that reservation was 
permissible under the Covenant, then it would not be bound to implement domestically 
that clause. Australia’s participation in the somewhat sporadic debates on the topic of 
reservations was marked by increasing support for a State to have an unfettered capacity 
to enter reservations.
Overview of the International Debate
Discussion of the topic of reservations in the negotiations on the Covenants took place 
against a background of general uncertainty concerning the scope of States’ powers to
146 The expansive approach of the High Court to the external affairs was most recently confirmed in 
Victoria v the Commonwealth (1996) 138 ALR 129.
147 Reservations are statements made by a State at the time o f ratifying or acceding to a treaty, by which 
they purport to make exceptions to the commitments they undertake under that treaty.
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enter reservations to treaties at international law .148 The customary international law 
position that developed around the time of the League of Nations was that a reserving 
State’s ratification of a treaty was only effective if  all other State Parties to the 
convention accepted the reservations.149 The rule of course could be altered by specific 
agreement o f the parties within the terms of the treaty.150 Within the Organisation of 
American States, a varied practice grew up. Reserving States’ ratification would be in 
general effective, save only that it would not be effective as between the reserving State 
and any individual State who objected to the reservations.151 Both tests were primarily 
‘subjective’ in nature -  that is, whether or not reservations were appropriate was a 
question judged by other States according to no fixed criteria. Consent, rather than any 
objective test, determined the appropriateness of a reservation. The International Court 
of Justice in the Reservations case752 developed a new approach to the issue.
At issue in the Reservations case was the validity o f reservations to the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment o f  the Crime o f  Genocide, 1948 (‘the Genocide 
Convention’).153 The case had been referred to the Court by the General Assembly after 
debate about the legitimacy of reservations to the Genocide Convention were raised 
there. In 1951, the International Court of Justice handed down its judgement. In a split 
7:5 decision, the Court concluded that if  a State had made a reservation to the Genocide 
Convention, the State could be considered a party to the Convention provided the 
reservation was compatible with the object and purposes of the Convention. Although 
establishing an essentially objective test for the legitimacy of reservations, the Court
148 As to contemporary literature on the question of reservations, see AD McNair, The Law of Treaties 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1961; GG Fitzmaurice, ‘Reservations to Multilateral Treaties’ (1953) 2 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1.
149 DP O’Connell, International Law, vol 1, Stevens and Sons, London, 1965, 251.
150 The League o f Nations, in a Resolution in 1931, for instance, declared that reservations to 
multilateral treaties could only be made at the moment o f ratification and would be effective only if 
all other signatory States agree on the lodgement o f such reservations o f if  such reservations had 
been provided for in the text o f the Convention: League of Nations Official Journal, Special 
Supplement, No 92, October 1931, 10: quoted by DP O’Connell, op cit, 251.
151 J Linehan, ‘The Law of Treaties’, in S Blay, R Piotrowicz, M Tsamenyi, Public International Law: 
An Australian Perspective, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1997, 102.
152 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime o f Genocide, ICJ 
Rep 1951, 15.
153 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime o f Genocide, 1948, opened for 
signature 9 December 1948, entered into force generally 12 January 1951, ATS 1951 No 2.
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also held that if a particular State took the view that the reservations did not meet this 
compatibility test, that State could treat the party as not a party to the Convention. The 
majority emphasised that no one State could be permitted to frustrate the raison d ’etre 
of the convention by lodging reservations. Thus more than an individualised subjective 
approach was required. The minority rejected the applicability of the ‘compatibility’ 
test, re-affirming the traditional view that the consent of all States was required before a 
reservation (or the ratification of the reserving State) would be effective.154
Whilst establishing a new frst to be applied, the Reservations case did not bring an end 
to debate over the topic of reservations. The Court had not had to consider the 
legitimacy of specific reservations, such that the application of the compatibility 
approach remained untested. Commentators varied in their opinions as to whether the 
compatibility test could be usefully applied to all treaties.155 It was not until 1969 that 
the international community agreed upon a basic test for reservations within the context 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties}56 What the Reservations case did, 
however, was to sensitise the international community to the thorny issues surrounding 
reservations. The General Assembly adopted a series of Resolutions on the topic, 
directing United Nations depositaries to accept lodgment of reservations without 
judging the reservations and recommending that specific provisions on the acceptability
1 C *7
of reservations be included in multilateral conventions to provide clarity.
As Vratislav Pechota has noted, there were no drafting proposals to include an Article 
allowing reservations in the earliest deliberations upon the draft Covenant on Human
i r o
Rights. In the aftermath of the Reservations case, the General Assembly adopted a
154 The case is discussed more folly in I Brownlie, Principles o f Public International Law, 4th Ed, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, 609-610; J Linehan, op cit, 102.
155 The International Law Commission for instance initially rejected the ‘compatibility’ test as being 
too subjective. It was not until 1962 that it endorsed the test: I Brownlie, op cit, 610.
156 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 21 -22.
157 See I Brownlie, op cit, 609, J Linehan, op cit, 102.
158 For a brief summary consideration given to the reservations issue in the drafting o f the ICCPR, see 
V Pechota, ‘The Development o f the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’, in L Henkin, The 
International Bill o f Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Columbia University 
Press, New York, 1981, 52-54.
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specific Resolution on the Human Rights Covenant, recommending that the 
Commission on Human Rights include a clause dealing with the ‘admissibility or non­
admissibility’ of reservations.159 It was not until 1954 that specific drafting proposals 
were put forward to permit or restrict reservations. The issue of reservations was 
discussed sporadically in the period 1954-1966, yet at no stage did any of the proposed 
clauses permitting reservations gamer sufficient support to be included in the draft 
Covenants. Thus the ICCPR and ICESCR were finalised without any clause on 
reservations. Given the timing of the international debates, most o f the Australian 
policy consideration given to the topic was confined to the Casey and Bureaucratic 
period. Unfortunately, only brief comments can be made about Australia’s early 
attitude towards the issue of reservations.
I. Evatt Period
In the Evatt period, Australia placed comparatively little importance on the making of 
reservations. In response to its awareness of potential inconsistencies between 
Australian law and human rights guarantees, the Australian Mission to the United 
Nations advised the Department of External Affairs to examine the extent of change to 
Australian law needed.160 The Australian Mission reported the views o f the United 
Kingdom and the United States that accession with reservations should not be allowed. 
The Australian delegation did not in private or public make any comment on the 
issue.161 Instead, it seems to have viewed the debate over reservations as significant 
more in terms o f reflecting ideological divisions. Thus the Australian Mission reported 
that the United Kingdom and United States wished to ensure that only States accepting 
full obligations would be able to participate in the debate concerning international 
implementation.162 Though not explicitly stated, the message seemed to be that the 
United Kingdom and the United States considered that the Soviet Union was likely to 
make reservations and should be prevented from having a say in shaping the
159 GA Resolution 546 (VI), 5 February 1952, 6 UN GAOR Resolutions Supp No 20, 37 (1952).
160 Cablegram from Australian Delegation, UN Assembly, NY to DEA, 11/5/48, in NAA A 1838/278, 
Item 856/13 Pt3.
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international means of implementation. In any case, there was little sense of the issue 
o f reservations being of vital significance for Australia.
II. Spender Period
There is even less evidence of the attitude of policy-makers in the Spender period 
towards the topic of reservations. There were no submissions on the topic, nor were 
there any public comments on point. Instead, the focus appears to have been on 
ensuring that the shape of the substantive clauses was consistent with Australian 
desires. An emphasis on the necessity of a reservations clause did not emerge until the 
Casey and Bureaucratic period.
III. Casey and Bureaucratic Period
In the early 1950s, after the appointment of Richard Casey as Minister for External 
Affairs, Australia had a rather contradictory approach to the issue of reservations. On 
the one hand, the Brief for the Eighth Session for the Commission on Human Rights in 
1952 stated that reservations should not be permitted.163 On the other hand, the same 
Brief was also contemplating Australia making a reservation in respect of the 
inhabitants o f trust territories should a colonial-application clause not be accepted by 
the Commission.164 It was as if reservations were to be permitted only in the rarest 
circumstances. This reluctance to permit reservations was jettisoned however by 1954.
In 1954 the United Kingdom put forward a draft reservations clause that was fully 
supported by Australia.165 The proposal permitted States to enter reservations of any 
type and such reservations were to take effect provided they were supported by two- 
thirds of the States which became parties to the Covenant within a fixed period. It 
implicitly rejected the approach of the International Court of Justice in the Reservations
163 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the Eighth Session of the Commission on Human Rights, in 
NAA A 1838/1, 856/13/10/7 Pt 1.
164 Ibid.
165 Memorandum from Australian Mission to the UN, NY to the Secretary, DE A, 29/5/50, in NAA A 
518/1, Item 104/5/1 Pt 1.
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case in favour of a return to a more consent-based test. Such a proposal was promoted
as a means of affording adequate safeguards against the use of reservations to avoid
obligations under the Covenants whilst taking due account of some States’ good faith
inability to accede to all provisions of the Convention. 166 In the same session, Chile and
Uruguay were arguing that no reservations should be permitted. The Soviet Union
168advocated that States should have an unfettered power to make reservations.
The Australian delegation, headed by Fred Whitlam, described the United Kingdom’s 
proposal as a ‘realistic and accommodating approach’ that encouraged ratification 
whilst ensuring reservations were not of so wide a character as to invalidate the 
Covenants. 169 In expressing support for the United Kingdom proposal, Whitlam 
criticised the International Court of Justice’s ‘compatibility’ test as an inappropriate 
fetter on States’ rights. 170 Furthermore, it was said that the criteria used for the 
compatibility test, that is whether the reservation was compatible with the object and 
purpose of the Convention, was not readily applicable to such multifaceted documents 
as the human rights Covenants. Unlike the Genocide Convention that dealt with only 
one international crime, the human rights Covenants concerned a wide variety of 
subjects and thus applied ‘to nearly every aspect of the life of contemporary society’. 
Even with respect to the Genocide Convention, four of the five dissenting members of 
the International Court of Justice had expressed dissatisfaction with the difficulties in
172ascertaining whether or not a reservation passed the compatibility test.
Whitlam also keenly defended the right of States to make reservations per se. 
Reservations were a necessary concession to the ‘collectivity of the States which might 
become parties to the Covenants’ . 173 One could not set out a hierarchy of reservations
166 JDL Hood, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 564,104; 27 October 1954.
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid
169 Memorandum from Australian Mission to the UN, NY, to the Secretary, DEA, 30/3/54, in NAA 
432/20, Item 54/3779 Pt 9.
170 HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 444, 3-4; 23 March 1954.
171 Ibid
172 Memorandum from Australian Mission to the UN, NY, to the Secretary, DEA, 30/3/54, in NAA 
432/20, Item 54/3779 Pt 9.
173 HFE Whitlam, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 446,8; 24 March 1954.
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where some were acceptable and others not. The United Kingdom approach had the 
benefit of being tailored to suit the community of treaty-making States who were bound 
by ‘common interests and corporate feelings of fellowship’.174 States would mark their 
recognition o f the interdependence of the contemporary international community and of 
the fact that peace and security could be achieved only by determined efforts to promote 
the economic and social advancement of all peoples in accordance with the United 
Nations Charter175 by permitting States to make reservations.
In the years 1955 to 1965, the inclusion of a reservations clause became an established 
part of Australian policy. Though the leadership role in promoting the clause was left 
largely to the United Kingdom, Australian Briefs directed Australian delegates to 
support the United Kingdom’s initiative.176 They also included references to Australia’s 
need for specific reservations for example, to deal with the Australian policies towards 
indigenous people or Australia’s opposition to the right of self-determination.
By 1965, the United Kingdom modified its position in the hope of winning majority 
support for the inclusion of a reservations clause. Its revised proposal incorporated a 
compatibility test for reservations.179 This placed Australian policy-makers in a 
quandary. The Department of External Affairs, concerned that some of the reservations 
that Australia might conceivably wish to make might not pass such a test, ordered the 
delegation to abstain from voting on the clause unless by so doing, Australia would be 
isolated.180 In 1966, Australian representatives spoke in favour of the United Kingdom 
proposal. It was defended as being necessary to solve the constitutional problems 
faced by States or to permit States to set up special machinery for implementation of
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
Ibid.
Ibid.
See for example, Brief for the Australian Delegation to the 10th Session o f the General Assembly, in 
NAA 1838/1, Item 856/10/10/9 Pt3.
Ibid.
Cablegram o f DEA to Australian Mission to the UN, NY, 14/11/55, in NAA A 432/72, Item 
64/3090.
Cablegram from DEA to Australian Mission to the UN, NY, 20/12/65, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 
929/5/6 Pt 4.
Ibid.
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rights. The shift in policy seems to have been motivated by an awareness that 
Australia ultimately accepted a similarly worded clause in CERD on the basis of the 
prevailing international climate,182 and that an unqualified right to make reservations 
was unlikely to be endorsed by the General Assembly.
When no reservations clause was included in either the ICCPR or the ICESCR, 
Australian policy-makers were not overly concerned. While admitting the existence of 
some uncertainty, the Australian Mission to the United Nations expressed the view that 
States would be able to make reservations to the Covenants. In its view, the general 
rules of international law would permit the making of reservations, though it noted that 
several States had considered the ‘compatibility’ test a necessary pre-requisite. The 
stage was thus set for Australia to limit its obligations through the lodgement of 
reservations to both Covenants. Furthermore, the absence o f any principled 
commitment to the application of a compatibility test made unlikely that such 
reservations would be subject to a rigorous examination domestically as to their 
‘compatibility’ with the Covenants.
During the Casey and Bureaucratic periods, one thus sees a significant switch in 
Australian policy: from opposing to supporting a reservations clause. This change 
appears to have been motivated by concerns about Australian ‘vital interests’. By 1954, 
Australia was concerned that other means of limiting obligations, such as a federal-State 
clause and a colonial application clause, would not be included. Support for a 
reservations clause was thus a fallback position. Whitlam’s State-centric view of 
international law clearly influenced the form of arguments used. The legacy was, 
however, a deep-seated belief in the right of States to determine the extent of their 
international law obligations.
181 RF Osborn, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 1142, 203; 3 November 1966.
182 Cablegram from DEA to Australian Mission to the UN, NY, 29/11/65, in NAA A 1838/1, 929/5/6 
Pt 4.
183 Cablegram from Australian Mission to the UN, NY to DEA, 7/11/66, in NAA A 1838, Item 929/4 
Pt 21.
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Conclusion
This Chapter has presented an account of Australian policy dominated by movements 
away from extensive Commonwealth action to implement human rights. These 
movements belie any inevitability in Australian support for the application of all human 
rights guarantees throughout the territory of Australia. In the area of the domestic 
obligations clause, Australia began by promoting expansive State domestic 
responsibilities and ended by resisting attempts to impose any obligations to legislate to 
protect human rights. In parallel developments, Australia showed increased enthusiasm 
to limit the federal government’s responsibilities to implement human rights through the 
insertion of a federal-State clause and an intensified commitment to an unqualified 
reservations clause in the periods of Liberal administration.
Neither the federal system nor constitutional complexities offer sufficient explanations 
for these shifts in attitude. Instead, this Chapter highlights the likely interplay of the 
personal and party-political philosophies of the key personnel involved in policy- 
development. While Evatt was committed primarily to preserving Commonwealth 
legislative action to implement human rights, Spender and his Liberal Party successors 
had an aversion to such centralised exercises of power. The 1950s also saw a 
resurgence o f the influence of Diceyan notions of reliance of the common law and 
parliamentary sovereignty as the means of protecting human rights amongst key 
Commonwealth lawyers like Whitlam and Bailey. As a result, Australian policies 
moved from an active conception of the State respecting, promoting, protecting and 
ensuring human rights, to a more passive vision of the State respecting human rights. 
Such a vision encouraged the ‘reading-down’ o f obligations clauses and the keen 
defence of non-interventionist means of protecting rights. It was not a vision, therefore, 
likely to give rise to an expansive programme of State remedial action in furtherance of 
its international obligations.
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Chapter 6
The International Implementation of Human Rights
Introduction
This Chapter considers Australia’s approach to the international implementation of 
human rights. By international implementation is meant the ways in which the 
international community was to be involved in monitoring and responding to alleged 
human rights violations committed by State Parties to the human rights Covenants. 
Notwithstanding the Soviet Union’s consistent stance that all forms of international 
implementation represented an interference with State sovereignty, 1 the majority of 
delegations favoured some form of international implementation. The questions then 
multiplied -  what form of system? An adjudicatory system or conciliatory system? 
Should individuals have a right to petition bodies or should only States have that right? 
Should the system of implementation be identical for all forms of rights?
If one subscribed to the ‘Cold War’ perspective on human rights development 
(discussed in the Introduction), one might have expected that in contradistinction to the 
Soviet stance of implacable opposition, Australia would have offered its consistent 
support to a system of international implementation of human rights. Co-incidentally, 
such an assumption would also sit well with the ‘continuous support’ approach to 
Australia’s human rights policy development identified in the Introduction. The 
narrative that emerges from this Chapter is more complex. Australia entered the 
debates on international implementation as a strong advocate for international, judicial 
modes of dispute resolution. With the intensification of world tensions, however, came 
a wariness concerning the ability of any United Nations body to provide an impartial
As to the Soviet hostility to all forms of international implementation, see J Humphrey, Human 
Rights and the United Nations: a great adventure, Transnational Publishers, New York, 1984, 54 
and F Jhabvala, ‘The Soviet Bloc’s View of the Implementations of Human Rights Accords’ (1985) 
7 Human Rights Quarterly 466. It is also noted in the Report of the Australian Delegate to the Fifth 
Session of the Commission on Human Rights, in NAA A 432/85, Item 47/725 Pt 3.
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consideration of human rights matters and a suspicion of the motives of any individual 
who would complain of human rights abuses to the international community.
Weakening support for strong international implementation mechanisms also 
significantly masked a shift from an individual-centred view of the implementation of 
human rights guarantees to a State-centred desire to protect the reputation and stability 
of the State.
Overview of the International Debate
Given that the UDHR was conceived as a non-binding statement, the real debate as to 
international implementation occurred in relation to the draft ICCPR and ICESCR. The 
measures of international implementation were the subject of discussion in the early 
years of the Commission on Human Rights (1947-1952) and the later years of the Third 
Committee’s investigation (1963-6). Even before a final decision was taken on whether 
to draft one or two Covenants,2 separate implementation schemes were being discussed 
for civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights. When finalised, 
both Covenants imposed an obligation on States to provide periodic reports on the 
implementation o f human rights. The ICCPR, however, included a further 
implementation mechanism -  the establishment o f a Human Rights Committee to 
conciliate inter-State complaints and provide views on communications from 
individuals in circumstances where States had ratified the Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR.3
In respect of civil and political rights, a range of implementation options were 
canvassed before the international community opted for the Human Rights Committee 
complaint-based system.4 Various papers on implementation were authored by the
2 The separation of the draft Covenant on Human Rights into two separate Covenants is discussed at 
length in Chapter 1.
3 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, open for signature 19 
December 1966, entered into force generally 23 March 1976, ATS 1991 No 39.
4 For an excellent account of the Human Rights Committee, see D McGoldrick, The Human Rights 
Committee: Its Role in the Development o f  the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991, Chapter 1.
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Secretariat o f the United Nations and the Working Group on Implementation o f the 
Commission on Human Rights.5 The alternatives considered included an International 
Court of Human Rights,6 a High Commissioner for Human Rights7 and ad-hoc 
Committees o f Inquiry.8 In 1950, the Commission on Human Rights voted in favour of 
the establishment of a permanent body based on the French model for a Commission of 
Inquiry and Conciliation. The body was to hear only complaints between States and to 
offer its ‘good offices’ to the States concerned with the aim of facilitating a friendly 
solution to the dispute. The body was to be composed o f persons elected by State 
members of the Commission.9 It was the model ultimately adopted for the ICCPR.10
The issue o f whether individuals should have the right to petition the Human Rights 
Committee was raised periodically throughout the negotiations. In 1949, when a 
motion proposing such a right was put to the vote, the members of the Commission 
were evenly divided. Despite later discussion in the Commission on Human Rights,* 11 
and the Third Committee of the General Assembly,12 the decision was never reversed. 
Instead, in the late 1960s, majority support coalesced around a United States 
compromise proposal for a separate protocol to be drawn up giving individuals a right 
of petition.13 As result of the right o f petition being contained within a separate
See for instance, Report of the Drafting Committee, 1947, UN Doc E/CN.4/21, Annex H; and 
Secretariat documents: UN Doc E/1371, 9 UN ESCOR, Supp (No 10), 1949, Annex III; UN Doc 
E/4511, accompanying UN Doc A/5655, 18 GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item 48 (1963).
6 Australia was the leading proponent of a Court of Human Rights as is discussed later in this 
Chapter. See for instance, UN Doc E/1371, 9 ESCOR Supp 10 (1949).
The establishment of this office was encouraged in particular by Uruguay and the United States, see 
J Humphrey, op cit, 130; D McGoldrick, op cit, 13.
8 The United Kingdom in particular supported the establishment of ad hoc fact finding committees as 
discussed later in this Chapter.
9 The 1950 decision of the Commission on Human Rights is discussed by D McGoldrick, op cit, 6
10 The details o f the inter-State complaint mechanism were largely settled by 1950 and adopted by the 
General Assembly in 1966. The details of the Commission’s manner of appointment and 
establishment were subject to greater debate and were not resolved until 1953-4. For a detailed 
history of the drafting of Part IV of the ICCPR, see MJ Bossuyt, Guide to the ‘Travaux 
Preparatoires ’ o f the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Martinus Nijhoff, 
Dordrecht, 1987, 501-787.
11 In 1951, for instance, the Commission rejected the suggestion for non-government organisation 
petitioning 7:4:3, and individual petitioning 8:3:3: MCR Craven, The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995, 18.
12 In 1950, the General Assembly considered the question of petitions and directed the Commission on 
Human Rights to proceed with consideration of provisions to be inserted into the draft Covenant or 
in separate protocols, dealing with the receipt and examination of petitions from individuals and 
organisations: GA Resolution 42IF (1950), quoted in D McGoldrick, op cit, 7.
13 See D McGoldrick, op cit, 14.
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protocol, States could adhere to the human rights Covenants without necessarily 
permitting their citizens to approach the Human Rights Committee. The Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR was thus drafted and finalised at the same time as the ICCPR.
Granting the Committee powers to independently look into human rights practices of 
individual countries was considered but rejected by a majority of delegates of the 
Commission on Human Rights. In 1950, when the Commission voted in favour of the 
French-style inquiry and conciliation body, it rejected a proposal that the Committee 
should have a general power to supervise ‘observance o f the provisions’ of the human 
rights Covenant.14 In 1955, India proposed that the Committee be able to initiate 
inquiries of its own accord into human rights violations.15 It met with no greater 
success. Instead, the view that the Committee essentially was to respond to actions by 
States was adopted. Throughout the 1950s, the idea o f States’ reporting on the 
protection of civil and political rights within their jurisdictions was on the table.16 In 
1966, the Third Committee voted for this proposal.17 States would be obliged to submit 
periodic reports to the Human Rights Committee.18 The Human Rights Committee 
would consider such reports, and was empowered to make ‘general comments’ on their 
contents.19
There was significantly less debate concerning the implementation o f economic, social 
and cultural rights. At its Seventh Session ini 951, the Commission on Human Rights 
drafted provisions on implementation that provided for State Parties to submit periodic 
reports to the Economic and Social Council. Such reports were to cover the progress 
made in achieving the observance of economic, social and cultural rights. To prevent 
duplication o f effort, States were permitted to refer to reports that had been submitted to
14 Ibid, 6.
15 As to the Indian proposal, see UN Doc A/2929, in 10 GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item 28, Part II 
(1955), quoted by D McGoldrick, op cit, 13.
16 As to the details o f the proposals, see MJ Bossuyt, op cit, 620-621.
17 Ibid, 623. In most particulars, the clause adopted (Article 40(1) of the ICCPR) was identical to that 
proposed by the Commission on Human Rights. The major amendment deleted reference to the 
qualifying term ‘legislative and other’ measures taken by State parties.
18 Article 40(1) ICCPR.
19 Article 40(4) ICCPR.
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other specialised bodies.20 Major debate centred around the appropriate role for the
specialised agencies rather than whether reporting was an appropriate implementation
mechanism. In the draft submitted by the Commission on Human Rights to the General
Assembly in 1954, it was resolved that the Economic and Social Council would act as a
conduit to such specialised bodies.21 The Third Committee resolved not to consider the
22issue of implementation until having settled the substantive contents of the Covenants. 
Thus it was not until the 1965-6 period that attention was focused on the 
implementation of economic and social rights.
The basic shape of the ICESCR international implementation was approved without 
major change by the Third Committee of the General Assembly. In 1966, the United 
States and Italy advanced an amendment providing for the establishment of an expert
'y*
Committee to review the State reports." The proposal was based on that contained 
within the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD).24 Yet, this proposal failed to gain the support of the Third Committee since a 
majority feared that such a body might encroach upon the work of the Economic and 
Social Council and the functions of the specialised United Nations agencies. The 
proposal was thus withdrawn though there was recognition that the Economic and 
Social Council might establish such a body in the future.25 The original reporting 
mechanism was maintained with States to report on the ‘measures which they have 
adopted and the progress made in achieving the observance of the rights’.26 It was also 
envisaged that States would indicate factors and difficulties affecting the degree of 
fulfilment of obligations under the ICESCR.27
20 D McGoldrick, op cit, 7.
21 UN Doc A/2808, quoted in MCR Craven, op cit, 20.
22 MCR Craven, op cit, 20.
23 UN Doc A/C.3/SR 1401, 9-10; 24 October 1966.
24 MCR Craven, op cit, 21.
25 See MCR Craven, op cit, 22. The current ICESCR Committee of Experts was established in 1985.
26 Article 16(1) ICESCR.
27 Article 17(2) ICESCR.
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I. Evatt Period
Supporters and detractors of Dr HV Evatt alike accept that he had a passionate 
commitment to the United Nations and a belief in creating a strong international system 
to maintain peace.28 As a result, it comes as no surprise that at his behest Australia 
pushed for strong mechanisms of international implementation, mechanisms that were 
to be accessible to both individuals and States. Significantly, in consistently arguing for 
such modes of international implementation, Australia was not deterred by a lack of 
support from traditional allies such as the United States and the United Kingdom. Nor 
was it convinced that strong models of international implementation would in any way 
interfere with the ‘domestic jurisdiction’ of States.
During the Evatt period, international implementation was seen as the key issue for the 
international negotiations of the International Bill of Rights. When Australia was 
invited to be a member of the first Commission on Human Rights, Evatt’s enthusiasm 
for participation was linked specifically to his desire to see strong methods of 
international implementation developed. Thus in directing Colonel Hodgson personally 
to attend the Commission on Human Rights proceedings, Evatt specifically mentioned 
the need to continue pushing for a Court of Human Rights.29 The Court was the only 
institution mentioned explicitly in the Cablegram. When three sub-groups were 
established by the Commission in 1947, one with responsibility for drafting the 
Declaration, one for drafting the Covenant and a third on implementation, Australia 
opted for membership of the Working Group on Implementation. Its enthusiasm for 
implementation even led Australia to initially voice objection to the drafting of a non­
binding Declaration,30 though in time it was to welcome the UDHR as a necessary
28 See eg N Harper and D Sissons, Australia and the United Nations, Manhattan Publishing Company, 
New York, 1959, 276-280. Evatt labelled ‘steady and unwavering support for the United Nations, 
especially the purposes and principles declared in the Charter’ to be the first and fundamental 
principle of Australia’s foreign policy: See Notes of Speech on Foreign Affairs, House of 
Representatives, 9 February 1949, ‘Speeches and Statements, 1948-9(a)’ Folder, Evatt Collection, 
Flinders University; See too Evatt’s speech in 1948: Commonwealth of Australia, House of 
Representatives, Parliamentary Debates, (Hansard), vol 196, 8 April 1948, 748-50.
29 Cablegram from DEA to Hodgson, 23/1/47, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 1.
30 Report of Australian Representative on Drafting Committee, International Bill of Human Rights, 
First Session of the Commission on Human Rights, in NAA A 1838/1, 856/13/2/1.
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precursor, a first step towards a binding Covenant.31 In its speech on the occasion o f the 
UDHR’s adoption by the General Assembly, Australia noted its anticipation of the
"5 'y
further development of modes of international implementation for the rights.
In keeping with this enthusiasm, Australia advanced bold and expansive international 
implementation proposals. The centrepiece o f Evatt’s policy was the proposal for an 
International Court of Human Rights. The Commission on Human Rights was not the 
first forum in which Evatt had put forward such a proposal. At the Paris Peace 
Conference in 1946, a conference concerned with the negotiation o f peace treaties 
between the allies and European ex-enemy States,33 Australia pushed for the 
establishment of a European Court of Human Rights.34 Drawing upon such 
international precedents as the Permanent Court o f International Justice, and the
r
Arbitral Tribunal of Upper Silesia, Australia suggested that if  provisions were to be 
inserted in the peace treaties dealing with human rights, there needed to be also an 
international mechanism for the enforcement of such rights. From the papers included 
in the Brief for Australian delegates to the Paris Peace Conference, the proposal appears 
to have been particularly influenced by the writings o f Professors Bentwich and 
Kaeckenbeeck.36 Norman Bentwich had advanced the thesis that the time was ripe for a
31 Cablegram from Delegation to Commission on Human Rights to DEA, 11/12/48, in NAA A 
1838/1, 856/13 Pt 5.
32 Speech of Australian delegate to General Assembly on Declaration of Human Rights, in NAA A 
1838/1; 856/13/7 Pt 2; also available as Speaker’s Notes on the Report of the Commission on 
Human Rights, undated but circa December 1948, ‘UN Charter’ Folder, Evatt Collection, Flinders 
University.
33 The Paris Peace Conference of 1946 negotiated the peace treaties between the Allies and Roumania, 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Finland, Austria and Germany. It also drafted a treaty between the Allies and 
Italy. Documents relating to the Paris Peace Conference are found in NAA A 1067/1, Item 
E/46/38/28, and NAA A 10563/; For general commentary on the Paris Peace Conference, see CWP 
Waters ‘Voices in the Wilderness: HV Evatt and the European Peace Settlement’, in D Day (ed), 
Brave New World: Dr H  V Evatt and Australian Foreign Policy: 1941-49, University of 
Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1996; S Kertesz, The Last European Peace Conference: Paris 1946 -  
Conflict o f  Values, University Press of America, Lanham, 1985.
34 Statement Concerning the formation of a European Court of Human Rights included in NAA A 
1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 1.
35 The Arbitral Tribunal of Upper Silesia was set up after World War One to deal with claims between 
German and Polish citizens regarding their treatment following the re-drawing of boundaries 
between the two territories: see CA Macartney, League of Nations’ Protection of Minority Rights, 
in E Luard (ed), The International Protection o f Human Rights, Camelot Press, London, 1967, 
Chapter 2.
36 Extracts from these two authors are to be found in the Briefs for Australian delegations: see for 
instance, Statement for Australian Delegate on Court of Human Rights, Political and Territorial 
Commission for Italy, in NAA A 1067/1, Item E/46/38/28.
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Court of Human Rights in an article in the 1944 British Yearbook of International 
Law. Kaeckenbeeck, reflecting on the operations of the Silesian Arbitral Tribunal, had 
concluded that central to the prospects of success of an international body with 
jurisdiction over nationality claims was the need for individual-initiated complaints and 
the power of an authority to make binding determinations.
In defending the European Court proposal, Evatt and other Australian delegates rejected
the utility o f political remedies to deal with human rights abuses. Evatt, for instance,
derided the effect of State declarations alone:
The history o f the territorial adjustments made at the Conference o f Versailles suggests 
that basic and essential rights and freedoms of the individual - who is so often the cipher 
in territorial adjustments - should not hinge simply upon declarations made by states.
Such declarations, standing alone, are not sufficient to guarantee the inalienable rights o f  
the individuals and behind them it is essential that some sufficient sanction be 
established.39
Negotiations between parties (particularly State parties) was also viewed as providing 
second-class justice. States might compromise an individual’s interests in 
circumstances where a Court would make an order for redress.40 Quoting CA 
Macartney, negotiations were seen as 'tempering injustice with mercy, but...not meting 
out justice'.41 Diplomatic redress was insufficient since human rights were ‘not things 
to be created or extinguished, to be granted or withheld, to be enlarged or restricted, 
according to the politics of governments and the workings of diplomatic processes.’42 
National governments alone could not be trusted to protect human rights since 
individuals would be subject to the arbitrary will o f a majority.43 A court, on the other
37 N Bentwich, ‘Statelessness through the Peace Treaties After the First World War’ (1944) British 
Year Book o f International Law 171, 176.
38 Dr Kaeckenbeeck’s reflections on the Arbitral Tribunal for Upper Silesia from his text, The 
International Experiment of Upper Silesia: a study in the workings o f the Upper Silesian 
Settlement, 1922-1937, Oxford University Press, London, 1942, are quoted in the Statement for 
Australian Delegate on Court o f Human Rights, Political and Territorial Commission for Italy, in 
NAA A 1067/1, E/46/38/28.
59 Statement by Delegate for Australia in Paris Peace Conference, undated, in NAA A 1838/278, 
856/13 Pt 1.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid. The Delegate was quoting from CA Macartney, National States and National Minorities, 
Oxford University Press, London, 1934, 11-12.
42 Ibid.
43 European Court o f Human Rights: Statement by Delegate for Australia, undated, in NAA A 
1838/278, Item 856/13 Pt 1.
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hand, would not only serve to give individuals remedies, but would serve as a deterrent 
to would-be perpetrators of abuse.44
The proposal was given little consideration at the Paris Peace Conference. The Legal 
and Drafting Committee of the Conference concluded that the state of international law 
was in flux. The topic of human rights was to be the subject o f further discussion by the 
Economic and Social Council. In such circumstances, it was not possible to compel a 
State to accept the decision of an international legal body on contested matters of 
human rights. 45 Australia withdrew its proposal at this point. In the negotiations of the 
Italian peace treaty, the Australian delegate raised the proposal again, but to similar 
avail46 Although Australian delegates expressed some frustration that their proposal 
had not been given proper consideration in the ‘blind stabbing’ rush to compromise 
with the Soviet Union to gain a peace treaty,47 the delegation was not unduly 
discouraged. In accepting the decision of the Conference, the Australian delegate, for 
instance, ventured the hope that in the future ex-enemy States and the successor States 
would voluntarily enter into a joint covenant for the setting up of a Court of Human 
Rights.48 Likewise in their internal correspondence, a conviction was expressed that 
Australia had gained respect for its stance and that in time to come Australia’s case 
would be vindicated .49 Indeed the delegation appears to have gone to the Paris Peace
44 Statement by Dr Herbert V Evatt, First Delegate of the Australian delegation, Australian 
Amendments and Proposed Additions to Draft Treaties, 21 August 1946, ‘War-Paris Peace 
Conference, 1945-6’ Folder, Evatt Collection, Flinders University.
45 Doc C.P. (JR) 4th Meeting, 11 September 1946, RG 31, International Conference, Paris Peace 
Conference 1946, Box 2; United Nations Archives, New York. Note that in a later document 
prepared by the UN Secretariat, the failure of the Court proposal was attributed to delegations’ view 
that the Security Council offered a sufficient forum for the resolution of human rights issues: 
Memorandum on Implementation, in NAA A 432/85, Item 47/725 Pt 3.
46 In the context of discussions of the Italian peace treaty, the proposal was defeated 15:4 with one 
abstention: Report of Australian delegation to Paris Peace Conference, undated, in NAA A 2910, 
Item 412/25/25.
47 Letter from JA Beasley to Evatt, 14/2/47, ‘War -  Paris Peace Conference 1945-6’ Folder, Evatt 
Collection, Flinders University. Evatt himself expressed resentment at the attitude of the Council of 
Foreign Ministers (UK, USSR, USA, France and China) who were unwilling to consider changes to 
the text they had previously agreed to: Cablegram from Evatt to JA Beasley and R Hodgson,
11/1/47, ‘Cables - London- 1943-1946’ Folder, Evatt Collection, Flinders University.
48 European Court of Human Rights: Statement by Delegate for Australia, undated, in NAA A 
' 1838/278, 856/13 Pt l .
49 Letter from JA Beasley to Evatt, ‘War-Paris Peace Conference 1945-6’ Folder, Evatt Collection, 
Flinders University.
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Conference with peculiarly low expectations, considering that even though the proposal 
may well not be adopted, Australia’s proposal would assist in the campaign for a 
European Court of Human Rights that would in turn be the precursor of a ’World Bill 
and Court of Fundamental Rights' .50
When the Commission of Human Rights began its deliberations, the Australians were 
quick to grasp the opportunity to resurrect the Court o f Human Rights proposal.
Obeying his orders from Evatt, Colonel Hodgson raised the issue o f the Court at the 
first meeting o f the Commission.51 Whenever the opportunity arose, Australians spoke 
with great fervour about the establishment of a Court. One Australian delegate for 
instance proclaimed:
The Australian proposals for an International Court o f Human Rights have been put 
forward because we favour a continuous, effective, and just system o f international 
supervision. In English law the remedy is to us as important as the right, for without the 
remedy there is no right. Our basic thesis is that individuals and associations as well as 
states must have access to and full legal standing before some kind o f international 
tribunal charged with the supervision and enforcement of the covenant. In our view 
either a full and effective observance of human rights is sought, or it is not. If we do 
seek it, then the consequence must be admitted and the idea o f compulsory judicial 
decisions accepted.52 (emphasis added)
In a manner reminiscent of the statements at the Paris Peace Conference, Australian 
delegates emphasised that only a court judgement would be likely to lead to changes in 
State actions. Were practices o f States subject merely to discussion in the General 
Assembly, any General Assembly Resolution that was forthcoming from the debate 
might be easily dismissed as having been tainted by political considerations. A court 
judgment would be impartial and would be regarded as having greater legitimacy than 
any alternative. It was recognised that establishment o f the Court would not be without 
difficulties, but considered that it would be possible. If  the Nuremberg Tribunal had 
been created in a situation where the relevant laws were not clearly established, the
50 ‘International Court of Civic Rights and International Nationality Tribunal’, paper in Briefing for 
Australian delegation to Paris Peace Conference, undated, in NAA A 1067/1, Item E 46/38/28.
51 Cablegram from R Hodgson to Evatt, 8/2/47, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 1; See too: Report 
on First Session o f Commission on Human Rights; in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 1: ‘It was left 
to Australia to point out that no International Bill o f Rights would have any effect unless there was 
provision for enforcement’.
52 Statement by Australian Representative on International Court of Human Rights, undated, in NAA  
A 432/82, Item 1947/725 Pt 3. See to similar effect statement of Alan Watt in the Third Committee 
of the General Assembly: UN Doc A/C.3/SR 92, 56; 2 October 1948.
53 Statement by Australian Representative on International Court of Human Rights, undated, in NAA  
A 432/82, Item 1947/725 Pt 3.
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situation would be easier in the case of a Court of Human Rights which would be 
responsible only for enforcing fixed norms, set out in the Bill (of human rights).54
In 1948, a detailed statute for the International Court was prepared, clarifying the 
parameters o f the Court’s anticipated powers.55 The statute made provision for a wide 
range of categories of parties to have standing before the Court: States (including in 
certain situations, States who were not parties to the international covenants), 
individuals, groups of individuals, and associations, whether national or international. 
The Court could also receive information from public international organisations and 
request information from such organisations. It was also empowered to request the 
Commission on Human Rights to carry out particular investigations.
The Court was to have jurisdiction over:
(i) All disputes arising out o f the interpretation and application o f the Covenant on 
Human Rights referred to it by any party to such Covenant;
(ii) All disputes arising out o f the interpretation and application o f Articles concerning 
human rights in any treaty or convention between States referred to it by any party to 
such treaty or convention;
(iii) All matters concerning the observance o f Human Rights by the parties to such 
Covenant or to any such treaty of Convention referred to it by the Commission on 
Human Rights30
This jurisdiction clause was startling in its breadth. It included not only disputes arising 
from the Covenants being drafted but also human rights disputes arising under any other 
treaty if  one party referred the case, or matters relating to either category o f treaty 
referred by the Commission on Human Rights (a form of non-voluntary jurisdiction). 
Although the delegation was later to query whether the intention was to give the Court 
such extensive powers, the reply from the Department indicated that this intention was 
deliberate. As a result of pressure within the Commission on Human Rights, a
55 The draft Statute can be found in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 1; It was also included in the 
Report o f the Working Group on Implementation’s Report to the Commission on Human Rights: 
UN Doc E/CN.4/53, Annex C.
56 Ibid.
57 The Australian delegation queried the source of the Commission’s power in dealing with disputes 
under other treaties and asked whether in such cases, the consent of both parties would be required: 
Cablegram from delegation to DEA, 13/5/48, in NAA A 1838/278, Item 856/13 Pt 3. The 
Department responded that it was not intended that both parties in a particular dispute would have 
to consent, given that States would be agreeing in advance to the jurisdiction of the Court through 
becoming parties to the court’s statute. Furthermore, the Commission’s powers could be expanded
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filtering role for the Commission on Human Rights in relation to the complaints of 
individuals and associations was introduced. In addition to jurisdiction over contested 
cases, the Court was to have the capacity to give advisory opinions on questions relating 
to human rights at the request o f the Commission on Human Rights. The Court itself 
was to be the ultimate arbiter of its own jurisdiction.
In Australia’s original draft, the Court was to have both original and appellate 
jurisdiction. Individuals or States could approach the Court in the original instance to 
pass judgment on their claim or they could appeal from State court judgments to the 
International Court. This feature was identical to that proposed in the Paris Peace 
Conference by Evatt.58 Significant disquiet was evident in the Department concerning 
the difficulties raised by each type o f authority. In an internal memorandum to Alan 
Watt which was discussed with Evatt, the point was made that there could be significant 
embarrassment o f national courts should there be a necessity to exhaust domestic 
avenues before approaching the Court. However, were the Court to act in the first 
instance, there was the spectre o f ‘irresponsible organizations bringing suits against 
their respective governments ' . 59 Evatt did not respond directly to this concern, 
requesting only that someone with legal training report on developments from New 
York.60 In the end, the issue o f appellate authority became a casualty of discussion in 
the Commission on Human Rights.
The draft statute presented to the Commission on Human Rights had comparatively 
little detail about remedies. Like the statute for the International Court o f Justice,61 the 
draft statute stated that decisions of the Court would bind only the parties and the
by agreement: Cablegram from DEA to Australian Delegation, UN, 17/5/48, in NAA A 1838/278, 
Item 856/13 Pt 3.
58 Statement concerning the formation o f a European Court o f Human Rights, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 
856/13 Pt 1.
59 Memorandum to A Watt, (author unclear), circa 1947, in NAA A 1838/278, Item 856/13/2.
60 Annotations on memorandum to A Watt, (author unclear), circa 1947, in NAA A 1838/278, Item 
856/13/2.
61 Statute for the International Court of Justice, opened for signature 26 June 1945, entered into force 
generally 24 October 1945, ATS 1975 No 50.
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judgement was without appeal.62 Powers of the Court to award damages or reparations 
were not mentioned. The lack of any details concerning remedies might have been 
considered an oversight had it not been for the fact that, at the Paris Peace Conference, 
Australia had put forward proposals enforcement of judgments. In that context,
Australia had suggested that the Court make orders for damages and that such orders 
would be enforceable against the revenues or other property o f the State. By the time
of the Commission on Human Rights, this feature was omitted, leaving the Working 
Group on Implementation a free hand to devise a new system.
The Working Group on Implementation recommended that the successful party (or the 
Commission on Human Rights) be given the capacity to raise the matter with the 
General Assembly. The General Assembly would then make a recommendation as to 
appropriate action.64 Australia did not express any particular concern at this model, a 
response that seems somewhat surprising in so far as the Working Group’s model did 
not provide for guaranteed redress for individuals who had suffered human rights 
violations. It may have been that Australian delegations remained confident that States 
who respected the rule of law would abide by Court judgments without future coercive 
mechanisms being required. Certainly, at the Paris Peace Conference, Australia had 
downplayed the issue of enforcement of judgements, stating ‘[t]he problem to be solved 
is not the enforcing of a judgement (which is one o f the ultimate problems of 
International Law), but the implementing of clauses.’ 65
At no point did the draft statute for the Court purport to define the boundaries o f the 
term ‘human rights’. Given Australia’s consistent support for economic and social 
rights during the Evatt period,66 it might have been assumed that the Court was 
designed to have jurisdiction over breaches o f all rights recognised by the international
62 Statute for the Court of Human Rights, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 1.
62 Statute for a European Court of Human Rights, contained in NAA A 1067/1, Item E 46/36/8.
64 Report o f Fifth Session of the Commission on Human Rights, Report to ECOSOC, Annex III, 36-7. 
(1949); E/1371, 9 ESCOR Supp 10.
65 Paper entitled ‘International Court of Civic Rights and International Nationality Tribunal’, included 
in brief to Paris Peace Conference, in NAA A 1067/1, Item E 46/38/8.
66 See Chapter 1.
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community. This was not necessarily the view of Evatt’s bureaucratic officers. In 
explaining the Commission on Human Rights’ drafting of a questionnaire on methods 
of implementation for human rights in 1949, the Australian delegate took credit for 
suggesting a separate question on the implementation of economic rights. It was said 
that this separation was justified on the basis of the view expressed ‘by Australian 
representatives and others’ that judicial machinery might be less suitable than the 
involvement of specialised agencies for the investigation of economic and social 
rights. There is no evidence that Ministerial support was sought prior to this decision. 
One possibility is that this selective view represented the independent view of the 
Department. However, the fact that in some of the documents for the Paris Peace 
Conference, the European Court was labelled a ‘Court o f Civic Rights’ would tend to 
support the hypothesis that Evatt shared the Department’s vision o f a Court limited to 
hearing complaints of civil and political rights.68
In advancing the Court proposal, delegates were convinced of the appropriateness of
international action to enforce human rights. When questioned as to how the imposition
of a non-voluntary Court solution could be reconciled with the over-arching
‘sovereignty’ o f States, delegates emphasised that States were already under obligations
to abide by human rights under the United Nations Charter:
If we believe in the idea of international bills o f human rights we must necessarily 
accept these limitations [on sovereignty]... In the Charter we have already accepted the 
principles governing our actions in these fields, and there should be no objection to a 
system which seeks to keep us up to our obligations.69
At the Paris Peace Conference Australian delegates had been savage in their derision of
the ‘sovereignty’ objection. Sovereignty was said to be:
an outmoded conception, a fetishist survival whose worship should be anathema in the 
fact o f economic and human inter-relationships of our one atomic world.... Gentlemen, 
every international agreement is a derogation o f sovereignty.70
67 Noted in Report of the Australian representative to the Fifth Session o f the Commission on Human 
Rights, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 4.
68 Note for instance, the preparation o f a paper entitled ‘International Court of Civic Rights and 
International Nationality Tribunal’, included in brief to Paris Peace Conference, in NAA A 1067/1, 
Item E 46/38/8.
69 Statement by Australian Representative on International Court of Human Rights, undated, in NAA 
A 432/82, 1947/725 Pt 3.
70 Quoted in internal memorandum to Watt concerning the Court of Human Rights, (author unclear), 
undated, in NAA A 1838/278, Item 856/13/2. This position seems to have been somewhat at 
variance with the official briefing for the Paris Peace Conference which included an extensive note
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In the Commission on Human Rights, Australian delegates were more moderate in their 
statements. Sovereignty of States was accepted as a valid concept. It was not regarded, 
however, as a barrier to State acceptance of human rights obligations and the 
establishment of an international court.
As John Humphrey, the Director of the UN Division of Human Rights from 1946 to 
1966, has pointed out, the Australian proposal for a Court does not appear such a radical 
suggestion when considered in the light of the European Community’s establishment of 
such a body in 1950.71 Yet, despite receiving the endorsement o f the Working Group 
on Implementation, the proposal never came close to enjoying the support of a 
majority of the Commission.73 Within the Working Group on Implementation, only 
Belgium actively supported the proposal.74 The Soviet Union was implacably opposed 
to the proposal which it perceived as a breach of sovereignty.75 The United Kingdom 
regarded the proposal as premature in light of the fact that the content of the Bill had 
not yet been determined.76 The United States pointed to the chilling effect the Court
from Professor Bentwich stressing that human rights were a matter of international concern, such 
that no infringement of sovereignty was involved with respect to the establishment of a court:
Annex D to Papers from the Peace Conference, contained in memorandum from Australian External 
Affairs Office, London to the Secretary, DEA, dated 7/11/46, in NAA A 1067/1, Item E/46/38/28.
71 Allan Watt cited the European community’s movement towards a court hopefully in the Third 
Committee in 1948: UN Doc A/C.3/SR 92, 56; 2 October 1948.
72 Report of Working Group on Implementation, Annex C to Commission on Human Rights, 2nd 
Session Report to the Economic and Social Council, 36-54. Included in the Report is a summary of 
the debate on the Australian proposal. The Report of the Working Group was subsequently adopted 
by the Commission on Human Rights. Colonel Hodgson considered the acceptance of the Report in 
the Plenary Session to be a ‘signal victory for Australian proposal for Court of Human Rights’. He 
reported that the proposal was ‘widely commended and even Governments previously in opposition 
namely United States and United Kingdom agreed scheme merited consideration by their 
Governments and voted for its transmission’: Cablegram from R Hodgson to DEA, 16/12/47, in 
NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/2.
73 Harper and Sissons report that Australia faced almost continuous opposition from the great powers: 
N Harper and D Sissons, op cit, 252.
74 Memorandum from the Secretary, Attorney-General’s Department, to the Secretary, DEA, 14/4/49, 
in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 2. In initial reports Hodgson was more hopeful - reporting to 
Watt that when first raised, support was received from India, Uruguay and to some extent France 
and Belgium. Chile and Iran was also reported to be sympathetic: Cablegram from R Hodgson to 
Evatt, 8/2/47, in NAA A 1838/278, Item 856/13 Pt 1.
75 Hodgson, for instance, in his report on the Second Session of the Commission on Human Rights 
reported that the USSR objected to the Australian proposal ‘on the well known theme that it would 
impinge upon the sovereignty and independence of States.’. A copy of the report is to be found in 
NAA A 1838/278, Item 856/13 Pt 2.
76 See Cablegram from R Hodgson to Evatt, 8/2/47, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 1.
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might have upon ratifications given the prevailing world climate.77 Chile described the
scheme as ‘utopian’.78 While France offered some support, it regarded the moment for
such a Court as ‘not yet ripe’79 preferring a Commission of Inquiry and Conciliation.
Even the international jurist, Professor Lauterpacht, a strong proponent of developing
the international human rights system, rejected the Australian proposal on the bases that
it would be controversial given outstanding concerns about the scope of domestic
jurisdiction and State sovereignty, that it would encourage litigation and that it would be
80ineffective in being able to evaluate domestic law systems.
As early as December 1947 Australian delegates were pointing to the need for Australia
81to consider its responses to other mechanisms given the lack of support for its Court.
By April 1949 the Department of External Affairs concluded that the Court proposal 
was destined for rejection despite evidence of growing support by non-governmental 
organisations.82 Interestingly, in the departmental memorandum presenting the strength 
of opinion against the Court, there is some suggestion that not even Australia would 
ratify a Covenant that included a Court ‘at the present time’.83 Australia, too, was 
beginning to question the effect that the Cold War would have on the impartial 
dispensation of justice. The Department recommended to Evatt that the delegation shift 
its stance to supporting the Court as an adjunct to the French commission proposal, 
fearing that if the Court remained an independent proposal, it might be defeated 
permanently.84 Evatt’s direction, however was to continue pushing for a Court ‘for
77 United States Delegation Handbook No 1, UN Commission on Human Rights, 3rd Session, 1948, 
Box 4581, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, Franklin D Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park.
78 Report o f Australian Representative on the Drafting Committee of the International Bill o f Rights, 
1947, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/2/1.
79 Ibid. As to the French proposal, see UN Doc E/CN.4/82/Add. 10/Rev 1, and UN Doc E/CN.4/147; 
described in memorandum from the Australian Mission to the UN to the Secretary, DEA, 16/2/49, 
in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 2.
80 H Lauterpacht, An International Bill o f  The Rights o f  Man, Columbia University Press, New York, 
1946; quoted and discussed in memorandum from the Australian Mission to the UN to the 
Secretary, DEA, 16/2/49, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 2.
81 Cablegram from DEA to R Hodgson, 5/12/47, in NAA A 1838/278, Item 856/13/2.
82 Memorandum from TG Glasheen, for the Secretary, DEA to the Secretary, Attorney-General’s 
Department, 14/4/49, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 2.
83 Letter from TG Glasheen, on behalf o f the Secretary, DEA to the Secretary, Attorney-General’s 
Department, 14/4/49, in NAA A 432/82, Item 47/725 Pt 3.
84 Submission to Minister Evatt, 17/6/49, repeating advice from delegation, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 
856/13/7 Pt 4.
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tactical reasons’ while working towards the establishment of the French style 
conciliation and inquiry commission.85
At a departmental level there appears to have been some willingness to qualify the 
Court proposal in an attempt to make it more attractive to other States. In particular, in 
late 1949 a draft response was prepared by the Department of External Affairs to the 
Commission on Human Rights’ questionnaire on implementation. In addition to 
making clear the exclusion of economic and social rights from the jurisdiction of the 
Court, the response suggested that the Court would only be expected to act in response 
to ‘cumulative experience of indifference, laxity or ill-will’ rather than in response to
o z :
isolated or individual breaches. In addition, a (French-style) Commission was 
envisaged as the primary enforcement agency, with the Court only being utilised as a 
last resort against systematic breaches of human rights.“7 Such conservatism was no 
doubt welcomed by the Department o f Labour and National Service which voiced 
opposition to the Court proposal on the basis that ‘supervision should not be pressed to 
a point where legal sanction is outstripping moral acceptance’ o f the provisions of the 
Covenant.’ 88
Notwithstanding the departmental preparedness to qualify Australia’s Court proposal, 
Australia’s consistent support internationally for the Court is significant. In choosing 
the model o f a court for the adjudication of human rights disputes, Australia was 
indicating a preference for judicial modes of dispute resolution, at least in relation to 
civil and political rights. It was also revealing a commitment to permitting individuals 
to petition the Court and a concern about ensuring not only that States were prevented
85 Evatt’s directions were repeated in the memorandum from the A/g Secretary, DEA, to Australian 
Mission to the UN, 28/4/49, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 3. Similarly, in the draft answer to 
the Secretary-General’s Questionnaire on Implementation prepared before the change of 
government, the development of a two stage process incorporating a Commission and a Court 
represented a significant shift in Australia’s stance on the working of the Court: in NAA A 
1838/278, Item 856/13/7 Pt 5.
86 Draft answer to the Secretary-General’s Questionnaire on Implementation, in NAA A 1838/278, 
Item 856/13/7 Pt 5.
87 Ibid.
88 Letter o f W Funnell, Secretary, Department of Labour and National Service to the Secretary, DEA, 
9/12/49, in NAA A 1838/278, Item 856/13/7 Pt 5.
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from continuing human rights violations, but that injured individuals would have a right 
o f redress. The individual was not to require the consent of his/her State to proceed to 
the international tribunal. This individual-centred view was to be reflected also in 
Australia’s responses to other initiatives.
Australia was implacably hostile to suggestions that human rights violations be 
addressed in the context of General Assembly discussions or other political channels. 
Australia opposed the United Kingdom proposal that individuals be able to petition the 
General Assembly for relief on the basis that under the scheme individuals required 
State sponsorship to petition the General Assembly and that the scheme would have the
on
unfortunate tendency to turn human rights into political issues. A similarly hostile 
reaction was given to the United States-Chinese proposal for State-to State mediation on 
the basis that there would be no enforcement machinery, that implementation would 
peter out if  the committee of three (the two States and a third appointed by the 
Secretary-General) failed and that intervention would be ‘a diplomatic act, and would 
take place, or not, in accord with political interests. ’90
The only proposal to gain Australian support was the French proposal for a Commission
of Inquiry and Conciliation primarily because it shared two pivotal features of the
Australian Court proposal: it involved a permanent body, and (at least in its initial
versions) gave individuals a right of petition. The Australian delegation, for instance,
was instructed to ensure the right of individual petition remained in the Commission
model.91 These themes were clear in the statement of the Australian delegate signalling
Australia’s preparedness to support the French model:
Should the Commission decide that the time is not yet ripe for the setting up of an 
international court, the Australian Government would wholeheartedly support the 
proposals put forward by Professor Cassin last year, providing for a review o f the extent 
to which the laws o f the contracting states are consistent with the Covenant, the
89 J Humphrey, op cit 39. Humphrey comments that in his opinion Australia did not give the United 
Kingdom proposed Bill o f Rights fair consideration because of their misplaced enthusiasm for a 
court.
90 Memorandum from JDL Hood, Australian Mission to the UN, to the Secretary, DEA, 16/2/49, in 
NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 2.
91 Memorandum from A/g Secretary, DEA to the Australian Mission to the UN, 28/4/49, in NAA A 
1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt3.
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examination, if necessary by investigation, o f the complaints o f states, associations and 
individuals, and the proposal, where appropriate, o f recommendations to the General 
Assembly. Whilst this would not go as far as we would wish in the protection of human 
rights, it may well be as far as we can go at the present time, and would clearly make a 
very important contribution to what we are striving to do.92
Australian support was also made conditional upon the Commission being given the
power to request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. From its
private records, it is apparent that the Australian delegation was hopeful that at least the
French proposal might yield a more considered approach to the issue of human rights
violations than might otherwise be the case. In addition the persons of ‘high repute’ to
be appointed to such a body were predicted to be ‘less likely to be absorbed in political
wrangling than the eighteen Government representatives in the Commission on Human
Rights’.93
The right of petition was discussed separately. As might be expected from its Court
proposal, Australia voted in favour of individuals having a right o f petition with respect
to human rights violation.94 In disputing claims that United Nations bodies were not
well suited to hearing individual claims, Australian delegates pointed to the example of
the Trusteeship Council’s effective operation.95 Again in responding to claims that a
right o f petition would not respect ‘national sovereignty’,96 Australia confirmed the
statement o f the Belgian representative (Delhousse):
national sovereignty was always raised in international law by those who took a 
reactionary attitude...if that objection were raised at every stage o f its work, the UN 
would in due course be destroyed.97
Australia re-iterated its understanding that Articles 55 and 56 o f the United Nations 
Charter meant that there was not the least doubt concerning the competence and even 
the obligation o f the United Nations to undertake international action in some form or
92 Statement o f Australian Delegate in the Commission on Human Rights, undated, circa 1949 in 
NAA A 432/82, Item 47/725.
93 Report o f Australian Representative to the Third Session o f the Commission on Human Rights, in 
NAA A 1838/1; Item 856/13 Pt 5.
94 UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 118: D McGoldrick, op cit, 5-6.
95 A Watt, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 159, 701-702; 26 November 1948.
96 Typical o f this response was the statement of Mr Insffan o f Paraguay: ‘even if the abolition o f  
national frontiers was a legitimate and noble aspiration, it was not one that could be realized as 
things were at present, and any measures that did not respect the national sovereignty o f States 
would be out of place’: UN Doc A/C.3/SR 159, 700; 26 November 1948.
97 A Watt, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 159, 699-701; 26 November 1948.
244
QQ
other. The only debatable question 'was that of the methods and the time'. It would be
anomalous if inhabitants of trust territories could approach the United Nations with their
human rights complaints, but that inhabitants of metropolitan countries would be
precluded from doing so." Instead of accepting the view that Article 2(7) precluded the
United Nations considering human rights matters within individual countries, Australian
delegates put forward a dynamic view of Article 2(7) such that, even had human rights
matters previously been a matter o f ‘domestic jurisdiction’ (a point not conceded), 
certain matters of domestic jurisdiction could be transferred to international jurisdiction.
That would not constitute a violation, but rather an exercise of sovereignty. A country 
would always be free to demand guarantees against irresponsible petitions.100
The major driving force behind the Australia’s international implementation proposals 
appears to have been Evatt. Evatt’s personal interest in the promotion of an 
International Court of Human Rights was evident in his early cablegram to Colonel 
Hodgson and the direction given to Australian delegates to continue pressing for the 
Court proposal notwithstanding the lack of international support. Indeed, it is likely 
that Evatt took a central role in initially drafting the proposal as presented to the Paris 
Peace Conference.101 At a minimum, as Neville Harper and David Sissons have 
commented, the Court proposal was consistent with Evatt’s ‘firm belief that judicial 
procedures should be more widely utilized at the international level.’ Having settled 
upon the Court as the preferred model of implementation, Australian policy on other 
alternatives was relatively easily deduced: political models of resolution were 
unacceptable, the retention of individual rights to petition the United Nations was 
essential and if  possible, impartial judicial bodies were to resolve human rights 
disputes.103
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid, 701.
101 Although Dr John Burton, Evatt’s personal secretary at the time of the Paris Peace Conference has 
recalled that Evatt took comparatively little interest in the texts of the peace treaties, neither Burton, 
nor Alan Renouf, the other Australians who drafted amendments to the treaties have claimed 
responsibility for the court proposal: Interview with Dr J Burton conducted by author, Canberra, 1 
September 1999; A Renouf, The Champagne Trail: Experiences o f  a Diplomat, Sun Books, 
Melbourne, 1980, 29-30.
102 N Harper, D Sissons, op cit, 258.
103 John Burton has commented that after the San Francisco conference, Evatt took the view that the 
Department of External Affairs ‘knew his position, knew the Charter, and therefore knew what
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From whence did Evatt’s desires derive? The answer seems to relate more to personal 
than party-political philosophy. There was little in Australian Labor Party policy that 
dictated a preference for judicial and international means of dispute resolution. 
Undoubtedly, Evatt and his colleagues shared a belief in supporting the United Nations 
and moving away from a reliance on the protection of the United Kingdom. However, 
Evatt’s belief in legal adjudication as the primary method for achieving justice for 
individuals appears to have fired Australia’s enthusiasm for an International Court. As 
a former High Court judge, Evatt’s belief in formal adjudicatory mechanisms is not all 
that surprising. Equally, it seems to have been Evatt’s strong personal belief that it was 
the State’s responsibility to represent the interests of the individual and so seek ways of 
facilitating the individual’s access to the international realm.104 Dr Burton, his former 
personal secretary and appointed by Evatt to be Secretary of the Department of External 
Affairs, has stated that Evatt identified with people rather than institutions and so 
confronted norms when they did not reflect individual concerns.105 The fact that 
Australia’s policies were so little shaped by Cold War tensions also seems referable to 
Evatt’s well-documented sense that the Cold War should not dominate policy 
discussion.106 His successors were not to share his views.
II. Spender Period
The directions given by Percy Spender as the Minister for External Affairs in 1950 and 
early 1951 were to produce a fundamental shift in attitude towards issues of 
international implementation of human rights. In addition to authorising withdrawal of 
the Court proposal, Spender instituted strong anti-individual petitioning strategies.
104
105
106
policies to deduce in his absence’: J Burton, ‘Herbert Vere Evatt: A Man Out o f His Time’ in D 
Day, op cit, 9. A similar conclusion might be reached about Australia’s international 
implementation policy.
Ibid, 3.
Ibid.
See, D Lowe, Menzies and the ‘Great World Struggle’: Australia’s Cold War 1948-1954, 
University o f New South Wales Press, Sydney, 1999; M Burgmann, ‘Hot and Cold: Dr Evatt and 
the Russians, 1945-1949’ in A Curthoys, J Merritt (eds), Australia ’s First Cold War, vol 1: Society, 
Communism and Culture, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1984; 80-108.
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During 1949-1951 the United Nations and its subsidiary bodies were perceived as 
institutions designed to assist States in their efforts to promote human rights, but not to 
hear the complaints of disaffected, potentially subversive individuals or groups.
In March 1950 the Department of External Affairs prepared a submission for Spender 
focusing on the available choices regarding the international implementation of human 
rights. The options outlined were:
(i) an International Court of Human Rights (as previously proposed by Australia);
(ii) ad hoc fact-finding Committees that would be engaged where one State made a 
complaint against another State (a proposal favoured by the United Kingdom and 
the United States); and
(iii) a permanent Commission of Inquiry and Conciliation (as proposed by France).
The Department, in keeping with its views in 1949, suggested that the Court proposal 
was ‘quite unreal’ given the fundamental differences in philosophy and in legal 
procedures between East and West:
A condition precedent to the successful functioning o f  such a Court is the common
acceptance of a basic humanistic philosophy and agreement on fundamental legal
* 1 107
concepts and procedures by the States Parties to the Statute.
Spender agreed with the Department’s proposal that the Court proposal be referred to 
the International Law Commission for further study.108 The Australian representative 
attempted to have this course adopted by the Commission on Human Rights. However, 
the Commission did not agree to this course of action, and, as a result o f the 
representations o f the Rapporteur, the Commission resolved that the Australian proposal 
should remain on the continuing agenda of the Commission.109 In light o f its failure to 
attract substantial support, the Department and Spender’s decision to move away from 
the Court proposal is not surprising. However, what is clear from an investigation of 
Spender’s other policies is that, even had there been sufficient support for the
107 Copy o f Submission from TG Glasheen to Minister o f External Affairs, annotated by Spender, in 
NAA A 1838/1, Item 895/3/12.
108 See Brief for the Australian Delegation to the Eighth Session o f the Commission on Human Rights, 
in NAA A432/20, Item 54/3779 Pt 7.
109 HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 201, 12,14; 19 May 1950.
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establishment of a Court of Human Rights, it is likely that Australian delegations under 
Spender would have pressed for amendment of the Court proposal. In particular, it is 
unlikely that Spender would have been as supportive of individuals and non­
government organisations having a right to commence proceedings in the Court of 
Human Rights.
O f the three options put to Spender in March 1950, the one that attracted his support 
was the United Kingdom’s proposal to have ad hoc fact-finding Committees whose 
jurisdiction would be limited to inter-State conflicts. Spender rejected the Department’s 
arguments in favour of a Commission of Inquiry and Conciliation (augmented by a 
High Commissioner for Human Rights),110 annotating the submission put to him 
concerning the proposal with the comment: ‘[tjhere is the further objection that it could 
easily be made a political instrument, and intermeddle in the domestic concerns of any 
State’.* 111 In this brief statement, Spender revealed his abiding concerns and 
assumptions. First, Spender thought that there was no guarantee that a United Nations 
body would dispense impartial justice. Instead, such a body was envisaged as 
vulnerable to manipulation by State actors with differing political ideological agendas. 
It was a view that was obviously related to the intensified political tensions dominating 
many of the discussions in the United Nations. Secondly, however, Spender was 
indicating that he considered that human rights matters were a matter of ‘domestic 
concern’ for States, rather than being an appropriate subject for international scrutiny. 
The focus o f Spender’s concern was and remained upon providing for stable 
government. It was thus a heavily State-centric, rather than individually-focused, view.
In late 1950 and 1951, Australia moved towards support for the French model o f a 
permanent body to conciliate inter-State complaints on the basis o f it receiving 
overwhelming international support. Spender’s world view of supporting restrictive
110 Copy of Submission from TG Glasheen to Minister of External Affairs, annotated by Spender,
3/3/50, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 895/3/12.
111 Ibid.
112 Submission to Minister of External Affairs, 22/9/50, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 10.
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implementation mechanisms was to remain influential in shaping other aspects of 
Australia’s international implementation policy.
The dominance o f such a State-centric view is apparent in Spender’s position on
whether individuals should have a right to petition the United Nations with respect to
infringements o f human rights. In what represented a complete reversal o f policy from
the Evatt period, Spender directed that Australia oppose individual petitioning
mechanisms and be cautious concerning petitions from non-government organisations.
In response to a submission from the Department of External Affairs that concluded that
it would be premature to have petitions from individuals, Spender explicitly limited the
Australian delegation to support for the right of petitions for signatory States alone.113
In the final weeks of his Ministry, Spender reiterated that petitioning was a privilege
that individuals could not be trusted not to abuse.1 n  Furthermore, Spender perceived
that permitting individuals or non-government organisations to petition the United
Nations would run the risk of lowering the prestige and authority of the national law
courts. In his view, such arguments overrode theoretical considerations based on
individual liberty and political theories.115 For Spender individual petitioning would: 
inevitably lead to outside interference frequently from people whose chief concern is 
interference in domestic matters o f a State. Further, it will lend itself to agitation within 
a country for nefarious purposes.116
If permitted to petition the international community, individuals might destabilise
States. Whitlam as Australia’s representative in 1951 echoed this State-centric view.
While the State had a responsibility to protect the rights of individuals, international
society was to be concerned with the relations of States:
States were still the greatest societies of the world, both as national entities and as 
members o f the international community. They existed not only to rule, but also to 
ensure the protection o f the people under their control and jurisdiction who owed them 
allegiance and even those within their jurisdiction who did not owe them allegiance.117
113 Spender’s views were expressed in response to a Submission put to him on 24/10/50. The 
delegation were informed that Spender would ‘not countenance’ the idea of individuals or non­
government organisations being given the right o f petition: memorandum from Australian Mission 
to the UN,NY to the Secretary, DEA, 29/9/50, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 9.
114 Spender’s views were relayed to the delegation, in Cablegram from DEA to Australian delegation, 
20/4/51, in NAA A 1838/1, 856/13/10/6 Pt 2.
115 Ibid.
116 Memorandum of AH Tange, Assistant Secretary to Australian representative on Commission on 
Human Rights, 13/4/51, A 1838/1, 856/13/10/6 Pt 1.
117 HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 211, 13; 23 April 1951.
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In a dramatic manner befitting the Cold War context o f the ongoing negotiations, 
Whitlam pointed to the potential for a right of individual petitioning to undermine the 
basis of ordered government:
Every existing institution was being challenged today. It would be both impolitic and 
unwise to present an opening to those who were desirous of decrying the principles and 
institutions of justice.118
Colin Moodie, as Australian representative in the Third Committee of the General
Assembly, spoke in similar terms against granting individuals a right o f petition. To
Spender’s list o f objections, however, Moodie added a ‘floodgates’ argument.119 Since
individuals in most States made representations to their governments on matters
covered by the Covenant, it would only be reasonable, Moodie stated, to assume that
many of these people, if dissatisfied with action by their government would proceed to
bring their grievance before the Committee.120 The planned Committee would not have
the resources to deal with such a number of complaints, nor should it be required to find
such resources when the bulk o f such complaints could be dealt with adequately by
121individual governments.
Slightly more enthusiasm for the concept of non-government organisation petitioning 
was evident within departmental ranks. In April 1950 the Department attempted to 
persuade Spender that support might be given to the United States compromise proposal 
to draft a separate protocol giving non-government organisations the right to petition the 
Human Rights Committee.122 Spender was unmoved. After caustically noting that he 
considered ‘non governmental bodies were seeking to extend unduly their authority’ 
through the petitioning proposal, Spender withheld support from this proposal on the 
basis that it was impossible to know which non-government organisations were in 
contemplation.123 The Australian delegation was thus to oppose the proposal.
118 Ibid.
119 C Moodie, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 301, 197; 1 November 1950.
120 Ibid.
121 See letter from Australian Mission to the UN, NY to the Secretary, DE A, 2/11/50, in NAA A 
1838/1, Item 856/3 Pt9.
122 Copy of Submission from TG Glasheen to Minister for External Affairs, annotated by Spender, 
28/4/50, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 8.
123 Ibid.
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Evident also in Australia’s stance on individual petitioning was an increasing use of the
shield o f ‘domestic jurisdiction’ as a justification for limiting United Nations
involvement in the scrutiny process.124 Thus, in expressing his opposition to Australia
responding to individual communications from Australian individuals, Spender stated: 
These matters have nothing whatever to do with the Commission and we should do what 
we can to prevent their discussion and if discussed record unequivocably that we will 
not have outside interference in our domestic affairs.125
More ambiguous statements were made in the Commission on Human Rights
concerning whether the United Nations had a pre-existing right to be involved in
matters of the enforcement of human rights. At the 211th Meeting of the Commission,
held in April 1951 immediately prior to Spender’s resignation, Whitlam accepted that
‘from the very beginning of the present chapter in international relations’, the
conception that the individual and his rights were of concern to the international
community had prevailed.126 At the same time, however, Whitlam did not accept that
the United Nations thereby had any rights to choose expansive methods of international
implementation. State sovereignty had to be protected and international inquiry into an
individual State’s practices could only be permitted to the extent that States agreed to
such intervention.127 For Spender, defending the ‘domestic jurisdiction’ o f States (a
field that he saw including human rights practices) was a priority. Submissions to him
were returned to departmental officials with references to ‘domestic jurisdiction’
underlined.128
124 Note this echoes Spenders’ concern that the UN was overstepping its mark in relation to non-self- 
governing territories -  a theme in his first foreign policy speech, see Commonwealth of Australia, 
House o f Representatives, Hansard, vol 208, 8 June 1950, 4014-5.
125 Memorandum from AH Tange to Australian Representative to Human Rights Commission, 13/4/51, 
in NAA A 1838/1,856/13/10/6 P t l .
126 HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc A/CN.4/SR 211, 12; 23 April 1951.
127 Ibid.
128 See for example, Submission to Minister for External Affairs, annotated by Spender, 28/4/50, in 
NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 8; Watt has highlighted the similarity between the views o f Spender 
during his Ministry concerning the scope of the United Nations’ proper authority and those he 
voiced as a judge on the International Court o f Justice in the Certain Expenses Case: A Watt, The 
Evolution o f Australian Foreign Policy, 1938-1965, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1968, 
332-3.
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In jealously guarding Australia’s domestic jurisdiction against the intervention o f the 
United Nations or the subversive antics of Australian individuals, Spender’s approach to 
international implementation was markedly different from that pursued during the Evatt 
period. Spender’s stance was influenced by a perceived need to preserve Australia from 
the destabilising effect of communism. Spender’s adoption of such a Cold War 
perspective was typical of Liberal Party politicians during the 1950s. As David Lowe 
has demonstrated, though some of the anti-communism rhetoric was designed to 
achieve electoral advantage, Menzies and his Liberal counterparts had genuine fears 
that communist represented a real threat to Australian society.129 Liberal Ministers 
viewed ridding Australia of the communist threat to be one of their central roles.
Yet Spender’s shift of direction did not simply relate to whether the international 
community could be trusted to provide impartial injustice. In so far as Spender 
consistently spoke of the interest of the State, he was adopting a different focus to that 
of Evatt. For Spender, the State was the central unit to consider, whereas for Evatt, it 
had been the individual. Not only was the individual’s interest marginalised in the 
Spender period, but the ‘complaining individual’ was demonised. Cold War forces thus 
came together with a State-centrism to produce a restrictive attitude to international 
implementation. To a large extent, this coalition of forces was to continue to shape 
Australian policy over the remaining 15 years o f the international negotiations.
III. Casey and Bureaucratic Period
During the terms of Richard Casey and his successors as Minister for External Affairs 
there were few novel developments in Australian policy. Instead, opposition to 
extensive international implementation powers was further entrenched. Australia 
continued to resist proposals empowering the United Nations to actively consider the 
human rights practices of individual States (without that State’s consent) such as giving 
the Human Rights Committee independent powers, establishing a High Commissioner
129 See D Lowe, op cit, Chapter 3.
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for Human Rights, or permitting individuals an automatic right to petition the United 
Nations. Reporting obligations for the ICECSR were supported primarily because they 
were viewed as not involving undue interference in a State’s policies. There was one 
area in which Casey left a legacy. His abiding policy direction was for Australia not to 
become isolated. It was an approach that was followed assiduously and led to a 
softening o f some of Australia’s stances.
The Commission on Human Rights was in the midst of its Seventh Session when Casey 
was appointed Minister for External Affairs on 27 April 1951. As noted in the previous 
section, Australia had privately moved towards supporting the French proposal for a 
Commission of Inquiry and Conciliation during the Spender period. It was in the 
Seventh Session that Australia made its public announcement o f support for the 
proposal. Its change of heart was couched in terms of being persuaded in the face of the 
overwhelming support given to the proposal by other delegations.
Having effectively lost the battle against the establishment of a permanent body, 
Australian delegations headed by Whitlam spearheaded a campaign to ensure the 
Commission’s operations would be kept within narrowly defined boundaries. The Brief 
for the Ninth Session of the Commission on Human Rights in 1953, for instance, 
directed delegates to clarify that the Committee’s functions to exercise its ‘good offices’ 
would not include actual visits to countries to investigate human rights situations. The 
Committee was to be restricted to sitting in New York and Geneva and was to be 
informed by the State parties o f the relevant state of affairs.131 Likewise Whitlam 
opposed the Committee having any independent power to initiate its own inquiries in 
the 1953 sittings o f the Commission on Human Rights.132 The underlying approach was 
to downplay the importance o f international implementation mechanisms, seeing them
130 General Statement made by Representative in Third Committee (accepting implementation 
procedures), 10 December 1951, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/22.
131 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the Ninth Session o f the Commission on Human Rights, in 
NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/10/8/1.
132 HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc, E/CN.4/SR 341, 4; 9 April 1953.
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essentially as supplements to domestic action, an ‘exercise of moral influence’ rather 
than a primary method of enforcing human rights.
The legitimate role of the United Nations was regarded as acting as facilitator and 
‘support agent’ for the efforts of States. In the Brief for the Eighth Session of the 
Commission on Human Rights, for instance, the delegate was directed to support the 
view that ‘the principal function of the Human Rights Committee is to exercise “good 
offices” and not to endeavour to act as a body concerned with ‘bringing offenders to 
heel.’134 Similarly Australia supported the appointment of persons with special 
qualifications on the Committee (rather than political representatives) on the basis that 
specially qualified persons could assist States between whom a difference had arisen to 
form a better relationship with each other.135 It was a conception, however, that led to 
continued opposition to the United Nations accepting petitions from individuals or 
organisations and so investigating practices within a State without that State’s consent.
When Casey took over as Minister for External Affairs in late April 1951, the 
Department of External Affairs renewed its efforts to persuade the Minister to authorize 
the Australian delegation to support petitioning from non-government organisations. 
Departmental support for petitioning seems to have strengthened particularly once the 
United Kingdom indicated that if the United States protocol proposal gained majority 
support, the United Kingdom too would support the proposal. Whitlam, Australian 
representative on the Commission on Human Rights in the early 1950s, also had some 
personal sympathy for a system of petitions. At the 245th meeting of the Commission 
on Human Rights in early May 1951, for example, Whitlam noted that many cogent 
arguments had been given in favour of individual and non-government organisation 
petitions that appealed ‘not only to the mind, but also to the heart.’136 Despite repeating 
Spender’s concern about the revolutionary elements that might be let loose through
133 HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 436, 10; 16 March 1954.
134 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the Eighth Session o f the Commission on Human Rights, in 
NAA A 432/20, 54/3779 Pt 9.
135 HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 343, 6; 10 April 1953.
136 HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 245, 9; 16 May 1951.
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allowing individual petitioning,137 Whitlam indicated sympathy with the view that 
petitions should be permitted.
According to a draft submission discovered in the Department o f External Affairs files,
1a series of arguments was put to Casey recommending a change in Australia’s stance. 
State to State complaints were said to be unlikely to lead to effective enforcement of the 
treaties since States would be reluctant to bring complaints for fear of retaliatory 
action. Only through allowing non-government organisations to petition the United 
Nations bodies would there be a fulfilment of Article 55 of the Charter, the Department 
argued. Furthermore, the United States proposal had been amended to include a 
requirement that the non-government organisations had to be approved by two-thirds of 
the Committee before they had standing to bring a complaint. This was presented as a 
safeguard against ‘extremist and irresponsible’ non-government organisations. The 
Department also pointed to the fact that no major embarrassment had yet been caused to 
the administering territories through petitions submitted to the Trusteeship Council.
The United States proposal also provided that ‘domestic remedies’ had to be exhausted 
before petitions could be permitted to the Human Rights Committee. The Department 
thus recommended that Australia support petitioning for non-government organisations, 
but continue opposing individual petitions. As a contingency plan, however, the 
Department provided that if  a majority of delegations were to support petitions from 
individuals, Australia should insist upon a separate protocol with safeguards for 
domestic jurisdiction and adequate rules of procedure.140
There is no record of the final version of this submission or Casey’s response in the 
Department o f External Affairs’ files. However, the delegation to the Eighth Session of 
the Commission on Human Rights in 1953 was instructed to maintain opposition to any
137 Ibid.
138 (Draft) Submission from AH Tange to Minister for External Affairs, 17/5/51, in NAA A 1838/1, 
Item 856/13 Pt 8.
139 (Draft) Submission from AH Tange to Minister for External Affairs, 17/5/51, in NAA A 1838/1, 
Item 856/13 Pt 8.
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form of non-State petitioning, but to be mindful of the opinion of the United Kingdom 
and France.141 By the Ninth Session Brief in 1954, the Australian delegate was directed 
that Australia’s ‘final position’ might have to be taken ‘with regard to the views of other 
British Commonwealth countries and the United States’.142 Thus Casey’s response 
seems to have advised delegates to avoid being isolated, rather than condoning a 
positive shift in Australian policy. In the 1955 Brief for the General Assembly which 
was to remain the guide for Australian delegations for seven years, delegations were 
advised to continue opposing petitions ‘unless there was a clear majority vote (including 
the UK)’. If Australia was likely to be in a minority position, delegates were ordered to 
report back to the Department on the views of other governments, in particular the 
United Kingdom.143
In expressing Australia’s opposition to individual petitioning, Australian representatives
adopted arguments that directly contradicted Australia’s stance o f only several years
earlier. Whereas delegates during the Evatt period had drawn analogies between the
petitioning system in the Trusteeship Council and that proposed for the human rights
Covenant, delegates under Casey and Whitlam’s policy control distinguished the two
situations. The Australian delegate to the Sixth Session on the General Assembly, for
instance stated in the Third Committee:
The Administering Governments have, under the Charter, accepted definite obligations 
in relation to Trust Territories of a kind which they do not have in the field of human 
rights. The Trusteeship Council, to which the petitions are referred is constituted in 
such a way that there is always a balance between the administering and non- 
administering powers. Further, the Council has at its disposal the machinery of visiting 
missions which can on a regular and objective basis investigate the conditions which are 
likely to be the most frequent subjects of petitions. Moreover, the Trusteeship Council 
has developed safegaurds, especially Rule 81, on the subject of recourse to Courts of the 
Administering Authority, and processes of sifting and screening tested by experience. It 
is highly doubtful whether it would be possible in a Covenant on Human Rights to 
reproduce the conditions which have made the handling of petitions from trust territories 
possible. The experience of the Assembly in relation to Human Rights illustrates the 
difficulty of persuading States even when bound to do so by Treaty to accept 
investigation of the observance of human rights. 144
Brief for the Australian Delegation to the Eighth Session of the Commission on Human Rights, in 
NAA A 432/20, 54/3779 Pt 9.
Brief for the Australian Delegation to the Ninth Session of the Commission on Human Rights, in 
NAA A 1838/1,856/13/10/8/1.
Brief for the Australian Delegation to the 10th Session o f the Commission on Human Rights, in 
NAA A 1838/1, 856/13/10/9 Pt 3
Summary report in UN Doc A/C.3/SR 363, 101; 10 December 1951 (RL Harry).
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As with other issues such as the reservations clause (discussed in Chapter 5), Australia’s 
stance on petitioning only changed as a result o f Australia finding itself in a minority 
position. In 1965, in the parallel negotiations for the CERD, the Australian delegation 
suggested that Australia’s failure to support the petitioning process was likely to receive 
adverse comment and lead to implications that Australia supported racial 
discrimination. The Department of External Affairs prepared a submission for the then 
Minister o f External Affairs, Paul Hasluck. In addition to pointing to the fact that 
Australia had in practice tended to respond to individual petitions,145 the submission 
referred to the virtual unanimity within the Western bloc in favour o f supporting strong 
implementation measures for the CERD. The hope was said to be that such 
mechanisms would put communist countries and the Affo-Asians on the defensive.146 
The Department considered it unwise for Australia to vote with a group which had 
reason to be concerned about its own record, and to be isolated from virtually all 
Western countries. Ultimately, the submission relied upon political ‘anti-isolation’ 
reasoning. It thus sought approval for the delegation to vote in favour of the optional 
petitioning procedure for individuals and to vote in favour of the non-optional 
petitioning procedure for non-government organisations if abstention would isolate 
Australia from other Western countries.147 Minister Hasluck agreed.148
Having felt pressured into changing its stance on the petitioning question in the CERD 
negotiations, Australia followed suit in relation to the ICCPR. The delegation was 
instructed that it should indicate to the Western powers Australia’s readiness to be
145 This subject is discussed further in Chapter 7.
146 As to concerns about the Communist and Afro-Asian blocs proposal for all implementation 
measures to be inserted into a separate protocol to the CERD, see letter o f JH Hoyle, Australian 
Mission to the UN, NY to DEA, 21/10/65, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 929/4 Pt 20.
147 Submission from MR Booker to Minister for External Affairs, annotated by Hasluck, 23/11/65, in 
NAA A 1838/1, Item 929/5/6 Pt 3. Note there was some departmental unease with the tactics of the 
Western bloc. LJ Lawrey of the Australian Mission communicated to the United States 
representative, Kotschnig his fear o f the risks of promoting ‘hasty adoption o f politically slanted 
implementation measures: reported in letter from LJ Lawrey to the Secretary, DEA, 7/12/65, in 
NAA A 1838/1, Item 929/4 Pt 20.
148 Submission from MR Booker to Minister for External Affairs, annotated by Hasluck, 23/11/65, in 
NAA A 1838/1, Item 929/5/6 Pt 3.
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guided by majority view on the issue.149 Although noting that Australia’s preference 
was for there to be no individual petitioning in the ICCPR, Australia was not prepared 
to be isolated. Thus Australia was to avoid final commitment on the matter.150 On 3 
December 1966 Australia voted with the rest of the Western group in favour of the 
Optional Protocol.151 As in so many of the cases described in Chapter 5, Australia’s 
change of vote was undertaken reluctantly and did not represent any fundamental 
conversion about the United Nations’ proper role in relation to human rights.
Interestingly, Australia argued that reporting obligations were inappropriate for civil 
and political rights. According to internal records, Arthur Tange o f the Department of 
External Affairs was responsible for inserting opposition to reporting for civil and 
political rights into the Brief for the Eighth Session of the Commission on Human 
Rights.152 It was said that the Committee would have neither the resources nor the tools 
to consider State implementation of civil and political rights. By 1953 at the Ninth 
Session of the Commission on Human Rights, Australia was commenting more 
explicitly on the distinctions to be drawn between evaluating respect for different 
categories of human rights. Whereas economic, social and cultural rights were seen as 
amenable to ‘quantitative measurement and statistical presentation’, civil and political 
rights were regarded as dependent on more abstract factors such as legislation and 
judicial decisions. A Human Rights Committee considering individual instances of 
alleged breach was better placed to consider a State’s respect for civil and political 
rights than a Committee considering general reports.153 Put in modem terms, Australia 
was arguing that it was more feasible to establish objective benchmarks for the 
achievement o f economic and social rights than for civil and political rights. In the 
1955 Brief for the General Assembly used by delegations throughout the 1955-1962
149 Cablegram from DEA to Australian Mission to the UN, NY, 1/11/66, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 929/4 
Pt 21.
150 Ibid.
151 Cablegram from Australian Mission to the UN, NY to DEA, 3/12/66, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 929/4 
Pt 22.
152 Letter from T Pyman to HFE Whitlam, 8/4/52, in NAA A 1838/1. 856/13/10/7 Pt 1; See too HFE 
Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 429,6; 11 March 1954.
153 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the Ninth Session of the Commission on Human Rights, in 
NAA A 1838/1, 856/13/10/8/1.
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period on this point, it was said that to insert a reporting procedure into the ICCPR 
would create ‘artificial uniformity’ between the Covenants.154
Ultimately, Australia surrendered its objections to the reporting obligations, though the 
change of heart is not fully explained in the files. It is likely that the change was 
another example o f Australia avoiding isolation. The vote for the reporting procedure 
was carried 82 votes to none, with two abstentions.155 While not enthusiastic about 
reporting on civil and political rights, Australia was adamant that whatever be the 
finalised implementation procedure, it should be included in the body of the ICCPR. In 
1966 there was a proposal before the Third Committee that States reporting procedures 
be included in a separate instrument. RF Osborn, as Australia’s representative in the 
Third Committee, argued that anything that lessened the accountability o f States Parties 
under the Covenant would reduce the instrument’s effectiveness.156 Such an argument 
was not applied in relation to the petitioning procedures, but Australia did support the 
inclusion o f reporting and inter-State dispute resolution in the body of the ICCPR.
In contrast to its concerns about the implementation o f civil and political rights, 
Australian policy-makers showed very little concern or apprehension concerning the 
proposed system of periodic reports for economic, social and cultural rights. When the 
issue first arose in 1952 at the Sixth Session of the General Assembly, the delegate 
decided to reserve Australia’s position while privately expressing the opinion that 
reporting obligations would not prove too onerous.157 FHE Whitlam spoke in favour of 
the use o f specialised agencies to review reports by States at the Seventh Session of the 
Commission on Human Rights in 1951.158 No specific Ministerial direction has been 
preserved concerning this point, though as the Briefs were submitted to the Minister for
154 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the 10th Session of the General Assembly, in NAA A 462/21, 
Item 575/1.
155 UN Doc A/C.3/SR 1427; quoted in MJ Bossuyt, op cit, 632.
156 RF Osborn, Australian representative, A/C.3/SR 1416, 229; 8 November 1966.
157 This stance was recorded in a note for TG Pyman, author unclear, undated, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 
856/13/10/7 Pt 1; See too letter o f Australian delegate to the Sixth Session o f General Assembly to 
DEA, 22/1/52, in NAA A 1838/1, 929/4/6 Pt 1.
158 HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 206, 22; 18 April 1951.
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approval prior to being sent to delegations, it would seem likely that Casey gave his 
general assent to this approach. By the Eighth Session of the Commission on Human 
Rights in 1952, Whitlam was stating:
Once [the progressive realisation of economic, social and cultural rights] ...is realised it 
follows inevitably that the implementation procedure adopted will have as its essential 
feature a reporting system. This feature has of course been accepted by Australia which 
subscribes to the general view that the purpose of such reports would be to reveal 
achievements and needs and not to provide a basis for criticism and censure.159
Rather than fearing that reporting requirements would highlight deficiencies in 
Australian practice, the Australians expected that compulsory reporting would have the 
advantage of bringing to light policies in both colonial and non-colonial countries, 
thereby deflecting some of the criticism of colonial powers. l0° Australia had some 
concerns about the proposal that countries report on the difficulties they faced in 
implementing economic and social rights, fearing that this would lead to the United 
Nations feeling justified in stepping into domestic debates.161 In public, therefore, its 
acceptance o f reporting requirements was qualified by the understanding that the aim of 
receiving United Nations bodies would be to assist (rather than stigmatise) the efforts to 
States to make effective the economic and social rights of their citizens. In so doing, 
Australia expressed confidence that the United Nations would not seek to go beyond its 
responsibilities and resources.162
Similarly, proposals for a specialist committee for the ICESCR prompted little debate in 
Australia. In October 1966, for instance, the Department of External Affairs expressed 
the view ‘We cannot see any particular reason to resist the committee idea and feel that
159 Draft Report of Australian Representative to the Eighth Session of the Commission on Human 
Rights, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/10/7 Pt 1.
160 Ibid. Note, however, not all were in agreement with this stance. The Department of Territories 
expressing the concern that reports had been used by some of the non-administering States to level 
‘uninformed and exaggerated criticism against the policies of the administering Governments’: 
letter from the Secretary of the Department of Territories to the Secretary, DEA, 16/4/52, in NAA A 
518/1, Item 104/5/2 Pt 2. The concern of the Department of Territories was included in the Brief 
for the Australian Delegation to the Ninth Session of the Commission on Human Rights, in NAA A 
1838/1,856/13/10/8/1.
161 Cablegram from DEA to Department of Education, 31/3/52, in NAA A1838/342, Item 929/4/4 Pt 2.
162 RL Harry, Australian representative, UN Doc A/C.3/SR 363, 101; 10 December 1951; See to 
similar effect, earlier comments of HFE Whitlam, Australian representative, UN Doc E/CN.4/SR 
238,18; 11 May 1951.
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we can leave the handling of it generally, to the discretion of the delegation’.163 The 
delegation indicated some support for the Committee in the public debates164 but the 
proposal was rejected by a majority.
In the forefront of bureaucrats’ minds in ultimately supporting reporting provisions for
the ICCPR and ICESCR was a perception that the international bodies receiving the
periodic reports of States had limited powers. In particular, the implementation bodies
were regarded as having no power to make comments on the human rights practices of
individual countries. In a paper prepared for circulation to other Departments in 1967,
Patrick Brazil (the then outposted Legal Adviser to the Department o f External Affairs
from the Attorney-General’s Department) made the following comment:
The limitation on the Council and the Commission to making general recommendations 
should mean that these bodies will not single out situations in individual countries for 
special comment and criticism.165
Likewise in relation to the Human Rights Committee, Brazil stated:
It is to be noted that under Article 41 the Committee is not given any competence to 
decide complaints or even to make recommendations for their solution.166
No reference was made to the optional protocol to the ICCPR in explaining the potential
breadth of the ICCPR. Although this memorandum was prepared after the conclusion
of the Covenant debates, it is likely that Brazil’s understanding corresponded with those
of the Department of External Affairs as o f the date o f the Covenants being finalised. It
is thus highly significant in demonstrating the minimalist view of international
implementation embraced. If, as is likely, this interpretation was accepted by recipient
Departments, it would have helped to create a sense of complacency about the
significance o f the international implementation bodies.
Certainly, Australian policy-makers in this period remained opposed to the development 
of more interventionist international models of international implementation. Whitlam, 
for instance, wrote to the Solicitor-General, Kenneth Bailey, in 1955 providing adverse 
commentary on Luis Katner’s paper dealing with, inter alia, an International Court of
163 Memorandum to MR Booker, unsigned, 20/10/66, in NAA A 18381, Item 929/4 Pt 21.
164 RF Osborn, Australian representative, A/C.3/SR 1416, 229; 8 November 1966.
165 P Brazil, Background Paper on the Covenants, 27/6/67, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/7 Pt 2.
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Human Rights. Whitlam clearly viewed such a proposal as going outside the realm of
Article 2(7) o f the Charter and the existing realms of international law. He stated: 
the author’s argument fails to recognize that the United Nations is not an organic union 
of any sort, but is merely an organization of sovereign States, the argument also accepts 
the views of the perfectionist school of international lawyers as to interpretation of the 
Charter in relation to human rights and as to the limited effect of Article 2(7)...
The author has too readily accepted the view that International Law has developed to the 
point where individuals may be recognized as subjects. That is only a comparatively 
recent idea and it has certainly not been universally accepted. There is grave doubt, too 
as to whether such an idea and, with it, the idea that a right of petition inheres in the 
individual, should be accepted...167
In a State-centric comment that Spender would no doubt have endorsed, Whitlam 
quoted from Arnold McNair:
However attractive from the point of view of human rights the proposal may be, it must 
be remembered that the litigation of a claim between a private individual and a foreign 
government before an international tribunal is capable of exciting national feelings 
between two States, and I submit that an individual uncontrolled by his Government 
ought not to be allowed to make that possible.. .168
Australia also withheld its support from proposals to establish a High Commissioner for 
Human Rights. In the early 1950s the focus of Australia’s objections was the lack of a 
suitable world climate. Whitlam privately indicated that he saw a role for an Attorney- 
General or High Commissioner for Human Rights.169 Publicly, Australia did not give 
any support to the proposal. In 1965, the United States had renewed its calls for the 
establishment o f such a post. The Australian Mission viewed the United States push in 
cynical terms. To the Department of External Affairs, the Mission declared that the 
United States was attempting to re-assert world leadership and broaden the scope of 
human rights investigations in order to bring to an end the disproportionate attention 
that United States race policies had attracted. The Department o f External Affairs
was forthright in opposing the proposal. First, it expressed the view that the West could 
be unduly harmed since information critical of the West was more readily available to 
communist countries than vice-versa. Secondly, it considered that communist countries 
were unlikely to cooperate with a High Commissioner and feared that African countries
167 Memorandum from HFE Whitlam to Solicitor-General, KH Bailey, 2/8/55, in NAA A 432/68, Item 
68/2797 Pt 3.
168 The quotation was taken from AD McNair, The Development o f International Justice: ibid.
169 Filenote of conversation between HFE Whitlam and unidentified DEA official, 2/52, in NAA A 
1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 10.
170 Cablegram from Australian Mission to the UN to DEA, 18/2/65, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 929/4/11 
Pt 1.
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might move defensively to widen the mandate of the High Commissioner to include (or 
indeed prioritise) issues of colonialism and racial discrimination. Such a move might 
prove embarrassing in light of Australia’s immigration policies. Thirdly, it was 
regarded as expanding the United Nations’ power to look into the internal affairs of 
Member States and that it had been a fundamental tenet of Australian policy that the 
United Nations should not interfere in the domestic policies of members.171
The grounds o f Australian opposition to the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
proposal serve as a useful demonstration of the interplay of factors influencing 
Australian policy. Cold War and anti-colonial tensions were taken into account in 
perceiving that United Nations bodies could be manipulated in terms of the priorities 
they established. At the same time, there was a State-centred attitude, similar to that 
espoused by Spender and Whitlam, that led to challenges being mounted to the United 
Nations’ power to engage in country-specific human rights investigations. Finally, 
there was a desire to avoid adverse comment on Australian policies. Together these 
influences combined to shape a policy of supporting minimalist forms of international 
implementation wherever possible.
To a large extent, the reasons for the adoption of such policies in the Casey and 
Bureaucratic period mirror those applicable in the Spender period. International 
tensions remained high, as anti-colonial sentiments joined with Cold War tensions to 
produce a bitterly divided United Nations. Even had there been less tension, however, 
Australia would still have been likely to adopt restrictive implementation policies in 
view of the State-centrism that had become an entrenched part of Australian policy. 
Spender, Casey and Whitlam, the primary architects of the Australian policy up until 
the mid-1960s took a narrow view of the United Nations’ proper role in the area of 
human rights and an expansive view of the State’s right to limit United Nations 
involvement in human rights. By the late 1960s bureaucratic and political aversion to
171 Cablegram from DEA to Australian Embassy, Washington, 19/11/65, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 
929/4/11 Pt 1.
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being isolated combined with a defensiveness about Australia’s racial record to produce 
a softening o f Australia’s policies. However, viewed in context, these late shifts were 
only superficial in nature. The current favouring minimalist forms o f international 
implementation remained strong.
Conclusion
This Chapter has revealed the shrinking nature of Australia’s enthusiasm for 
international implementation of human rights, at least in the area of civil and political 
rights. Australia in the early Evatt period advanced proposals for judicial modes of 
international adjudication that would involve individuals, non-government 
organisations, the State and the international community. By the late 1960s Australia 
had moved towards withholding support from any but the most narrowly defined 
proposals for inter-State, consensual models of dispute resolution and limited reporting 
obligations. While Liberal Ministers certainly reflected Cold War-style suspicion of 
subversive communist forces, individuals, non-government organisations and States, the 
Cold War does not provide a complete explanation for the shifts. Instead, one must 
look also to the personal political philosophies of the dominant actors about the nature 
of international society, and the role of the State vis-a-vis the individual. Evatt’s early 
focus on the individual as the centre o f States and international society came to be 
replaced by an emphasis on the State championed by Spender and Casey and the 
successive bureaucrats who framed Australian policy. Australia’s final votes in support 
of the implementation procedures thus disguise a myriad of operating, limiting 
assumptions.
In the area o f economic and social rights, there is a slightly different narrative evident in 
this Chapter. Australian policy-makers were consistent in supporting non-judicial 
forms of implementation for economic and social rights. Interestingly, however, 
policy-makers considering the system of periodic reports to the Economic and Social 
Council appeared confident that benchmarks could be established for the achievement
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of economic and social rights. In light of the conclusions of Chapter 5, the benchmarks 
were likely to have been set low, at least by decision-makers in the 1950s and 1960s. 
However, the consistent acceptance by Australian policy-makers o f economic and 
social rights’ amenability to review by external bodies remains significant.
Overall, what this Chapter highlights, is the lack of unanimity among Australian State 
actors concerning the scope of the United Nations’ proper power in relation to human 
rights. The resultant tensions in Australian policy were mirrored in relation to 
Australia’s attitudes towards United Nations involvement in scrutinising human rights 
violations outside the context of the human rights Covenants, a subject dealt with in 
Chapter 7.
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Chapter 7
Human Rights and ‘Domestic Jurisdiction’
Introduction
An underlying tension in negotiations for the International Bill o f Rights was the extent 
to which the United Nations had a valid role in scrutinising the human rights practices 
o f individual countries. The issue of whether human rights were a priori a matter of 
exclusive ‘domestic jurisdiction’ under the United Nations Charter, or conversely were 
a matter of pre-existing ‘international concern’, cut across the boundaries of United 
Nations fora. Attitudes on this point fundamentally affected views on the significance 
to be attributed to the human rights Covenants: that is, whether they constituted new 
and exclusive rules of engagement for the international community in dealing with 
individual States’ infringements of human rights, or whether they would be a counter­
part to the United Nations’ pre-existing authority in the human rights area.
Given the varying invocations and rebuttals of ‘domestic jurisdiction’ arguments by 
Australian delegations seen in Chapter 6, it is useful to complete the discussion of 
Australia’s implementation policies by examining in closer detail the Australian 
approach to the United Nations’ power to scrutinise the human rights practices of States 
otherwise than as endorsed by the draft Covenants. This Chapter focuses on two 
particular aspects o f the domestic jurisdiction debate: (a) the General Assembly’s 
power to discuss and make recommendations concerning individual State’s human 
rights practices under the United Nations Charter and (b) the Commission on Human 
Right’s powers in relation to individual petitions received during the negotiations of the 
International Bill o f Rights. The picture that emerges in relation to each subject reveals 
the complex interplay of legal opinions, international politics, domestic sensitivities and 
dominant personalities in producing at times paradoxical policies.
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A. General Assembly Scrutiny of States’ Human Rights 
Records
Overview of the International Debate
As noted earlier in this thesis, the United Nations Charter committed the United Nations
to the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all. Article 55 of the UN Charter states in part:
With a view to the creation of conditions o f stability and well-being which are 
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination o f peoples, the United Nations 
shall promote:
(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
Member States pledged themselves to take joint and separate action in pursuance of this
aim in Article 56 of the Charter. Article 10 provided that the General Assembly was to
be able to:
discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating 
to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, 
except as provided for in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the 
United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.
The Charter also, however, included an overall qualification. Article 2(7) stated that: 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction o f any 
State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the 
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
In the field of human rights, debate raged as to the significance of Article 2(7). One 
view was that an individual State’s human rights record constituted a matter ‘essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction’ of a State. While the General Assembly would have 
power to discuss human rights in general terms, the effect of Article 2(7) was to prevent 
the General Assembly acquiring any power to discuss and make recommendations on 
an individual State’s human rights record. Another view was that human rights (and 
States’ implementation of them) had been taken out of the scope of matters of domestic 
jurisdiction through being mentioned in Articles 55 and 56. Accordingly, the operation 
of Article 2(7) had no effect in preventing the General Assembly using its Article 10 
power to discuss and make recommendations on an individual State’s human rights
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record. A variant on the non-applicability of Article 2(7) theme was that the General 
Assembly’s action in discussing individual practices did not constitute ‘intervention’ 
under Article 2(7). Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, for instance, advanced the view that 
‘intervention’ required ‘a peremptory demand accompanied by enforcement or the 
threat of enforcement in the case of non-compliance’.1
From its earliest days of operation, the General Assembly was plagued by debate as to 
its proper role when States made allegations of human rights violations against other 
States and wished the General Assembly to take condemnatory action. Some items 
such as concern over the execution of Greek trade unionists in 1949 had only a limited 
shelf-life within the General Assembly whilst other items such as South African 
apartheid policies were to remain on the General Assembly’s agenda for decades. As a 
member of the General Assembly, Australia was required to formulate a position on the 
listing and treatment of these matters.
I. Evatt Period
During the Evatt period, an expansive interpretation was given to the General 
Assembly’s power to consider and take action on the human rights practices within 
individual countries. Notwithstanding Australia’s insistence during negotiations of the 
Charter that Article 2(7) prevented the United Nations from becoming involved with 
matters like Australia’s immigration policy, once the United Nations began operating 
Evatt and Australian delegations were active in encouraging the General Assembly to 
concern itself with human rights violations in Eastern Europe. Divisions of opinion on 
the scope of Article 2(7) as between Evatt and some of his bureaucratic advisers were a 
constant feature of the period, though Evatt’s views enjoyed general priority. At the 
same time, however, Evatt recognised that many members of the international
H Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights, Stevens and Sons, London, 1950, 168. For a 
general account of the debate over domestic jurisdiction, see JES Fawcett, ‘Human Rights and 
Domestic Jurisdiction’, in E Luard (ed), The International Protection o f  Human Rights, Camelot 
Press, London, 1967, Chapter 11.
2 See text below, 273-275.
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community might require further proof of the General Assembly’s power in the form of 
an International Court of Justice judgement and so at times supported referral of the 
‘domestic jurisdiction’ question to the Court. Yet even Evatt was open to softening 
Australia’s stance in order to accommodate competing foreign relations goals, 
particularly the protection of Commonwealth allies.
That Australia should have supported any General Assembly action in relation to the 
human rights practices of individual countries has puzzled a number of commentators 
such as Neville Harper and David Sissons,* 3 Alan Watt,4 Geoffrey Sawer5 and Bill 
Hudson.6 All these commentators have espoused the view that at the San Francisco 
Conference, Evatt was committed to insulating a wide range of domestic policies from 
the scope of international scrutiny. Geoffrey Sawer and Alan Watt, for instance, suggest 
that Evatt’s baseline attitude was to insulate all domestic policies from international 
scrutiny and attribute subsequent exceptions to this policy to political expediency or 
confusion.7 Neville Harper and David Sissons conclude that despite advocating a full 
employment clause, Evatt did not intend for domestic policies aimed at realising full 
employment to be examined internationally.8 According to this accepted wisdom, 
human rights policies, too, would have been regarded as outside the scope of proper 
international jurisdiction. A re-analysis of Australia’s contribution at the San Francisco 
Conference reveals less hostility towards international scrutiny of human rights issues 
than has been hitherto been accepted.
N Harper, D Sissons, Australia and the United Nations, Manhattan Publishing Company, New
York, 1959.
4 A Watt, The Evolution o f Australian Foreign Policy: 1938-1965, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1968.
5 G Sawer, ‘The United Nations’, in G Greenwood, N Harper, Australia in World Affairs: 1950-1955, 
FW Cheshire, Melbourne, 1957, 98-100.
6 WJ Hudson, Australia and the New World Order: Evatt at San Francisco, 1945, Australian Foreign 
Policy Public Program, Australian National University, Canberra, 1993, Chapter 9.
G Sawer, op cit, 98; A Watt, op cit, 89-90. See too P Hasluck, ‘Australia and the Formation o f the 
United Nations: Some Personal Reminiscences’ (1954) 15(3) Royal Australian Historical Society 
Journal and Proceedings 134, 139 where Hasluck states that Australian policy subsequent to San 
Francisco was ‘always confused and self-contradictory on the subject o f domestic jurisdiction’.
8 N Harper, D Sissons, op cit, 62. Harper and Sissons conclude that the position taken by Evatt 
concerning Article 10 of the UN Charter in later discussions o f the General Assembly was 
‘fundamentally inconsistent’ with his stance at San Francisco: ibid 166.
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Evatt certainly spoke in strong terms about the need for Article 2(7) in the United 
Nations Charter. In expressing support for the inclusion of Article 2(7), for instance, 
Evatt stated that its terms were :
really implicit in any organisation that is genuinely international in character. No 
such organisation should be permitted to intervene in those domestic matters in 
which, by definition, international law permits each state entire liberty of action.9
Australia even suggested initially that the clause limit the Security Council’s powers.10
Yet of central importance in the current context was Australia’s proposal that Article
2(7) extend to matters ‘essentially’ within the domestic jurisdiction o f a State, rather
than matters ‘solely’ within the domestic jurisdiction.* 11 Clearly the term ‘essentially’
was intended to cover a broader ambit of domestic policies than the term ‘solely’.12 Yet
the preference for a broader clause does not of itself lead inexorably to the conclusion
that Australia regarded human rights matters as encompassed by the notion of matters
essentially within a State’s domestic jurisdiction.
Rather than referring to the exemption of all domestic policies in advancing the 
amendment, Australian delegations revealed a desire to insulate one specific subject 
area: immigration. In its general report on the San Francisco Conference, for instance, 
the Australian delegation was scathing of the original terminology for Article 2(7) on 
the basis that it might have given the Security Council power to intervene over issues 
such as migration:
under the draft Chapter as it stood [after London], therefore, such matters as 
migration policy would have become subject to the jurisdiction of the Security 
Council immediately an aggressor threatened to use force. Indeed, the Dumbarton 
Oaks text would almost have amounted to an invitation to an aggressor to use force, 
in the hope of inducing the Security Council to extort concessions in the interests of 
maintaining peace.13
9 Memorandum Submitted to Committee 1/1 on 11th June 1945, by Evatt, ‘UN Charter -UNCIO 
Folder’, Evatt Collection, Flinders University.
10 In analysing the Dumbarton Oaks proposal for the Charter, Australia was concerned that if the 
Security Council had power to intervene in domestic matters where peace was threatened, an 
aggressor State might manufacture a threat to the peace in order to wring concessions from a State 
faced with the spectre of Security Council intervention. Australia subsequently directed its attention 
more squarely at limiting the situations in which the Security Council’s powers were engaged: see 
JDE Plant, The Origins and Development of Australia’s Policy and Posture at the United Nations 
Conference on International Organisation, San Francisco, 1945, PhD Thesis, Australian National 
University, 1967,363-5.
11 G Sawer, op cit, 99.
Report on San Francisco Conference, ‘United Nations - Conference on International Organization, 
San Francisco, 1945’ Folder, Evatt Collection, Flinders University.
13 Report on San Francisco Conference, ibid.
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The report also stated that Evatt took the opportunity during the discussion on the 
Australian proposal to make clear that Article 2(7) was ‘a recognition, among other 
things, that migration policy cannot become the subject of any action by the United 
Nations’ outside the Chapter VII context.14
A strong argument can be made that Evatt’s desire to insulate Australian immigration 
policies was not synonymous with an intention to insulate Australia’s ‘human rights 
practices’. From the discussion of substantive rights in Chapters 2 and 3, it will be 
recalled that Australia denied that there was any right to be given asylum or to migrate 
to a particular country. All that would be conceded was a right o f individuals to seek 
asylum.
One piece o f evidence, however, presents a particular challenge. In the course of 
speaking against the Security Council’s potential power to intervene where minorities 
were repressed, the Official Report of the Australian delegation states that Australia 
suggested the treatment o f minorities should be taken ‘out of the ambit of domestic 
jurisdiction’ by the conclusion of a human rights convention. The clear implication of 
this statement was that rights o f minorities could be considered human rights matters 
and also prima facie  within the ‘domestic jurisdiction’ of a State.
Having regard to the terms of the memorandum by Evatt that presumably formed the 
basis of the speech to the San Francisco Conference, it would appear that the 
subsequent Report misstates the intention of Evatt. Evatt’s original memorandum 
stated:
If the members of the Organization really desire to give the Organization the power 
to protect minorities, their proper course is either to declare that they recognize the 
protection of minorities as a matter of legitimate ‘international’ and not merely of 
‘domestic concern’ or to make a formal international convention providing for the 
proper treatment of minorities...
Once a matter is recognized as one of legitimate international concern, no exception 
to the general rule is needed to bring it within the powers o f the Organization. The
14 Ibid.
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general rule ceases to apply as soon as the matter ceases to be one of domestic 
jurisdiction.15
The fuller statement is important in so far as Evatt did not label the treatment of 
minorities a ‘human rights issue’. Nor did he speak o f incorporating the treatment of 
minorities into a ‘human rights convention’. Instead, he referred to the treatment of 
minorities as a distinct subject and affirmed that it, as a subject, was a matter of 
‘domestic jurisdiction’. This too is consistent with Australia’s stance that minorities did 
not have special rights (discussed in Chapter 3). The bureaucrats responsible for the 
final version of the Official Report appear to have introduced the confusing equation of 
minority rights and human rights.16 From Paul Hasluck’s recollections, this may have 
been deliberate. Hasluck reports that even at San Francisco, Alan Watt, Kenneth Bailey 
and Paul Hasluck sought to rein in Evatt’s policies ‘to bring his mind back to some of 
the dangers Australia might be facing’.17 Hasluck admits the example that carried the
1 o
most weight with Evatt was immigration. Having regard to Evatt’s original language, 
it would appear that it was the view of his advisers rather than Evatt that the whole 
category of human rights be exempted. For Evatt, while matters like immigration and 
the treatment of minorities would be exempted under Article 2(7), the United Nations 
would be free to discuss the full range of (properly classified) human rights matters.
Evatt’s (unpublished) records of the San Francisco Conference in fact confirm his 
willingness to have the General Assembly take action in respect o f human rights 
matters. In his draft report on the San Francisco Conference,19 Evatt welcomed the 
prospect of the United Nations taking an active role in considering human rights 
matters. Evatt noted that the Assembly was likely to engage in frank criticism of action 
both national and international likely to prejudice peaceful living:
15 Evatt’s memorandum is quoted in an unpublished paper by the Australian Institute o f International 
Affairs (Commonwealth Council), ‘Australia and UN Intervention’, Carnegie Endowment UN 
Project, Data Paper No 3, in Kenneth Bailey Papers, NLA Manuscript Collection, MS 4622, 2.
16 Paul Hasluck reports that he, Kenneth Bailey, Alan Watt and Ronald Wilson wrote the Official 
Report: P Halsuck, Diplomatic Witness, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1980, 218.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Evatt’s draft Report on the San Francisco Conference, ‘United Nations -  Conference on 
International Organisation, San Francisco, 1945’ Folder, Evatt Collection, Flinders University. The 
report appears to have been finalised by bureaucrats: see fii 16 above.
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[f]or example, the Charter is specific regarding respect for and observance of human
rights. An infringement o f human rights in any country is likely to be commented
20upon.
Viewed in this light, it comes as little surprise that Evatt supported the General 
Assembly’s discussion of, and making of recommendations concerning, specific human 
rights violations. What require more explanation are the reasons for Australia’s 
occasional lapses of enthusiasm for such intervention.
Australian practice in the General Assembly 1946-49
In the matters in which Australia took a prominent role, Australia endorsed a broad 
view of the General Assembly’s potential jurisdiction in human rights matters. This is 
most apparent in the initiative taken by Australia in respect of unfolding events in 
central Europe. In 1948, for instance, Australia took the lead in placing on the General 
Assembly’s agenda the topic of the 'observance o f fundamental freedoms and human 
rights in Bulgaria and Hungary, including the question of religious and civil liberty, in 
special relation to recent trials of Church leaders'.21 Australia was not alone in its 
concern with apparent persecution of religious leaders in Eastern Europe,22 in particular 
with issues relating to the legal proceedings brought against Cardinal Mindszenty of 
Hungary.23 What was remarkable about the Australian stance was that unlike other 
critics who wished to rely purely on breaches o f the Peace Treaties24 to establish the 
United Nations jurisdiction in the matter, Australian delegates relied on Articles 55 and 
56 of the United Nations Charter.
21 The reference to Romania was inserted at the Fourth Session o f the General Assembly.
22 Detailed briefing papers were prepared, for instance by the Commonwealth Secretariat: see 
Cablegram from the Secretary o f State for Commonwealth relations, to DEA, 22/6/49, ‘London: 
January-July 1949’ Folder, Evatt Collection, Flinders University.
23 Cardinal Mindszenty was charged for treason after speaking out against State controls on religion. 
The Hungarian government had suppressed exercise o f the Catholic and Uniate Churches.
24 The Peace Treaties were the treaties negotiated between the allies and central European States at the 
Paris Peace Conference of 1946. The treaties included a provision obliging States to respect human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. As to the Paris Peace Conference, see: S Kertesz, The Last 
European Peace Conference: Paris 1946- Conflict o f  Values, University Press o f America, 
Lanham, 1985; Reliance on the Peace Treaties giving rise to an international situation was the 
preferred approach of, for instance, the United Kingdom: see Note by TG Glasheen on Violation of 
Fundamental Human Rights by Satellite States, 17/3/49, inNAA A 1838/283, Item 852/10/18 Pt 1
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In putting forward the topic for consideration by the General Assembly, Evatt, then 
Chair of the General Committee of the General Assembly, advanced a broad view of the 
General Assembly’s legal competence. First, Evatt referred to Article 10 of the United 
Nations Charter:
The right o f discussion provided for in Article 10 o f the Charter was one o f its most 
important provisions. There was not a single question or matter coming within the 
scope o f the charter, relating to its aims, its principles, or any o f its provisions, 
which could not be discussed by the General Assembly. If any question was 
covered by an article o f the Charter, that question would no longer be a matter 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction o f a State.25
Given that Article 55 imposed a duty on the United Nations to work in the field of 
human rights, Evatt argued that the General Assembly, through the combined operation 
of Article 10 and Article 55, had competence to consider the observance/non­
observance of human rights by a United Nations State member. More audaciously, 
Evatt supported the United Nations having the power to consider the human rights 
records of States wrhich were not members of the United Nations on the basis that 
Article 10 was ‘essentially universal’ in scope.
By outlining the attempts Australia had previously made to determine what was 
happening in Cardinal Mindszenty’s trial in Hungary, Evatt may have been implying 
that international discussion and action should be regarded as a last resort after State to 
State dialogue had failed. Evatt informed the General Committee that Australia had 
made six attempts to obtain permission for its representatives to be present at the trial as 
observers.27 Indeed, Australia continued to make individual representations to Hungary 
in relation to the ongoing trials of religious leaders. What Evatt was rejecting,
however, was that inter-State approaches constituted the only means of redress available 
for concerned States. Evatt was happy for the details of the alleged violations to be 
evaluated by the General Assembly. In 1949, for instance, Norman Makin, the 
Australian representative, presented a summary of the evidence before the Political 
Committee to the General Assembly. He spoke at length on the evidence available to
25
26
27
28
Evatt’s statement quoted in the unpublished paper, ‘Australia and UN Intervention’, op cit, 6.
Dr HV Evatt, Chair of General Committee, UN Doc A/GC/ SR 58, 15; 6 April 1949.
Ibid.
See for example, Cablegram from DEA to High Commissioner's Office, London, 22/1/49, ‘Cables - 
London - August-November 1949’ Folder, Evatt Collection, Flinders University.
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the Commission concerning the breaches of human rights. He outlined allegations 
concerning improper interference in the administration of justice, control of the legal 
profession, inequality under the law, and interferences in individuals’ freedom of 
religion.29
In participating in this debate, Australia was not simply supporting a position of 
generally ‘discussing’ the practices. It was pushing for the General Assembly to pass a 
Resolution stating that the actions in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania were a matter of 
general concern and warranted the appointment of an investigative committee under
i n
Article 55. Only when it was apparent that a majority o f delegates would not support 
a strongly worded condemnatory Resolution did Australia move to supporting 
Resolutions referring primarily to the treaties and the European powers’ responsibilities 
to participate in conflict resolution procedures under those treaties.31 In 1949 Australia 
voted with the majority for referral of the question whether a dispute under the Peace 
Treaties existed to the International Court of Justice.32
It is noticeable that, in their advocacy of General Assembly action, Australian delegates 
did not mention Article 2(7) of the Charter. In their view the express powers given to 
the United Nations (Article 10, in combination with Articles 55 and 56) were sufficient 
to establish the General Assembly’s power. Article 2(7) had no relevance in that it 
neither granted nor took away the power of the Assembly. This view is clearer in the 
debates concerning international implementation of human rights discussed previously 
in Chapter 6. At the Paris Peace Conference, for instance, the Australian delegates’ 
Brief included a statement by Professor Norman Bentwich that cases involving human 
rights:
are not matters of purely domestic character such as are excluded from the
intervention of the organ o f the United Nations, for one o f the main purposes o f the
29 N Makin, Australian representative, UN Doc A/SR 235, 148; 22 October 1949.
30 N Harper, D Sissons, op cit, 151.
31 As to the Resolutions, see ibid.
32 Ibid. The International Court o f Justice in 1950 determined that the central question for it to answer 
was whether the settlement o f dispute procedures under the Peace Treaties was applicable, a 
question which it said was clearly international in character such that it was not necessary for the 
court to consider the scope of Article 2(7): see Interpretation o f Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Romania, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep 1950, 65. A further ruling was handed down 
after States refused to appoint representatives to a settlement procedure: ICJ Rep 1950, 221.
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United Nations Organization is to secure those human rights and every member of 
the United Nations Organisation is obligated to assure them to all the inhabitants of 
its territories.33
Human rights were thus perceived as matters of international concern, justifying 
international action.
Admittedly, Australia did not always push strongly for immediate General Assembly 
action on human rights violations. Australia made no statement in relation to Soviet 
attempts to have a Resolution calling upon the Greek government to stay the execution 
of Greek trade unionists at the Third Session of the General Assembly .34 When the 
issue of the freedom of movement of Russian women married to foreigners was raised 
in the General Assembly, Australia supported a Chilean proposed Resolution 
condemning the Russian actions, but also suggested that the International Court of 
Justice be requested for an opinion on whether international law had been breached.35 
More notoriously, Australia did not support broadly worded Resolutions condemning 
South Africa for its treatment of its Indian population.36 Its practice in relation to the 
Indian item was indeed variable. In the First Session o f the General Assembly Australia 
supported reference o f the ‘domestic jurisdiction’ question to the International Court of 
Justice.37 At the Second Session Australia voted against a Resolution calling upon the 
interested States to have a round-table discussion and condemning South African 
action. It supported, however, a Resolution calling upon the parties to attempt to 
mediate and conciliate the issue and, failing that, to refer the matter to the International
33 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, in NAA A 1067/1, Item E 
46/36/8.
34 For further details of the Australian stance, see N Harper, D Sissons, op cit, 153. Note though 
Harper and Sissons take a different view of the significance o f Australia’s abstention -  suggesting 
that Australia might have been expected to vote against the Resolution had it not been for its 
concern at the actions of the Greek government.
35 See N Harper, D Sissons, op cit, 152. Australians sought clarification o f whether restrictions on the 
movements of members of the families of foreign diplomats was contrary to international law. The 
allegation was that the Soviet Union was preventing the Soviet-bom wives of foreigners to leave 
Russia to join their husbands.
36 India in 1946 complained that contrary to its agreement with South Africa (the Cape Town 
Agreement of 1927) and the UN Charter, South Africa was discriminating against persons of Indian 
ethnic origin living in South Africa. India was particularly incensed by the Asian Land Tenure and 
Indian Representation Act 1946 that limited where Indians could reside and purchase land: see N 
Harper, D Sissons, op cit, 146.
37 Australia did not comment on initial discussions of the matter and opposed the original 
condemnatory Resolution of the General Assembly. In the plenary session, Australia supported an 
alternate proposal to request an advisory opinion on Article 2(7): ibid.
38 Australia’s attitude discussed: ibid, 147.
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Court of Justice. By the Third Session, Australia supported a United Nations 
sponsored round-table discussion.40
Rather than revealing growing doubts as to the General Assembly’s powers, this mixed 
practice appears to have been influenced by political factors. In none of these cases did 
Australia speak against the General Assembly’s power to consider and take action on 
the various topics. In the ‘Greek trade unionists’ case, Australia abstained on a 
Resolution denying the Assembly’s competence in the matter.41 In the debates on South 
Africa, despite pressure from South Africa and the United Kingdom for Australia to 
support their Article 2(7)-based objections, Australia desisted. A cablegram from the 
delegation to the Department of External Affairs in 1946 made clear the contemporary 
understanding: ‘We understand our instructions are not to support contention that the 
Assembly is barred by Article 2(7) from discussing the matter'. The delegation instead 
sought specific directions on the matter of an advisory opinion of the court on the 
jurisdiction matter.42 In such circumstances, Australia’s support for referral to the 
International Court of Justice seems to have been motivated by a desire that the matter 
be resolved so that time-consuming debates on the matter could be avoided. It was thus 
seen as a means o f supporting, rather than undermining, General Assembly action.
More prosaic political motivations also came into play in shaping Australia’s policy on 
General Assembly Resolutions concerning South Africa. A desire to avoid offending 
South Africa was clearly a major determinant of Australia’s prevarication over the 
South Affican-Indian item. Memoranda originating in the Australian Mission to the 
United Nations refer to a desire to avoid the prospect of embarrassing British
39 Ibid.
40 Australia initially proposed a Resolution that called on the governments to renew their efforts to 
reach an agreement without mentioning the UN Charter or the Declaration. When this proposal 
failed, Australia supported the French-Mexican proposal for a round-table discussion of India, 
Pakistan and South Africa ‘taking into consideration the purposes and principles’ o f the UN Charter 
and the Declaration: N Harper, D Sissons, op cit, 148.
41 Ibid, 147.
42 Cablegram from Australian Delegation to UN Assembly to DEA, 1/11/46, in NAA A 1067/1, M 
46/21/7 Pt 1.
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Commonwealth relationships with South Africa, India or the United Kingdom.43 When
South Africa’s policies with respect to South-West Africa were raised in the Fourth
Committee, Evatt spoke strongly in favour of South Africa’s record:
South Africa was one of the few nations that from the beginning stood firm against 
aggression. So let those who are so ready to pass judgement upon others take all this 
into account.... I pay tribute to Mr Lawrence and General Smuts for the magnificent 
war job o f the Union of South Africa. I do not like their being pilloried here. Nor do I 
like to enter upon a comparison of the conditions in South Africa as far as freedom and 
practice o f democracy.44
That Australia took such a strong stand in support of the General Assembly’s 
competency seems referable to Evatt’s personal views rather than those of his 
bureaucratic advisers. Indeed, there is significant evidence that Evatt’s advisers tended 
towards a more conservative view of the General Assembly’s powers. Evatt was 
encouraged by Terence Glasheen, a Department of External Affairs officer, to rely on 
the Peace Treaties to establish the General Assembly’s jurisdiction. Evatt declined to 
do so on the basis that the Peace Treaties lacked an appropriate remedies clause and that 
therefore the General Assembly was a preferable forum for discussion and action.45 
The Attorney-General’s Department took a cautious approach to the ‘domestic 
jurisdiction’ question. In an unsigned memorandum bearing the style o f Kenneth 
Bailey, for instance, the view was stated that the issues raised in the Indian complaints 
against South Africa were taken outside the scope of Article 2(7) only by the existence 
of the international agreements concerning the treatment of Indians such as the 
Capetown Agreement of 1927 and of the statement o f 1932 46 This approach was 
inconsistent with Evatt’s approach to Hungary and Bulgaria.
44 Speech by Evatt in Committee Four -  Trusteeship, 8 October 1947, in NAA A 1068, Item PI 
47/5/3/1; quoted by K Buckley, B Dale, W Reynolds, Doc Evatt: Patriot, Internationalist, Fighter 
and Scholar, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1994, 307.
45 see Note by TG Glasheen on Violation of Fundamental Human Rights by Satellite States, 17/3/49, 
in NAA A 1838/283, Item 852/10/18 Pt 1, and Cablegram from Australian Embassy, Washington to 
Evatt, 16/3/49, in NAA A 1838/283, Item 852/10/18 Pt 1. As to Evatt’s response, see Cablegram 
from DEA to Australian High Commissioner’s Office, London, 17/3/49, in NAA A 1838/283, Item 
852/10/18 Pt 1. The exchange was re-run in substantially similar terms in August and September, 
1949: See, TG Glasheen, Memorandum to Minister, 5/9/49, in NAA A 1838/283, Item 852/10/18 
Pt 4; and Cablegram from DEA to Australian Delegation to UN, 15/9/49, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 
852/10/18 Pt 6.
46 Attorney-General’s Department Memorandum on Article 2(7), 2/8/46, in NAA A 1067/1, Item 
M46/21/7 Pt 1.
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On at least one occasion, the Australian delegation acted in accordance with a view 
closer to that o f Bailey and Glasheen than Evatt. John Hood, as Australian delegate, 
reported to the Department in 1949 that he had been approached by a United States non­
government organisation seeking to have the Ingram case47 reviewed by the United 
Nations. Without seeking instructions on the matter, Hood declined any assistance on 
the ground that the United Nations had no capacity to deal with the matter until the 
Covenant was finalised and an implementing body established.48 Even when the 
Cardinal Mindszenty trial was offered as a precedent for action, Hood responded that an 
individual human rights complaint was distinguishable from a violation that represented 
also a breach o f treaty.49 Hood thus noted with satisfaction that the non-government 
organisation would be in no doubt that Australia would be unlikely to support action in 
the General Assembly.50 Hood’s response was clearly at variance with the approach 
authorised by Evatt. It, together with the correspondence of Glasheen and Bailey, 
shows a significant fracturing o f opinion as between the bureaucratic and political 
levels.
Looking at the Evatt period overall, however, Australian policy was marked by an 
acceptance o f the General Assembly’s power to discuss and make recommendations 
concerning the human rights practices of individual States, even o f non-United Nations 
member States. This competency was not based on the international community’s 
drafting of the UDHR or attempts to draft a binding Covenant, but was seen as referable 
to the original conception of the United Nations in Articles 10, 55 and 56 of the United 
Nations Charter. Although awareness of the controversy surrounding Article 2(7) and 
political sensitivities influenced the extent to which Australia supported the General 
Assembly taking action, Australia was adamant that there was no bar to the General 
Assembly taking action should a majority of parties request such action. Rather than 
being a consensus view of all Australians involved in policy-making at the time,
47 According to the material left by the NGO, the Ingram case concerned the alleged mistrial o f an 
African American.
48 Letter from Australian Mission to the United Nations to DEA, 16/8/49, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 
856/13 Pt 5.
49 Ibid.
50 TU; A
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Australia’s position seems to have been shaped primarily by Evatt’s view of the proper 
relationship between international society and individual States. The influence of 
Evatt’s views, however, was short-lived. During later periods of policy development 
successive Australian policy-makers reflected a startlingly different approach.
II. Spender Period
When Spender came to office in late 1949 Australia’s public stance on Article 2(7) 
underwent a dramatic change. Human rights were ipso facto a matter of ‘domestic 
jurisdiction’. Article 2(7) was seen as a bar to all United Nations action in the field of 
individual countries’ human rights practices subject to that State giving consent or 
States having entered into a treaty that removed the topic from domestic jurisdiction. 
Any action by the General Assembly in relation to the human rights practices of States, 
whether it be the inscription of an item on the General Assembly’s agenda, discussion 
of the item or the making of recommendations, constituted prohibited ‘interference’. 
Within the General Assembly this policy was most evident in Australian policy with 
respect to ongoing discussion of South Africa’s treatment of its Indian population.
In 1950 Spender directed that Australia should regard the South African item on the 
General Assembly’s agenda as governed by the ‘domestic jurisdiction clause’. South 
Africa was to be supported in its resistance to any General Assembly action, though 
Australia was also to support informal efforts to ‘get the countries together’.51 
Delegates were told to 'lend whatever support we can to South Africa (on the issue of 
Indians in South Africa), as he (Minister) regards the question of domestic jurisdiction 
as being of overriding importance' regardless of the merits or demerits of the South 
African policies towards the Indians.52 The Australian representative, Keith Officer, 
maintained this public line, but was forthright privately in his estimation that Australia 
would not be generally supported in its stance on Article 2(7):
51 Quoted in Department of External Affairs Memorandum concerning Australian policy to date on 
South Africa, 30/8/50, in NAA A1838/283; Item 201/2/5/2 Pt 2.
52 Quoted in memorandum to the Secretary, DEA, 14/11/50, in NAA A 1838/283, Item 201/2/5/2 Pt 2. 
Bracketed material in the original.
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There is little open support for our views on domestic jurisdiction the prevailing 
attitude being that the Assembly has acquiesced three times already in a discussion 
on the subject.53
Australia also reconsidered its support for referring the issue o f the General Assembly’s 
jurisdiction over South African racial policies to the International Court of Justice. In 
late 1950, the Department of External Affairs sent a telegram to the Australian Mission 
stating
Recent statements o f Australian policy have stressed need for strict adherence to 
Article 2(7) and this must be kept in mind in considering out[sic] attitude towards a 
reference to the Court. If it could be assumed that the Court would give an extensive 
interpretation to domestic jurisdiction it might be advantageous to obtain an advisory 
opinion and to support a United Kingdom resolution, particularly if  acceptable to 
South Africa. However, as it is difficult to anticipate what attitude the Court might 
adopt, we feel you should endeavour to avoid taking up a position on reference to 
the Court until we are in a position to discuss the question with the Minister.54
When consulted, Spender was not confident in the outcome of international litigation.
The delegation were thus informed of Spender’s view that:
it is not in Australian interest for us to facilitate any reference to the Court which 
might result in a rigid definition of the scope of 'domestic jurisdiction' which we 
might be unable to accept.55
The Spender period was thus noteworthy for its introduction o f a narrow formalistic 
approach to Article 2(7) and the powers o f the General Assembly. There is little 
evidence o f any dissent to this approach by bureaucrats, a fact that is not surprising 
given the extent to which Spender’s views accorded with many senior bureaucrats who 
had served during the Evatt period. Yet it was Spender who was the main player in 
determining Australia’s shift away from supporting General Assembly action in 
scrutinising the human rights record of individual countries. To a large extent 
Spender’s resistance appears to have been linked to his wariness concerning the 
political nature o f the United Nations, discussed previously in Chapter 6. His solution, 
however, was not to seek General Assembly endorsement o f ‘non-political’ inquiries 
into abuses such as the appointment of a neutral Rapporteur. Instead his response was 
to completely reject the General Assembly’s powers. His response thus revealed a 
fundamentally different approach to the desirable relationship between the United
53 Cablegram from FK Officer to AS Watt, 15/11/50, in NAA A 1838/283; Item 201/2/5/2 Pt 2.
54 Cablegram from DEA to Australian delegation to UN, 15/11/50, in NAA A 1838/1; Item 201/2/5/2 
Ptl .
55 Cablegram for FK Officer from AS Watt, 16/11/50 in NAA A 1838/283; Item 201/2/5/2 Pt 2.
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Nations and the individual State than that adopted by Evatt. For Spender, the rules of 
engagement had been previously set by the Charter in favour of State discretion over 
matters of human rights. Such a balance of interests could only be overturned through 
the consensual acts of States.
III. Casey and Bureaucratic Period
For most o f the Casey period (1951-9) Australia’s position remained unchanged.
Despite some internal questioning of the policy in the early years, the conservative 
legalism of the major players, a distrust of the United Nations and Australia’s growing 
sense of vulnerability to international attack reinforced Australia’s devotion to an 
‘exclusionary reading’ of Article 2(7). In the years 1959-1961 Australia reluctantly 
surrendered its opposition to General Assembly action with respect to South African 
apartheid policies in an attempt to avoid becoming internationally isolated and 
stigmatised. Despite this shift, however, Australia’s fundamental policy of principled 
resistance to discussion of individual human rights matters and championing of Article 
2(7) was retained. Given the prominence of the South African race-related items 
internationally, the following discussion looks first to Australia’s policies in this area 
before looking at Australian policy more generally.
South African Race Related Items
In the initial years of the Casey ministry (1951-2) it appeared likely that Australia
would lessen its Article 2(7)-based objections to General Assembly Resolutions
directed at South Africa’s treatment o f its Indian population. Within the Department of
External Affairs there was some questioning of the propriety and utility of Australia’s
stance. In 1951 an Assistant Secretary of the Department of External Affairs concluded
that it was difficult to advise whether Australia should vote against or merely abstain on
motions concerning South Africa’s treatment o f its Indian population.56 While aware of
the sensitivities concerning unjustified intervention in domestic policies in Australia
56 Memorandum from Assistant Secretary, United Nations Section, to the Secretary, DE A, 29/12/51 in 
NAA A 1838/283; Item 201/2/5/2 Pt 2.
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such as immigration policies, the Assistant Secretary considered the domestic
jurisdiction argument to be weak in the particular case of South Africa and the treatment
of Indians given the involvement of international agreements. He thus concluded: 
International jurists are not by any means unanimous on this question but the better 
opinion seems to be hardening against denying competence to the United Nations where 
international agreements have removed a matter from purely domestic concern; NZ and 
UK will be abstaining.57
In the Sixth Session of the General Assembly, the delegation was ordered not to refer to 
the domestic jurisdiction argument unless compelled to do so.58 The South African 
withdrawal from the General Assembly discussions in the Sixth Session was perceived 
as leaving Australia in an embarrassing situation.59 In the lead-up to the Seventh 
Session Casey approved an approach being made to the South Africans to explain and 
clarify the Australian intention to abstain rather than oppose Resolutions. South Africa 
was to be informed that Australia’s interests in South and South East Asia ‘now oblige 
us to take a less positive attitude, and that while we will not support United Nations 
“intervention”, we may refrain from participating in both discussion and voting.’60 By 
the Seventh Session of the General Assembly, the delegation was ordered not to take an 
active part in the discussion, accepting that since the item had been discussed by six 
Assembly sessions with overwhelming majority support, there was de facto recognition 
of United Nations competence.61 Had it not been for the listing of the apartheid matter 
and the influence o f Percy Spender and Kenneth Bailey, it is possible that Australia 
would have henceforth adopted a low-key approach of abstaining in relation to all 
human rights agenda items in the General Assembly.
The listing o f apartheid as a separate item on the General Assembly’s agenda in 1952 
provoked renewed concern about General Assembly action. In September 1952 the 
Solicitor-General, Kenneth Bailey, together with the major human rights adviser in 
Attorney-General’s Department, Leslie Lyons, met with the legal adviser to the
57 1bid.
58 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the Sixth Session of the General Assembly, Item 25, in NAA 
A 1838/283; Item 201/2/5/2 Pt 2.
59 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the Seventh Session of the General Assembly, Item 22, in 
NAA A 1838/283, Item 852/20/2.
60 Ibid.
61 tu:a
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Department o f External Affairs, Dr Anstey Wynes, to discuss the proper interpretation 
o f Article 2(7). Kenneth Bailey expressed the view that Article 2(7) was paramount 
over all other clauses of the United Nations Charter, and that the historic intention of 
Article 2(7) had been to prevent discussion of any internal matters including human 
rights.62 According to Bailey, Article 55 was not inconsistent with Article 2(7) -  it 
merely permitted the General Assembly to take general action in the human rights field, 
such as its establishment of the Commission on Human Rights. Dr Wynes was not 
persuaded. He considered that Article 55 and 56 demonstrated an intention to permit 
the General Assembly to discuss and make non-binding recommendations in relation to 
specific human rights matters.63 Ultimately, however, it was Kenneth Bailey’s view of 
Article 2(7) that won the day. The delegation was directed to fight strongly against the 
listing and discussion of apartheid and to oppose or abstain if  isolated on further 
General Assembly action on the treatment of Indians in South Africa.64
The themes incorporated in the Australian delegates’ directions on the Indian item were
to be echoed in Australian speeches throughout the 1952-1959 period. The
supplementary section to the Brief for the Seventh Session of the General Assembly
reminded the delegation of the competency limits of the General Assembly, and also
warned of the dangerous precedent value for discussions of race related issues:
Australia has opposed such infringements in the past and the Indian complaint 
affords no good ground for changing this policy. Moreover, if  the Indian complaint 
be accepted, it will establish an unfavourable precedent for future enquiries into 
other countries' domestic affairs, for example, Australia's treatment o f aborigines.
The Brief also questioned the utility o f General Assembly action. Rather than
persuading South Africa to change its policies, General Assembly action could be
expected to aggravate racial conflict.66 There was also fear expressed that India might
62 Memorandum by Dr WA Wynes on Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations, 29/9/52, in 
NAA A 1838/2, Item 852/10/2/1 TEMP. Note, too that Arthur Tange, the then Assistant Secretary 
of the Department o f External Affairs questioned this interpretation o f history -  considering that 
Australia’s support for the full employment pledge indicated support for international involvement 
in such matters.
63 Ibid.
64 See Brief for the Australian Delegation to the Eighth Session o f the General Assembly, in NAA A 
1838/283, Item 852/10/2/3 Pt 3.
65 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the Seventh Session o f the General Assembly, Supplementary 
Item, in NAA A 1838/283, Item 852/10/2/3 Pt 1.
66 Ibid.
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be encouraged by success in the General Assembly to exert further influence in African 
affairs.67 The Seventh Session Brief permitted the delegation to abstain should it find
zr o
itself isolated. Indeed, in the years up to 1961 Australia more commonly abstained on
Resolutions than opposed them. It was not until 1961 that Australia spoke again at 
length on the Indian item. By this time, the politicisation of apartheid had occurred to 
such an extent to make Australia unwilling to make the high political price for 
continued support for South Africa.69
In contrast to its dealings on the Indian item, Australia showed no inclination to adopt 
the neutral stance of abstaining in the early years of responding to the General 
Assembly’s listing of the apartheid item. When the issue was first raised in the Seventh 
Session of the General Assembly in 1952 Australia responded with a vehemence similar 
to that employed in the Spender period. Australia argued that South Africa’s treatment 
of its own people was a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of South 
African and thus outside the proper realm of the General Assembly. Notwithstanding
70strong support from the United States for the General Assembly to take on such a role,
Australian delegates branded the action as ‘indefensible’.71 When the issue was
referred to an Ad Hoc Political Committee in 1952, Patrick Shaw, as Australia’s
representative in that Committee rejected claims that Australia was being narrowly
legalistic for reasons of self-interest:
We are on a slippery path if  we speak vaguely of the 'ever-expanding competence' o f  
the United Nations without defining what we mean. What some people mean is to 
disregard the Charter whenever they think it expedient, so to do...The words 'nothing 
contained in this Charter' mean what they say, and it is difficult to see how 
provisions such as those o f Article 55 and 56 can be held to create overriding 
obligations....72
68 Ibid.
69 Australia changed to voting in favour of condemnatory Resolutions in 1961; in relation to the South 
African-Indian item, see Submission to the Minister for External Affairs, 11/4/61, in NAA A 
1838/2, Item 852/10/2/3 Pt 10.
70 Cablegram from Australian Mission to the UN to DEA, 8/11/52, in NAA A 1838/283, Item 
201/2/5/2 Pt 2.
71 Ibid.
72 Statement by the Australian Delegate in the Ad Hoc Political Committee, Mr Patrick Shaw, 14 
November 1952 in NAA A 1838/283, Item 852/10/2/3 Pt 1; a summary record is in UN Doc 
AC.61/SR 16, 83; 14 November 1952.
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Shaw steadfastly refused to comment on the South African legislation. He suggested 
that since each country had its own political and moral philosophy, its own economic 
and social history and consequently its own laws and customs, it could not be expected 
that all States would approve each other’s laws.73 The point was not the merits or 
demerits of a State’s laws, but whether such domestic laws came within the competence 
o f the United Nations. The Australian view was that they did not. Furthermore, Shaw 
rejected the view that discussion could be considered non-intervention and thus 
permissible under Article 2(7):
As we see it, the word 'intervene' in Article 2(7) means what it says. Its simple Latin 
derivation means 'to come between'. It has been claimed here that mere discussion 
or perhaps even the passage of a resolution does not constitute intervention. I think 
that we need only cast our minds back over the progress o f this debate so far to see 
that discussion in itself is intervention.
Shaw finished his speech with gloomy predictions for the history o f the United Nations 
if  it persisted with such intervention: 'we are convinced that in the end we may destroy 
and not consolidate the institution to which we are all committed'.74
In each subsequent session of the General Assembly up until 1959, Australian delegates
affirmed the illegitimacy of United Nations action in the field. In 1953, for instance,
Australians characterised Article 2(7) as having a dual nature. Not only was it designed
as a prohibition on United Nations action, but it encompassed also an obligation on
States to respect the domestic jurisdiction of other States. Instead of leading to
productive change, passing further Resolutions would prove ‘abortive’ and would lower
the prestige o f the United Nations. Supporting an internally-driven, rather than
externally-driven, model of change, the Australian delegate proclaimed in 1953:
is it [the United Nations] to recommend measures to force a change in the psychological 
and moral attitude of the people of South Africa? Even those powers who have held for 
a period supreme sovereign power over other peoples have not been able to effect
this...it seems to use that in accordance with fundamental democratic principles the 
• • ISimpetus for such a change must come from within...
In challenging the legitimacy of the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation 
in the Union o f South Africa in 1955, a distinction was drawn between the objectives of 
the United Nations and obligations of member States. While the United Nations was
73
74
75
Ibid.
Ibid.
1953 statement on South African apartheid policies, in NAA A 1838/283, Item 852/10/2/3 Pt 3.
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obliged to promote human rights, member States were bound to respect the internal 
authority of other States.76 It was not until 1955 that Australian delegates incorporated 
an appeal to the self-interest of other States in their speeches. Unconstitutional action, 
such as that undertaken by the special Commission, was said to carry its own evils, 
setting a precedent ‘dangerous to those who endorsed it’.77 Unswayed by the fact that it 
was continuously outvoted, Australia portrayed itself as standing up for principle and 
minimised the significance of the majority opinion on the basis that ‘repetition of an 
error did not make it a truth.’78 It was not until 1959 that there was any softening of this 
line.
Recalling the discussions between Kenneth Bailey, Solicitor-General, and Dr Wynes, 
the Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs, it would appear that Australian 
hard-line attitudes on Article 2(7) were based on a bona fide  belief that Australia’s 
stance was in conformity with the proper interpretation o f the United Nations Charter.
Sir Percy Spender, who by this period was Australia’s Ambassador to the United States 
and involved in some representational work at the United Nations, was also an adherent 
of an ‘exclusionary’ reading of Article 2(7). '9 In a climate in which Menzies and 
successive External Affairs Ministers decried the United Nations’ tendency to usurp the 
role of States, particularly in criticising administering powers, it is not surprising that 
the official policy was to continue to push for restrictive interpretations o f General 
Assembly power. From the Briefs for various delegations, it would also appear that 
Australia was feeling increasingly vulnerable concerning the precedent value of 
permitting the General Assembly to evaluate and condemn South Africa’s apartheid 
policies. Specifically, mention was made of Australia’s vulnerability concerning its 
Aboriginal policies. The obstructionist policies of 1951-1959 thus bear the hallmarks o f
76 UN Doc A/AC.80/SR 11, 38-39; 7 November 1955.
77 Ibid.
78 TW Cutts, Australian representative, A/SPC/SR 94, 43; 21 October 1958.
79 His influence can be seen in relation to discussion of the Tunisian matter discussed later in this 
Chapter.
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the conservative legalism and State interest that determined Australia’s response to self- 
determination in the mid-1950s.80
1959 was a watershed year. It was the year in which Australian delegations began 
abstaining rather than voting against Resolutions concerning South African apartheid 
policies. Political expediency rather than principle prompted the move. In an internal 
memorandum prepared for the Minister for External Affairs, Department of External 
Affairs’ officials expressed resentment at the pronounced tendency amongst communist 
powers to engage in ‘a complete travesty o f the truth’ whereby Australia’s refusal to 
support General Assembly action was interpreted as sympathy for the policies o f South 
Africa.81 The memorandum went on to point out the risks to Australia’s foreign 
relations should Australia persist in its continued opposition. Seven Commonwealth 
countries including Canada and New Zealand were by 1959 voting for the adoption o f 
moderate Resolutions. Australia was laying itself open to attacks that it had something 
to conceal and that alignment with South Africa on a racial issue stimulated the belief 
that Australia was guided by racial considerations like the White Australia policy. To 
alter Australia’s vote to abstaining would permit it to maintain that it was not putting 
expediency before principle and avoid prejudicing its relations with its Asian
o 9
neighbours.
Notwithstanding the United Kingdom’s urgings that Australia remain steadfastly 
against General Assembly action,83 Garfield Barwick, as Acting Minister for External 
Affairs, agreed to a change o f vote. The only proviso was that Australian delegates 
record the retention of Australia’s views on the General Assembly’s lack of 
competence.84 On his return, Casey endorsed the change of position.85 The delegate in
80 See Chapter 3.
81 Quoted in Memorandum by RL Harry, ‘The Australian Vote on Apartheid’, prepared for Senator 
Gorton, 11/4/61; in NAA A 1838/2, Item 852/10/2/3 Pt 10.
82 Memorandum from DJ Munro to the Secretary, DEA, 26/10/59, in NAA A 1838/283; Item 
852/10/2/3 Pt 6.
83 Record o f Conversation with Mr N Pritchard, Acting High Commission for the United Kingdom, 
unsigned, 6/11/59, in NAA A 1838/283; Item 852/10/2/3 Pt 6.
84 Cablegram from AH Tange to J Plimsoll, 3/11/59, in NAA A 1838/283, Item 852/10/2/3 Pt 6.
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1959 thus abstained on the adoption of a condemnatory Resolution, explaining that
86Australia wished to make clear its lack of support for apartheid.
Australia’s political leaders were certainly not willing to surrender all objections to
General Assembly action in relation to individual human rights matters. Prime Minister
Menzies upheld the principle o f non-interference in both the General Assembly, and in
relation to other collective association of States, such as the Commonwealth.87 When
challenged in the House of Representatives on his stance on South Africa, Menzies was
forthright in outlining the matters of principle and State self-interest at stake:
To ignore this principle of non-interference would be to make domestic policies 
matters of international jurisdiction. That, I venture to say, would do much to create 
hostilities in the international atmosphere far greater than those which now exist 
[after referring to native populations and Australia’s responsibilities]... If we are too 
free in asserting that what happens in South Africa is a matter for international 
jurisdiction, we may well step out of the light into the darkness on this matter. We 
may well find that, the door having been opened in that way, somebody will be 
willing to assert, at some time or other, in some circumstances, that we, in relation 
either to our own internal population or to the population of our territories, are also 
subject to international condemnation and international jurisdiction.88
When a Labor Member of Parliament inteijected with the comment ‘And so we should
be!’, Menzies attempted to highlight the hypocrisy of Labor which had not sought
United Nations scrutiny of other human rights abuses:
I did not hear a word from the honourable member for Sydney when men, women 
and children were shot down in their homes by the Mau Mau....My advice, and the 
advice of the Government of this country, is that, whilst nobody need restrain his 
individual indignation or feelings, we, as the government, should be careful not to 
abandon firm international ground in order to secure the advantage of some 
temporary feeling on this matter. We have our future to consider. We have also the 
whole of the relations between Commonwealth countries to consider....89
Such statements by Menzies indicated his firm ongoing commitment to Article 2(7) and
the principle o f non-intervention in domestic matters.
In 1961 a dramatic unexpected shift occurred. Australia announced that it would no 
longer object to the General Assembly’s power to pass Resolutions condemning
85 Cablegram from Australian Mission to the UN to DEA, 5/11/59, in NAA A 1838/283, Item 
852/10/2/3 Pt 6.
86 A press conference was also held to explain the change of vote: see: Extract from Prime Ministers' 
Press Conference, 13 November 1959, in NAA A 1838/283; Item 852/10/2/3 Pt 6.
87 As to Menzies’ attempts to prevent Commonwealth consideration of South African policies, see: 
RG Menzies, Afternoon Light: Some Memories o f Men and Events, Penguin Books, Melbourne, 
1969, 189-201.
88 Excerpt of Menzies response to a question from F Chaney MP, 29/3/60 in NAA A 1838/2, Item 
852/10/2/1 TEMP.
89 Interjection was made by Eddie Ward MP, see Excerpt: ibid.
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apartheid and moved to support elements of the Resolutions then being proposed.
Given the timing of the Australian announcement, in the year following following the 
Sharpeville massacre in which some 69 persons were killed and a further 180 wounded 
at a protest concerning South African apartheid laws,90 it might have been assumed that 
abhorrence of the brutalities of the apartheid regime led to an Australian overhaul of its 
Article 2(7) policy. Later internal documents certainly give this impression in relating 
Australia’s change of vote to such a consensus from the British, American and 
Australian governments.91 An examination of the flurry of documents surrounding the 
change of vote, however, undermines this causal theory
The Sharpeville massacre mobilised anti-apartheid sentiment internationally. It led, for 
instance, to the Security Council passing a Resolution condemning South Africa’s 
actions.92 Yet Prime Minister Menzies and Garfield Barwick (then Acting Minister for 
External Affairs) appear to have been unmoved. Both Menzies and Barwick refused to 
support a Resolution in the House of Representatives condemning South Africa. In 
April 1960, Barwick stated that Australia was not in a position to know the full facts o f 
the incident and defended his stance that it was ‘not Australian “to put the boot in” in 
such circumstances.93 Arthur Tange, who had become Secretary o f the Department of 
External Affairs in 1954, also noted Barwick’s position on Sharpeville. In a 
memorandum outlining Australia’s historic position on apartheid, a Department of 
External Affairs official had stated that the Australian government was 'appalled by the 
bloodshed and loss o f life at Sharpeville and elsewhere'. Tange scribbled next to this
90 See P Calvocoressi, South Africa and World Opinion, Institute o f Race Relations, London, 1961. 
The Sharpeville massacre occurred on 21 March 1960. Following Sharpeville, a state o f emergency 
was declared in South Africa and some 1700 persons were detained.
91 Covering Minute on Submission to Cabinet, Cabinet Minute 10/9/63, in NAA A 4940/1, Item C 
3298.
92 The Security Council concluded in the wake of Sharpeville that there was sufficient international 
friction such that a threat to international peace and security might emerge: SC Resolution S/4300, 
quoted in JES Fawcett, op cit, 295.
93 Garfield Barwick as Acting Minister for External Affairs, 29/4/60, Press Release in NAA A 
1838/283, Item 852/10/2/3 Pt 7.
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Statement 'the Minister does not so regard the events at Sharpeville'.94 Instead, the 
primary catalyst for change was the United Kingdom’s about-face on the issue.
On 5 April 1961, the United Kingdom expressed their departure from their previous
voting in the General Assembly in the following terms:
Apartheid confronts us with circumstances which are so far as I know unique in the 
annals of this organisation. We see the deliberate adoption, retention and 
development of a policy specifically based on total racial discrimination. This is 
further distinguished by the circumstance that it is discrimination amongst and 
against the permanent inhabitants of the country itself. Such a policy which is a 
deliberate exaltation of discriminatory principles, stands alone in its category.
While the importance we attach to the proper observance of Article 2(7) of the 
Charter remains undiminished, we regard the case of apartheid in the circumstances 
which now exist as of such an extraordinary and exceptional nature as to warrant our 
regarding it and treating it as sui generis.95
The Australian delegation was shocked by the United Kingdom’s statement and
complained about a lack of consultation on the matter.96 Prime Minister Menzies, who
had fought against discussion o f the topic (and expulsion of South Africa) within
meetings of the Commonwealth,97 implored his United Kingdom counterpart to
reconsider and to abstain at least on the paragraphs of the Resolutions concerning
sanctions and the threat posed by apartheid to international peace and security. In a
cablegram to Prime Minister Harold McMillan, Menzies pleaded:
I want you to realise that if the United Kingdom now vote in favour, with New 
Zealand presumably following suit, it would leave Australia quite isolated. This 
would render my own position intolerable. We, for our part, shall certainly abstain 
because to vote in favour would undermine and negate the attitude I have taken in
London and here since the Prime Ministers' Conference. I hope I shall not be
98impaled on the horns of such a dilemna.
When the United Kingdom could not be persuaded to change its stance, Prime Minister 
Menzies took the issue to Cabinet. Faced with the risk of being the only country not to 
vote for adoption of a Resolution, and the potential for Australia’s position to be 
misrepresented, Cabinet authorised Australian delegates to vote in favour of General 
Assembly action. In terms o f the specific Resolutions then before the General
94 Notation of Arthur Tange on Memorandum prepared by RL Harry, 'The Australian Vote on 
Apartheid in the UN General Assembly' for Senator Gorton, covering note dated 11 April 1961, in 
NAA A 1838/2, Item 852/10/2/3 Pt 10.
95 Excerpted in NAA A 1838/2, Item 852/10/2/3 Pt 10.
96 Cablegram from Australian High Commission, London, to the Secretary, DEA, 5/4/61, in NAA A 
1838/269, Item TS 852/10/2/3.
97 See fri 87 above.
98 Cablegram RG Menzies to H McMillan, 5/4/61, in NAA A 1838/269, Item TS 852/10/2/3
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Assembly, Cabinet directed that Australia could support the African Resolution" 
provided that it abstained on the paragraphs concerning the imposition of sanctions and 
the existence of a threat to peace and security. The delegation was also to seek to 
maintain Australia’s general position on Article 2(7).100
The qualified nature of Australia’s position was reflected in the manner in which it
announced its change of position. James Plimsoll, the Australian representative, spoke
briefly. He indicated that Australia affirmed the sentiments expressed by the United
Kingdom and that apartheid should be dealt with as a sui generis matter. It was only at
a later date that Australia could extol the virtues of General Assembly action:
With the exception of some extreme statements which would do more harm than good, 
the records o f the debate in the UN would undoubtedly strengthen the growing moral, 
intellectual, political and religious pressure upon the Government o f South Africa, 
which no Government could forever withstand.101
Even then, Australia did not convert to accepting expansive General Assembly action. 
Cabinet repeatedly affirmed that Australia was not to support sanctions102 nor would 
Australia accept that apartheid gave rise to any threat to the peace.103 Australia was 
frequently hesitant in supporting any General Assembly condemnatory Resolutions. 
Thus Australia at first refused to support Resolutions condemning the Rivonia trials of 
the African National Congress activists, including Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, 
on the basis that not sufficient facts were known about the trials.104 Similarly in 1966, 
when the General Assembly’s item was phrased the ‘Question of the Violation of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, including policies of racial discrimination 
and segregation and of apartheid, in all countries, with particular reference to colonial
99 The 1961 General Assembly had before it two Resolutions. In the first, sponsored by 25 mainly 
African States, it was proposed that the General Assembly endorse a series o f actions including 
breaking o ff diplomatic relations, closing ports to vessels flying the South African flag, and 
boycotting South African goods until such time as South Africa repealed the apartheid legislation. 
The second Resolution, put forward by India, Ceylon and Malaya, referred more generally to the 
need for collective action and for States to independently take appropriate reaction to precipitate 
South Africa’s withdrawal of the apartheid regime: outlined in Covering Minute for Cabinet 
Submission, in NAA A 1838/269, Item TS 852/10/2/3.
100 Cabinet Minute, 7/4/61, Decision No 127, in NAA A 1838/269, Item TS 852/10/2/3.
101 AJ Eastman, Australian representative, UN Doc A/SPC 381, 108; 10 October 1963.
102 In addition to the Cabinet Decision 127, quoted in fii 94 above, Cabinet re-affirmed its opposition to 
sanctions in 1963 and 1964: see NAA A 1838/2, Item 916/1 Pt 23.
103 See Cabinet Minute, 7/4/61, Decision No 127 in NAA A 1838/269, Item TS 852/10/2/3.
104 AJ Eastman, Australian representative, UN Doc A/SPC 381, 22; 10 October 1963.
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and other dependent countries and territories’, RF Osborn, the Australian delegate, 
abstained on the draft Resolutions on the basis that they placed all colonial and 
dependent territories on the same footing and purported to mandate sanctions against 
South Africa. 105 For all this hesitancy, however, Australia was never to resurrect an 
Article 2(7) objection to discussions of South African racial policies.
Other Contexts
Apart from items dealing with South Africa’s race-related policies, Australian policies 
reflect only minor fluctuations. Overall, the period witnessed an increasing attachment 
to an ‘exclusionary’ view of Article 2(7) and human rights. In 1952, when French 
policies in Tunisia were raised in the General Assembly, Casey sent through a 
cablegram to the Mission directing it to focus its response on Article 73 o f the Charter 
(responsibilities of States in respect of non-self-governing territories) and emphasise the 
support of self-government ideals. He indicated some unease with raising Article 2(7) 
objections given Australia’s previous stance on Indonesia106 and Evatt’s early position. 
Casey thus suggested that Article 2(7) be invoked only ‘when we have to do so as we 
have yet to work out a detailed and consistent line on domestic jurisdiction.107 In the 
United States Percy Spender obviously thought differently. Notwithstanding Casey’s 
direction, Spender gave a strong speech against the inclusion of the Tunisian item, 
relying almost exclusively on Article 2(7). Not even the fact that the nature of Tunisia’s 
relationship with France was dealt with in a treaty was sufficient to give the General 
Assembly jurisdiction over French policies in Tunisia since France retained 
sovereignty. Only after this speech did Spender receive backing from Casey to vote 
against the draft Resolutions concerning Tunisia on the basis of Australia’s consistent 
opposition to discussing matters like apartheid or administered territories.108
105 UN Doc A/SR 1389, 72; 10 October 1966.
106 Australia had previously supported United Nations involvement in the independence o f Indonesia.
107 Cablegram from the Minister for External Affairs to the Australian Mission, 8/12/52 quoted in 
Memorandum to the Secretary, DEA on Australian Statement on Tunisia at Seventh Session o f the 
General Assembly, in NAA Australian Statement on Tunisia at 7th General Assembly, in NAA A 
1838/2, Item 852/10/2/1 TEMP.
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After 1952 Australia continued to take hardline attitudes in relation to Article 2(7). It 
thus opposed the General Assembly’s discussion of the problems in Cyprus (1954- 
1958) and Algeria (1955-1958).109 The cases in which it did condone discussion were 
limited to those demonstrably ‘international’. Australia thus supported discussion of the 
Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956110 and the status of West Irian.* 111 In the latter case, 
an international agreement governed what was termed ‘Netherlands New Guinea’, 
namely the Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty of December 1949. There is some
evidence o f a certain war-weariness creeping in around the time Australia began 
abstaining on the South African apartheid Resolutions. At the 14th Session of the 
General Assembly in 1959, Australia did not object to the listing of an item related to 
the violations o f human rights and destruction of culture occurring in Tibet. The 
Australian representative took a path of least resistance in stating that ‘since the 
question has been brought before the General Assembly, we have to look at what has 
happened in Tibet’.113 The reasoning may have been that China’s invasion of Tibet in 
1948-50 distinguished the situation from earlier cases such as Tunisia or Algeria. It 
may also indicate a temporary easing of Article 2(7) objections.
Even if  the Tibet case represented a significant concession, it is evident that Australia’s 
renunciation o f Article 2(7)-based objections in the apartheid context did not lead to an 
across the board abandonment of such objections. In 1966, for instance, in providing 
information to the Australian delegation on the situation o f Aboriginal Australians, the 
Department of External Affairs emphasised that no formal revision of Australia’s 
attitude towards Article 2(7) had been undertaken. It thus concluded that the subject o f 
Aboriginal policies would be regarded as prima facie  one falling within the scope of
109 Memorandum on Domestic Jurisdiction, undated, NAA A 1838/2, Item 852/10/2/1 TEMP.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid. Note though that in the midst of the debates about West Irian, Sir Percy Spender for Australia, 
emphasised the point that the General Assembly could not give an interpretation o f the UN Charter 
that had any ‘legal validity’, but did not propose that the Court be asked for an advisory opinion on 
Article 2(7): N Harper, D Sissons , op cit, 172-3.
112 Memorandum on Domestic Jurisdiction, undated in NAA A 1838/2, Item 852/10/2/1 TEMP.
113 Memorandum No 1262/59 from Australian Mission to the United Nations to the DEA, quoted in 
Memorandum concerning Domestic Jurisdiction in NAA A 1838/2, Item 852/10/2/1 TEMP.
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Article 2(7).114 Similarly, even when informed that the United Kingdom was thinking 
of revising its stance on domestic jurisdiction, the Australian authorities showed no 
inclination to follow suit.115 By the end of the period, therefore, Australia had conceded 
ground on the issue of apartheid, but maintained an otherwise strong emphasis on the 
incompetence o f the General Assembly to take action in relation to the human rights 
abuses committed in individual countries.
Furthermore, during this later period of policy development it is evident that Australian 
policy-makers did not believe that the finalising of the Covenants would alter the 
General Assembly’s powers. In 1953, for example, the Brief for the Eighth Session of 
the Commission on Human Rights limited the significance of the draft Covenants to 
reducing the scope for domestic jurisdiction arguments to be raised in defence to actions 
taken under those Covenants:
The approval of the covenant by Australia will have implications for Australian 
policy in regard to the domestic jurisdiction issue. There can be no doubt that the 
bringing into effect o f the covenants through the necessary ratifications will extend 
the scope of international action. Any government accepting the covenants will find 
itself compelled to face the possibility o f international discussion which previously, 
it could plead, was barred by the domestic jurisdction clause o f the Charter.
This statement was not a recognition that human rights would have become a matter of
international concern generally, but that the Covenants might themselves authorise
international discussion on a State’s human rights record. The point was made more
clearly in a letter from Prime Minister Menzies to the Reverend Beovich, the
Archbishop o f Adelaide. In declining the Archbishop’s invitation for Australia to seek
General Assembly action against religious intolerance in Czechoslovakia on the
grounds of Article 2(7) of the Charter, the Prime Minister further noted:
You will appreciate, however, that the Covenant when approved will only permit 
investigation of alleged breaches of human rights to be carried out in those cases in 
which the Government accused of a breach has ratified the Covenant, including the 
important implementation provisions which provide for hearing o f complaints by a 
Human Rights Committee.117
114 Memorandum from JD Petherbridge, for the Secretary, DEA to the Secretary, Department of 
Territories, 15/12/66, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 929/5/3 Pt 2.
115 Draft Letter from DEA to the Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department concerning United 
Kingdom’s proposal, circa August 1966, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 929/4/12.
116 Brief for the Australian Delegation to the Eighth Session o f the Commission on Human Rights, in 
NAA A 432/20, Item 54/3779 Pt 7.
117 Letter from Prime Minister Menzies to Archbishop M Beovich, 15/8/51, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 
929/1/2 Pt 1.
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Similarly, in the notes prepared for the Australian delegation to the Conference o f the
Inter-Parliamentary Union in Bangkok of November 1956, the delegation was warned
that a State’s adherence to a human rights convention:
need not necessarily mean that the rights are no longer essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of those States, in the sense o f Article 2(7) o f the Charter.
Thus, it will be seen that the competence of the UN to deal with an individual 
violation o f human rights, even when it is the subject o f an international convention, 
may be open to doubt.118
Article 2(7) was thus seen as representing a continuing barrier to General Assembly 
action in relation to individual human rights practices.
Despite being consistently subject to a certain degree o f manipulation to achieve foreign 
affairs objectives, it is evident that during the period o f 1946-1966 Australian 
receptiveness to the General Assembly initiating debates and recommendations on the 
human rights practices of individual States varied enormously. Evatt’s initial 
enthusiasm for encouraging the General Assembly to exercise such powers was 
replaced during the Spender and later periods by an insistence that Article 2(7) made 
any such General Assembly action illegitimate. Differing legal opinions, and sensitivity 
to potential United Nations criticism of Australia’s race based policies combined to 
produce this movement. In light of these attitudes to General Assembly competency, 
one might have expected to see a similar pattern o f resistance in Australia’s policy 
towards the Commission on Human Rights’ handling o f individual petitions received 
during the negotiations of the International Bill o f Rights. Interestingly, the reverse 
seems to have been the case.
B. Responses to the Commission on Human Rights’ Receipt of 
Individual Petitions
Overview of the International Debate
Throughout the negotiations o f the International Bill o f Rights, the United Nations was 
inundated with individual human rights petitions. The Secretariat of the United Nations 
passed along such complaints to the Commission on Human Rights but did not resolve
118 Notes for the Australian delegation to the Conference o f the Inter-Parliamentary Union in Bangkok 
of November 1956, in NAA A1838/1, Item 856/13 Pt 16.
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what action the Commission on Human Rights was to take on such petitions.119 In 1946
the Human Rights Division of the Secretariat sought advice from the Legal Department
of the United Nations. The Legal Department advised that it would need to study all
possible interpretations of Article 2(7) and so would not be able to provide a speedy,
definitive view. John Humphrey, the inaugural Director o f the Human Rights Division,
then reached the view that the Commission did not have any power under the Charter to
make a recommendation to the States in regard to the letters. In his view the ‘facts and
circumstances’ described in the communications fell within the area o f a State’s
‘domestic jurisdiction’ and that even a recommendation might be considered improper
intervention by the member State concerned. Henri Laugier, the Assistant Secretary-
General of the United Nations with responsibility for human rights matters determined
121that the communications should be disclosed to Commission members in the interim.
At its First Session in 1947 the Commission on Human Rights discussed what action it 
should take in relation to the transferred communications. The Commission concluded 
that it did not have power to take any action, but requested the Economic and Social 
Council to confirm this view .122 After consideration of the matter, the Economic and 
Social Council agreed the Commission had no power to evaluate the petitions, but 
devised a system of handling them. Under ECOSOC Resolutions 75(V) and 275(X),123 
the Secretary-General was to compile a confidential list o f communications concerning 
human rights before each session, with a brief indication o f each communication’s 
substance. This list would be furnished to Commission members without divulging the 
identity of those making communications (unless specific permission had so been
119 Although most letters of complaints were addressed to the United Nations or the Secretary-General, 
the letters were re-directed to the Commission on Human Rights.
120 Memorandum from JP Humphrey, Director, Division of Human Rights, to Henri Laugier, Assistant 
Secretary-General in charge of Social Affairs, 28/8/46, DAG 18/1.1.0 Box 4, United Nations 
Archives, New Y ork.
121 Memorandum from H Laugier, Assistant Secretary-General, Social Affairs, to Secretary-General, 
15/10/46, DAG 18/1.1.0, Box 4, United Nations Archives, New York.
122 E/CN.4/27, see too E/CN.4/64 -  14 December 1947.
123 The combined effect o f the Resolutions is apparent in ECOSOC Resolution 275 (X), 17 February 
1950, 10 ESCOR Supp 1 (1950).
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granted). States were free to respond to the communications and have their responses 
published in summary or short form by the Commission on Human Rights.124
Few attempts were made by Commission on Human Rights members to increase the 
Commission’s activity in relation to individual communications. At the Eighth Session 
of the Commission on Human Rights, India sponsored a draft Resolution requesting the 
Economic and Social Council to reconsider Resolution 75(V) so as to authorise the 
Commission to make reports and recommendations concerning ‘serious cases’ of 
violations o f human rights. While receiving support from Egypt and Latin American 
States, a majority would only accept the suggestion that statistics concerning 
communications be included in Commission reports. At the Eighth Session of the 
General Assembly, Egypt suggested that the Commission transmit to governments the 
serious allegations o f violations and for such complaints and any responses received to 
be forwarded to ECOSOC. It was defeated 26 to 9 with 15 abstentions.126 The final 
major attempt to increase the Commission’s activities came in 1957 with the Greek 
proposal that the Commission be empowered to take ‘interim measures’ with respect to 
complaints o f human rights abuses. The proposal was not accepted, with a majority of 
delegations o f the view that it would be best to await the finalisation of the Covenants 
and their implementation mechanisms.
I. Evatt period
Unfortunately, there is very little documentation o f the Australian policy concerning the 
Commission on Human Rights’ handling of individual complaints during the Evatt 
period. Unlike other aspects of human rights implementation, there are no records o f 
communication between Evatt and his advisers on this point. The surviving
124 States were to indicate whether they wished their replies to be presented in summary form or in full: 
ECOSOC Resolution 192 A (VIII), 9 February 1949, 8 ESCOR Supp No 1 (1949).
125 Outlined in the Brief for the Australian Delegation to the 10th Session o f the Commission on 
Human Rights, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/10/9 Pt 3. ECOSOC at its 14th Session resolved not 
to change the procedures for dealing with communications: ibid.
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documentation was generated solely by the Australian Mission to the United Nations. It 
indicates that as Australian complaints began filtering into the Commission, Australian 
representatives affirmed the Commission’s lack o f capacity to deal with the merits of 
the cases without evincing particular defensiveness.
When the matter was before the Commission on Human Rights at its First Session, 
Australia does not appear to have entered into the debate. The only reference in the 
Report of the representative to the First Session o f the Commission on Human Rights 
describes Australia’s support for South Africa’s proposal that the confidential list of 
communications be distributed to all members of the United Nations, rather than being 
limited to members of the Commission alone.127 By 1947 the Commission had received 
two Australian communications.128 Judging from the lack of documentation, however, 
the Australian delegates did not seek to elicit any response to the communications from 
interested Departments. In public the Australian delegate stated without elaboration 
that the Commission had no authority to act as a world tribunal or a quasi-judicial 
authority.130
Given Evatt’s active support for General Assembly action in relation to human rights 
complaints in relation to the human rights situation in Eastern Europe in the late 1940s, 
one might have expected the delegation to indicate support for the Commission (or 
another body o f the United Nations) to take more initiative in acting on the 
communications. Australia’s willingness to accept that no action be taken on the 
complaints seems traceable to three factors. First, the delegation appears to have been 
developing policy ‘on the run’, without seeking the views of Evatt. This may have led
127 Report on First Session of Commission on Human Rights, in NAA A1838/278, Item 856/13 Pt 1. 
This proposal was defeated.
128 According to the report of the delegate, the first complaint involved the contact o f whites with 
aboriginals on native reservations through the establishment o f a rocket range. The second 
complaint alleged inffingment o f the right to work due to the operation o f the Employment Bureau: 
ibid.
129 Cablegram from R Hodgson, Australian Delegation, Geneva to DEA, 5/10/47, in NAA A 1838/278, 
Item 856/13 Pt 1.
130 Report on Second Session o f the Commission on Human Rights (Hodgson), in NAA A 1838/278, 
Item 856/13 Pt 2.
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to the delegation being influenced by the more conservative approach to Article 2(7) 
limitations that enjoyed some currency in the bureaucracy (discussed in Part A o f this 
Chapter). Secondly, even if the delegation had received instructions from Evatt, it is 
possible that his view of the Commission’s power would have been quite distinct from 
his stance on the General Assembly’s power. Whereas the General Assembly was 
given particular powers under the Charter to discuss matters within the United Nations’ 
jurisdiction, the Commission was a subsidiary body of the Economic and Social 
Council and so required the delegation of specific functions from the Economic and 
Social Council. The Commission had not been mandated to perform any functions with 
respect to individual complaints. Thirdly, a distinction might be drawn between the 
topics Evatt raised in the General Assembly that related to systematic abuses and the 
specific claims of complainants to the Commission on Human Rights. Even in the case 
of Cardinal Mindszenty’s trial, Australia raised more general claims concerning the 
administration of justice and freedom of religion in a broad range o f situations. In the 
Spender period Australia’s objections were more firmly interlinked with the domestic 
jurisdiction question.
II. Spender Period
The Spender period is most remarkable for the simplicity and consistency of the 
Australian approach. Australia rejected any competency of the Commission to evaluate 
complaints and similarly refused to respond to the communications publicised by the 
Commission. In a submission prepared in April 1951, the Department of External 
Affairs outlined the complaints that had been received by the Commission on Human 
Rights from Australians. Spender refused permission to the delegation to refer to such 
factual defences in the Commission on Human Rights. Spender’s annotation to the 
paper read:
These matters have nothing to do with the Commission and we should do what we can
to prevent their discussion and if discussed record unequivocally that we will not have
131outside interference in our domestic affairs.
131 Memorandum from AH Tange, Assistant Secretary, DEA to Australian Representative to the HRC, 
13/4/51, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/10/6 Pt 1.
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At sessions o f the Commission on Human Rights in 1950 and 1951 Australia thus 
remained silent and received the list of communications without comment. It was not 
until the Casey and Bureaucratic period that this silence was broken.
III. Casey and Bureaucratic Period
During the period May 1951-1966, Australia displayed a somewhat paradoxical 
approach to the issue of the Commission on Human Rights handling of petitions. On 
the one hand, there was a continuation of an official resistance to giving the 
Commission any powers to consider the detail o f the communications. On the other 
hand, however, with the increasing bureaucratisation of the process of policy 
development came a greater receptiveness to providing the Commission with responses 
to complaints.
Australia was never amongst the ranks of supporters for increasing the Commission’s 
activities with respect to the handling of communications. In relation to the Indian 
proposal that the Commission make reports and recommendations concerning ‘serious 
cases’ of human rights violations, Australia stated that the Commission was not in a 
position to contemplate action o f this sort.132 Similarly at the Eighth Session of the 
General Assembly, Australia voted against Egypt’s proposal that communications and 
responses be brought to the attention of the Economic and Social Council.133 Australia 
also opposed the Greek proposal that the Commission take interim measures in relation 
to human rights abuses on the basis that the Commission had no current power to take 
action and that the international community had to await the finalisation of the 
Covenants.134
Unlike the Spender period, however, Australia appeared willing to provide information 
to the Commission on Human Rights in response to the allegations. In files dealing
132 Outlined in the Brief for the Australian Delegation to the 10th Session o f the Commission on Human 
Rights, in NAA A 1838/1, Item 856/13/10/9 Pt 3.
133 Ibid.
134 See Cablegram from DEA to Australian Mission to the UN, NY, 1/2/57, in NAA A 518/1, Item 
104/5/2 Pt 2.
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with the Ninth Session of the Commission on Human Rights in 1953, there are copies 
of responses prepared by relevant departments, ready for submission to the United 
Nations. The 1954 Brief for the Commission on Human Rights contained full details of 
the Australian responses to two out of three individual communications. The absence of 
a response to the third communication was considered worthy of explanation. The 
delegation was informed that since the complaint related to the failure of the United 
Kingdom to grant an old age pension to a New Zealand citizen who had previously 
received a pension in Australia, the complaint was of only ‘incidental interest’ to 
Australia.
A fuller picture of Australian responsiveness to providing information in response to 
individual communications can be gained from an examination of the official records of 
the United Nations. The Geneva United Nations Archives have maintained the records 
relating to individual communications and responses received from 1956 onwards. In 
the 1956-1966 period, there were some 68 complaints concerning the behaviour of the 
Australian government. Of these 68 complaints, some 25 appear to have elicited no
response from the Australian government, judging from the absence of a response in 
either the Geneva files or the governmental files. In view of the degree of 
incompleteness of records in either Geneva or Australia,136 allowance needs to be made 
for some margin of error. Notwithstanding this consideration, it is of interest that 
surviving records indicate a responsiveness level of 63%.
It is somewhat easier to document Australia’s record of providing responses in a 
majority of cases than to indicate how this change of heart took place. The Australian 
government files examined by the author do not reveal any Ministerial direction from 
Casey on the point. In the absence of such a direction, the most likely explanation is
135 The 68 complaints were identified from the six microfilmed files of complaints held in the Geneva 
United Nations Archives: SO 215/1 Austl., UN Archives, Geneva. All complaints received in the 
period 1956-1966 in the Geneva files. In some o f the cases the responses were received in 1967.
136 The author’s search of both sources revealed the existence o f some complaints received by the 
United Nations that were not forwarded on to Australia, and some responses sent by Australia that 
are not reflected in the Geneva files. Similarly, Australia did not keep one file containing all 
communications and the responses.
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that bureaucrats took the initiative in preparing and submitting Australian responses.137 
From Chapter 5, it may be recalled that Fred Whitlam was personally in favour of some 
form of individual petitioning for the Covenants (notwithstanding Casey and Spender’s 
opposition), and the Department of External Affairs consistently argued in support of 
allowing non-government organisations to make petitions. Annotations of 
conversations between Departments indicate that the Department of External Affairs 
certainly encouraged the making of responses. In 1954, for instance, KCO (Mick)
Shann was recorded as having told the Department of Territories that ‘there is no legal 
obligation to answer the communication, but if  there is a reasonable reply it is desirable 
to do so’.138
That bureaucrats left to their own devices were receptive to providing written responses 
to the United Nations is not surprising. Defending governmental action was and 
remains a standard part of a public servant’s normal duties. Bureaucrats involved in the 
administration of Australian domestic policies would have a vested interest in defending 
Australia’s record of due process and fairness in administering its policies. Once re­
assured that the practice of the Commission on Human Rights was to accept and 
publicise responses from governments without engaging in any commentary, 
bureaucrats would perceive that submitting positive responses was an excellent means 
of defending Australia without incurring further international debate on the particular 
issues involved. From being shown Briefs for delegates, successive Ministers for 
External Affairs would be expected to have had some awareness that Australia was 
routinely providing responses. From the lack o f any evident interference, it would 
appear that bureaucrats’ political masters concurred in the view that submitting 
information was a way of spreading good news about Australia without incurring 
political risk.
137 Whilst Ministers cleared briefs for delegations, the Australian responses to communications were 
often sent individually. The files examined did not reveal that they were ‘cleared’ through the 
Minister for External Affairs.
138 Annotations on Letter from KCO Shann, for the Assistant Secretary, DEA, to the Secretary, 
Department o f Territories, 6/9/54, in NAA A 518/1, Item 104/5/4.
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Such a strategy of using responses to complaints as a means o f positive publicity and 
defence would also sit comfortably with an analysis o f the nature of the complaints for 
which responses were not submitted. In the 1956-1966 period, the largest number of 
cases for which no response is evident in the Australian or United Nations files relate to 
issues of the greatest domestic sensitivity. Eight of the 28 complaints related to the 
treatment of Aboriginal people, and a further two related to inhabitants o f trust 
territories. Some six complaints concerning the treatment of migrants also appear to 
have not elicited a response, in addition to two concerning the application o f anti­
communist policies in Australia. It is not possible to use these statistics to claim that 
there was a blanket rule against responding to complaints dealing with such issues. 
Amongst the 40 communications to which there are Australian responses on file, some 
deal with conditions in migrant hostels and the treatment of indigenous persons. 
However, a higher proportion o f such cases appear in the ‘no response evident’ 
category. Thus, there was a more pronounced hesitance to provide responses in cases 
involving such sensitive cases. This hesitance is not surprising in an environment in 
which bureaucrats rather than political ministers were playing the lead role in decision­
making. Being aware of the political price that might be paid for adverse publicity, 
bureaucrats would be unlikely to volunteer politically sensitive information or 
concessions. What is evident is thus a consistent selective responsiveness to the 
Commission on Human Rights with respect to individual human rights complaints.
Conclusion
Australia cannot be said to have supported a broad interpretation of United Nations’ 
power in the field of human rights scrutiny throughout the period 1946-1966. Political 
alliances and sensitivities caused minor fluctuations in policy during each time period. 
However, notwithstanding these fluctuations, there was a distinct movement away from 
recognising any competency in the United Nations to deal with individual human rights 
violations, other than through the mechanisms drafted for the human rights Covenants. 
Rather than simply being a result o f Cold War tensions, Australia’s adoption of such 
obstructionist policies reflected distinct, narrow conceptions o f the role o f the
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international community in intervening in human rights matters. Evatt adopted a broad 
view of the role for the international community (through the General Assembly) in 
responding to human rights violations occurring in individual States. Spender and 
Bailey took a much narrower view of the role o f the United Nations, maintaining that 
human rights matters were a matter of ‘domestic jurisdiction’ under the United Nations 
Charter. Even when the international politicisation of racial issues prompted a 
reconsideration o f Australia’s stance on apartheid, Ministers and bureaucrats alike in the 
1960s were reluctant to encourage General Assembly inquiries, their legal views being 
bolstered by their sense of vulnerability about Australian policies, particularly those 
concerning Aboriginal people.
The devolution o f policy-making responsibility to the bureaucratic level in the 1950s 
and 1960s is also revealed as having a paradoxical effect. Even as Australia’s 
insistence that the Commission on Human Rights did not have power to deal with 
individual human rights complaints crystallised, Australia increasingly provided 
information to the Commission in response to the complaints. This responsiveness was 
selective however. Bureaucrats viewed the provision of (positive) information as a 
means of deflecting international criticism from Australia rather than inviting any 
discussion of individual human rights issues. There was no pattern established likely to 
encourage fulsome participation in all inquiries o f the United Nations into human rights 
violations in Australia.
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CONCLUSION
In Louis Henkin’s words, it took the international community eighteen years ‘to 
accommodate, bridge, submerge and conceal’ deep divisions between States in order to 
reach agreement on the twin human rights Covenants.1 This thesis suggests that 
Australia’s continuing support for the development of international human rights norms 
belied similarly deep divisions within the Australian State. Contrary to the impression 
created by existing analyses, support for an international human rights regime 
underpinned by a common ‘human rights lexicon’ was far from inevitable.
Furthermore, the very nature o f the resistances to many principles commonly assumed 
to be shared principles amongst human rights adherents highlights the likelihood of 
continuing divergence in Australian implementation of the International Bill o f Rights.
The Chapters of this thesis have shown that a significant narrowing of approach towards 
international human rights occurred during the period 1946-1966. The period whose 
policies most approximate those promoted by most current human rights commentators 
was the Evatt period. During this period, Australia in general sought recognition of 
broad international human rights guarantees in relation to civil, political, economic and 
social rights. It embraced an active view of the State’s role in implementing such 
rights. The enactment of legislation to cover both the private and public sectors was 
endorsed as a minimum standard. Federal action was viewed as desirable so as to 
provide for the uniform enjoyment of human rights. In this period, Australia also 
advanced ambitious proposals for the international community’s involvement in 
scrutinising the human rights records of individual States, including the establishment 
of an International Court of Human Rights.
In the period 1949-1951, the Spender period, the conceptualisation of an ideal 
international human rights regime narrowed dramatically. Rights requiring government
L Henkin, ‘Introduction’ in L Henkin (ed), The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Columbia University Press, New York, 1981, 9-10.
306
intervention, whether they be civil, political, economic, social or cultural were 
criticised. The individual was looked to as the major agent o f ensuring the realisation of 
most rights. The only exceptions were those traditional civil and political rights that 
restricted a government’s powers to intervene in individuals’ lives. Rights were 
regarded as being constrained by and dependent upon an individual’s performance of 
his or her duties. Government action to guarantee rights was scorned. Federal 
legislative action was particularly stigmatised as upsetting the existing federal balance.
In relation to international implementation, Australia moved away from expansive 
methods of international implementation, seeking to limit United Nations ‘interference’ 
in domestic matters. Suspicion was also directed towards the motives of those 
individuals and NGOs who would be eager to submit complaints in relation to 
Australia’s performance.
In the earliest years of Casey’s term in office as Minister for External Affairs, the policy 
instructions of the Spender period were endorsed with little change. Only Casey’s 
direction that Australia avoid isolation served to soften some o f the edges of Australia’s 
policies. Yet the period 1952-1966 is remarkable for the shifting balance of power in 
policy-making. With the exception of intervention in relation to the most politically 
sensitive topics such as General Assembly action on race-related issues, the fulcrum of 
power shifted to the bureaucratic level. As bureaucrats like Fred Whitlam and Kenneth 
Bailey became more involved in decision making, Australian policy became even more 
linked to the support for ‘traditional’ common law human rights. The need for precise 
drafting of the Covenants was emphasised in order to separate out the imaginative rights 
of the UDHR from the legal rights to be included in the Covenants. A desire to insulate 
existing Australian policies became more pronounced, particularly in the civil and 
political rights field. Increased emphasis was placed on the limited, progressive nature 
of economic and social rights. International scrutiny was to be kept within tight 
boundaries. At the same time, the bureaucratisation o f policy development led to an 
increased responsiveness to providing detailed defences of Australian governmental 
practice to the Commission on Human Rights.
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Existing accounts of Australia’s relationship with the international human rights regime 
have glossed over this process of change. As discussed in the Introduction, they have 
either failed to advert to any divisions within Australia or minimised the significance of 
variations by attributing the responsibility to the external, temporally limited Cold War. 
This thesis reveals that the Cold War is not a sufficient explanation for the variations in 
policies. Undoubtedly anti-communism did play a role in shaping Spender and Casey’s 
view that permitting international discussion of individual human rights abuses might 
lead to the communist-inspired subversion of orderly government. Likewise Menzies’ 
commitment to eradicating communism in Australia influenced Australian support for 
broad limitations clauses even to civil and political rights. Individual complainants in 
Australia were often written off as communist sympathisers. Yet Australia did not 
adopt a ‘Western bloc’ approach. During the Evatt period, Australia routinely promoted 
policies that were opposed by the United States and the United Kingdom. Even in the 
mid-1950s, when Cold War tensions were high internationally and bureaucrats were 
keen to avoid international isolation, Australia opposed the United States’ initiatives on 
self-determination.
One needs to look closer to home for the explanations for these divergences. This thesis 
has suggested that three primary factors were at work in shaping the movements in 
policy. The first factor was party-political allegiances. The switch from a Labor 
government to a Liberal government in 1949 (and the continuation of Liberal 
administration from 1949 until the end of the period studied in this thesis) and the 
associated changes in the outlook between Evatt and Spender were pivotal in affecting 
Australia’s relationship to human rights. Labor’s commitment to socialism lent itself to 
active government involvement in all forms of rights and was also amenable to 
recognition of economic and social rights. The Liberal Party’s aversion to socialism 
made government intervention appear unattractive and led to a questioning of 
freestanding economic and social rights, at least those relying on the State for their 
realization. Labor and Liberal also had fundamentally different approaches to
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federalism, differences that were mirrored in Australia’s earliest approaches to inclusion 
of a federal-state clause.
The second factor consistently identified in this thesis has been the personal political 
philosophies of policy-makers. This was evident, for instance, in Evatt’s 
conceptualisation of government power being constrained by human rights. It was 
equally evident in the contrary conceptualisation o f Spender and Whitlam that 
governments enjoyed a broad discretion in defining the scope o f international human 
rights. Similarly, due to their acceptance of Diceyan-style ideals, both Whitlam and 
Bailey emphasised the importance of ‘civil liberties’ and supported reliance on the 
common law and parliamentary democracy as the best means of protecting human 
rights.
The third factor this thesis identified was the status of decision-makers - whether 
decision-makers were politicians or bureaucrats. During the Evatt and Spender periods, 
when Ministers were most active, Australian delegates were empowered to advance 
original proposals. In the Evatt period, for example, Australia submitted a statute for an 
International Court of Human Rights. In the Spender period, Whitlam was ordered to 
seek reference to the mutuality of rights and duties. By 1952, it was bureaucrats who 
carried the burden of decision making in general, the only exception being the sporadic 
re-engagement of Ministers in response to the international politicisation of race. In the 
bureaucratic period very few new initiatives were suggested and policy stagnated.
Briefs were duplicated for at least six years (1955-1961) with little review. Competing 
Australian domestic laws and policies were outlined in Briefs with directions for the 
delegates to seek accommodating amendments or voice restrictive understandings of 
clauses. Such conservatism of approach is not surprising. Following previous 
directives and protecting all Australian policies so as to prevent political embarrassment 
was obviously an attractive option for public servants left without significant political 
guidance. Paradoxically, the bureaucratisation o f policy development also appears to 
have produced a greater receptiveness to responding to individual petitions to the
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United Nations. At least in cases where a positive response could be provided, 
bureaucrats were eager to promote Australia’s record o f efficient and just administration 
on the international plane.
This thesis has shown that at any particular time there were often several of these 
factors interacting to produce Australian policy. In Australia’s increased resistance to 
civil and political rights involving government intervention, for instance, one sees the 
dovetailing o f Spender’s Liberal Party philosophy with Whitlam’s Diceyan ideals. 
Similarly in Australia’s change of vote on apartheid or the anti-discrimination clause, 
one sees bureaucratic concern over international pressure overlapping with political 
preparedness to take action. Identification of these three factors is not to deny the 
undoubted effect of international tensions. The Cold War as well as the politicisation of 
race and decolonisation had a profound impact in shaping Australian policies. Yet, this 
thesis has argued that ultimately, the three internal forces identified had the greatest 
impact overall in shaping the policies adopted.
This thesis has also highlighted that, notwithstanding these variations o f policy, there 
were significant areas of continuity in Australian policies. At no point was there 
acceptance that the implementation regimes for all types of rights should be identical. 
Question marks always surrounded the international and domestic implementation of 
economic and social rights. Similarly Australia consistently resisted the recognition of 
rights or implementation mechanisms that threatened to impinge upon Australian 
immigration and race-related policies. Chapter 3 in particular highlighted the resistance 
to recognition o f a right to self-determination and any special rights of minorities. 
Chapters 1 -4 revealed the extent to which an Anglo-Celtic male model o f the rights 
holder influenced Australian policies. Occasionally some of these areas of resistance 
appeared to be surrendered as Australia modified its voting pattern. Yet, frequently, 
though Australia was keen to avoid becoming internationally isolated, it was also 
capable o f transforming its objections into narrow understandings of the disputed 
clauses. Examples of this tendency include the way in which Australian delegates
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regarded the ‘special measures’ provision in CERD as covering ‘protective’ legislation 
for aboriginal people (discussed in Chapter 2) and the expressed understanding in 
internal documents that the progressive nature of economic and social rights excused 
existing discriminatory practices (discussed in Chapter 1).
In exploring the central areas of divergence and similarity, this thesis puts into 
perspective Australia’s act of ratifying the ICCPR and ICESCR. At the simplest level, 
identification o f the many areas o f resistance in the latter period o f policy development 
helps contextualise Australia’s less than enthusiastic voting for the ICCPR and 
ICESCR. Study of the later period of policy-development (the Casey and Bureaucratic 
period) also suggests plausible explanations for why Australia’s ratification of the 
ICESCR and ICCPR was somewhat delayed, and in the case of the ICCPR, 
accompanied by significant reservations.3
The findings o f this thesis would seem to have broader significance, though, in 
enriching our understanding of likely patterns in Australia’s future implementation of 
its human rights obligations.
Some Reflections on the Potential Significance o f  Australia ’s Negotiating History
As stated in the Introduction to this thesis, this study was not undertaken in the belief 
that it is possible to predict an unaltered cycle for future Australian State behaviour. The 
significance of Australia’s ratification of the finalised ICCPR and ICESCR brings into 
play additional factors. Post-ratification, States may reconsider their attitudes to
In the final votes on the substantive articles of the ICCPR, Australia supported 17 provisions, 
abstained on 5 and opposed 2. In relation to the ICESCR, Australia supported 3 rights, abstained on 
8 and rejected 2. The reasons for such votes are summarised in Memorandums by P Brazil on the 
ICCPR and ICESCR, 19/6/67, in NAA A 446/165, Item 1970/76776.
Australia originally entered reservations to Articles 2, 10, 14, 17, 19, 20, 25, and 50 and entered an 
‘understanding’ concerning Australia’s position as a federal state. On 6 November 1984, Australia 
withdrew its reservations to Articles 2, 50, 17, 19 and 25, and part of its reservations with respect to 
Article 10 and 14. For the text o f the reservations, see UNTS, Vol 1197, 411; See too G Triggs, 
‘International legal notes: Australian reservations and declarations with respect to the ICCPR’ 
(1981) 55 Australian Law Journal 699, 699-700.
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international instruments and the clauses and seek to integrate into their understanding 
and practice, the understandings of clauses promulgated by international authoritative 
bodies such as the Human Rights Committee or Committee of Experts of the ICESCR 
or may embrace the understandings of clauses set out in ‘standard texts’. One of the 
central tenets of international law is that States surrender subjective understandings of 
international law and agree to be governed by the objective textual meaning of treaty 
provisions, taken to by synonymous with the perceived common intention. Thus, where 
Australian decision-makers are conscious that Australia’s interpretation of a particular 
clause of the International Bill of Rights is out of step with current international 
standing, practitioners of international law would expect Australia to jettison that 
understanding and embrace the ‘objective’ interpretation.
Yet, given the lack of any ‘ultimately authoritative’ body in the international human 
rights regime, it would seem likely as a matter of practice that future Australian State 
actors will be influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by the divergent values, 
assumptions and attitudes revealed in this thesis in interpreting their human rights 
obligations. A brief examination of the major cases in which Australia’s human rights 
practices have been subject to critical examination by the United Nations to date 
suggests a high level of continuity between past and present attitudes towards 
international human rights.
The first case in which Australia faced an adverse finding from the Human Rights 
Committee was the Toonen case.4 At issue in that case were the Tasmanian laws 
criminalising homosexuality. Toonen argued that the Tasmanian laws infringed his 
right to privacy as protected under Article 17 of the ICCPR. The Human Rights 
Committee agreed. A division occurred between the Commonwealth and Tasmanian 
state government. A Labor Party Commonwealth government did not seek to justify the 
Tasmanian laws. The Liberal Party Tasmanian government emphasised the discretion of 
a State to make judgements about matters of public welfare and the inability of the State 
Toonen v Australia, Comm No 488/1992, UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992,4 April 1994.
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to change personal opinions. When the adverse Human Rights Committee view was 
handed down, the Commonwealth government acted speedily to enact the Human 
Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act 1994. Looking at the case in the context of Australia’s 
past history, the Labor Commonwealth government’s approach of accepting 
international scrutiny, accepting limits to governmental powrer, and enacting federal 
legislation mirrored approaches during the Evatt period. The approach o f the 
Tasmanian government was closer to that of Spender and Whitlam’s philosophical 
approach to defending State discretion in matters of defending rights. It will also be 
recalled that all the provisions with ‘arbitrary’ protections were the subject of resistance 
by Whitlam and his successors on the basis that they did not sufficiently define the 
restrictions on governmental power. The Toonen case thus serves as an excellent 
example of the residual divergences in approaches of different State actors.
The second case in which the Human Rights Committee reached the conclusion that 
Australia was breaching its obligations concerned federal law that permitted the 
ongoing detention o f illegal entrants to Australia. In A ’s case,5 the Human Rights 
Committee concluded, inter alia, that the detention of individuals on the basis of a 
general deterrence policy rather than evidence as to the individuals’ likelihood to 
abscond was ‘arbitrary’. The legislative policy had been introduced by a Labor 
government. The Liberal Party was in power when the Human Rights Committee view 
was expressed. The Australian government disputed the findings o f the Committee as 
to the meaning of ‘arbitrary’ and ‘unlawful’ and affirmed the legitimacy of their 
migration policies. Such a reaction is consistent with the deeply seated, bipartisan 
resistance to permit international human rights guarantees to interfere with immigration 
policies revealed in this thesis.
Thirdly, in 1998 Australia’s Aboriginal policies were questioned by the Committee on 
the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (the CERD Committee). The 
CERD Committee sought information from the federal government concerning, inter
5 A v Australia, Comm No 560/1993, UN Doc CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993; 30 April 1997.
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alia, changes to the Native Title Act 1993 which were allegedly racially discriminatory.6 
The amendments had the effect of reducing native title rights enjoyed over pastoral
*7
lease properties. After considering information provided to it by the government and 
non-government organisations, the CERD Committee expressed ‘concern’ at the 
inconsistency between the amendments (and the lack of consultation involved in the 
promulgation of these amendments) and Australia’s obligations under CERD.8 Viewed 
in the context of the findings of this thesis, the resistance o f the Australian government 
to adopting a ‘substantial equality’ approach to indigenous Australians and its neglect of 
distinct Aboriginal rights seems to be part of an ongoing pattern o f marginalising 
consideration o f non-Anglo-Celtic persons and interests in determining Australia’s 
international human rights policy. However, this thesis suggests that, despite the 
political heat o f the debates surrounding the amendments to the Native Title Act 1993, 9 
it is not clear that had the Labor Party been in power, one would have seen more 
fulsome consideration of Aboriginal interests.
Most recently, in August 1999 the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Attorney-General 
and the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs issued a joint press release 
criticising the current operation of the United Nations human rights treaty bodies.10 The 
release argued inter alia that the system of committees under the human rights treaties 
needed reform in order to ensure ‘adequate recognition o f democratically elected 
governments and the subordinate role of non-government organisations’ and to ensure 
committees worked within their mandates. As a statement, it was strongly reminiscent 
of Australia’s arguments during the 1950s and 1960s that the United Nations was
The CERD Committee was acting pursuant to its ‘early warning’ processes: Decision 1(53), UN 
Doc A/53/18, para 22; 11 August 1998.
7 The survival o f native title on Crown land over which pastoral leases had been granted was affirmed 
in the Wik decision o f the High Court: Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1; Casenote 
prepared by author, ‘Co-existence o f native title and pastoral leases’, (1997) 22 Alternative Law 
Journal 47.
8 Decision 2(54), UN doc A/54/18, para 21(2); 18 March 1999.
9 For a history o f what is termed the ‘Wik’ debate, see F Brennan, The Wik Debate: its impact on 
aborigines, pastoralists and miners, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 1998.
10 Joint News Release o f the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Attorney-General and the Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 29 August 2000: ‘Improving the Effectiveness o f United 
Nations Committees’. The full text can be found on the Attorney-General’s website: 
http://www.ag.gov.au/aghome/agnews/2000newsag/iointl4 00.htm
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trespassing on the powers of States and was being vulnerable to being manipulated by 
subversive elements. Although stripped of any Cold War overtones, the response 
demonstrated a belief that United Nations committees’ primary role was to listen to and 
assist governments. Non-government organisations were to enjoy a secondary status 
whilst individuals were not mentioned as a stakeholder in the deliberations of 
committees. Rather than being an isolated over-reaction to adverse criticism from the 
treaty-bodies, this thesis has shown that the resistance to recognising the legitimacy of 
United Nations adjudication of human rights disputes has a long heritage.
Further examples of parallels between Australia’s ‘pre-ratification’ and ‘post­
ratification’ international human rights history can also be drawn from recent domestic 
policies. Whereas a Labor government established the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission, 11 a Liberal administration is seeking to rename the 
Commission, the Human Rights and Responsibilities Commission. 12 It is a movement 
echoing the earlier divisions between Evatt and Spender as to the inter-relationship 
between rights and duties. Similarly, in a manner reminiscent of Spender’s emphasis on 
correlative duties, the Howard Liberal administration has stressed the concept of 
‘mutual obligations’ and introduced work requirements for receipt of government 
unemployment benefits, a move resisted by Labor party representatives. These 
examples reflect ongoing ongoing divergences within Australia as to the meaning of 
human rights guarantees and justify looking further at additional patterns that might be 
replicated.
The dynamism of Australia’s ‘pre-ratification’ international human rights policy 
suggests that it is not possible to take for granted all future State actors acceptance of a 
universal ‘objective’ interpretation of international human rights standards. While
11 HREOC was established by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Act 1986 (Cth)
12 This change was embodied in the Human Rights Legislation Amendment Bill (No 2) 1998. It has 
not yet been passed by both Houses o f Parliament.
13 The scheme which is colloquially known as the ‘Work for the Dole Scheme’ was embodied in the 
Social Security Legislation Amendment (Work for the Dole) Act 1997. For a critical examination of 
its effect, see M Leech, Work for the Dole -  Does it Work?, Uniya Focus Series, Sydney, 1997
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future governments could be expected to uphold the value of international human rights, 
it is likely that their understanding of the implications of such rights will vary 
considerably. Although the Australian Labor Party appears to have moved away from 
any active commitment to socialising industry, the Labor Party retains a commitment to 
government intervention in the economy and a suspicion of relying purely on free 
enterprise for the fulfilment of individuals’ rights. The Liberal Party, by way of 
contrast, retains an individualist small government outlook that sees large-scale welfare 
policies as harmful and encourages individuals to be the agents o f social change.
Liberal State actors would be less likely to regard intervention in the private economic 
sector as a necessary step to fulfil international obligations than would Labor State 
actors. These philosophical differences are prime candidates for shaping future 
Australian human rights policy. Specifically, future Labor State actors are more likely 
to adopt broad interpretations of rights in the ICESCR than their Liberal Party 
counterparts. Likewise, it could be anticipated that Labor administrations are likely to 
take a more expansive interpretation of a State’s obligation to enact implementing 
legislation than Liberal administrations which would stress the importance of public 
education.
In periods (or in relation to specific subjects) in which bureaucrats are dominant, one 
could also predict that a State-centric perspective is likely to be adopted. Such a 
perspective would correspond with general defences o f existing policy, and the adoption 
of expansive interpretations of limitations clauses in the instruments. In the absence of 
strong political intervention, it could also be expected that Australia would respond 
selectively to requests for information from international bodies and view criticism by 
international bodies as unwarranted and unjustified.
Variations are also likely in future conceptualisations of the ideal relationship between 
the individual, the State and the international community. Notwithstanding the 
establishment o f mechanisms of international implementation in the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR and Australia’s ratification of the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR,
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receptiveness to international criticism may well vary. The thesis has revealed a strong 
State-centric, nationalist perspective in both Liberal and bureaucratic periods of 
administration. Conversely, it has highlighted Evatt’s adherence to a more 
internationalist perspective in which the State is the conduit of communication between 
the individual and the international community. Looking towards the future, this thesis 
would suggest that conservative politicians and bureaucratic decision-makers, in 
particular, are likely to adopt a narrow view of the relationship between the 
international community, the State and the individual and so translate a resistance to 
international ‘interference’ in domestic human rights affairs into a narrow interpretation 
of the powers of international human rights bodies. Clearly, debate on such general 
philosophical points is likely to continue to underlie debates concerning the role of the 
international community in the implementation of human rights.
If a true dialogue is to be conducted in Australia, it is vital that speakers appreciate the 
depth of pre-existing philosophic differences between actors. For those interested in 
improving Australia’s compliance with human rights standards interpreted according to 
the ‘human rights lexicon’ shared by many commentators, little will be gained by 
simply repeating the terms of the international instruments. Interpretation of these 
instruments is likely to remain a battlefield. The task of human rights commentators 
and activists is to justify, rather than simply assert, the superiority of the values 
informing the observer’s interpretation and criticisms. There may, of course, be cases 
where a government is acting contrary to its own appreciation of its obligations. Yet 
there may also be a wide range of cases in which governments are acting in accordance 
with their bona fide interpretation of their obligations. Dialogue must thus include 
reference to the underlying values and perspectives informing policy rather than 
focusing exclusively on ‘shaming tactics’, that is accusing governments of a lack of 
commitment to (universally understood) human rights principles.
It would also seem likely that the persistent areas of resistance noted in this thesis will 
feature in future disputes involving Australia. Self-determination, in particular
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economic self-determination, would be an obvious candidate for further contention14 as 
would special rights for minorities. Similarly one would expect there to be an 
entrenched resistance to ensuring substantive equality o f any form, but particularly with 
respect to the substantively equal treatment of men and women in the workplace. The 
implementation of economic and social rights would also seem likely to attract 
secondary consideration with bipartisan resistance to any adjudicatory or judicial 
consideration of Australia’s compliance with economic and social rights standards. One 
might also expect replication of the implicit dichotomy between those considered 
worthy of human rights and those requiring ‘special protection’ from  human rights. 
Although seen in this thesis in the context of Aboriginal people, it is possible that the 
dichotomy might be used to justify the State’s limitation of rights to other groups 
considered ‘vulnerable’ such as persons with intellectual disabilities.
Other less obvious implications of Australia’s negotiating history can be identified.
From a process point of view, one would expect that Australian government authorities 
would be resistant to the notion of evolving understandings o f human rights, 
notwithstanding the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties. 
Throughout the negotiations, federal government departments and state departments 
were given feedback on the ‘meaning’ of clauses. Often, they were reassured that their 
policies did not infringe the relevant standards or at least that Australia would insulate 
existing policies through making an appropriate statement of understanding. In none of 
the advices provided was there any reference to the possibility o f the meaning of the 
clauses changing over time. Thus, a culture may well have been created of departments 
and states accepting that international human rights had a fixed meaning. One could 
expect significant opposition to be expressed towards arguments by international bodies 
or commentators that the meaning of clauses had evolved. In particular, if  a 
Department were advised in say, 1964, that a policy was consistent with the 
international standards, one could expect little receptiveness from that Department to
14 Chapter 3 has already noted the way in which Australian delegates involved in discussions of the 
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples have recently sought to distance Australia 
from support for indigenous persons’ right to self-determination: see Chapter 3, fii 52.
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any argument that by the development of international law, these policies had become 
unacceptable. In the case of the Department of Immigration, the consistent efforts to 
insulate immigration policy from the scope of international human rights might in 
particular be expected to give rise to a dominant cultural belief that human rights were 
an improper influence, an unjustified interference on ongoing policy development.
International pressure has been revealed as a likely catalyst for changes of policy, 
though this policy has underlined the extent to which such changes may be superficial.
In the instance of Australian attitudes towards scrutiny o f apartheid, for instance, the 
Australian State accepted the condemnation of apartheid in the General Assembly 
whilst resisting similar scmtiny of Australian indigenous policies. Similarly even 
though the international politicisation of race caused Australia to reverse its opposition 
to Article 26 of the ICCPR’s inclusion of protection o f ‘equal protection’, Australian 
delegates did not thereby surrender a narrow view of ‘equal protection’. Thus for 
advocates seeking international condemnation of policies, care is needed to ensure that 
the international scrutiny is sufficiently specific to minimise the chances o f the 
Australian State employing ‘distinguishing tactics’ to avoid the real impact of the 
criticism. Similarly, the ongoing monitoring of a State’s behaviour post-criticism is 
vital in order to ensure that ‘prohibited action’ does not reappear in another guise.
More encouraging signs may also be identified from this research. This thesis has 
highlighted the role of individuals in shaping policies, or more specifically, the role of 
individuals’ personal and party-political philosophies. For those wishing to change 
dominant conceptions of human rights, the task o f encouraging individuals to alter their 
outlook may appear less daunting than changing the patterns of the more amorphous 
‘State’. Recognising the diversity o f opinions within a State permits strategic 
interventions to change the overall behaviour of the State. The lobbying of political 
parties and their members would also appear to be a fruitful means o f attempting to 
change both influential individuals’ attitudes and the party-political principles that offer 
resistance to active government realization of human rights. Attention could also be
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focused on broadening the pool of individuals likely to play a role in decision-making at 
either the political or bureaucratic level. It is noticeable, for instance, that all the key 
personnel involved in the development of Australia’s human rights policy were Anglo- 
Celtic men.15 A more representative sample of personnel to be involved in key 
positions would be likely to lead to the adoption of broader perspectives on the meaning 
and implementation of human rights.
Furthermore, in the Australian context, this thesis has highlighted that federalism has 
not been used consistently as a barrier to the federal legislation implementing human 
rights. This thesis has revealed that stress on a federal-State clause came from the 
Commonwealth rather than the Australian states. Support for a federal-State clause 
was not continuous throughout the negotiations but peaked as a result of Kenneth 
Bailey’s cautious view of federal legislative authority and his view, probably shared by 
Spender and his Liberal party successors, that the states were better placed to implement 
human rights guarantees. Although by 1955, states had become more active in 
supporting inclusion of a federal-State clause, the Commonwealth ultimately was 
prepared to surrender its push for a federal-state clause. The way in which Evatt 
supported federal action offers the prospect that not all future governments will view 
federalism as an implacable barrier to federal legislative action.16 By outlining the 
extent to which Australian states were kept informed of the developing Covenants, this 
thesis also undermines the states’ claim that obligations were thrust upon them without 
their knowledge.
15 Although by the 1960s, the Australian delegation to the Third Committee o f the General Assembly 
included Elizabeth Warren, Ms Decolgnon (nee Warren) has reported that she had no role in 
formulating policy. Instead, she directly repeated instructions in the Brief sent to her: Interview 
with Ms Delognon by author, 9 September 1999, Canberra.
16 As to the way in which federalism has been used as a justification to desist from legislative action, 
see H Charles worth, who has concluded that ‘federalism’ ‘has become a weasel word, allowing 
Australia to rationalise its tardy participation and ambivalent implementation o f human rights 
guarantees’: ‘The Australian Reluctance About Rights’ in P Alston (ed), Towards an Australian 
Bill o f Rights, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity and Centre for International and Public Law, 
ANU, joint publication, Canberra, 1994, 44.
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In identifying the ever-changing parade of faces, personalities and philosophies in 
Australia, this thesis’ findings are significant for other States. Through its use of the 
central concept of the ‘State’, international law gives the misleading impression of an 
unchanging entity exercising sovereignty over its people. The reality is far more 
complex. By going behind the Statist veil, this thesis has revealed that the potential 
influences shaping State human rights policy are ever-changing. Even if a State at the 
time of ratifying the human rights treaties accepted a particular understanding of human 
rights obligations, there is no guarantee that later States, composed of different persons 
and philosophies, will have the same approach to those obligations. It cannot be 
expected that even a State that helped draft a particular Covenant will retain the 
opinions or even knowledge relating to the instrument in some twenty years. Thus, a 
process of continuous promotion of human rights and the meaning of the human rights 
needs to be maintained within and outside States for their effective implementation.
Within Australia, this thesis points to the value of further research on Australia’s ‘pre- 
ratification history’. Future studies might profitably examine the extent to which there 
was an unbroken chain of thinking between 1966 and Australia’s ratification of the 
ICCPR and ICESCR. With the increased activism in civil society during the Vietnam 
years, one might find new evidence of the influence of domestic pressures on Australian 
policy. Inevitably, more information would be available on the perceptions of the 
impact of the ICCPR and ICESCR on domestic policies of the Commonwealth and the 
states that might serve to enrich further our understanding of the way in which domestic 
implementation policies were conceived. It would also permit further examination of 
the extent of divergences between perceptions of Liberal and Labor administrations.
For too long Australia’s ‘pre-ratification’ history has been treated as irrelevant to 
Australia’s current practices. It is only by reclaiming individual States’ histories and 
revealing prior understandings of human rights that we will appreciate more fully the 
complexity of decisions being made concerning the implementation of international 
human rights guarantees.
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Appendix 1- Timeline
Y E A R IN T E R N A T IO N A L  
H U M A N  R IG H T S 
E V E N T
A U S T R A L IA N  M IN IS T E R  F O R  
E X T E R N A L  A F F A IR S
1945 A d o p tio n  o f  the  U n ited  N ations D r H V  E vatt
C h arte r (fro m  7 O cto b er 1941)
1946 E co n o m ic  and Social C o u n c il’s 
C rea tio n  o f  the  C o m m issio n  on 
H u m an  R ights
1947 F irs t M eeting  o f  the 
C o m m issio n  on  H u m an  R ights; 
D ec is io n  taken  to d ra ft a 
D ec la ra tio n  and a C o venan t on 
H u m an  R ights
1948 U n iv ersa l D eclara tion  o f  
H u m an  R ights adop ted  b y  the  
G enera l A ssem bly
1949 P C  S pender
(fro m  19 D ecem b er 1949)
1951 R G  C asey
(fro m  27 A pril 1951)
1954 C o m m issio n  on  H u m an  R ights 
ended  its  deliberations on  the 
tw o  h u m an  righ ts  C ovenan ts; 
su b m itted  draft tex ts  to the 
G enera l A ssem bly
1955 T h ird  C o m m ittee  o f  the  
G eneral A ssem bly  b eg an  its 
consid era tio n  o f  th e  d raft 
C ovenan ts
1960 R G  M enzies
(fro m  4 F eb ru ary  1960)
1961 G  B arw ick
(fro m  22  D ecem b er 1961)
1964 P H aslu ck
(fro m  24  A pril 1964)
1966 G en era l A ssem bly  adop ts the  
In terna tiona l C o venan t on  
C iv il and  P o litica l R igh ts  
(IC C P R ), the  O p tiona l P ro tocol 
to  th e  IC C P R , and  th e  
In terna tiona l C o v en an t on  
E conom ic , Social and  C ultu ral 
R ig h ts  (IC E S C R )
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Appendix 2 -  The International Bill of Rights
A. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Adopted by the General Assembly resolution 217 A (III), 10 December 1948
Preamble
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have 
outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall 
enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the 
highest aspiration of the common people,
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to 
rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of 
law,
Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights 
of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life 
in larger freedom,
Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation with the United 
Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms,
Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for 
the full realization of this pledge,
Now, therefore,
The General Assembly,
Proclaims this Universal Declaration o f Human Rights as a common standard of achievement 
for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, 
keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote 
respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to 
secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of 
Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.
Article I
All human beings are bom free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason 
and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
Article 2
1. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
2. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or 
international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be 
independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.
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Article 3
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
Article 4
No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all 
their forms.
Article 5
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
Article 6
Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.
Article 7
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of 
the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this 
Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.
Article 8
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts 
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.
Article 9
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.
Article 10
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial 
tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against 
him.
Article 11
1. Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his 
defence.
2. No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did 
not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was 
committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time 
the penal offence was committed.
Article 12
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
Article 13
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each 
State.
2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. 
Article 14
1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.
2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political 
crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
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Article 15
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his 
nationality.
Article 16
1. Men and women of füll age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have 
the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during 
marriage and at its dissolution.
2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.
3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection 
by society and the State.
Article 17
1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.
Article 18
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others 
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and 
observance.
Article 19
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold 
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any 
media and regardless of frontiers.
Article 20
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association.
Article 21
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives.
2. Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country.
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be 
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and 
shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.
Article 22
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, 
through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization 
and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his 
dignity and the free development of his personality.
Article 23
1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable 
conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.
2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
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3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself 
and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other 
means of social protection.
4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 
Article 24
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and 
periodic holidays with pay.
Article 25
1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary 
social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, 
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether 
bom in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.
Article 26
1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and 
fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional 
education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to 
all on the basis of merit.
2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the 
strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall 
further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.
3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children. 
Article 27
1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the 
arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.
Article 28
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth 
in this Declaration can be fully realized.
Article 29
1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his 
personality is possible.
2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations 
as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the 
rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and 
the general welfare in a democratic society.
3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations.
Article 30
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any 
right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights 
and freedoms set forth herein.
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B. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights
Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General 
Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966
entry into force 3 January 1976, in accordance with article 27
Preamble
The States Parties to the present Covenant,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the 
United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world,
Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person,
Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieved 
if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural 
rights, as well as his civil and political rights,
Considering the obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote 
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms,
Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to 
which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance 
of the rights recognized in the present Covenant,
Agree upon the following articles:
PARTI
Article 1
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co­
operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case 
may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for 
the administration of Non-Self-Goveming and Trust Territories, shall promote the 
realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity 
with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
PART n
Article 2
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to 
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights 
enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind 
as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status.
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3. Developing countries, with due regard to human rights and their national economy, 
may determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in 
the present Covenant to non-nationals.
Article 3
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men 
and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the 
present Covenant.
Article 4
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, in the enjoyment of those 
rights provided by the State in conformity with the present Covenant, the State may 
subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as 
this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of 
promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.
Article 5
1. Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group 
or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the 
destmction of any of the rights or freedoms recognized herein, or at their limitation to a 
greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant.
2. No restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights 
recognized or existing in any country in virtue of law, conventions, regulations or 
custom shall be admitted on the pretext that the present Covenant does not recognize 
such rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent.
PART III
Article 6
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to work, which 
includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he 
freely chooses or accepts, and will take appropriate steps to safeguard this right.
2. The steps to be taken by a State Party to the present Covenant to achieve the full 
realization of this right shall include technical and vocational guidance and training 
programmes, policies and techniques to achieve steady economic, social and cultural 
development and full and productive employment under conditions safeguarding 
fundamental political and economic freedoms to the individual.
Article 7
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work which ensure, in particular:
(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without 
distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed 
conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay 
for equal work;
(ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in accordance 
with the provisions of the present Covenant;
(b) Safe and healthy working conditions;
(c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an 
appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other than those of 
seniority and competence;
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(d ) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic 
holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays
Article 8
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure:
(a) The right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his 
choice, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, for the 
promotion and protection of his economic and social interests. No restrictions 
may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those prescribed by law 
and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others;
(b) The right of trade unions to establish national federations or confederations 
and the right of the latter to form or join international trade-union 
organizations;
(c) The right of trade unions to function freely subject to no limitations other 
than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security or public order or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others;
(d) The right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws 
of the particular country.
2. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of 
these rights by members of the armed forces or of the police or of the administration of 
the State.
3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour 
Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of 
the Right to Organize to take legislative measures which would prejudice, or apply the 
law in such a manner as would prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that 
Convention.
Article 9
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social 
security, including social insurance.
Article 10
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that:
1. The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the 
family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society, particularly 
for its establishment and while it is responsible for the care and education of 
dependent children. Marriage must be entered into with the free consent of the 
intending spouses.
2. Special protection should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable period 
before and after childbirth. During such period working mothers should be 
accorded paid leave or leave with adequate social security benefits.
3. Special measures of protection and assistance should be taken on behalf of 
all children and young persons without any discrimination for reasons of 
parentage or other conditions. Children and young persons should be protected 
from economic and social exploitation. Their employment in work harmful to 
their morals or health or dangerous to life or likely to hamper their normal 
development should be punishable by law. States should also set age limits 
below which the paid employment of child labour should be prohibited and 
punishable by law.
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Article 11
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The 
States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, 
recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation based 
on free consent.
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental right of 
everyone to be free from hunger, shall take, individually and through international co­
operation, the measures, including specific programmes, which are needed:
(a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by 
making full use of technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating 
knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by developing or reforming 
agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most efficient development 
and utilization of natural resources;
(b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and food­
exporting countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies 
in relation to need.
Article 12
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full 
realization of this right shall include those necessary for:
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality 
and for the healthy development of the child;
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene;
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational 
and other diseases;
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and 
medical attention in the event of sickness.
Article 13
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to 
education. They agree that education shall be directed to the full development of the 
human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. They further agree that education shall enable 
all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance 
and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, and further 
the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, with a view to achieving 
the full realization of this right:
(a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all;
(b) Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and 
vocational secondary education, shall be made generally available and 
accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular by the 
progressive introduction of free education;
(c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of 
capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive 
introduction of free education;
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(d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged or intensified as far as possible 
for those persons who have not received or completed the whole period of their 
primary education;
(e) The development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively 
pursued, an adequate fellowship system shall be established, and the material 
conditions of teaching staff shall be continuously improved.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of 
parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to choose for their children schools, other 
than those established by the public authorities, which conform to such minimum 
educational standards as may be laid down or approved by the State and to ensure the 
religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own 
convictions.
4. No part of this article shall be construed so as to interfere with the liberty of 
individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational institutions, subject always to 
the observance of the principles set forth in paragraph I of this article and to the 
requirement that the education given in such institutions shall conform to such 
minimum standards as may be laid down by the State.
Article 14
Each State Party to the present Covenant which, at the time of becoming a Party, has 
not been able to secure in its metropolitan territory or other territories under its 
jurisdiction compulsory primary education, free of charge, undertakes, within two 
years, to work out and adopt a detailed plan of action for the progressive 
implementation, within a reasonable number of years, to be fixed in the plan, of the 
principle of compulsory education free of charge for all.
Article 15
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone:
(a) To take part in cultural life;
(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications;
(c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting 
from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full 
realization of this right shall include those necessary for the conservation, the 
development and the diffusion of science and culture.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to respect the freedom 
indispensable for scientific research and creative activity.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the benefits to be derived from 
the encouragement and development of international contacts and co-operation in the 
scientific and cultural fields.
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PART IV
Article 16
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to submit in conformity with 
this part of the Covenant reports on the measures which they have adopted and the 
progress made in achieving the observance of the rights recognized herein.
2. (a) All reports shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who 
shall transmit copies to the Economic and Social Council for consideration in 
accordance with the provisions of the present Covenant;
(b) The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall also transmit to the 
specialized agencies copies of the reports, or any relevant parts therefrom, from 
States Parties to the present Covenant which are also members of these 
specialized agencies in so far as these reports, or parts therefrom, relate to any 
matters which fall within the responsibilities of the said agencies in accordance 
with their constitutional instruments.
Article 17
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant shall furnish their reports in stages, in 
accordance with a programme to be established by the Economic and Social Council 
within one year of the entry into force of the present Covenant after consultation with 
the States Parties and the specialized agencies concerned.
2. Reports may indicate factors and difficulties affecting the degree of fulfilment of 
obligations under the present Covenant.
3. Where relevant information has previously been furnished to the United Nations or to 
any specialized agency by any State Party to the present Covenant, it will not be 
necessary to reproduce that information, but a precise reference to the information so 
furnished will suffice.
Article 18
Pursuant to its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations in the field of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, the Economic and Social Council may make 
arrangements with the specialized agencies in respect of their reporting to it on the 
progress made in achieving the observance of the provisions of the present Covenant 
falling within the scope of their activities. These reports may include particulars of 
decisions and recommendations on such implementation adopted by their competent 
organs.
Article 19
The Economic and Social Council may transmit to the Commission on Human Rights 
for study and general recommendation or, as appropriate, for information the reports 
concerning human rights submitted by States in accordance with articles 16 and 17, and 
those concerning human rights submitted by the specialized agencies in accordance 
with article 18.
Article 20
The States Parties to the present Covenant and the specialized agencies concerned may 
submit comments to the Economic and Social Council on any general recommendation 
under article 19 or reference to such general recommendation in any report of the 
Commission on Human Rights or any documentation referred to therein.
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Article 21
The Economic and Social Council may submit from time to time to the General 
Assembly reports with recommendations of a general nature and a summary of the 
information received from the States Parties to the present Covenant and the specialized 
agencies on the measures taken and the progress made in achieving general observance 
of the rights recognized in the present Covenant.
Article 22
The Economic and Social Council may bring to the attention of other organs of the 
United Nations, their subsidiary organs and specialized agencies concerned with 
furnishing technical assistance any matters arising out of the reports referred to in this 
part of the present Covenant which may assist such bodies in deciding, each within its 
field of competence, on the advisability of international measures likely to contribute to 
the effective progressive implementation of the present Covenant.
Article 23
The States Parties to the present Covenant agree that international action for the 
achievement of the rights recognized in the present Covenant includes such methods as 
the conclusion of conventions, the adoption of recommendations, the furnishing of 
technical assistance and the holding of regional meetings and technical meetings for the 
purpose of consultation and study organized in conjunction with the Governments 
concerned.
Article 24
Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations and of the constitutions of the specialized agencies which 
define the respective responsibilities of the various organs of the United Nations and of 
the specialized agencies in regard to the matters dealt with in the present Covenant.
Article 25
Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of 
all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources.
PARTY
Article 26
1. The present Covenant is open for signature by any State Member of the United 
Nations or member of any of its specialized agencies, by any State Party to the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice, and by any other State which has been invited by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations to become a party to the present Covenant.
2. The present Covenant is subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3. The present Covenant shall be open to accession by any State referred to in paragraph 
1 of this article.
4. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States which have 
signed the present Covenant or acceded to it of the deposit of each instrument of 
ratification or accession.
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Article 27
1. The present Covenant shall enter into force three months after the date of the deposit 
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the thirty-fifth instrument of 
ratification or instrument of accession.
2. For each State ratifying the present Covenant or acceding to it after the deposit of the 
thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or instrument of accession, the present Covenant 
shall enter into force three months after the date of the deposit of its own instrument of 
ratification or instrument of accession.
Article 28
The provisions of the present Covenant shall extend to all parts of federal States without 
any limitations or exceptions.
Article 29
1. Any State Party to the present Covenant may propose an amendment and file it with 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall thereupon 
communicate any proposed amendments to the States Parties to the present Covenant 
with a request that they notify him whether they favour a conference of States Parties 
for the purpose of considering and voting upon the proposals. In the event that at least 
one third of the States Parties favours such a conference, the Secretary-General shall 
convene the conference under the auspices of the United Nations. Any amendment 
adopted by a majority of the States Parties present and voting at the conference shall be 
submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations for approval.
2. Amendments shall come into force when they have been approved by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations and accepted by a two-thirds majority of the States 
Parties to the present Covenant in accordance with their respective constitutional 
processes.
3. When amendments come into force they shall be binding on those States Parties 
which have accepted them, other States Parties still being bound by the provisions of 
the present Covenant and any earlier amendment which they have accepted.
Article 30
Irrespective of the notifications made under article 26, paragraph 5, the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations shall inform all States referred to in paragraph I of the 
same article of the following particulars:
(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions under article 26;
(b) The date of the entry into force of the present Covenant under article 27 and 
the date of the entry into force of any amendments under article 29.
Article 31
1. The present Covenant, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish
texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit certified copies of the 
present Covenant to all States referred to in article 26.
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C. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by 
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966
entry into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with Article 49
Preamble
The States Parties to the present Covenant,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the 
United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world,
Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person,
Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear 
and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy 
his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights,
Considering the obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote 
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms,
Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to 
which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance 
of the rights recognized in the present Covenant,
Agree upon the following articles:
PARTI
Article 1
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co­
operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case 
may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for 
the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the 
realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity 
with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
PARTH
Article 2
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.
2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State 
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with 
its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt 
such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized 
in the present Covenant.
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3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are 
violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has 
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right 
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative 
authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal 
system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when 
granted.
Article 3
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men 
and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present 
Covenant.
Article 4
1 . In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence 
of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take 
measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not 
inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve 
discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social 
origin.
2. No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be 
made under this provision.
3. Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of the right of derogation shall 
immediately inform the other States Parties to the present Covenant, through the 
intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, of the provisions from 
which it has derogated and of the reasons by which it was actuated. A further 
communication shall be made, through the same intermediary, on the date on which it 
terminates such derogation.
Article 5
1. Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group 
or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction 
of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater 
extent than is provided for in the present Covenant.
2. There shall be no restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human 
rights recognized or existing in any State Party to the present Covenant pursuant to law, 
conventions, regulations or custom on the pretext that the present Covenant does not 
recognize such rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent.
PART in
Article 6
1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. 
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be 
imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time 
of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present 
Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgement rendered 
by a competent court.
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3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood that 
nothing in this article shall authorize any State Party to the present Covenant to 
derogate in any way from any obligation assumed under the provisions of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the 
sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in 
all cases.
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below 
eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women.
6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of capital 
punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant.
Article 7
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical 
or scientific experimentation.
Article 8
1. No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade in all their forms shall be 
prohibited.
2. No one shall be held in servitude.
3.
(a) No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour;
(b) Paragraph 3 (a) shall not be held to preclude, in countries where 
imprisonment with hard labour may be imposed as a punishment for a crime, 
the performance of hard labour in pursuance of a sentence to such punishment 
by a competent court;
(c) For the purpose of this paragraph the term "forced or compulsory labour" 
shall not include:
(i) Any work or service, not referred to in subparagraph (b), normally 
required of a person who is under detention in consequence of a lawful 
order of a court, or of a person during conditional release from such 
detention;
(ii) Any service of a military character and, in countries where 
conscientious objection is recognized, any national service required by 
law of conscientious objectors;
(iii) Any service exacted in cases of emergency or calamity threatening 
the life or well-being of the community;
(iv) Any work or service which forms part of normal civil obligations.
Article 9
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such 
grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.
2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his 
arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.
3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a 
judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled 
to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general rule that persons 
awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to
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appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion 
arise, for execution of the judgement.
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings before a court, in order that court may decide without delay on the 
lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.
5. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an 
enforceable right to compensation.
Article 10
1. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect 
for the inherent dignity of the human person.
2. (a) Accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be segregated from 
convicted persons and shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate to their status 
as unconvicted persons;
(b) Accused juvenile persons shall be separated from adults and brought as 
speedily as possible for adjudication. 3. The penitentiary system shall comprise 
treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and 
social rehabilitation. Juvenile offenders shall be segregated from adults and be 
accorded treatment appropriate to their age and legal status.
Article 11
No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual 
obligation.
Article 12
1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the 
right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those 
which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order 
(ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are 
consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.
4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.
Article 13
An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant may be 
expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and 
shall, except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be 
allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, 
and be represented for the purpose before, the competent authority or a person or 
persons especially designated by the competent authority.
Article 14
1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any 
criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone 
shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law. The press and the public may be excluded from all or part 
of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or national security in a 
democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or 
to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances 
where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice; but any judgement rendered in 
a criminal case or in a suit at law shall be made public except where the interest of
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juvenile persons otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or 
the guardianship of children.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law.
3. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to 
the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands 
of the nature and cause of the charge against him;
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and 
to communicate with counsel of his own choosing;
(c) To be tried without undue delay;
(d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal 
assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal 
assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any 
case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in 
any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it;
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the 
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same 
conditions as witnesses against him;
(f) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak 
the language used in court;
(g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.
4. In the case of juvenile persons, the procedure shall be such as will take account of 
their age and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation.
5. Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence 
being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law.
6. When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and when 
subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground 
that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a 
miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such 
conviction shall be compensated according to law, unless it is proved that the non­
disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him.
7. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has 
already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal 
procedure of each country.
Article 15
1 . No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or 
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international 
law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the 
one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed. If, 
subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the 
imposition of the lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.
2. Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any 
act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to 
the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations.
Article 16
Everyone shall have the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.
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Article 17
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks.
Article 18
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This 
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and 
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to 
adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or 
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 4. The States Parties to the 
present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when 
applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children 
in conformity with their own convictions.
Article 19
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other 
media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it 
special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but 
these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of 
public health or morals.
Article 20
1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.
2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.
Article 21
The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on 
the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which 
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public 
safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Article 22
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the 
right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are 
prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public 
health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall
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not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on members of the armed forces and of 
the police in their exercise of this right.
3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour 
Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of 
the Right to Organize to take legislative measures which would prejudice, or to apply 
the law in such a manner as to prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that 
Convention.
Article 23
1. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the State.
2. The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family 
shall be recognized.
3. No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending 
spouses.
4. States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality 
of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its 
dissolution. In the case of dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary 
protection of any children.
Article 24
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of 
protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and 
the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions 
mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely 
chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the 
free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his 
country.
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Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the 
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and 
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any 
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Article 27
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other 
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own 
religion, or to use their own language.
PART IV
Article 28
1. There shall be established a Human Rights Committee (hereafter referred to in the 
present Covenant as the Committee). It shall consist of eighteen members and shall 
carry out the functions hereinafter provided.
2. The Committee shall be composed of nationals of the States Parties to the present 
Covenant who shall be persons of high moral character and recognized competence in 
the field of human rights, consideration being given to the usefulness of the 
participation of some persons having legal experience.
3. The members of the Committee shall be elected and shall serve in their personal 
capacity.
Article 29
1 . The members of the Committee shall be elected by secret ballot from a list of 
persons possessing the qualifications prescribed in article 28 and nominated for the 
purpose by the States Parties to the present Covenant.
2. Each State Party to the present Covenant may nominate not more than two persons. 
These persons shall be nationals of the nominating State.
3. A person shall be eligible for renomination.
Article 30
1. The initial election shall be held no later than six months after the date of the entry 
into force of the present Covenant.
2. At least four months before the date of each election to the Committee, other than an 
election to fill a vacancy declared in accordance with article 34, the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations shall address a written invitation to the States Parties to the 
present Covenant to submit their nominations for membership of the Committee within 
three months.
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare a list in alphabetical order 
of all the persons thus nominated, with an indication of the States Parties which have 
nominated them, and shall submit it to the States Parties to the present Covenant no 
later than one month before the date of each election.
4. Elections of the members of the Committee shall be held at a meeting of the States 
Parties to the present Covenant convened by the Secretary General of the United 
Nations at the Headquarters of the United Nations. At that meeting, for which two 
thirds of the States Parties to the present Covenant shall constitute a quorum, the 
persons elected to the Committee shall be those nominees who obtain the largest 
number of votes and an absolute majority of the votes of the representatives of States 
Parties present and voting.
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Article 31
1. The Committee may not include more than one national of the same State.
2. In the election of the Committee, consideration shall be given to equitable 
geographical distribution of membership and to the representation of the different forms 
of civilization and of the principal legal systems.
Article 32
1. The members of the Committee shall be elected for a term of four years. They shall 
be eligible for re-election if renominated. However, the terms of nine of the members 
elected at the first election shall expire at the end of two years; immediately after the 
first election, the names of these nine members shall be chosen by lot by the Chairman 
of the meeting referred to in article 30, paragraph 4.
2. Elections at the expiry of office shall be held in accordance with the preceding 
articles of this part of the present Covenant.
Article 33
1. If, in the unanimous opinion of the other members, a member of the Committee has 
ceased to carry out his functions for any cause other than absence of a temporary 
character, the Chairman of the Committee shall notify the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, who shall then declare the seat of that member to be vacant.
2. In the event of the death or the resignation of a member of the Committee, the 
Chairman shall immediately notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who 
shall declare the seat vacant from the date of death or the date on which the resignation 
takes effect.
Article 34
1. When a vacancy is declared in accordance with article 33 and if the term of office of 
the member to be replaced does not expire within six months of the declaration of the 
vacancy, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify each of the States 
Parties to the present Covenant, which may within two months submit nominations in 
accordance with article 29 for the purpose of filling the vacancy.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare a list in alphabetical order 
of the persons thus nominated and shall submit it to the States Parties to the present 
Covenant. The election to fill the vacancy shall then take place in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of this part of the present Covenant.
3. A member of the Committee elected to fill a vacancy declared in accordance with 
article 33 shall hold office for the remainder of the term of the member who vacated the 
seat on the Committee under the provisions of that article.
Article 35
The members of the Committee shall, with the approval of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, receive emoluments from United Nations resources on such terms and 
conditions as the General Assembly may decide, having regard to the importance of the 
Committee's responsibilities.
Article 36
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall provide the necessary staff and 
facilities for the effective performance of the functions of the Committee under the 
present Covenant.
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Article 37
1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene the initial meeting of the 
Committee at the Headquarters of the United Nations.
2. After its initial meeting, the Committee shall meet at such times as shall be provided 
in its rules of procedure.
3. The Committee shall normally meet at the Headquarters of the United Nations or at 
the United Nations Office at Geneva.
Article 38
Every member of the Committee shall, before taking up his duties, make a solemn 
declaration in open committee that he will perform his functions impartially and 
conscientiously.
Article 39
1. The Committee shall elect its officers for a term of two years. They may be re­
elected.
2. The Committee shall establish its own rules of procedure, but these rules shall 
provide, inter alia, that:
(a) Twelve members shall constitute a quorum;
(b) Decisions of the Committee shall be made by a majority vote of the 
members present.
Article 40
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to submit reports on the 
measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein and on the 
progress made in the enjoyment of those rights:
(a) Within one year of the entry into force of the present Covenant for the 
States Parties concerned;
(b) Thereafter whenever the Committee so requests.
2. All reports shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who 
shall transmit them to the Committee for consideration. Reports shall indicate the 
factors and difficulties, if any, affecting the implementation of the present Covenant.
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations may, after consultation with the 
Committee, transmit to the specialized agencies concerned copies of such parts of the 
reports as may fall within their field of competence.
4. The Committee shall study the reports submitted by the States Parties to the present 
Covenant. It shall transmit its reports, and such general comments as it may consider 
appropriate, to the States Parties. The Committee may also transmit to the Economic 
and Social Council these comments along with the copies of the reports it has received 
from States Parties to the present Covenant.
5. The States Parties to the present Covenant may submit to the Committee observations 
on any comments that may be made in accordance with paragraph 4 of this article.
Article 41
1. A State Party to the present Covenant may at any time declare under this article that 
it recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications 
to the effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its 
obligations under the present Covenant. Communications under this article may be 
received and considered only if submitted by a State Party which has made a 
declaration recognizing in regard to itself the competence of the Committee. No 
communication shall be received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party which
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has not made such a declaration. Communications received under this article shall be 
dealt with in accordance with the following procedure:
(a) If a State Party to the present Covenant considers that another State Party is 
not giving effect to the provisions of the present Covenant, it may, by written 
communication, bring the matter to the attention of that State Party. Within 
three months after the receipt of the communication the receiving State shall 
afford the State which sent the communication an explanation, or any other 
statement in writing clarifying the matter which should include, to the extent 
possible and pertinent, reference to domestic procedures and remedies taken, 
pending, or available in the matter;
(b) If the matter is not adjusted to the satisfaction of both States Parties 
concerned within six months after the receipt by the receiving State of the 
initial communication, either State shall have the right to refer the matter to the 
Committee, by notice given to the Committee and to the other State;
(c) The Committee shall deal with a matter referred to it only after it has 
ascertained that all available domestic remedies have been invoked and 
exhausted in the matter, in conformity with the generally recognized principles 
of international law. This shall not be the rule where the application of the 
remedies is unreasonably prolonged;
(d) The Committee shall hold closed meetings when examining 
communications under this article;
(e) Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (c), the Committee shall make 
available its good offices to the States Parties concerned with a view to a 
friendly solution of the matter on the basis of respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms as recognized in the present Covenant;
(f) In any matter referred to it, the Committee may call upon the States Parties 
concerned, referred to in subparagraph (b), to supply any relevant information;
(g) The States Parties concerned, referred to in subparagraph (b), shall have the 
right to be represented when the matter is being considered in the Committee 
and to make submissions orally and/or in writing;
(h) The Committee shall, within twelve months after the date of receipt of 
notice under subparagraph (b), submit a report:
(i) If a solution within the terms of subparagraph (e) is reached, the 
Committee shall confine its report to a brief statement of the facts and 
of the solution reached;
(ii) If a solution within the terms of subparagraph (e) is not reached, the 
Committee shall confine its report to a brief statement of the facts; the 
written submissions and record of the oral submissions made by the 
States Parties concerned shall be attached to the report. In every matter, 
the report shall be communicated to the States Parties concerned.
2. The provisions of this article shall come into force when ten States Parties to 
the present Covenant have made declarations under paragraph I of this article.
Such declarations shall be deposited by the States Parties with the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the other 
States Parties. A declaration may be withdrawn at any time by notification to 
the Secretary-General. Such a withdrawal shall not prejudice the consideration 
of any matter which is the subject of a communication already transmitted 
under this article; no further communication by any State Party shall be 
received after the notification of withdrawal of the declaration has been 
received by the Secretary-General, unless the State Party concerned has made a 
new declaration.
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Article 42
1. (a) If a matter referred to the Committee in accordance with article 41 is not resolved 
to the satisfaction of the States Parties concerned, the Committee may, with the prior 
consent of the States Parties concerned, appoint an ad hoc Conciliation Commission 
(hereinafter referred to as the Commission). The good offices of the Commission shall 
be made available to the States Parties concerned with a view to an amicable solution of 
the matter on the basis of respect for the present Covenant;
(b) The Commission shall consist of five persons acceptable to the States 
Parties concerned. If the States Parties concerned fail to reach agreement within 
three months on all or part of the composition of the Commission, the members 
of the Commission concerning whom no agreement has been reached shall be 
elected by secret ballot by a two-thirds majority vote of the Committee from 
among its members.
2. The members of the Commission shall serve in their personal capacity. They shall 
not be nationals of the States Parties concerned, or of a State not Party to the present 
Covenant, or of a State Party which has not made a declaration under article 41.
3. The Commission shall elect its own Chairman and adopt its own rules of procedure.
4. The meetings of the Commission shall normally be held at the Headquarters of the 
United Nations or at the United Nations Office at Geneva. However, they may be held 
at such other convenient places as the Commission may determine in consultation with 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the States Parties concerned.
5. The secretariat provided in accordance with article 36 shall also service the 
commissions appointed under this article.
6. The information received and collated by the Committee shall be made available to 
the Commission and the Commission may call upon the States Parties concerned to 
supply any other relevant information. 7. When the Commission has fully considered 
the matter, but in any event not later than twelve months after having been seized of the 
matter, it shall submit to the Chairman of the Committee a report for communication to 
the States Parties concerned:
(a) If the Commission is unable to complete its consideration of the matter 
within twelve months, it shall confine its report to a brief statement of the status 
of its consideration of the matter;
(b) If an amicable solution to the matter on tie basis of respect for human rights 
as recognized in the present Covenant is reached, the Commission shall confine 
its report to a brief statement of the facts and of the solution reached;
(c) If a solution within the terms of subparagraph (b) is not reached, the 
Commission's report shall embody its findings on all questions of fact relevant 
to the issues between the States Parties concerned, and its views on the 
possibilities of an amicable solution of the matter. This report shall also contain 
the written submissions and a record of the oral submissions made by the States 
Parties concerned;
(d) If the Commission's report is submitted under subparagraph (c), the States 
Parties concerned shall, within three months of the receipt of the report, notify 
the Chairman of the Committee whether or not they accept the contents of the 
report of the Commission.
8. The provisions of this article are without prejudice to the responsibilities of the 
Committee under article 41.
9. The States Parties concerned shall share equally all the expenses of the members of 
the Commission in accordance with estimates to be provided by the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations.
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10. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be empowered to pay the 
expenses of the members of the Commission, if necessary, before reimbursement by the 
States Parties concerned, in accordance with paragraph 9 of this article.
Article 43
The members of the Committee, and of the ad hoc conciliation commissions which may 
be appointed under article 42, shall be entitled to the facilities, privileges and 
immunities of experts on mission for the United Nations as laid down in the relevant 
sections of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.
Article 44
The provisions for the implementation of the present Covenant shall apply without 
prejudice to the procedures prescribed in the field of human rights by or under the 
constituent instruments and the conventions of the United Nations and of the 
specialized agencies and shall not prevent the States Parties to the present Covenant 
from having recourse to other procedures for settling a dispute in accordance with 
general or special international agreements in force between them.
Article 45
The Committee shall submit to the General Assembly of the United Nations, through 
the Economic and Social Council, an annual report on its activities.
PARTY
Article 46
Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations and of the constitutions of the specialized agencies which 
define the respective responsibilities of the various organs of the United Nations and of 
the specialized agencies in regard to the matters dealt with in the present Covenant.
Article 47
Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of 
all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources.
PART VI
Article 48
1. The present Covenant is open for signature by any State Member of the United 
Nations or member of any of its specialized agencies, by any State Party to the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice, and by any other State which has been invited by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations to become a Party to the present Covenant.
2. The present Covenant is subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3. The present Covenant shall be open to accession by any State referred to in paragraph 
1 of this article.
4. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States which have 
signed this Covenant or acceded to it of the deposit of each instrument of ratification or 
accession.
Article 49
1. The present Covenant shall enter into force three months after the date of the deposit 
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the thirty-fifth instrument of 
ratification or instrument of accession.
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2. For each State ratifying the present Covenant or acceding to it after the deposit of the 
thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or instrument of accession, the present Covenant 
shall enter into force three months after the date of the deposit of its own instrument of 
ratification or instrument of accession.
Article 50
The provisions of the present Covenant shall extend to all parts of federal States without 
any limitations or exceptions.
Article 51
1. Any State Party to the present Covenant may propose an amendment and file it with 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Secretary-General of the United 
Nations shall thereupon communicate any proposed amendments to the States Parties to 
the present Covenant with a request that they notify him whether they favour a 
conference of States Parties for the purpose of considering and voting upon the 
proposals. In the event that at least one third of the States Parties favours such a 
conference, the Secretary-General shall convene the conference under the auspices of 
the United Nations. Any amendment adopted by a majority of the States Parties present 
and voting at the conference shall be submitted to the General Assembly of the United 
Nations for approval.
2. Amendments shall come into force when they have been approved by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations and accepted by a two-thirds majority of the States 
Parties to the present Covenant in accordance with their respective constitutional 
processes. 3. When amendments come into force, they shall be binding on those States 
Parties which have accepted them, other States Parties still being bound by the 
provisions of the present Covenant and any earlier amendment which they have 
accepted.
Article 52
Irrespective of the notifications made under article 48, paragraph 5, the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations shall inform all States referred to in paragraph I of the 
same article of the following particulars:
(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions under article 48;
(b) The date of the entry into force of the present Covenant under article 49 and 
the date of the entry into force of any amendments under article 51.
Article 53
1. The present Covenant, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish 
texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit certified copies of the 
present Covenant to all States referred to in article 48.
SOURCE: United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Website: http//www. 
unhchr.org
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